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In t r o d u c t io n : S m a l l  s t a t e s ’ p o l it ic s , t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  a n d
ENGINEERING INFLUENCE
Throughout history, small states have been the designated victims of international 
power struggles. Their limited capabilities made it hard to defend themselves 
against aggression from their more powerful neighbours. Century after century 
small Powers found themselves intimidated, blackmailed, invaded, financially 
drained and even annihilated by countries with the means to do so. Even if the 
small state managed to survive, its lack of coercive, inter-state power resources 
tended to minimalise its influence on other states and its impact on international 
relations in general.
The classic Greek historian Thucydides provides us with an example, 
fascinating in its lucidity, of how small state victimization was carried out and 
justified, in the case of the raid o f mighty Athens against the small island state of 
Melos towards the end of the fifth century before Christ. The Athenians justified 
their attack as follows: ‘For we both alike know that in the discussion of human 
affairs the question of justice only enters where there is equal power to enforce it, 
and that the powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must. (...) 
And we will now endeavour to show you that we have come in the interests o f our 
empire, and that in what we are about to say we are only seeking the preservation 
of your city. For we want to make you ours with the least trouble to ourselves, and 
it is in the interest of us both that you should not be destroyed/1 The Melians, 
answering that they would consider themselves weaklings and cowards not to 
fight for their freedom and suffer anything rather than becoming Athens’ slaves, 
obtained the following reply: ‘Not so, if you calmly reflect: for you are not 
fighting against equals to whom you cannot yield without disgrace, but you are 
taking counsel whether or not you shall resist an overwhelming force. The 
question is not one of honour but of prudence.’2
Therefore: ‘If you are wise (...) you ought to see that there can be no disgrace 
in yielding to a great city which invites you to become her ally on reasonable 
terms, keeping your own land, and merely paying tribute; and that you will 
certainly gain no honour if, having to choose between two alternatives, sagacity
1. Thucydides. Een blijvend bezit. De oorlog tussen de Peleponnesiërs en de Atheners. Vertaling 
Leo Lewin (s.l., s.a.), vol. 5, no. 10.
2. Ibidem.
1
and war, you obstinately prefer the worse. To maintain one's rights against equals, 
to be politic with superiors, and to be moderate towards inferiors is the path of 
safety.’3 Because that is the way things go: ‘For of the Gods we believe, and of 
men we know, that by a law of their nature wherever they can rule they will. This 
law was not made by us and we are not the first who have acted upon it. We did 
but inherit it and shall bequeath it to all time, and we know that you and all 
mankind, if you were as strong as we are, would do as we do.’4
Quintessentially: The strong do what they will, while the weak suffer what they 
must. The Athenian reference to nature and nature’s laws as a justification for 
dominance and aggression of the Big to the detriment of the Small in interstate 
relations was to provide a dominant motive for action for many centuries of 
interstate relations, albeit generally cloaked by other, less cynical, historical, legal 
and missionary motives for application of violence in interstate relations. Both 
Machiavelli and the so-called realist school of international theory are indebted to 
its emphasis on power as an overriding argument in interstate conflicts.
The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia is generally regarded5 as the first serious and 
lasting limitation to the unbridled use of power in interstate relations. In answer to 
the horrendous destruction the Thirty Years War had brought to Central Europe, 
the Treaty laid down the principles of what became known as the ‘modem state 
system’: The kings, queens and other royalty of Europe mutually recognized each 
other’s highest authority or, as it became known, ‘sovereignty’ over their realms 
and citizens. Legitimate rule within a state could only stem from the sovereign 
ruler and his offspring, in line with the principle of dynastic succession. Internally, 
the sovereignty concept meant that other states no longer had a right to interfere in 
the internal affairs of another state. Externally, sovereignty provided rulers with 
autonomy and independence of action in their relations with other states. In theory, 
no power had the right to tell another sovereign state what to do or not to do.
In spite of notable exceptions -  the division of Poland between Russia, 
Austria and Prussia in 1793-1795 appears as the most clamorous one - the 
Westphalian rules and the normative sovereignty concept which they embodied 
did indeed lend a degree of protection to Europe’s smaller as well as its bigger 
states: the smaller states protection against the larger countries of Europe, the
3. Ibidem.
4. Ibidem.
5. For a differing opinion, however, see Andreas Osiander. ‘Sovereignty, International
Relations, and the Westphalian Myth’, in International Organization, 55 (2001), 251-287.
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bigger against a raise to dominance by one hegemonic power, notably France. 
Broken down under French hegemonism and expansionism, the Westphalian rules 
were restored in the aftermath o f the Napoleonic wars, albeit in a somewhat 
modified fashion: Once dynastic authority in Europe again prevailed over the 
democratic concepts carried forward by the French revolution, the rulers reiterated 
the independence and right to security of their states, promised to respect each 
other’s legitimate interests and undertook to settle their differences by diplomatic 
means. France’s bid at dominance, however, having left its mark, the policy­
makers of Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and Austria-Hungary (the Four) 
undertook to join together in a (counter-)‘balance’ against a future expansionist 
state. No state was to aspire to dominance in Europe or even attempt to do so. 
France was admitted as a partner on equal footing with the four self-proclaimed 
guardian states, all of which were to police the new system. Thus, in devising 
what became known as the ‘Concert of Europe’, the Five made an explicit 
distinction between themselves as the ‘Great Powers’ and the other states of 
Europe, basing themselves on a definition the Four had agreed upon previously, in 
March 1814, that a Power capable of contributing 60.000 troops in the fight 
against Napoleon should henceforward be considered a Great Power.
Although the Concert-system was supposedly for the benefit of all European 
states, a certain division of tasks was evident: whereas the Great Powers 
committed themselves to maintaining the interstate status quo, the position o f the 
Smaller Powers was to be compared with what was expected of small children, i.e. 
‘to be seen but not heard’. A degree of protection could rightfully be expected, at 
the price, however, of being excluded from active, let alone significant, 
contribution to the interstate diplomatic debate.6
While lending a certain degree of uncertain stability to European interstate 
relations for almost a century, the Concert-system was unable to cope with the 
tensions resulting from the process of German unification. Consequently, in the 
Wilsonian post World War I analysis, it was precisely the failure of Europe’s 
Great Power diplomacy that had led to the bloodshed and atrocities of the ‘Great 
War’. In the same vein, the League of Nations can be regarded as a Kantian 
inspired alternative for Great Power dominance, i.e. as an attempt to safeguard the 
Westphalian principles by institutionalizing and democratizing their application
6. W.K.N. Schmelzer, ‘De mogelijke invloed van de kleinere staten in het huidige wereld­
bestel', Internationale Spectator 26 (1972) 793-802 (795-796). This article summarizes the 
text of a ministerial speech by Schmelzer on 22.2.72 in Leuven. Belgium.
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and safeguarding. The nominal equality of sovereign states was re-established and, 
as Wilson worded in his ‘fourteen points’, the League was to provide for ‘mutual 
guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small 
states alike’ (emphasis mine, AGH). Moreover, out of the legacy of the Russian 
and Austrian-Hungarian empires, the Versailles Treaty restored and created a 
considerable number of small states, thus adding to the potential role of small 
Powers in international affairs.
Nevertheless, in the subsequent years, the League’s protection proved 
insufficient to exempt small or weak states from aggression by more powerful 
ones: Japan conquered large parts of China, Italy occupied Albania and present- 
day Ethiopia, and Nazi-Germany overran Czechoslovakia and Poland, the latter 
event leading to the outbreak of the Second World War. Subsequently, another 
overhaul of the Westphalian system materialised in the post-WW II United 
Nations world system, aimed at both globalizing and institutionalizing the 
Westphalian cum Wilsonian notions of interstate behaviour as well as the return of 
a special responsibility for world peace for the Great Powers, which found 
expression in their permanent membership of the Security Council and their right 
to veto in that forum. Nevertheless, the UN system has been beneficial, by and 
large, for the Small State. Arguably, no small state’s sovereignty has been 
extinguished by force in the post-World W ar II era.7 The UN’s defining principle 
o f ‘sovereign equality’ provides small states with a moral, legal and political line 
of defence against their larger counterparts.8 Moreover, the UN’s ‘one state, one 
vote’ rule for the General Assembly, combined with a sharp rise in Small Powers’ 
numbers due to post-war decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s as well as the split 
up of the Soviet empire in the 1990s, entailed a Small Powers’ majority in that 
forum which underpinned their potential role in world affairs, if and when they 
managed to speak with one voice. Which so far has been a rather rare event. For 
small or weak states today, a larger chance of survival is not necessarily matched 
by a larger say in world affairs. In the greater scheme of things, therefore, the role 
o f small Powers in international relations was and is one typically characterized 
by both vulnerability as well as a lack of international influence, or even
7. Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace. Democracy, Interdependence and 
International Organizations (New York 2001) 21. One could cite the Chinese occupation of 
Tibet as well as the occupation of East-Timor by Indonesia as exceptions to this general 
observation.
8. ‘The Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members'. 
Charter o f the United Nations, article 2.1.
4
international impotence. As Vital worded it: ‘The smaller the human and material 
resources of a state the greater are the difficulties it must surmount if it is to 
maintain any valid political option at all and, in consequence, the smaller the state 
the less viable it is as a genuinely independent member of the international 
community.’9
Nevertheless, not always do small states constitute weak and uninfluential 
actors: some noteworthy exceptions to the general rule can be identified. Although 
certainly not the only one, the status of the Republic of the United Provinces 
during the latter half of the XVIIth century is among the most intriguing of these 
exceptions. A cluster of seven separate provinces, restricted in population and 
territorial extent, which shortly after breaking away from the Habsburg Empire 
*(...) swiftly became a Great Power inside and outside Europe for almost a 
century’.10 Its strength in inter-state relations was founded on economic wealth, 
providing it with the financial resources needed to raise substantial armies, turning 
it into a formidable military power, as well as the most effective naval power until 
well into the 18th century. In spite of being a geographically small state, the 
Netherlands constituted the wealthiest country in Europe, controlling a large part 
of international trade, industry and finance, with enough military clout not only to 
wage a war of independence and cast off the rule of the Spanish-Austrian 
Habsburg dynasty (1572-1648), but also to raid the Sound when free trade with 
the Baltic States was in danger (1660), to resist a combined Anglo-French 
invasion (1672), to lead the coalition against French expansionism and to wage 
the first successful invasion of England since 1066 (Chatham, 1667). Arguably, 
the Netherlands constituted the first hegemonic power of the modem state 
system.11 Its seat of government, The Hague, was in the words of the Swedish 
King, Gustavus Adolphus, ‘The theatre of all actions in Europe’12
Historical anomalies attract historical interest. Huizinga, among others, was 
fascinated by the Republic’s oddball status: ‘How is it possible, one asks oneself, 
that such a small and rather distant area as the Netherlands in the seventeenth 
century were, reached such predominance as a state, as a trading power and as a
9. David Vital, The Inequality o f States. A Studv o f the Small Power in international Relations 
(Oxford 1967), 3.
10. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fait o f the Great Powers Economie Change and Military 
Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London 1988), 85-89 (85).
11. Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy o f International Relations (Princeton 1987), 73-74.
12. Joris J.C. Voorhoeve, Peace, Profits and Principles. A Studv o f  Dutch Foreign Policy (Lei­
den 1985), 3.
5
source of civilisation, as the Republic did actually attain?’. Huizinga explains the 
‘Dutch miracle’ in terms of the civil and economic liberties prevailing in the 
Netherlands, allowing mercantile elite to successfully fight the war of 
independence and subsequently lead the world economically, politically as well as 
culturally.13
Huizinga’s explanation is one of a self-admitted inadequacy. He finishes his 
analysis by referring to an elevated level of virtues to be ascribed to the Dutch 
nation: ‘Wij Nederlanders weten, dat van het beste wat onzen Staat en ons volk in 
de zeventiende eeuw groot heeft gemaakt, de kracht, de wil tot daden, het besef 
voor recht en redelijkheid, de barmhartigheid, de vroomheid en het 
Godsvertrouwen, ook nu en voor de komende tijden nog niets verloren is.’ 
(English translation in footnote)14
As Kossmann comments, Huizinga presents the Dutch Republic as a unique 
case. ‘It is clear that the unique can not be explained. It is therefore to be admired 
and described as a gift from God.’ 15 Uniqueness can indeed be regarded as a 
barrier to historical explanation, albeit that, as Kindleberger demonstrates, each 
nation, at least in its youthful stage, is -  as each individual person -  inclined to 
regard itself as unique. Young countries, Kindleberger argues, feel unique and 
look ahead. In later stages they loose confidence in their exceptional!sm and are 
inclined to resort to nostalgia for one or more golden ages.16 This argument 
appears to speak out in favour of historical analysis on a comparative base.
The alternative is to break away from the individuality of the Dutch 
Republic’s case and moot the question in a more general way as a theory of 
international relations problem: Small states tend to be Small Powers, but 
exceptions to this rule are possible. Apparently, there is no exact proportional
13. J. Huizinga, Nederland’s Beschaving in de I7de Eeuw (Haarlem, 1956, 2nd ed.), 1 -41 (3).
14. ‘We Dutchmen know, that now and in the time to come nothing has been lost of what in the 
seventeenth century has made great our State and our people, to wit our force and will to act, 
our sense of justice and reasonability, our mercy and piety and trust in God.’ Huizinga, 
Nederland’s beschaving, 161.
15. E.H. Kossmann, ‘Some Meditations on Dutch Eighteenth-Century Decline’ in: Frederick 
Krantz and P.M. Hohenberg, eds. Failed Transitions to Modern Industrial Society: 
Renaissance Italy and Seventeenth-Century Holland (Montreal 1974). 49-54 (49); quoted in: 
Charles P. Kindleberger, World Economic Primacy 1500-1990 (New York 1996) 211. A 
comparable comment on Dutch uniqueness by Schama: ‘The most extraordinary invention of 
a country that was to become famous for its ingenuity was its own culture (...) The Dutch 
created a fresh identity.’ Simon Schama. The Embarrassment o f Riches: An Interpretation of 
the Dutch Culture o f the Golden Age (Berkeley 1977), 67. Ibidem.
16. Kindleberger, World Economic Primacy, 211-212.
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relation between the geographic or demographic size of a state and its power and 
influence in international relations.17 How are the Dutch Republic and other 
exceptions to the rule to be understood? Or, worded slightly more generally: How 
and under which conditions can geographically and/or demographically small 
states bridge the power and influence gap with larger states?
Small States’ Politics (SSP), a subdiscipline of International Relations theory, 
provides us with concepts for understanding the position of small states in 
international relations. Its general line of argument can be summarized as 
contradicting the textbook wisdom that small countries are the minor actors in IR.
Firstly, SSP highlights the relative nature of the dimensions of size and 
strength among states. As Mosser argues, the debate whether or not to call states 
‘small’ or ‘weak’ leads to contentious, counterproductive and endless angels-on- 
heads-of-pins discussions. In this respect SSP argues that small states are either 
smaller or weaker than their counterparts, but not necessarily both. Nigeria, for 
example, is a large state in terms of area but a Small Power in terms of power and 
influence. Switzerland, Japan, and the Netherlands are small states in terms of 
area but are more powerful politically and economically than their small size 
would lead one to surmise.18
Secondly, SSP argues, the primacy of the great powers in International 
Relations is equally a relative one. The confrontation between small power and 
great power becomes a naked confrontation only in crisis situations. In other 
situations it would be more appropriate to speak of relationships characterized by 
tests of wills and skills, not unlike the quality of cunning which Machiavelli 
recommends to the Prince.19 Strong states do not always act according to their 
capabilities; small states may rise to occasions. Size, in the words of Katzenstein, 
should be dealt with as a variable rather than as a constant.20
Hence, thirdly, there is room fo r  manoeuvre for small states to overcome 
power differentials. In this, context and issues at stake are the dominant factors 
which, carried to their extremes, as Hirsch has it, make it ‘perfectly possible for a
17. Hence, following Voorhoeve, we will speak of small states if the size of the country in terms 
of territory and/or population is the subject and of Small Powers when power is the object of 
comparison. By capitalizing the first letter of ‘power’ when we refer to a state we distinguish 
power as an asset from Power as an actor. Voorhoeve, Peace, Profits and Principles, 4.
18. Michael Mosser, ‘The 10 as enabler: Institutional Realism as an Explanation for Influence in 
International Organizations’ (unpublished manuscript 2002), 2.
19. Mario Hirsch, ‘Influence without Power: Small States in European Politics’, The World 
Today, March 1976,112-118.
20. Baldur Thorhallsson, The Role o f Small States in the European Union (Aldershot 2000), 1.
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state to be both small and big at the same time’.21 More cautiously, Voorhoeve 
concludes, that a small state usually is not a major influence in the world system, 
but that its policies can be of importance ‘if it is determined, if it pursues its goals 
with an able diplomacy, is located in a strategic area, and if other circumstances 
are propitious’. 22
The most important means for the small state to overcome its weakness in 
contemporary international politics, SSP argues fourthly, is international 
organization. International organization not only helps small states and Smaller 
Powers generally to mitigate some of the effects of international anarchy, it also 
provides them with a means to punch above their weight. Apparently, in spite of 
Realism’s assumption of anarchy and its attendant consequences, international 
organization provides small states cum Smaller Powers with more power and 
influence than they ‘ought’ to have. The precise functioning of this mechanism is 
far from clear. Rosenau describes ‘the conundrum of smaller state power in 
international organizations’ as a ‘genuine puzzle’. Countries weak and strong 
support internationally structured formal institutions, known as international 
organizations, with a view to reducing risks and uncertainty in their mutual 
relations. In the resulting process, however, international organisations empower 
smaller states to gamer more influence than they ‘should’ otherwise possess. 
Presumably, international organizations facilitate Small Powers in exerting ‘Soft 
Power’, the ability, as Joseph Nye defines it, ‘to get what you want through 
attraction rather than coercion’.23
The European Union (EU) may well be considered the ultimate case in point in 
Small Power influence. Firstly, the EU provides its member-states with a 
guarantee that international and European law rather than interstate power 
relations will prevail. For Europe’s small states, the Union means that for the first 
time in the history of the continent, it is run by law rather than by force. European 
citizens are gradually waking up to this paradigmatic revolution in international 
relations and becoming aware of Europe being a unique experiment in 
international relations.
21. Hirsch, ‘Influence’, 113.
22. Voorhoeve, Peace, Profits and Principles, 9.
23. James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study o f Foreign Policy (London 1980), 29-30. Joseph 
Nyc, Soft Power, the Means to Success in World Politics (New York 2004), X. Soft power is 
also described as the ability ‘to get others to want what you want’, ‘America and the Arabs’,
- The Economist, 23.3.2002,11.
Secondly, in a SSP context, the Union provides Smaller Powers with a power 
base.
Without questioning the primacy of the Great Powers24 we agree with The 
Economist ‘that the present EU system is [...] hugely stacked in favour of small 
countries’. In the EU’s first pillar, where qualified majority voting is the rule, 
voting is so heavily weighted in favour of the smaller member-states ‘that it 
borders on the anti-democratic\ 25 In the second and third pillar, dealing with 
respectively the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 
intergovernmental cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), respect for the 
sovereign equality of all member-states allows them to make their presence felt 
and their approval mandatory if and when consensus is the rule. The large 
member-states experience the institutional set-up of the Union as increasingly 
problematic. Since 1957, a series of successive enlargements with predominantly 
small accessants has resulted in a situation in which the six large member-states, 
to wit Germany, France, Britain, Spain, Poland and the UK, representing three 
quarters of the EU population barely command half the total number of voting 
points in the Council of Ministers. A system, Duverger sighs, with the hallmark of 
the Marx brothers. An image of six giants under permanent supervision by 19 
dwarfs evokes such feelings in some of the large member-states, particularly in 
France.26
Small State power in the European Union is an instance of a more general 
manifestation. Smaller states use international organizations to exert influence and 
shape the world according to their preferences. Mosser theorizes that smaller 
states engage in ‘binding behaviour’ by purposefully creating and then 
manipulating the rules of nascent international organizations to best fit their 
purposes. He calls this ‘engineering influence’. 27 The engineering influence
24. Moravcsik. it will be remembered, equalled the outcome of EU decision making with the 
Lowest Common Denominator of the policy preferences of France, Britain and Germany. 
Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Negotiating the Single European Ad: national interests and conventional 
statecraft in the European Community*, International Organization 45, winter 1991,19-56.
25. ‘Tyranny of the Tiny?', The Economist 25.1.2003,31.
26. Maurice Duverger, ‘Surmonter l’obstruction des petits Etats', Le Monde, 3.3.1994; Thomas 
Ferenczi, ‘Europe: la révolte des petites nations’, Le Monde, 10.5.2003; Jean-Claude Boyer, 
‘Grands et petits Etats: un clivage artificiel?’, Le Monde Diplomatique, April 2004, 12-13.
27. Mosser deliberately uses the term ‘engineering’ to connote a conscious and purposeful 
strategy of smaller-state institut ion-building that is not conveyed by expressions as ‘exerting’ 
or ‘exercising*. Michael W. Mosser, ‘Engineering Influence: The Subtle Power of Small 
States in the CSCE/OSCE’, in: Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner (eds.) Small States and 
Alliances (Vienna 2001), 53-71. Michael Mosser, ‘The IO as enabler: Institutional Realism
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hypothesis provides us with a perspective to analyse Small Power policies and 
their role in the making of the European Community.
This study analyses the Netherlands’ pursuit of engineering influence during 
the formative years of the European Economic Community. Its central question is 
whether, under which conditions and by which means the Netherlands have 
exerted engineering influence on the economic and institutional architecture of the 
EEC - as a forerunner of the present-day European Union - on eight identifying 
issues during the EEC’s formative years. The expression ‘formative years’ refers 
to the period of the ‘Original Six’, the integrational development of the European 
Communities from the inception of the European Coal and Steel Community in 
1952 to the first enlargement of the European Economic Community in 1973. Our 
method is the historical one, i.e. analysis of the primary source material in the 
Dutch national and ministerial archives. The vast and rapidly growing body of 
historical literature on the European integration process during the 1950s and 
1960s provided us with scholarly guidance throughout the process.28 This 
historical study consists of three parts. In the first part ‘Conceiving the Common 
Market’, we concentrate on three identifying issues during the 1950s, the first 
formative decade of the ‘construction européenne’. Our first chapter analyses the 
launching of the Beyen Plan as a Smaller Power’s exercise in exerting influence 
in international relations. In his response to the proposals for a European Political 
Community, Dutch foreign minister Jan Willem Beyen, set Dutch European 
policy on an entirely new footing (1952-1954). The second chapter plumbs the 
depths o f Beyen’s ambitions and the Netherlands’ role in the ‘relance européenne’, 
the European integration revitalization project during the mid 1950s (1954-1955). 
From the second half of the 1950s onwards , as will be demonstrated throughout 
our analysis, Beyen and his successors pursued a policy of ‘functional 
supranationalism’. characterized by the transfer of national policy competences to 
a European economic community endowed with a strong executive.
The so-called Benelux-effect is the central topic of the third chapter: the 
Benelux experiment provided the Netherlands and its Benelux partners with first 
hand information on the realities of regional economic integration. Also, Benelux
as an Explanation for Influence in International Organizations’ (unpublished manuscript 
2002), 6.
28. The volumes published by the ‘groupe de liaison des professeurs d'histoire contemporaine 
auprès des communautés européennes' proved particularly helpful.
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foreign policy cooperation enhanced the Netherlands’ diplomatic position in 
Europe. To which extent did the Netherlands manage to put these two Benelux 
dimensions to good use on the negotiation tables which brought about the EEC 
Treaty of Rome (1955-1957)?
The second part of our study deals with three defining issues during the 
second decade of the European integration process, i.e. during the 1960s. This part 
is called ‘Defending the Community’. This title may sound slightly confusing, in 
that in the course of the 1960s the Netherlands did  successfully realise the 
country’s most important post-WW II European policy goal. The EEC’s Customs 
Union did indeed become a reality by July 1968. Thus, The Hague obtained the 
Greater Benelux it had campaigned for since the 1952 launching of the Beyen 
Plan. Nevertheless, during most of the 1960s, we find the Netherlands also in a 
much more defensive role, fighting to preserve the communitarian nature of the 
European integration experiment. Chapter four, dealing with the so-called Fouchet 
negotiations on a European Political Union, analyses the Netherlands’ use of 
engineering influence to torpedo French president De Gaulle’s plans to de- 
supranationalise the European integration experiment (1959-1962). In the fifth 
chapter, we analyse the Dutch handling of the empty chair crisis of the mid-1960s 
and the extent in which the Hague government managed to defend and further its 
European policy goals under the conditions entailed by the crisis (1965-1966). 
Chapter six focuses on the Hague summit conference of December 1969, a 
meeting of heads of state and government, which is generally regarded as the 
diplomatic breakthrough which ended the De Gaulle induced stagnation of the 
1960s. This chapter analyses Dutch European policy and resulting engineering 
influence with regard to the Hague summit and its instrumental importance for re­
launching European integration (1968-1970).
The third part of this study deals with two consequences of the Rome Treaty 
on the European Economic Community (1957) of which we can safely conclude 
that the Netherlands got more than they bargained for. From the late 1950s 
onwards, the Common market developed an external political dimension that at 
least partly opposed Dutch geo-political interests and constituted a potential threat 
to Atlantic unity in particular. Hence the third part, ‘Externalizing Europe’, which 
focuses on two diachronic EEC externalities: Firstly foreign policy cooperation in 
the European Political Cooperation (EPC) framework and secondly EEC’s 
association policy with developing countries. Chapter seven addresses the 
question to which extent and how the European Community, in lieu of a threat to
11
Dutch Atlanticism, grew into an actively pursued policy forum for engineering 
influence in the area o f high politics from the early 1970s onwards (1957-1973). 
Chapter eight deals with the question to what extent successive Dutch 
governments were willing to endorse overseas EC involvement, particularly in 
Africa and, to what degree, did they attempt to influence multilateral negotiations 
and policy outcomes on this matter (1956-1969).
The Netherlands’ policies on Europe have to be understood against the 
background of the country’s political system and the structure and traditions of 
The Hague’s governmental apparatus. The ins and outs of Dutch decision-making 
on Europe find clarification in a final Note on ‘The Making of the Netherlands’ 
European Policy during the 1950s and 1960s’.
Since we concentrate on eight identifying issues some other aspects of the 
Netherlands European policy during the period under scrutiny, particularly 
regarding the Euratom negotiations (1955-1957) and Benelux’ development 
during the 1960s, receive less attention than they would receive in a fully-fledged 
history of the Netherlands’ European policy for the period concerned.
It could be argued - and has been argued - that Small States’ Politics is 
unsuitable as an approach to analyse Dutch foreign policy, since the Netherlands 
does not qualify as a Small Power. Admittedly, in the period under discussion the 
stature o f the Netherlands in international relations was a topic of debate, in the 
country itself as a well as in international Academia.
Stikker, serving the Netherlands as foreign minister (1948-1952) at the start 
of the period under scrutiny, was of the opinion that the loss of empire in general 
and the formal recognition of Indonesian independence in December 1949 in 
particular, turned the Netherlands into a small power.29 Stikker’s successor, Luns, 
(1952-1971) on the other hand, thought the notion of the Netherlands as a small 
country repulsive: ‘The Netherlands is a very important country’30 References by 
Dutch nationals to their country as a small country he deprecated as 
‘zelfkleinering’ ( ’self-belittlement)31 In his view, the country’s history and 
political and economic importance, rather than its territorial size, determined the
29. Dirk U. Stikker, Memoires. Herinneringen uit de lange járen waarin ik betrokken w as bij de 
voortdurende wereldcrisis (Rotterdam 1966), 213.
30. While addressing the Tweede Kamer (Lower House of Parliament) on 9 December 1970, as 
quoted in: Peter R. Baehr, ‘The Foreign Policy o f the Netherlands* in: R.P. Barston (ed.), The 
Other Powers, Studies in the Foreign Relations o f  Small States (London 1973). 61-91 (71).
31. J .L. Heldring, ‘Zelfkleinering en zelfoverschatting', NRC Handelsblad 25-2-1997.
scope of the Netherlands in world politics. As testified by his proposals for a 
European Security Conference mooted during a state visit to Yugoslavia in the 
Spring of 1968:
‘Countries of our size can play an influential role, both bilaterally and 
multilaterally, in exploring ways and means to gradually arrive at solutions for the 
problems in Europe because the great powers often do not dispose of the same 
room for manoeuvre/32 In his memoirs Luns depicts himself as an exponent of the 
‘Dutch vision’, a vision, successful, above all in Europe. Referring to the first 
extension of the European Communities during the early 1970s, he states: T he  
Dutch vision, of which I was the exponent, resulted in both the Six and the 
English acknowledging the Netherlands as the leading force towards the 
developments successfully rounded off in the Spring o f 1971. Which goes to show 
that in specific constellations in international politics a middle-sized Power can 
play a large role.’33 Luns successor, Schmelzer, (1971-1973) addressed the same 
theme on a slightly more modest tone. Using the concept of ‘Smaller States’, 
apparently including the Netherlands, he argued that their role in world politics 
might be larger than ever before. The parts played by Cuba and Albania in world 
politics, as well as the role of Canada in the UN and the Luxembourg presidencies 
in the European Communities, constituted a case in point. The role of Smaller 
Powers in international relations, Schmelzer argued, was dependent on objective 
factors, above all the international context, as well as subjective ones, most 
importantly their quality of vision and political determination. He stressed the 
importance of quality of vision, as a power factor bearing no direct relation to 
political or military power. Increased global interdependence, enhanced 
international communication and the stalemate between the superpowers enabled 
Smaller Powers to make the difference in international politics. Thus, Schmelzer 
referred to the role of the Benelux countries in European integration as a source of 
ideas. ‘They had a vision’, he argues, by acknowledging European 
interdependence and putting their trust in establishing European institutions.34
32. ‘Minister Luns in Joegoslavië’, Keesings Historisch Archief, 29, March 1968, as quoted in 
Bob de Graaff, ‘Nederland in de wereld van de twintigste eeuw’, Internationale Spectator, 
51 (2003), 360-366 (362).
33. Michel van der Plas, Luns: ‘Ik herinner mij... ’. Vrijmoedige herinneringen van Mr. J.M.A.H. 
Luns zoals verteld aan Michel van der Plas (Leiden 1972). 171.
34. W.K.N. Schmelzer, ‘De mogelijke invloed van de kleinere staten in het huidige 
wereldbestel’, Internationale Spectator 26 (1972) 793-802. This article summarizes the text 
of a ministerial speech by Schmelzer on 22.2.72 in Leuven, Belgium.
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In much the same vein, Beyen, the Netherlands’ Foreign Affairs minister 
(1952-1956), responsible for much of the country’s diplomatic successes at the 
European negotiation tables during the 1950s, ignores the Big Power - Small 
Power debate and stresses, in line with the abovementioned insights of Small 
States’ Politics, the importance of international organization as an enabling 
structure for the Netherlands: ‘As a member of an ever more organized 
international society, the Netherlands can play a significant role through 
knowledge, [diplomatic] expertise, and a continuous striving for the maintenance 
of the international legal order’.35
In Academia, opinions on the stature of the Netherlands in international 
relations equally diverge. In his seminal work Peace, Profits and Principles. A  
Study o f Dutch Foreign Policy (1985), Voorhoeve depicted the Netherlands as a 
‘small, yet influential’ pow er.36 Two decades later he arrived at a different 
conclusion. Observing the degree in which the Netherlands’ power resources 
compensated for its demographic and territorial smallness, he qualified it as ‘a 
pocket-sized middle power’.37 Goldstein characterizes the country as a regional 
activist exercising power beyond its size.38 George and Bache portray the country 
as a middle-sized one, attempting to carve out an independent sphere of action by 
joining international frameworks like the European Communities.39 Heldring, the 
doyen of Dutch foreign policy commentators, repeatedly stressed the importance 
of empire. As the third colonial power in the world, the Netherlands’ influence in 
international relations exceeded a Small Power status. The loss of the Dutch East 
Indies (1949), Netherlands’ New Guinea (1962) and Surinam (1975) substantially 
reduced The Hague’s leverage in world affairs. The Netherlands’ position in
35. Joris J.C. Voorhoeve, Peace, Profits and Principles. A Study o f Dutch Foreign Policy 
(Leiden 1985), 3.
36. Voorhoeve, Peace, Profits and Principles, 11.
37. J.J.C. Voorhoeve, ‘Nederland en de wereld', in: J.A.M. Baak, L.J. Bal & JJ.C. Voorhoeve 
(eds.), Nederlands buitenlands beleid (Heerlen 1994), Vol. 1, 15-40 (36). The expression 
‘Middelgrote mogendheid in zakformaat’ (pocket-sized middle power) correctly denotes the 
country’s position in world affairs, stated foreign affairs minister Bot in September 2005, 
referring to the Netherlands ranking on the Newsweek power index (10th position) and its 
position in international-economic relations (14th largest economy in the world). Bernard 
Bot, ‘Bestaande kaders, nieuwe wegen? Nederland en de Europese mid-life crisis. Toespraak 
door dr. Bernard Bot, Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 
ter gelegenheid van de viering van 60 ja ar Nederlands Genootschap Internationale Zaken’ 
(Den Haag, 27.9.2005), 4.
38. Joshua Goldstein, International Relations, (New York, brief second edition 2005), 63.
39. Stephen George and Ian Bache, Politics in the European Union (Oxford 2001). 200.
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Europe in the 1950’s and 1960s, however, concludes Heldring, constitutes an 
exception to this rule.40
As Hanf en Soetendorp argue, until the early 1990s Dutch policy-makers 
were quite confident of their relative influence within the EC decision-making 
process.41 Trausch recounts the discussion at a dinner party thrown by the Dutch 
EC Presidency during the second half of 1991. Prime Minister Lubbers told his 
guests that a popular topic of debate in the Dutch political class was the question 
whether the Netherlands was the smallest of the large Powers, or the largest of the 
smaller Powers in Europe.42 Dutch confidence, however, received a blow at 
‘Black Monday’, later in 1991 when it became suddenly and rather 
embarrassingly clear that a large majority of the member states refused to agree 
with the Dutch presidency’s draft on political union. According to Trausch, the 
Netherlands’ presidency ‘convaincue que les Pays-Bas étaient un grand pays’, 
was punished for its lack of modesty. In their attempt ‘de donner au projet un 
cachet néerlandais dans un sens assez fédéral’ the Dutch made a fatal error and 
were forced to withdraw their draft Treaty at the last moment. The Netherlands’ 
self-image, Trausch concludes, was not in line with its standing with the truly 
Great Powers of Europe: ‘Les Pays-Bas ont beau avoir 17 million d’habitants, 
pour les grands (la France, la Grande-Bretagne et l’Allemagne) ils sont classés 
petit pays et traités comme tel.’43
For all intents and purposes the impact of ‘Black Monday’ on the 
Netherlands’ view of its position in Europe appears to have remained limited in 
time. When British prime minister Blair organized a summit meeting with French 
president Chirac and German Chancellor Schröder in November 2001, their
40. J.L. Heldring, 'Zelfkleinering en zelfoverschatting’ in NRC Handelsblad 25.2.1997, J.L. 
Heldring. ‘Een uitzonderlijk man’, NRC Handelsblad 2.3.1999, J.L. Heldring, ‘Toch een 
uitzonderlijk man’, NRC Handelsblad, 22.4.2004. Brouwer relativizes the impact of 
dccolonization on the Netherlands’ role in the world. Jan Willem Brouwer, ‘Afgedaald “tot 
de rang van Denemarken'? Nederlands internationale positie na de dekolonisatie’, in: D.A. 
Hellema, C. Wiebes and B. Zeeman (eds.), Derde Jaarboek voor de geschiedenis van de 
Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek in de twintigste eeuw (Den Haag 1996), 91-107.
41. Ben Soetendorp and Kenneth Hanf, ‘The Netherlands: Growing Doubls of a Loyal Member’, 
in: Kenneth Hanf and Ben Soetendorp (eds.), Adapting to European Intégration. Small States 
and the European Union (London 1998), 36-51 (50).
42. Gilbert Trausch, ‘Quelques remarques sur la place et le rôle des petits pays en Europe’, in G. 
Trausch (ed.), Le rôle et la place des petits pavs en Europa au XXe siècle (Baden-Baden 
2005), 27-42.
43. Trausch, ‘Quelques remarques’, 31.
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Italian and Spanish counterparts protested and obtained invitations to attend the 
meeting. Dutch prime-minister Kok did not wait for an invitation. He went to 
London to attend the meeting.
Such anecdotal evidence of the Netherlands’ self-image may indeed bear 
some, but not necessarily much, relationship to the actual stature of the country in 
international relations. Since Vital published his classic The Inequality o f  States. A 
Study o f  the Small Power in International Relations in 1967, numerous attempts 
have been made to classify states according to their coercive power as well as 
influence. The outcomes are generally ambiguous, a fortiori so when dealing with 
Small Powers or Smaller Powers within the framework of the European Union. 
Smaller Powers in Europe, even if they do not possess coercive power faculties, 
may well have influence and thus, according to Russell’s definition of power as 
‘the production of intended effects’, access to a certain degree of power. As 
Baillie words it, in the Union’s institutional framework, a small state is not 
necessarily a weak state.44 Large Powers are not always aware of this, which can 
lead to short-sightedness as far as the Small Power’s autonomy is concerned. The 
mere fact that a Small Power does not want to align itself to the point of view of a 
Large Power is often interpreted by the latter as a sign that it must be the satellite 
of another Great Power. ‘Si vous voulez être bien vu à Paris, il faut aimer la 
France et n’aimer que elle’, Belgian foreign minister Spaak wrote to his 
Luxembourgian counterpart Bech, as early as 1936.45
This state of affairs provides both Small Powers as well as countries of an 
intermediate standing with a convincing incentive for pursuing engineering 
influence.
Groningen and Amsterdam, November 2006
44. Sasha Baillie, ‘The Seat of the European Institutions. An Example of small-state influence in 
the E U \ in: Gilbert Trausch (ed.), Small Countries in Europe. Their Role and Place in the 
XXth Century (Baden-Baden 2005), 465-479 (467).
45. Jan Willem Brouwer, ‘La myopie du ‘grand’ face au ‘petit’. L’exemple de la France devant 
les pays du Benelux, 1944-1950', in: Gilbert Trausch (ed.), Le rôle et la place des petits pays 
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C h a p t e r  1: T h e  B e  y e n  p l a n  a s  t iie  D u t c h  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  EPC
PROPOSALS
1.0 Introduction: On Dutch European policy and Benelux, 1945-1952
The post-war reconstruction of the Dutch economy was seriously hampered by 
prohibitive protectionism in Western Europe and concomitant bilatéralisation of 
international trade and monetary relations. The economic curtaining off o f the 
important German hinterland, the continued disruption of economic relations with 
the East Indies as a result of Indonesia's war of independence and the need for 
domestic industrialisation in the metropolitan Netherlands themselves, 
emphasized and increased the traditional dependence on foreign markets as well 
as the need for new markets. Awareness of the country’s difficult position was the 
major driving force behind Dutch support for economic cooperation and 
liberalization in Europe. Repeatedly, the Hague government as well the Tweede 
Kamer, the lower house of the Dutch Parliament, articulated that Dutch European 
policy should aim at ‘economic disarmament’ in Western-Europe by means of 
economic cooperation, liberalisation and possibly integration and that close 
Benelux cooperation was the apt instrument to further this end. Both economic 
liberalisation and Benelux were to remain at the heart of Dutch post-war foreign 
policy.
From its inception in 1944, economic and monetary cooperation between the 
Belgian-Luxemburg Economic Union and the Netherlands was a complicated and 
at times, difficult intergovernmental exercise46. In 1950, a Preliminary Economic 
Union saw the light of day; the projected Economic Union itself was still under 
construction by the late 1950s when it was caught up by the integrative 
development of the wider European framework of the Rome Treaties. 
Nevertheless, slow and protracted Benelux decision-making methods never 
dissuaded the three governments from claiming a special position in multilateral 
European discussions, referring to their exclusive real life experience in regional 
economic cooperation and integration. Likewise, since the end of the second 
World War the Benelux countries successfully presented themselves as a political 
co-operative ‘unity’, thus enhancing their collective leverage. At the Paris
46. On the origins of the Benelux cf. A.E. Kersten, ‘België en Nederland in London 1940-1944. 
Werken aan de na-oorlogse betrekkingen’ in: Colloquium over de geschiedenis van de Bel- 
gisch-Nederlandse betrekkingen tussen 1815 en 1945. Acta (Gent 1982), 495-520.
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Conference on European Economic Cooperation (July-September 1947), which 
drafted the European Recovery Program, the Benelux-countries participated with 
a common delegation and presented a Benelux Memorandum containing a 
Benelux plan of action. This operation found its mark. The same recipe was 
applied in order to be admitted to the Western discussions on the future of 
Germany in London in February 1948. The Brussels Pact negotiations constituted 
another example. As proposed by the Benelux governments, the Pact was to 
contain articles on economic, social and cultural cooperation, so that the image of 
an exclusively military agreement was avoided. Despite these successes political 
Benelux cooperation was temporarily discontinued. In the negotiations on the 
North Atlantic Pact in 1949 as well as in the Fritalux/Finebel talks with France 
and Italy in 1950 the three governments refrained from coordinating their policies.
Policy coordination among the Benelux-countries was equally lacking in the 
discussions on the Schuman and Pleven Plans in 1950 and 1951, even though the 
defence of identical opinions on crucial issues conveyed the impression of the 
contrary to the other participants. Regularly informal contacts between senior 
officials were insufficient to effectuate a return to previously successfully applied 
coordination methods. Personal differences between Dutch foreign minister 
Stikker and his Belgian counterpart Van Zeeland prevented the Benelux from 
joining forces. Even so, the Netherlands continued to examine ‘jusqu’à quel degré 
des prises de positions communes sont possibles, ceci sera un automatisme 
pendant toutes les années 50’. From 1953 onwards, when Jan Willem Beyen had 
taken over as foreign minister, Benelux re-emerged as a foreign policy co­
operation framework. Kersten points out, however, that only during the 
discussions on the Eden proposals for Western European Union in autumn 1954 a 
common stance would again be realized47.
As regards foreign economic relations, the Benelux governments held 
common views on the general patterns of international economic relations and 
cooperation, as their common memorandum to the Conference on European 
Economic Cooperation (July 1947) demonstrated. It urged for liberalization of 
intra-European trade on a multilateral basis in combination with enhanced 
monetary convertibility. The document also voiced the common Benelux view,
47. A. E. Kersten, Maken drie kleinen één grote? De politieke invloed van de Benelux 1945-55 
(Bussum 1982), 5-12. Steffen Elgersma, ‘Les Pays-Bas face à la France entre 1950 et 1957' 
in: Historians of Contemporary Europe, vol. 9, no. 1-2 (June 1994) 35-60 (52). We shall 
argue in this chapter that Kersten’s date is rather late. Benelux foreign policy co-operation 
revived during the EPC negotiations and the latter half of the EDC negotiations.
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that the participation of Germany was a precondition to the economic 
reconstruction of Western Europe. The memorandum had been drafted in The 
Hague and strongly reflected two basic elements of Dutch policy towards 
economic cooperation in Western Europe: (a) the necessary multilateralisation of 
trade and monetary relations and (b) the inadequacy of eliminating quantitative 
restrictions in intra-European trade if and when this was compensated for by 
equally protectionist prohibitive tariffs48.
The Dutch government initially hoped that along these lines progress 
could be made within the Marshall Plan setting, i.e. in the Organisation for 
European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). Promoting multilateralism within this 
policy framework, however, proved discouraging. Although a number of 
agreements on abolishing quantitative restriction in intra-European trade were 
agreed upon, their impact was limited due to prohibitive high tariffs and other 
barriers to trade. Attempts at further-reaching arrangements than were feasible in 
the OEEC by means of a more limited regional grouping of countries, in the so 
called Fritalux, foundered on the Dutch demand of German participation which 
was unacceptable for France49. Nevertheless, the Fritalux negotiations were of 
value for the Netherlands’ delegation headed by Dirk Spierenburg, in that they 
provided insight in the economic and policy problems a regional economic 
grouping of this size entailed. In this sense, although never seeing the light o f day 
itself, Fritalux can well be considered a forerunner for Beyen’s greater Benelux 
conception at the heart of this chapter.50
For the time being, however, the Hague government tried once more the 
OEEC framework to achieve its European economic aims with the Plan for Action 
tabled by Foreign Minister Stikker in June 1950. Economic cooperation, Stikker 
pointed out, should lead the way to an increase of the general standard of living, 
to an equilibrium of Western Europe’s balance of payments with the rest o f the 
world and eventually to a stable level of employment. Specialization of 
production and an improved division of labour were the instruments for realising
48. Archief van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken te Den Haag (Archive o f  the Ministry o f 
Foreign Affairs in The Hagué) (hencefonh: Min. BZ), DGEM, dossier 1209: Benelux 
memorandum July 1947.
49. R.T. Griffiths and F. Lynch, *L'échec de la ‘Petite Europe’: les négotiations Fritalux/Finebcl, 
1949-1950’. Revue Historique voL 274 (1986), 172-189.
50. Walter II. Salzmann, Herstel, wederopbouw en Europese samenwerking. D.P. Spierenburg 
en de buitenlandse economische betrekkingen van Nederland 1945-1952 ('s Gravenhage 
2000), 203-209.
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these aims. The creation of a European ’common market’ by way of a step by step 
removal of all impediments leading to a free circulation of products, labour and 
capital between the sixteen OEEC member-states, was called for to realise such 
benefits. Since it was obvious that a general liberalisation process on this scale 
would entail serious risks to the national economies involved, emanating 
difficulties should no longer be dealt with by national protective devices. 
Collective responsibility and financial solidarity were called for. The Stikker Plan 
envisaged two phases for the establishment of the proposed common market. First 
a reduction of 25 percent of quantitative restrictions in intra-European trade was 
to be established. During the projected second phase the remaining 75% of 
quantitative restrictions as well as the abolition of other barriers to trade were to 
be eliminated, step by step, in one industrial sector of industry after another. The 
Plan highlighted and emphasized OEEC-wide liberalisation of the basic industries 
-  primarily of coal and steel -  followed by agriculture and those manufacturing 
industries whose further specialization would constitute a vital contribution to an 
internationally competitive European economy. The reconstruction and 
modernization of the European key industries was to be financed by means of a 
European Integration Fund51.
The shelving of the Stikker Plan by the OEEC during the early 1950s did not 
diminish the conviction of The Hague’s governing elite that overall economic 
liberalization was elementary for the sake of European and more specifically the 
Netherlands’ economic survival and future prosperity. Nevertheless, the Hague 
remained ambivalent on the question whether to head for overall (or ‘horizontal’) 
economic disarmament and cooperation in Western Europe or, alternatively, to 
promote a succession of less ambitious sectoral (or ‘vertical’) market integration 
projects, until, in Autumn 1952, Stikker’s successor Beyen squarely opted for the 
first.
Beyen launched what in retrospective can well be regarded as the most 
important and -  eventually -  most successful campaign in post-war Dutch 
diplomacy, a campaign for overall regional economic integration between the six 
ECSC countries on a supranational footing. The European Economic Community 
(EEC) treaty of 1957, the completion of the EEC customs union by July 1968 and 
the ‘Europe 1992’ campaign for completing the EEC internal market were the 
stepping stones to the realization of Beyen’s ideal. Hence we may well regard the
51. A summary of the Stikker Plan has been publishcd in Jaarboek van het Ministerie van 
Buitenlandse Zaken 1949-50 ('s-Gravenhage 1950). 36-38.
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launching of the Beyen Plan as the starting point for Dutch attempts at effecting 
engineering influence on the framing of today’s European Union. This chapter 
analyses the launching and pursuing of the Beyen Plan as a Smaller Power’s 
exercise in international relations.
1.1. Jan Willem Beyen Sets OfT: the Luxembourg Resolution
Nothing on Jan Willem Beyen’s official track record predicted his transformation 
into an ardent supporter of continental regional integration on a supranational 
footing. Rather the contrary, as a mundane witty and rather cynical international 
banker without party affiliations, he appeared completely free of federalist 
inclinations. Which helped him considerably in winning the confidence of prime- 
minister Drees, who was afraid of and averse to a ‘Vatican led Europe’ as well as 
European political and military experiments with possible detrimental effects on 
NATO unity. After some gentle prodding by the royal family, with which Beyen 
entertained a long-standing friendship, Drees selected Beyen as Stikker’s 
successor at the Foreign Ministry.52 As the new foreign minister Beyen was 
responsible for multilateral European cooperation and integration issues. Joseph 
Luns, who had been the Catholic People’s Party’s (KVP) candidate for the job, 
was appointed as minister without portfolio, responsible for extra-European 
affairs.
Apparently a safe bet, the new foreign minister would nevertheless bring 
about a major transformation of the Netherlands’ European policy. To Drees’ 
dismay he traded in Stikker’s reticent stance on European integration for a pro­
active offensive campaign in which European integration among the Six, in lieu of 
a potential threat to the national interests or a necessary evil at best, henceforth 
represented welcome politico-legal leverage for the creation of a liberal trade 
regime in Western Europe.
The change was considered as rather abrupt. Forty years later, Beyen’s close 
advisor Van der Beugel, who later was to become Foreign secretary for European 
Affairs, remembered Beyen’s entry and subsequent conversion vividly and as a 
miracle:
52. W.II. Weenink. Bankier van de wereld. Bouwer van Europa. Johan Willem Beyen, 1897* 
1976, (Amsterdam etc. 2005), 285-294.
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He was an incredibly captivating man, although I thought him of a rather 
frivolous mind. He was a frivolous man. And that was expressed most of all 
in that he never took anything really seriously. He was so intelligent and of 
quick thinking that he fathomed any issue in no time. He himself was never 
captivated, never committed. That is why it is a miracle how that changed on 
the European issue. That within three months after joining the Department he 
was emotionally grasped and intellectually almost obsessed by the European 
issue. It is the only thing Beyen has ever been committed to.53
It would show, rapidly. On 10 September 1952 the foreign ministers of the 
Six ECSC countries met in Luxembourg on 10 September 1952 and reached 
agreement on a proposal by the Italian government, backed by the French, to 
speed up the negotiations on a new European Community. This European Political 
Community was to serve as a political superstructure for both the Coal and Steel 
Community and the Defence Community. Article 38 of the EDC treaty, namely, 
had charged the general assembly of the future EDC with the drafting of a new 
treaty for such a European Political Community (EPC). The government in Rome 
now came forward with an alternative proposal to not wait until the EDC treaty 
would be ratified and the organisation’s general assembly established. In lieu of 
the Article 38 procedure the foreign ministers agreed to commission the drafting 
o f the EPC treaty to an ‘ad hoc Assembly’, consisting of members of the ECSC 
parliament and other representatives of member states, among whom members of 
the national parliaments. W hen Germany’s Chancellor Adenauer, while chairing 
the meeting, requested each member-state to delegate a representative to a 
committee that would work out the composition and mandate of the proposed 
Assembly an unusual occurrence took place. Edmond Wellenstein, at the time a 
young civil servant in the Foreign Ministry vividly remembers the general 
surprise when Beyen stated that he himself, rather than a high-ranking civil 
servant, would represent the Netherlands on the committee. The new Dutch 
minister’s move, although ‘highly unorthodox’ was not to be attributed to 
inexperience but to his desire to broaden the scope of the Assembly’s mandate. As 
the sole government minister on the drafting committee Beyen secured the chair 
and had no problems in achieving his policy aim. Thus the ECSC resolution of 
Luxemburg of 10 September 1952 states that the political unification of Europe
53. A.G. Ilarryvan, J. van der Harst en S. van Voorst (eds.) Voor Nederland en Europa. Politici 
en ambtenaren over het Nederlandse Europabeleid en de Europese integratie, 1945-1975 
(Amsterdam 2001), 31-61 (41-42).
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could only be successful ‘par des réalisations concrètes créant d’abord une 
solidarité de fait’ and ’par l’établissement de bases communes de développement 
économique et à une fusion des intérêts essentiels des Etats-Membres’54.
The phrase ‘l’établissement de bases communes de développement 
économique’ was to become a catchphrase of Dutch diplomacy for the years to 
come. Known as the ‘Resolutie van Luxemburg’ it served Beyen and his 
collaborators as a politico-legal base for their initiatives for horizontal economic 
integration in Europe.
With the benefit of hindsight Beyen’s ‘conversion’ to European integration is 
not as miraculous as it appeared at the time. Weenink demonstrates that in the 
course of the 1930s Beyen obtained the conviction that the survival of Europe 
required a certain degree of unification. In this he was motivated by practical 
rather than ideological considerations. Since the general welfare had developed 
into a governmental responsibility the governments of Europe were obliged to co­
operate since there were no national solutions for the problems they had to cope 
with: prohibitive barriers to trade, unemployment, monetary obstacles and war, to 
name the most important. Such compelling co-operation, Beyen argued, would 
imply loss of national sovereignty. Hence, Beyen’s views on Europe and the 
necessity of European cooperation were practically rather than ideologically 
inspired, as the outcome of his analysis as a banker and economist implied and his 
personal experiences during the 1930s. At the outbreak of World War II Beyen 
was president of the Bank for International Settlements in Basle. He left 
Switzerland and came to London. As financial and economic advisor of the Dutch 
government in exile he was involved in the Benelux negotiations with Belgium as 
a first practical exercise in regional economic group formation. During the 
London years he was impressed and influenced by David Mitrany, professor at the 
University of Princeton in the United States and advisor to Beyen’s other 
employer, the Anglo-Dutch corporation Unilever, for which he worked as a 
financial director. Mitrany founded the ‘functionalist’ approach to international 
co-operation, advocating the sharing of international interests by transfer of 
national policy competences to supranational ‘functional organisations’ run by a- 
political technocrats. The resulting learning process would facilitate gradual
54. Jaarboek van hel Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken ¡954-55 ('s-Gravcnhage 1955), 234; 
Jean Monnet Oral History Project ‘Vraaggesprekken met Nederlandse beleidsmakers inzake 
Europese integratie', ‘Addendum bij het gesprek van drs. R.P.B.A. Dingemans en drs. J. 
Schram met Dr. E. P. Wellenstein* (Den Haag/Groningen 2001). 4. Weenink, Beyen, 322.
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further integration at consecutively higher levels. Mitrany’s philosophy appealed 
to Beyen in that it treated national economic and social interests preferentially 
over political and military interests of state. This was fully in line with Beyen’s 
conviction that economic decision-making should be at the heart of post-war 
politics. As Mitrany argued prosperity and general well being of the people was to 
precede over sovereignty. International economics and trade called for effective 
international organisation.55
Beyen did not share Mitrany’s preference for a global functional organisation 
per economic sector. During the interwar period, experience had taught him that 
global arrangements tended to fail. There was no reason to assume that they 
would fare better after World War II. Regional integration was also to be 
preferred since it was easier to realise. Likewise he dismissed sectoral integration 
as too limited as it would lead to a fragmented economy. Beyen’s belief in 
supranational organisation did not make him a federalist. On the contrary, he 
deemed attempts at creating a European Federation utopian. A network of 
effective international organisations would eventually result in political co­
operation, but in that order and not the other way around.56
At the end of the war Beyen left for Washington where he served as a 
director of the Worldbank until his return to the Netherlands in the Summer of 
1952. His views on Europe were unknown to the public at large and to prime- 
minister Drees when he selected Beyen as foreign minister in the third Drees 
government (1952-1956). To his displeasure Drees’ supposedly safe bet turned 
out a cuckoo’s fledgling in his cowbird’s nest. Apart from looking for kindred 
spirits in the Ministerraad in attempts at teaming up against Beyen and his plans 
there was not much that he could do about it: in the Netherlands’ coalition 
governments the prime-minister, although responsible for the upkeep of the 
coalition and the quality of cabinet decision-making, is not a leader of government 
in the British or German way. The minister of Foreign Affairs and the Cabinet as 
a whole determine foreign policy. (See ‘A note on the Making of Dutch European 
Policy during the 1950s and 1960s’ at the end of this thesis.)
55. Weenink, Beyen, 318-319.
56. Ibidem.
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1.2 The Beyen Plan: Pressing for European Economic Integration
The Italian-French initiative to speed up the negotiations for a European Political 
Authority confronted the Dutch with a new political situation. In this new 
constellation the wording of the economic clause of the Luxembourg Resolution 
had been Beyen’s First step in his attempt to safeguard the national interests in the 
European integration framework.
In November 1952 Beyen told the Cabinet that further action was called for. 
In view of the poor show of interest shown in ‘the economic aspects of European 
integration’ by the other West-European governments, the Dutch would have to 
awaken that interest, he pointed out to his colleagues by giving concrete form to 
the Dutch ideas with regard to economic integration and by bringing them into the 
open as elaborated concepts by means of a diplomatic campaign.
Moreover, both at home and abroad, the The Hague government was accused 
of clinging to demands for economic integration for solely tactical motives and, of 
using these demands, as a means to torpedo political integration without having to 
speak out against it in the open. A set of proposals, clearly stating what the 
Netherlands positively wanted, was therefore indispensable. Lastly, such an 
initiative would support the position of the Dutch members of the Assembly ad 
hoc in their efforts to push for economic integration while drafting the EPC-treaty 
concept.57
In a report entitled ‘The Foundations of the Dutch Stance on European 
Integration’ he presented an outline for these concepts: He pleaded for economic 
integration of Europe as absolutely essential for the future of the continent. 
Democratic Europe, threatened by communism and fascism both from within and 
outside, would only survive if the totalitarian virus was eliminated by means of a 
gradual but continuous improvement in the standards o f living of its population. 
The necessary enlargement and improvement of European production would not 
be possible as long as the region remained split up into small markets, each 
protected against the other by trade barriers. In this sense European economic 
integration was considered by Beyen a condition for the salvation of European 
civilisation.
Such integration, however, would only be feasible if there was enough 
corporate sense among the participating countries to allow for the sacrifices which
57. Nationaal Archief, The Hague (Henceforth: NA), MR (397), Notulen (Minutes) Ministerraad 
17.11.1952 and 24.11.1952.
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such a process of integration would entail. This corporate sense certainly played a 
key role in Beyen’s philosophy. It was not so much formal relations between 
partners as this sense of unity which was the decisive factor in conditioning the 
degree and effectiveness of co-operation between countries, he reasoned. The 
formal ties between the countries co-operating in Benelux e.g., for example, were 
rather loose, compared with the formal framework of the Dutch-Indonesian Union. 
Still Benelux had been much more successful in bringing about real co-operation 
than the latter; corporate sense had been the decisive factor.
In order to bring about this corporate sense on a European scale, the ‘fusion 
des intérêts’ referred to in the Luxembourg Resolution, would have to play an 
important role. Integration was, in Beyen’s view, much more than the introduction 
o f a particular political structure on a supranational basis; he considered it a 
continually evolving process with economic, political and military aspects which 
were considerably interrelated. ‘Political’ integration without simultaneous 
‘economic’ integration, that is, a political structure for Europe which would only 
pertain to the co-ordination of military affairs and regulations for the coal and 
steel sector, would fail to produce this vital sense of unity.
A first practical consequence of this view would be that the French stance, 
which saw further integration as necessarily limited to the political aspects of the 
coal, steel and defence sectors, would be unacceptable, just as it was unacceptable 
in view of the Dutch national interests, since such a limitation would imply a 
transfer of sovereignty without gains in the field of economic integration. A 
second conclusion for the Dutch would be that political integration outside the 
framework of ECSC and EDC would only make sense if it led towards economic 
integration and would otherwise be equally undesirable. This point of view, 
however, would in turn be unacceptable to the French and Italians. There was a 
problem here, as Beyen did not fail to notice; and he pointed out that the 
international differences of opinion were such that no agreement at all would be 
reached if the Dutch limited themselves to the negative stance that political 
integration without economic integration was unacceptable. A compromise would 
be possible along the following lines; limited political integration within the 
ECSC and EDC frameworks would be acceptable for the Dutch if coupled with 
some degree of progress in the field of general economic integration. The Dutch 
proposals and diplomatic campaign therefore would have to deal with both (a.) 
how far the The Hague government would go in accepting political integration
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and, (b.) what it positively wanted and claimed as far as economic integration was 
concerned.
With regard to (a.), Beyen suggested the acceptance of the attribution of new 
areas of authority as well as -  ‘in principle’- the attribution of certain legislative 
powers to the future EPC Assembly (as compared with the powers of the ECSC 
and EDC assemblies). Also he suggested the partial abandonment of the 
unanimity rule for decisions of the Council of Ministers. Direct elections for the 
Assembly, however, had to be rejected, not only because this would introduce a 
‘destructive communist element’ to this body, but also because such a directly 
elected parliament ‘would run ahead of the existing corporate sense and, therefore, 
instead of furthering the growth o f the latter would on the contrary reduce it’. The 
new institution which was to emanate from this should be based on the principles 
of supranationality. It could be set up in such a way that in the course of time it 
could take charge of the powers which gradually would be assigned to it by 
intergovernmental treaty. Auto-extension by self-legislation outside the control of 
the governments was clearly not what Beyen had in mind. In this way the new 
institution could, in due time, be provided with the responsibility for integrating 
traffic, public health, education etc. It should, however, be guaranteed that the 
new Community would make an immediate start with the groundwork for the 
economic integration of Western Europe.
With regard to (b.), the aim of economic integration should be to raise the 
standards of living in Europe. In order to allow for the necessary rise in 
production and productivity, the integration effort should be centred on the 
diminution and, where possible, the abolition of trade restrictions. The eventual 
goal should be a general Customs Union between the participating countries and 
to this end should be embodied in a treaty. The realisation of this aim would have 
to take place gradually and the effort should be directed first of all against those 
barriers which hampered competition and towards a more rational division of 
labour, standardisation and economies of scale. For eliminating these protectionist 
barriers the supranational organisation to be created would have the task of both 
drawing up rules for their reduction as well as formulating measures to provide 
for the economic and social disturbances which this process of liberalisation 
would bring about. Economic integration on this basis called for a certain degree 
of social and monetary co-ordination. A common monetary unit and a 
supranational central bank, however, would for some time remain impossible. 
Likewise, and just as before, convertibility was to be pursued within the bigger
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framework of the EPU. All this should in no way lead to the formation o f a West 
European block politically and economically isolated from the rest of the world. 
The relations with both the USA and the United Kingdom (cum Sterling Area) 
were to be considered essential, those with the Scandinavian countries important. 
It should be noted that the distinction between sector and general integration, 
which would play a key role in Dutch politics during the 1950's, was now 
formulated, as a dilemma, for the first time. By now Beyen clearly supported the 
‘general’ approach, although sectoral solutions for e.g. agriculture remained 
acceptable to him for the time being.58
Beyen asked Cabinet to approve the setting up of an interdepartmental 
Committee under his chairmanship, which would work out these ideas and give 
concrete form to them with a view to their presentation on an international level. 
Cabinet agreed. The new organisation, officially called the ‘Interdepartmental 
Advisory Committee for European Integration’, became generally known as the 
‘Beyen Committee’, even though Beyen hardly ever attended its meetings.59 It 
was indeed the concepts summarised above elaborated and modified by the Beyen 
Committee between December 1952 and May 1953 (and propagated by means of 
an extensive diplomatic campaign), which were going to constitute the so-called 
Beven Plan. This Beyen Plan would remain the official Dutch policy line for a 
great many years until its political realisation in 1957. In the light of its historic 
importance, a more thorough analysis of its coming into existence seems justified 
and will follow here.
The first task Beyen and his collaborators set themselves was the elaboration 
o f the economic integration proposals to be presented to the other Western 
European governments. In December 1952, their studies resulted in a 
memorandum, addressed to the ECSC partners. This new document largely 
followed the argument of Beyen’s note for Cabinet. It stressed the importance of 
economic integration in general terms and referred to the principle laid down in 
both the ECSC Treaty and the Luxembourg Resolution:
‘Le principe que l ’Europe ne se construira que par des réalisations concrètes 
créant d ’abord une solidarité de fait, et par l’établissement de bases communes de
58. Archief van het Ministerie van Financiën te Den Haag (Archive o f the Ministry o f  Finnnce, 
The Hague (hcnceforth: Min. Fin.)), Generale Thesaurie (henceforth: Gen. Thes.) HBV, 
1262-8, ‘Nota inzake de grondslagen voor het Nederlandse standpunt met betrekking tot het 
vraagstuk der Europese integratie’, 14.11.1952.
59. NA. MR (397), Notulen Ministerraad 17.11.1952.
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développement économique’.60 On the basis of this principle the concept of an 
EPC which would merely function as a political superstructure for EDC and 
EC SC was dismissed: the new organisation should be furnished with real tasks 
and real powers in a new area of integration. The conclusion was drawn that the 
governments without awaiting further developments should proceed to action 
concerning the ‘fusion des intérêts essentiels* as mentioned in the Luxembourg 
Resolution. It would be particularly difficult for the Dutch government, the 
memorandum warned, to support the future establishment of a European Political 
Community, if at that time no tangible results had been reached in the field of 
economic integration. In the opinion of the The Hague government such results 
should mean a Western European agreement on at least the following five issues.
• The gradual establishment of a ‘Communauté Tarifaire’ in a limited number 
of years, leading to the abolition of all internal tariffs and the introduction of a 
common tariff for trade with third countries. The first issue to be collectively 
agreed upon was the abolition of, prohibitive tariffs.
• Common responsibility for temporary disturbances in the national economies 
caused by the integration process.
• A number of safety clauses (permitting escape facilities for individual 
countries in specific situations); under condition that the application of these 
clauses would be decided upon by the Community, i.e. not by those individual 
countries requiring them.
• Co-operation with non-participating countries. The Dutch government adhered 
to its policy line that the economic integration of Europe would eventually have to 
comprise as many countries as possible. The proposed system was meant to 
favour the long term development towards that aim.
• The early establishment of supranational organisations by the participating 
countries for those sectors where detailed preliminary study had already taken 
place, particularly Western European agriculture.61
It can be concluded that in comparison to Beyen’s ‘Note’ for Cabinet from 
November the December Memorandum introduced a number of novelties: First of 
all, the long-term aim of a Western European Customs Union was no longer
60. ‘Memorandum door de Nederlandse Regering op 11 December 1952 toegezonden aan de 
Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken van de andere landen, die deel uitmaken van de Europese 
Gemeenschap voor Kolen en Staal, betreffende de taak en de bevoegdheden van een 
Europese Gemeenschap op economisch gebied', in: Jaarboek van het Ministerie van 
Buitenlandse Zaken 1952/1953, s.1., 1953,234-236.
61. Idem,
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mentioned. The proposals were now focused on a short-term attack on in the 
Dutch view, the most important aspect of the economic integration issue: the tariff 
problem. A Tariff Community was going to be the price the other countries would 
have to pay in exchange for Dutch support for the EPC. (This did not mean, 
however, that the non-tariff barriers to trade, transport and invisibles would 
remain unregulated. The memorandum specified that the latter would have to be 
‘taken into account’ during the negotiations.) Clearly, this focus on tariffs was to 
serve as a complement to the OEEC liberalisation campaigns, which had 
successfully eliminated quantitative restrictions in West European intra-trade, 
leaving governments with tariffs as their main policy instrument for protecting the 
national economy. Secondly, whereas in the November paper it was considered a 
task of the new supranational institution to draw up rules for the elimination of 
trade barriers, the new document insisted on a prior general agreement on the 
details o f the foreseen Tariff Community between the participating countries. 
Thirdly, the general economic integration issue was now linked to some kind of 
agreement on the problem of European agriculture and the establishment of a 
separate supranational organisation for this sector.
1.3 Rethinking the Beyen Plan
A second more elaborate draft o f this set of ideas was sent to the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs in February 1953 and presented by Beyen at a conference of the 
ECSC countries later that month.62 In his letter, Beyen stressed once more the 
necessity to combine political with economic integration, as well as the need to 
aim wholly at economic integration on a general level, instead of the step by step 
or sector approach which would neither do justice to the disparities in and 
between the national economies, nor produce the necessary sense of European
62. Ministerie van Algemene Zaken te Den Haag. (Mini sí ry o f  General Affairs, henccforth: Min. 
AZ)., Kabinet Min. Pres. 351.88(4)75:32, ‘Ontwerp van een Memorandum bestemd voor de 
regeringen', 28.1.1953, with accompanying letter Beyen to Drccs 30.1.1953; ‘Brief van de 
Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, Mr. J.W. Beyen, op 14 Februari 1953 toegezonden aan de 
Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken van de andere landen, die deel uitmaken van de Europese 
Gemeenschap voor Kolen en Staal, betreffende de taak en de bevoegdheden van de Europese 
Gemeenschap op economisch gebied', in: Jaarboek van bet Ministerie van Buitenlandse 
Zaken, 1952/1953, s.1., 1953, 237-241;
Min. Fin., Gen. Thes., BBV, 1262-10. Verslag van de Ministers Conferentie van de zes 
Schuman landen te Rome op 24 en 25 Februari 1953, 28.2.1953, with accompanying letter 
Beyen to Prime Minister 28.2.19; sec also Annex 4 of this report.
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solidarity. Moreover, the repercussions of sectoral integration were not limited to 
the sectors concerned but also involved the entire national and international 
economy. Even under the best imaginable conditions, Beyen argued, sectoral 
integration would lead to nothing but some form of cartelisation at the expense of 
other sectors. He drew the conclusion that Western Europe should head for 
general economic integration. Therefore, the EPC Treaty would have to state in 
general terms the aim of establishing a Western European Common Market. 
Beyen wrote. This new stance reflected the more ‘modem’ views of the 
Department of Economic Affairs and, in particular, o f BEB63 director Linthorst 
Homan, according to whom a ‘simple’ customs union without free factor 
movements would in the longer run not be viable. The dispositions for the first 
step towards this aim, the Tariff Community, would have to be specified in the 
treaty in detail, i.e. both the target year and the timetable for achieving it: ‘La 
réalisation progressive, moyennant des délais préalablement fixés, d’une Union 
Tarifaire, devrait figurer dans ce Traité’.64
It was clear that the Dutch government did not wish to entrust the actual 
realisation of this Tariff Community to the new supranational institution all by 
itself. In fact, in relation to moves towards economic integration, the major 
functions for the proposed EPC executive were limited. It would be given the 
competence to judge requests for the application of safety clauses by member 
countries plagued by ‘troubles fondamentaux’. It would also have the function of 
drafting ‘propositions’ aimed at remedying underlying structural difficulties. 
These propositions would comprise schemes both for the reorganisation of the 
sectors) concerned and for the modernisation of production methods. The 
schemes could be financed in part by the Community, which would have at its 
disposal a special Fund for that purpose. These powers for the Community were, 
in spite of their limited nature, nevertheless considered cornerstones of the Beyen 
approach: Because of the automatic nature of the system aimed at by the Dutch,
63. The roles of the various departments in The Hague’s policy making are discussed in a note at 
the end of this book on the making of the Netherlands' European policy during the 1950s and 
1960s.
64. ‘Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, Mr. J.W. Beyen, op 14 februari 1953 toege­
zonden aan de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken van de andere landen, die deel uitmaken van 
de Europese Gemeenschap voor Kolen en Staal, betreffende de taak en de bevoegdheden van 
de Europese Gemeenschap op economisch gebied', in: Jaarboek van het Ministerie van 
Buitenlandse Zaken 1952/1953, s. 1. , 1953, 237-241; Quotation in: Annex 4 of Verslag van 
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see previous note.
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the possibility of escape from such automatic treaty obligations by Community 
use of a safety clause, (for member countries in serious economic or social 
difficulties) was of crucial importance. The supranationally administered Fund 
was of equal importance. It reflected the common responsibility on all member 
countries of the consequences of integration. In this respect, the earlier drafts for 
general economic integration submitted to the OEEC, such as the Pella Plan, 
showed a fundamental weakness, in that they left the responsibility for coping 
with the effects of the integration process at the discretion of the individual 
governments. Supranationality, the transfer of part of national sovereignty, was a 
necessary precondition to the Fund’s functioning:
Or, ce n’est qu’en instituant une autorité supranationale, personnifiant la 
responsabilité commune, que les conséquences de l’intégration économique 
pourront être supportées, conséquences qui dans le seul cadre national 
rendaient toute mesure envisagée illusoire. Il y a donc nécessité d’un transfert 
' ’ d ’une partie de la souveraineté des pays à une autorité supranationale avec 
des pouvoirs et des responsabilités sur le terrain économique.
as Beyen worded it.65 For agriculture and other sectors, where the impact and 
repercussions of integration would be considerable, the system of safety clauses 
threatened to halt all progress. Therefore, special measures had to be taken for 
these sectors, such as the establishment of a specialised authority and the creation 
o f a common fund.
The first reactions to the Dutch proposals from the ECSC-partners were of a 
mixed nature. During the conference in Rome, in February 1953, all foreign 
ministers proclaimed their agreement with the underlying principles of the Beyen 
approach. Moreover, Van Zeeland from Belgium and De Gasperi from Italy gave 
full support to their Dutch colleague on the particulars of his scheme -  the idea of 
linking the EPC to a Tariff Community included. They argued that a European 
Community without simultaneous and concrete steps towards economic 
integration would be unacceptable. ‘We’re not on our own anymore’, a buoyant 
Beyen reported to the Cabinet. Agreement was not unanimous, however. 
Chancellor Adenauer and French foreign minister Bidault argued against writing 
down in the EPC Treaty itself the foundations of economic integration in general 
and a Tariff Community in particular since this would, in their view, both delay
65. Idem.
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and endanger the coming into force of the European Defence Community. Even 
Benelux partner Luxembourg’s foreign minister Joseph Bech publicly doubted the 
wisdom of linking EPC to the concept of a Western European Customs Union. 
Chancellor Adenauer underlined the necessity of a speedy realisation of Western 
Europe’s new defence framework, referring to the Soviet military build up on the 
one hand and American isolationist tendencies, which might be provoked by 
European inactivity, on the other.66
Meanwhile, in November 1952, the Ad Hoc Assembly in Strasbourg had 
made a start with the drafting of a concept treaty for the future Political 
Community. According to the Luxembourg Resolution, the Assembly’s 
proceedings would have to take place under the ‘guidance’ of the Foreign 
Ministers of the countries concerned. In practice, however, the Dutch efforts to 
substantiate this supervision principle were unsuccessful. The sole result of the 
intergovernmental talks on this subject was a rather incomplete and superficial list 
of questions the Assembly would have to take into account while drafting the EPC 
treaty. Real involvement of the governments turned out to be impossible not least 
because of the fear within the Belgian government that it may have to commit to 
the outcome of the Strasbourg negotiations.67 The consequent freedom of 
movement had an unfavourable impact on the proceedings of the Assembly, 
unfavourable at least from the point of view of the The Hague government. This 
was because the parliamentarians, who were now guided only by the rather vague 
wordings of the Luxembourg resolution, constructed a draft treaty which at 
several points ran counter to the standpoint of the Dutch government.
Right from the beginning of the talks the majority appeared to be concerned 
more with organisational and institutional aspects of the future Community, than 
with the problem of the tasks and powers to be attributed to it. This tendency was 
reinforced by the widespread acceptance among the parliamentarians of the 
French concept that these EPC powers had at first to be limited to the field of
66. NA, MR (398). Notulen Ministerraad 2.3.1953; Min. Fin., Gen. Thés., ‘Verslag van de 
Ministers Conferenüe van de zes Schuman landen te Rome op 25 en 25 Februari 1953’, 
28.2.1953, with accompanying letter Beyen to Prime Minister 28.2.1953. For Luxembourg's 
stance on the Beyen Plan see also 3.3.
67. Min. AZ, Kabinet Min. Pres. 351.88(4):075:32, ‘Verslag van de bespreking van experts der 
zes K.S.G.-landen te Bonn op 4 October 1952’, 7.10.1952, with accompanying letter Beyen 
to Prime Minister 7.10.1952; and; ‘Europese Politieke Gemeenschap', with accompanying 
letter Beyen to Prime Minister 5.2.1953; Min. Fin.. Gen. Thés., BBV, 1262-8. ‘Procès-verbal 
de la réunion des délégués chargés d'élaborer le questionnaire à soumettre à l’Assemblée en 
exécution de la décision du Conseil du 10 septembre 1952', 4.10.1952.
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competence of the EC SC and the EDC. According to this point of view the 
Community was to be drafted as a political superstructure incorporating the 
‘specialised’ Coal and Steel and Defence communities while at the same time 
establishing effective democratic control over the executive. Extension of the EPC 
powers to new fields was regarded as a future affair. Consequently, a lot of 
attention was paid to the drafting of the structure of the parliamentary body. A 
two-chamber system was designed, consisting of a People’s Chamber directly 
elected by the citizens of the member states and a Senate elected by the national 
parliaments. A European Executive would supervise and gradually take over the 
powers of the EDC Commission and the ECSC High Authority. A Council o f 
national ministers would play the role of watchdog, safeguarding the national 
interests. A European Court completed this scheme.68
The Dutch members of the Assembly, who were in close contact with the The 
Hague government and who fully supported Beyen’s ‘no political integration 
without economic integration’ stance, campaigned in vain for the attribution of 
real economic powers to the Executive. Their efforts were unsuccessful, firstly 
because of French resistance to any attempt to give concrete form to such powers 
concerning economic integration and, secondly, because of a more general feeling 
that such powers would endanger the ratification of both the EDC and EPC 
treaties by the French parliament.69
When on March 10, 1953, the vote on the final draft was taken the Dutch 
members of the Ad Hoc Assembly supported the proposed ‘Concept Treaty for 
the European Community’. They did this, however, with the express reservation 
that their vote should not bind them in regard to the attitude to be adopted in due 
course in the Dutch national parliament. The official handing over of the draft 
EPC Treaty by representatives of the Ad Hoc Assembly to the foreign ministers of 
the Schuman countries in Strasbourg on March 9, 1953, gave rise to a debate in 
the Netherlands on the merits and demerits of the proposed ‘Statute’. As far as the 
Cabinet was concerned, however, there were few merits evident in the proposals.
68. Min. BZ, GSI. 910.13 Eur. lm. deel 1. ‘Kort verslag van de zittingen der subcommissies der 
“commission constitutionnelle" der Assemblée ad hoe, (15-25 November 1952)', s.a.; Min. 
AZ., Kabinet Min. Pres., 351.88(4)075:32, ‘Samenvatting van de conclusies van de Tweede 
Zitting van de Assemblee Ad IIoc', 16.1.1953; and: Verslag van de Derde Zitting van de As­
semblee Ad Hoe, 16.3.53; and: ‘Samenvatting Ontwerp-Statuut EPG', 18.2.1953, with 
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Beyen more or less defended the draft as ‘a good working paper’; although, with 
the exception of Mansholt -  the only real ‘European’ (i.e. federalist) in the 
Cabinet -  the general reaction was negative and even cynical. Beyen himself 
stressed the need to continue pressing for economic integration, although he 
admitted that the whole situation was rather unclear, especially with the noticeable 
change in the French attitude since the Rome conference. In contrast with their 
former stance, the French now did not seem very keen on political integration. 
(Diplomatic sources suggested that precisely the growing pressure for economic 
integration by the Benelux countries and Italy had made the Paris government less 
enthusiastic about the whole idea.) Prime Minister Drees agreed with Beyen on 
the need to continue elaborating proposals for economic integration. Drees was 
convinced and argued repeatedly, however, that the other EC SC countries did not 
really want economic unification, and would refuse it. Consequently, he warned 
against the establishment of a complex institutional construction which would be 
‘without any real value for the Netherlands’. A customs union was to be 
considered an absolute condition for Dutch participation in the EPC. He doubted, 
however, whether the EPC Treaty would ever be ratified by the French 
Assemblée Nationale. In that case, a Political Community, serving only as a 
superstructure for the EC SC, would be undesirable. It could be expected then, he 
added prophetically, that the EDC would fall through and that its downfall would 
also mean the end of the EPC-project.70
Because of these uncertainties concerning the EDC ratification, the foreign 
ministers had arranged during the meeting in Strasbourg to convene again in May. 
In the event of sufficient progress they could then decide on the intergovernmental 
conference which would draw up the final version of the Political Community’s 
Statute, as prescribed by the EDC Treaty. In the meantime, the individual 
governments would study the draft of the Ad Hoc Assembly.71 In the Netherlands 
the Beyen Committee was charged with this task and, in its economic 
subcommittee, a critical discussion of both the Assembly’s ‘Project’ and the
70. NA, MR (398), Notulen Ministerraad 16.3.1953, 20.4.1953, 29.4.1953; Min. AZ., Kabinet 
Min. Pres., 351.88(4)075:32, Frankrijk en de Europese integratie, 11.2.1953.
71. Min. AZ., Kabinet Min. Pres., 351.88(4)075:32, ‘Procès-verbal de la réunion des six 
ministres des affaires étrangères à Strasbourg, le 9 mars 1953', 16.3.1953; Min. Fin,, Gen, 
Thés., BBV, 1262-10, ‘Verslag Conferentie v.d. Zes Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken op 9 
Maart 1953 te Straatsburg*, 12.3.1953.
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Dutch proposals took place. The result of these talks was the reformulation of 
Dutch proposals in a new memorandum for the ECSC-partners.72
The first novelty of this new document was that the Tariff Union, as the 
short-term aim, was de facto traded in for a general Customs Union. Although the 
Tariff Community was still maintained as a first aim, it was now completely 
linked to the abolition of quantitative restrictions on trade between the member 
countries, co-ordination of their foreign trade policies with regard to third 
countries and the creation of a common external tariff. The timetable to be written 
into the Treaty would have to deal with the abolition within a certain period of 
time for both tariffs and quota.
This change from the former Tariff Community approach towards something 
which would come down to a Customs Union reflected the criticism of the Tariff 
Community concept expressed by the Beyen Committee itself. Such a Community, 
though technically possible, would not suffice as a means to the Dutch end, the 
Committee argued, if the member countries retained their freedom of action 
concerning other barriers to trade. First and foremost, the establishment of a 
Community should not lead to a rise in non-tariff barriers, it reasoned and it was 
decided to take quantitative restrictions into account as w ell.73 The Dutch 
experience with the OEEC liberalisation program, which had often led to the 
substitution of quota by protectionist tariffs, certainly acted as an important 
motivating force here.
Also, the new approach fitted in with criticism from Benelux-partner 
Belgium. Brussels had given full support to Beyen’s pro economic integration 
policy in general and the Tariff Community goal in particular. It had stressed, 
however, that the preoccupation with tariffs should not push equally essential 
problems like those concerning quota and payments into the background:
Il ne conviendrait cependant pas que Ténoncé explicite d ’une première étape 
-  communauté tarifaire -  puisse porter à croire que d’autres réalisations -  
dont le caractère présente une égale urgence -  seront laissées à l’arrière-plan. 
Il s ’agit notamment de l’abolition progressive des restrictions quantitatives
72. Min. AZ, Kabinet Min. Pres., 351.88(4)075:32, ‘Concept voor Nederlands memorandum 
inzake de Europese Gemeenschap’ undated, accompanying letter 4.5.1953; NA, MR (489), 
Mémorandum du Gouvernement des Pays-Bas concernant la Communauté européenne. 
5.5,1953; accompanying letter Beyen to Foreign Ministers 5.5.1953.
73. Min, AZ, Kabinet Min. Pres., 351.88 (4)075: 32, ‘Rapport van de Economische Sub­
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aux échanges et des mesures à prendre pour améliorer le régime des 
paiements entre pays membres.
Lastly, as the Beyen Committee had pointed out, the Customs Union was -  
contrary to the tariff union concept -  mentioned and specified in both the Havana 
Charter and GATT. Linking up with these two agreements would be advantageous 
in that it allowed the Dutch to demonstrate their non-discriminatory intentions 
both to their partners and to the rest of the world. The conclusion was drawn by 
the Committee that the Tariff Community should be laid down in the Treaty as an 
‘interim agreement leading to the formation of a customs union’. Moreover in the 
Treaty mention should be made of a common market as the ‘ultimate’ goal.
Like its predecessors, the memorandum expressed the view that a target date 
at which all internal tariffs and quantitative restrictions were to be abolished 
should be incorporated into the Treaty. Beyen retained this clause, probably in 
view of the criticism the EPC draft Treaty proposals had received from his 
colleagues in the Cabinet, against the advice of the Economic subcommittee.
Nevertheless, both the memorandum and the subcommittee’s Report now 
stressed the need for policy co-ordination much more than had been the case in 
the earlier documents. For real economic integration, the subcommittee pointed 
out, the elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade would not suffice. 
Given the different conditions for production in the various countries, this aim 
would hardly be feasible if economic and social etc. policies were not -  to a 
certain degree -  going to be co-ordinated or harmonised. Agriculture served here 
as an example. The Memorandum similarly emphasised the need for co-ordination, 
yet it warned that this was not meant in the sense of uniformity. The aim would 
have to be ‘parallelism’ in production costs. How this co-ordination was to be 
brought about and who was going to be responsible for it was less clear.
Also, the memorandum, following the report of the Beyen Committee, 
distanced itself from the earlier concept of special sectoral arrangements and 
specialised High Authorities as for Western European agriculture and perhaps for 
transport. The Committee had studied the merits and demerits o f functional 
integration and the question of whether a partial sectoral approach within the 
general framework of integration would be desirable. Its answers to these 
questions were negative. The memorandum made it explicitly clear that, as far as 
the Dutch were concerned, functional integration came down to cartel-building 
detrimental to both consumers and other, economic and societal sectors. Therefore, 
agriculture should be treated in the same general way as other sectors. However
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distinction between different groups of products and the use of various timetables 
for the elimination of quotas and tariffs ought to remain possible.
Finally, both the memorandum and the Report underlined that the customs 
union should be geared to economic expansion and the modernisation of 
European production and therefore should be open and non-protectionist. Given 
the Dutch stance in earlier years, this should occasion no surprise. Moreover, this 
approach reflected the outcome of the Beyen Committee’s analysis of the 
consequences a customs union would entail for the Netherlands. The most 
important disadvantages for the Netherlands would be an upward movement in 
production costs and prices because of the linkage with more’ expensive’ 
economies as well as the higher tariffs the country would be faced with in its 
commercial contacts with third countries. Both factors would, to a certain degree, 
damage the Dutch competitive position on the world market.
In particular the possibility of high external tariffs caused some anxiety in 
Dutch government circles. An internal note by the Ministry of Finance for 
example had warned against overestimating the importance of the ‘Schuman 
Area’ for Dutch trade. Given its dependence on transit trade, such a tariff wall 
might have serious consequences for the Dutch economy, the note continued and 
would most certainly not contribute to the diversification of national exports.74
The contents of the new memorandum were specified in a number of draft 
economic articles for the future EPC Treaty. As Beyen pointed out to the Cabinet, 
these articles were meant for informal use only, as an indication of the legal 
structure the Dutch had in mind. According to these draft articles, the European 
executive would have to submit a schedule for the elimination of tariffs and 
quotas to the Council o f Ministers and, subsequently, to the European Parliament, 
within one year after the coming into force of the EPC-Treaty. Both organs would 
accept or reject this timetable by majority decision. The entire liberalisation 
operation should maximally last ’X ’, that is, a not yet specified, but fixed number 
o f years. (Beyen himself envisaged at this stage that such a transition period 
would last up to a minimal 5 and maximal 10 years.)
Undoubtedly, the proposed system made the actual realisation of the Customs 
Union much more plausible than had been the case with the economic articles of 
the draft EPC Treaty o f the Assemblee Ad Hoc. Nevertheless, as Prime Minister 
Drees pointed out, it still did not contain a watertight guarantee that such a




customs union would in fact materialise. Therefore, it was to be feared, he 
commented, that it would be impossible to realise the tariff and quotas elimination 
programme. The point was that because of the opposition to economic integration 
in the various countries, a majority for any integration scheme in the European 
Parliament seemed implausible. Essential, therefore, was a clause, which would 
automatically lead to the extinction of all internal Western European tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions, had the customs union come into being after a period of 
for instance 5 or 10 years subsequent to the signing of the Treaty. Also, in view of 
this opposition to economic integration, the Dutch would need to have certainty 
on their economic issues in general before acquiescing to the resolution of the 
institutional problems.
Beyen agreed that the guarantees suggested by Drees were, indeed, vital. He 
added that precisely that question of which guarantees for economic integration 
were to be considered sufficient by the Dutch government was going to be the key 
problem in the future negotiations.75
1.4 Intergovernmental Deliberations on EPC
As had been arranged in Strasbourg the foreign ministers met in Paris on May 12 
and 13, 1953, to discuss the Assemblee Ad Hoc’s draft treaty and the procedure 
for further action on the EPC-project. The most spectacular as well as most 
threatening contribution for the Dutch to this conference was the West German 
one. In line with his earlier attempts to speed up the decision making process on 
the EDC and the EPC, Chancellor Adenauer made clear that he aimed at a fast and 
simple procedure which would quickly lead to results. He deemed further study of 
the matter by national experts as unnecessary. Taking the Assemblee Ad Hoc’s 
concept as the starting point, the ministers should limit themselves to the cutting 
of the institutional knots left over by the Assemblee and charge the ECSC Council 
of Ministers Secretariat with drawing up, on the basis of these ministerial 
decisions, the legal text for the articles to be amended or inserted in the Treaty. In 
order to avoid further complications and retardation, he argued, the treaty and the
75. NA, MR (398) Notulen Ministerraad 11.5.1953 Min. BZ 1,913.10 Europese integratie Deel 2 
'Projet de dispositions économiques du Traité portant Statut de la Communauté 
Européenne'. Marcel Ermers & John Kragt, ‘Tussen tradities en traktaten. Minister Beyen en 
de Europese integratie 1952-1956’ (unpublished MA thesis. History Department of the 
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EPC itself should be kept plain and simple. The Community should be set up as a 
superstructure for EDC and ECSC, integrating them by taking over the 
competencies of these two organisations while at the same time allowing for a fair 
measure of democratic control by a European Parliament. For the time being no 
new powers should be attributed to the new body; an enabling clause which would 
make it possible for the Community to accept future powers (to be attributed in 
due time by agreements between the member states) would suffice for the moment. 
In fact, Adenauer’s approach resembled only too well the ‘institutionalist’ or 
‘minimalist’ line of thought as had been expressed by many a French delegate in 
the Assemblee ad Hoc sessions.
Belgium’s foreign minister, Van Zeeland, led the Benelux attack against the 
Chancellor’s proposals. On the basis of both the Luxembourg Resolution and the 
Assemblee ad Hoc’s concept treaty he stressed the link between the EPC and 
extension of European supranational powers to the economic field. The new 
political institutions could not do without a sound economic base, he told his 
colleagues. Especially for the smaller Western European nations, a common 
market was indispensable, since they were threatened with economic suffocation 
because o f a lack of export markets. Moreover, Beyen added, an EPC which 
would only serve as a superstructure for the specialised communities had never 
been acceptable to the Dutch government. In line with the stance taken by the 
Cabinet, he emphasised the necessity of deciding on the new economic powers to 
be attributed to the Community, before going into detailed discussions regarding 
its institutional arrangements.
Foreign minister Bidault o f France indirectly supported the Benelux case, 
stating that he could not possibly submit to the French parliament an only slightly 
altered draft Treaty. Given the far-reaching consequences an on-going study on 
behalf of the national governments was indispensable. Interestingly enough, he 
also challenged the Chancellor’s minimalist approach by demonstrating that more 
than half o f the articles o f the Assemblee ad Hoc’s draft did not bear any relation 
to either ECSC or EDC; in other words: the EPC-project obviously should go 
further than the prevailing situation. Since the French government, however, had 
not yet taken a stance on the matter, he did not want to commit himself to 
concrete statements about the nature of the new powers to be attributed. Bidault’s 
support for an on-going study can be understood as delaying tactics reflecting the 
change o f mood in France on EDC since early 1953.76
76. NA, MR (398) Nolulen Ministerraad 26.5.1953 Min. BZ, II, 913.100, inv. no. 26: ‘Verslag
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Italy’s De Gasperi basically defended his country’s federalist approach. The 
Western European countries could and should not discuss their future ‘ex novo’ 
anymore, since there was already the Ad Hoc Assembly’s draft EPC treaty, which 
‘soit è la base de nos discussions’. Although he too expressed the opinion that 
concrete results should be obtained as soon as possible, this did not mean that he 
supported Adenauer’s minimalist view with regard to the competencies of the 
future Community.
Consequently, the German Chancellor became isolated and his proposals 
were rejected. Eventually the ministers agreed that a new -  now 
intergovernmental conference for drawing up an EPC Treaty was to take place in 
Rome from June 12 onwards. Its results would be discussed by the foreign 
ministers at a conference in The Hague on July 12. No clear agreement was 
reached on the exact status of the concept of the Ad Hoc Assembly. Bidault, 
presiding over the meeting, concluded that the draft should serve as a basis for 
discussion; nevertheless it was up to the individual governments to decide if and 
to which degree they felt committed to this concept treaty.77
In his report to the Cabinet, Beyen showed himself greatly relieved that the 
institutionalist threat had been staved off. Approvingly he made mention of 
Adenauer’s surly remark that Benelux foreign policy co-operation had won the 
day. He was aware, however, of the possibility that this victory would turn out to 
be only a short-lived one. It remained to be seen, for instance, on which stance the 
French government would Finally decide. Moreover, he reasoned, Western 
Germany and Italy clearly wanted to see results at short notice, not in the least 
because of strong electoral pressures. One had to reckon with the possibility, he 
concluded, that at the future intergovernmental conference more attempts would 
be made to push for a limited Political Community. Hence it was advisable that 
the Cabinet, as soon as possible, form a notion of the objections which would be 
raised against the Dutch proposals at the forthcoming conference. Now that The 
Hague had made known its line of thought in detail, it should both try and
van de conferentie van Parijs, 12-13 mei 1953’; with accompanying letter Beyen; Wilfried 
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overcome its remaining internal differences of opinion, as well as explore the 
reactions to its approach in the five partner capitals.78
Hence, in order to bridge their internal differences the The Hague policy 
makers met in a series of cabinet meetings and interdepartmental committees. 
Once more Prime Minister Drees aired his disbelief of the prospect of realising a 
satisfactory degree of economic integration within the EPC framework. At the 
other extreme, Minister for Agriculture Mansholt pleaded in favour of a less 
economic-oriented and more institutionalist approach, i.e. the creation of a 
European political structure along the lines of the French and Italian conceptions. 
These deliberations did not produce tangible results. Beyen, with the support of 
Economics Minister Zijlstra skilfully steering a middle course between Scylla and 
Charybdis, could not prevent the Dutch delegation leaving for Rome with an 
extremely strict set of instructions allowing for very little room for manoeuvre 
during the negotiations. Secondly, with a view to sounding reactions and 
clarifying the Dutch point of view abroad, a team of two senior civil servants was 
sent on a tour of the Western European capitals. During the end o f May and early 
June 1953, Linthorst Homan, director of the Foreign Economic Relations 
Department (BEB) of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Van der Beugel 
heading the Economic and Military Cooperation Department of the Foreign 
Ministry visited Brussels, Luxemburg, Paris, Bonn and Rome, discussing the three 
memoranda constituting the Beyen Plan and the perspectives for the Rome 
negotiations in general. Their reports to The Hague demonstrated that, in spite of 
general appreciation of the Beyen Plan as a basis for discussion (as yet, no other 
country had come forward with clear-cut proposals), internal division within the 
other governments was as least as substantial as in the Netherlands. Favourable 
arrangements towards embodying economic arrangements in line with Beyen’s 
suggestions, they learned, could not be taken for granted. In Brussels, 
Benelux-partner Belgium eventually agreed to the general line of the Dutch 
approach. Allegedly, American pressure overcame Foreign Minister Van 
Zeeland’s Drees-like anti-EPC sentiments. Van Zeeland’s support for economic 
integration therefore, was not completely trusted, nor were his pleas for policy 
harmonisation appreciated by the Dutch. Some argued that Van Zeeland’s new
78. Idem.
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policy line was aimed at torpedoing the EPC-talks by complicating them and at 
luring the Dutch into stands that could be used against them in the current 
negotiations on the establishment of an economic union between the Benelux 
countries. The Dutch delegates felt themselves more at ease with their interlocutor 
from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, J. Snoy et d’Oppuers. Over the years this 
department had advocated economic co-operation and integration, in spite of the 
dominance of the Foreign Ministry on the matter.80 In Luxemburg the government 
showed itself preoccupied with its nation’s agricultural interests and, apart from 
that, seemed inclined to copy the Belgian stances during the forthcoming 
negotiations.81 In Rome, Linthorst Homan and Van der Beugel were confronted 
with reticent Italian attitudes. More than ever Italian reasoning seemed 
institutionalist-oriented and stuck with the idea that the creation of a political 
community could solve both Europe’s and Italy’s problems. The message was 
clear. More than sympathy for the Dutch economic proposals as a blueprint for 
possible future action was not to be expected.82 More encouraging were Dutch 
experiences in Bonn. The minimalist stance adopted by Adenauer earlier in the 
year which had been a cause of alarm in the Netherlands, was now under serious 
challenge by pro-economic integration initiatives from Secretary of State 
Hallstein and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The latter’s Academic Advisory 
Council came forward with a note which characterized political unification 
without economic integration as ‘unimaginable’ and in which the establishment of 
a customs union -  to be developed into a common market -  as well as a 
considerable degree of policy harmonisation, were advocated. This note and, more 
importantly, the fact that it obtained the official blessing of the Federal 
Government, was welcomed by the Dutch as winds of change in the right 
direction. Adenauer, who had the final say in the matter, however, had not yet 
made up his mind, according to diplomatic sources. Whether the German
80. Min. BZ, I, GS, 913.10, ‘Europese Integratie deel II’, Codetelegram Beycn/Luns to 
Washington, 9.6.1953; Min. BZ 1,913.100, no. 66 Beelaerts van Blokland to Van der Beugel, 
16.5.1953; Min. BZ, 913.100, 27, Linthorst Homan/Van der Beugel to Klim Min. BZ,
22.5.1953.
81. Min. BZ, I, 913.100, no. 27, Codetelegram Van der Beugel/Linthorst Homan to Min. BZ,
23.5.1953.
82. Min. BZ, I, G.S., 913.10 ‘Europese Integratie deel I I \  Codetelegram Boon to Min. BZ, 
6.6.1953; and: codetelegram Beyen/Luns to Washington, 9.6.1953; Min. BZ 1 ,913.100, 28, 
Codetelegram Van der Beugel:, Linthorst Homan, Eschauzier to Min. BZ, 12.6.1953. On this 
trip Linthorst Homan and Van der Beugel were accompanied by the Director-Gencral 
Political Affairs, H.F. Eschauzier.
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Chancellor would, wholeheartedly or not, support a pro economic integration 
policy seemed dubious, Beyen realised. If he did, on the other hand, there was the 
risk of the German delegation in Rome coming up with highly ambitious 
economic demands which would appear unacceptable for the Paris government.83 
Unfortunately, for the time being the question of what would be acceptable for 
France was to remain an academic one, since at the end of May the French 
government led by René Mayer had tendered its resignation. During the trip to 
Paris, it became clear that few certainties could be found about future French 
European policy. The French administration was divided. The stance taken by the 
French foreign office remained negative. Loss of sovereignty, social 
consequences, the Union Française, Europe’s shortage of raw materials, cross 
border labour movements and ‘le danger de la concurrence’ were among the 
arguments brought to the fore. The Paris Interministerial Committee on European 
economic co-operation issues, however, waged a devastating campaign in favour 
of economic integration against the opposition of the Quai d’Orsay84
The demissionary state of the Mayer government also led to a postponement 
o f the scheduled Rome conference. It was not until September 1953, that the 
experts of the six ‘Schuman Countries’ would finally meet, in order to discuss in 
detail the various national proposals, as well as (according to some: on the basis 
of) the draft proposal o f the Assemblée-ad-Hoc.
Meanwhile, the ministers of Foreign Affairs met informally in Paris on June 
22, 1953. Since nothing substantial could be decided upon, this meeting served 
mainly as a modest attempt to show the German and Italian electorates as well as 
the Washington government that the European integration process was alive and 
still on course.83 Another ministers’ conference at Baden-Baden (August 7 and 8,
83. Min. BZ, I, G.S., 913.10 ‘Europese Integratie deel H \ codetelegram Beycn/Luns to 
Washington, 9.6.1953; and codetelegram Lamping to Min. BZ, 2.6.1953; and codetelegram 
Lamping to Min. BZ 6.6.1953; Min. BZ, 1,913.100, no. 27 codetelegram Linthorst Homan/ 
Van der Beugel to Min. BZ, 29.5.1953 Min. BZ, DGEM 516/73, ‘Der Wissenschaftliche 
Beirat beim Bundes- Wirtschaftsministerium hat sich auf seinen 24. Tagung von 24. April bis 
1 Mai 1953 mit der Frage der Wirtschaftlichen Integration Europas befasst und dazu wie folgt 
Stellung genommen’, 1.5.1953.
84. Elgersma, Les Pays-Bas, 54-55.
85. Min. BZ, 1, 913.100, no. 39, ‘Procès-verbal de la réunion des six ministres des affaires 
étrangères, Baden-Baden les 7 et 8 Août 1953’.
Min. BZ, DGEM, dossier 514, inv. no 17, ‘Betreft: Economische punten op de ministerscon­
ferentie te Baden-Baden’.
Min. Fin., Gen. Thés., BBV, 1262 no. 10, ‘Verslag van de vergadering van de zes ministers 
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1953) did not produce tangible results either, apart from the fact that the wording 
of its communiqué, stressing the idea that the EPC would be ‘a community of 
sovereign states’, dashed the hopes of many of those who believed in a truly 
federalist Europe. For Beyen, who considered European integration as a means to 
an economic end rather than an aim in its own right, this outspoken anti-federalist 
novelty was perfectly acceptable.
Hardly any attention was paid to economic integration during these meetings, 
which enabled the Dutch to devote their attention to Fine-tuning their proposals for 
the forthcoming experts’ conference.
Tellingly, after their Baden Baden conference, the foreign ministers hardly 
discussed EPC among themselves. As an object of intergovernmental talks, EPC 
was relegated to the levels of deputies and civil-servants. In these discussions, 
events took a turn not unfavourable for the Netherlands, in that Adenauer, bucked 
up by his 1953 electoral victory, wanted European integration to steam ahead, 
enabling the German delegation to take the Hallstein line in favour of economic 
integration within the EPC framework, consistent with the Academic Advisory 
Council paper. Belgium, by and large, supported the Hague Customs Union 
proposals. Luxembourg said it was willing to go along with the latter, on 
condition that the country’s protective exception clauses and overall protected 
status within the Belgian-Luxembourgian Economic Union (BLEU) would find 
continuation in the EPC. Provided economic integration was dealt with succinctly 
in the Treaty, Italy too agreed, leaving France as the only participating country 
objecting to an economic dimension of EPC as such. The other Five also declared 
themselves in favour of the customs union concept. Isolating France was Beyen’s 
strategy and he was willing to make substantial concessions on, amongst others, 
institutional issues, in order to maintain a common front against French 
unwillingness on the main issue. Germany’s role in this was vital. When the Five 
succeeded in keeping up a common stance, American pressure on France would 
eventually, once the EDC was ratified, force Paris to agree with the Customs 
Union.86
In spite of such progress, by late 1953, it was evident that a political breakthrough 
on EPC was deemed impossible for the time being, i.e. as long as the French 
parliament did not ratify the EDC treaty. In the meantime, Beyen stuck to the 
Dutch point of departure that a European Community without an economic
86. Ermers and Kragt, Tussen tradities, 75-96.
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dimension was unacceptable. Strong American pressure notwithstanding, he was 
unwilling to make concessions in any shape or form on this matter.87 His policy 
was aimed at shifting American pressure on to France while tactfully maintaining 
a cohesive relationship with the other Five partners.88
During the The Hague conference on November 26, 1953, it was decided at 
Beyen’s suggestion to charge a working party of experts with the hitherto 
unsolved political and economic problems, leaving the members time to come up 
with proposals till March 15, 1954.89 Beyen hoped that American pressure to 
make concessions to France (with a view to the ratification of the EDC-treaty by 
the French parliament, see 1.5) would, by then, have vanished,90 Moreover, the 
Netherlands, then chairing the ECSC, would nominate the chairman of each of the 
working parties.
Throughout the first half of 1954 a common front of the Five on the 
economic dimension of EPC was indeed successfully upheld. However, Beyen’s 
assessment that France would eventually give in and accept the economic features 
o f EPC proved wrong.91 Instead of Paris accepting the Beyen Plan component of 
EPC for the sake of the Defence Community, the year 1954 would bring an 
altogether different outcome.
1.5 Endgame: the Backlash of the European Defence Community
When, in October 1950, French defence minister Pleven launched his proposal for 
a European Army, reactions from the Netherlands had originally been negative. 
The Hague was in favour of a German contribution to the defence of the West, 
hence of German rearmament within the framework of the Atlantic Community, 
i.e. by NATO-membership of the Federal Republic. Pleven’s scheme, however, 
advocated a European Defence Community (EDC) incorporating German forces, 
thus eschewing the sensitive issue of a restoration of the Wehrmacht, or, at least, 
the creation of a new national army in Germany92. The French, in Warner’s
87. P. Borguignon, ‘De r entrée en vigeur du traité de Paris h celle de traits de Rome’, Studia 
Diplomatica 34 (1981), 323.
88. Ibidem.
89. Max Jansen en and Johan K. De Vree. The ordeal of unity. The politics o f European 
integration, 1945-1985 (Bilthoven 1985), 131.
90. NA, MR (398), Notulen Ministerraad 30-9-1953.
91. R.T. Griffiths, & A.S. Milward, ‘The Beyen Plan and the European Political Community*, 
E.U.I.-Colloquium Paper, Florence, 1986, 20-27.
92. Johan K. De Vree and Max Jansen, The Ordeal o f  Unity. Integration and Disintegration in
elegant phrasing, ‘hoped to spin a cocoon of supranational restraints around West 
Germany from which it could never escape’.93
The Hague deemed its national security interests better served within NATO than 
by means of a European Army. The Dutch foreign policy elite looked askance 
upon integration experiments in the area of high politics, the latter regarded as 
potential threats to NATO unity and coherence. Stikker felt that the proposed 
European Army and the adjoining political institutions would entail the 
construction of a fully-fledged federal state. He felt strongly against The 
Netherlands being part to such a state. As he worded it in his memoirs:
(...) I was held back from taking an active role in European federalism, as the 
majority of the Dutch people in an upsurge of idealism wanted at that time, 
precisely because I saw no indication of how these grand ideas would fit into 
the pattern of world policy so long as the United States, on whose monopoly 
of nuclear weapons we all relied, and Great Britain and the Commonwealth 
had not clarified their thinking on these complex and formidable problems.94
In the Summer of 1951 a change in American policy forced Stikker, as he 
had predicted in November 1950, to change course. For a number of reasons, 
among other things the prospect to ‘Bring American boys home’, the United 
States now became an active supporter of the Pleven Plan. As a result, the 
Netherlands changed its status at the Paris EDC conference from observer to 
active participant and set to work to dress down the supranational, military and 
budgetary scope of the Defence Community, as well as claiming a substantial 
institutional role for its smaller member-states.
The role of enfant terrible at the negotiations was taken over by the Belgian 
delegation, whose ‘critical, almost uncompromising attitude’ allowed the 
Netherlands to play a constructive intermediary role between Belgium and the 
other participants. Thus Benelux foreign policy co-operation underwent a revival 
of sorts.95
Modern Europe (Amsterdam 1998), 121-122.
93. G. Warner, ‘The United States and the Rearmament of West Gennany, 1950-54', 
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Under substantial American and British pressure on the Benelux countries, 
Germany and France -  in which the threat of diminishing American military 
assistance played a powerful role -  the Six overcame their differences. The EDC 
Treaty of Paris was signed on 27 May 1952. It showed that there was considerable 
leeway given to the Benelux objections against Pleven’s original proposals. The 
single European Minister of Defence, advocated by Pleven, was substituted for a 
Council of Ministers which would decide on all budgetary and other important 
matters pertaining to this new institution by means of unanimity. In the eyes of the 
Dutch government, the EDC was now acceptable, but as a necessary evil only. 
Stikker’s successor, Beyen, showed moderate support for the Defence Community 
Treaty purely due to its being inextricably linked to the EPC and hence to his 
Customs Union campaign.96 Although Drees had reckoned with EDC ratification 
problems in Germany, because of the discriminatory elements against that country 
in the Treaty, it was the French Parliament which became increasingly critical of 
the political and military integration project even though the latter had been 
launched by French governments. ‘Anti-CEDisme’ (Anti EDCism) became a 
force to be reckoned with in French politics. From May 1952 till August 1954, 
consecutive French governments postponed submitting the EDC treaty for 
ratification, meanwhile -  with some degree of success insisting on additional 
‘protocols’ containing further concessions from the Five to France.
With a view to exerting pressure on Paris, American Secretary of State Foster 
Dulles, demanded the remaining five countries to speed up their national 
ratification procedures. Again, the threat of an ‘agonising reappraisal’ of 
American policy on Europe in the event of EDC failure, proved effective. Beyen 
managed to convince his reluctant colleagues in the Cabinet to submit the Treaty 
for parliamentary approval. On 23 July 1953, the Tweede Kamer ratified the 
Treaty with a large majority of 75 votes to 11. Again, as Elgersma words it, ‘le 
parlement néerlandais est plus favourable aux projects supranationaux que le 
gouvernement’.97
It was to no avail. In assuming that the Treaty, once it was ratified by the 
other five member-states, would o f necessity be ratified by France, Foster Dulles 
had underestimated the strength of the combined forces o f nationalism (Gaullism, 
m ore specifically) and communism in French national politics. In August 1954, 
Anti-Cedists of the Left and Right managed a majority of 319 parliamentarians
96. Elgersma, Les Pays-Bas, 39. Van der Harst, The Atlantic Priority, 170.
97. Van der Harst. The Atlantic Priority, 175-183; Elgersma. Les Pays-Bas, 39.
50
over 264, whose combined votes secured a definitive stop on the EDC ratification 
procedure.
In The Hague, the news of French obstruction was received with equanimity 
(as a vessel for German rearmament the Treaty had been second choice, anyway), 
with one notable exception: Beyen. The eventual refusal of the French parliament 
to ratify the EDC treaty dealt a death blow not only to EDC but likewise to the 
European Political Community and, with it, to the Beyen Plan for a West 
European Customs Union.98
Thus, amid a drastic change in the international context caused by the 
downfall of the European Defence Community, Beyen’s campaign for a liberal 
economic trade regime among the Six came to a grinding halt.
Like Foster Dulles and unlike prime-minister Drees, Beyen had steadfastly 
held to the belief in EDC ratification by the French Parliament. Even as late as 
June 1954, he still thought that if the French were finally confronted with the 
fundamental choice between either ratifying the Treaty or accepting German 
membership of NATO, they would eventually see the light.99
1.6 Discussion
Beyen’s policy saved the Netherlands from having to reject the EPC. Initially, his 
plans for horizontal economic integration within the EPC framework got little 
positive response, either at home or abroad. And in the end EDC turned out to be 
too large an obstacle. Arguably, Beyen remained sanguine for too long on the 
chances of the EDC treaty finding ratification, as well as fostering unrealistic 
expectations of the effect of American pressure on France. The causal chain also 
worked the other way. As Loth argues: ‘L’insistance néerlandaise en faveur de la 
Communauté économique conduisit à l’échec des négociations sur la 
Communauté politique, lequel entraînait l’échec final de la Communauté de 
défense’.100 Like Foster Dulles, Beyen had banked on convincing Germany and 
isolating France. Although both aims did eventually materialise, his policy failed. 
Whereas Foster Dulles had underestimated the strength of anti-CEDisme in
98. F.W.E. Fursdon, The European Defence Community. A History (London 1980). 296-297,
99. Van der Harst, The Atlantic Priority, 183.
100. Loth. ‘L’Allemagne', 250. Van der Harst, The Atlantic Priorin• passim.
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French national politics, Beyen, deeming that France had become ‘intellectually 
isolated', had invested too much trust in French EDC ratification.101 
On the other hand, Beyen managed to get the Netherlands’ economic desiderata 
back on the European integration negotiating table and to arrive at a substantial 
degree of agreement on the desirability of European economic integration 
between five of the six member-states of the Communities, thus laying the 
intellectual and diplomatic foundation for the future discussion and eventual 
implementation of his ideas in the European Economic Community.
Contrary to his predecessor Stikker, Beyen did not deprecate supranational 
integration or the establishment of a continental block. During his term of office 
he turned out to be an enthusiastic supporter of European economic integration on 
a supranational footing. His experiences as an international banker appear to have 
played a part here. For all that, during the Stikker and Beyen years (1948-1956), 
Dutch policy displayed a great deal of continuity in that both pursued step-by-step 
liberalization o f intra-European trade as the first aim of the Netherlands European 
policy. Institutionally, even Stikker eventually had had to reconcile himself to the 
prospect of a European federation of sorts, a rather uninviting prospect to him, but 
at the same time recognised as the inevitable outcome o f the course undertaken 
when founding Benelux, i.e. liberalisation by means of regional integration for the 
benefit of the Dutch economy. For Beyen, however, supranationalism was no 
threat but a challenge and an opportunity for realising fundamental long-term 
aims of Dutch foreign policy.
This does not necessarily imply or entail a federalist conviction. Duchene, 
commenting on the Netherlands reticent stance during the EDC negotiations, 
observed ‘the Benelux countries were not at all their later federalist selves’.102 
Duchene is right, up to a point. From the early 1950s both Parliament and public 
opinion expressed substantial federalist sympathies and support for European 
unification. Among the government, the Foreign Ministry and foreign policy 
making elite as whole, however, federalist convictions were a scarce commodity. 
Griffiths links what he describes as ‘the overwhelmingly pro-European 
reputation’ o f the Netherlands in the 1950s to its Parliament and parliamentarians 
and wonders how ‘in a supposedly democratic system’ the latter seemed incapable 
of exercising any significant pro-federalist influence on the government’s
101. Van tier Harst, The Atlantic Priority, 182.
102. R.T, Griffiths, The Netherlands and the integration o f Europe, 1945-1957 (Amsterdam 
1990), XI.
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European policy. For the Stikker years (1948-1952) this is undeniably true. The 
intergovernmental approach was dominant. 103 The Hague’s insistence on 
incorporating a Council of Ministers in the ECSC framework has been mentioned. 
Reluctance by the Drees government to serious delegation of power to the EDC 
was in the same vein. In a supranational structure, Stikker and his ministry argued, 
the larger powers would unavoidably dominate the smaller ones. As Van der 
Harst observed, this approach contrasted sharply with the fact that in later years 
supranationalism was looked upon as a major instrument for protecting the 
interests of smaller states.104 The initiator of this change was Beyen.
For Beyen, supranational institutions and supranational decision-making 
were a means to an end, to further and protect the Netherlands’ interest. From the 
second half of the 1950s onwards the Beyen approach -  which we could call 
‘functional supranationalism’ -  became a leading principle of the Netherlands’ 
policy on Europe. Apart from the institutional method, Beyen changed the scope 
of the Dutch liberalization campaign from the broad OEEC framework, including 
Britain and the Scandinavian countries to the more limited grouping of the six 
ECSC countries, precisely for the reason that in this ‘little Europe’ by means of 
supranationalism, results could be achieved where OEEC had failed.
During the period under consideration Benelux policy co-operation played a 
variable role. After its initial successes, Benelux as a foreign policy coalition 
became limp during the Fritalux, Schuman Plan and European Army negotiations. 
Mutual personal dislike between Stikker and his Belgian colleague Van Zeeland 
appears to be the cause. After Beyen came to the fore in August 1952 Benelux 
talks were revived and wherever possible the two countries supported each other 
during the EPC and the latter half of the Defence Community negotiations.
Both Stikker and Beyen can be said to have pursued a policy aimed at 
engineering influence in the making of the Communities. Stikker’s reactive and
103. Stikker himself, however, mentions the pro-integration majority as one of the two major 
reasons for not staying on as Foreign Minister in 1952 (the other being disagreement with his 
parliamentary party on Dutch New Guinea policy): ‘1 felt that the creation of a separate 
group of Six, before we really knew what directions its foreign or defence policies might 
take, was too risky a enterprise. I feared that the establishment of a restricted bloc of Six, 
which might even become autarkic, would, instead of leading to wider Western European 
unity, split Western Europa into blocs, I likewise feared the dangers that it posed to the vital 
need for unity within the Atlantic Alliance. Here again, however, the majority of the New 
Dutch Parliament felt otherwise.' Dirk U. Stikker, Men of Responsibility. As seen through the 
Memoirs o f a Participant in Years o f World Crisis (New York 1965). 250.
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predominantly defensive approach towards European integration and 
supranationalism within the framework of the Six found replacement by Beyen in 
initiating a pro-active and intellectually challenging campaign for a liberal and 
supranational trade regime among the Six.
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Chapter 2: The Netherlands, Benelux, and the Relance Européenne
2.0 Introduction
The refusal of the French National Assembly, on August 31, 1954, to ratify the 
treaty for the European Defence Community (EDC), forced the Dutch 
Government to reconsider its policy towards Western European integration. The 
collapse of the EDC project effectively put an end to all plans for a European 
Political Community, and, with these, torpedoed the Dutch Government’s main 
lever for promoting economic integration by means of a customs union between 
the six participating countries of the European Coal and Steel Community. In 
brief, the ‘No political integration without economic integration’ approach of the 
Dutch Government had been robbed of its meaning. This chapter deals with a 
period in the post-war history of European integration which is generally referred 
to as ‘La Relance européenne’, the European Relaunch. During the nine months 
between the shipwrecking of the European Defence Community Treaty by the 
French Parliament in August 1954 and the start of new intergovernmental 
negotiations which were the result of the Messina Conference in June 1955, 
various plans for the future of European integration were presented. Arguably, the 
most important of these schemes was the joint proposal of the governments of 
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The so-called Beyen-Spaak initiative 
resulted in a common Benelux-memorandum, which laid the foundation of the 
Resolution of Messina, which, in turn, started the negotiations on what was to 
become the European Economic Community.
The aim of this chapter is to present a detailed analysis of the Beyen-Spaak 
initiative, as much as possible on the basis of primary source material, with a view 
to gauging the pursuance of engineering influence by the Netherlands and its 
concomitant use of smaller Power policy instruments.
2.1 Saving Western Europe’s Defence from the EDC Wreck
During the weeks following the decision of the French Parliament, Foreign 
Minister Beyen and his colleagues in the Dutch Government came to the 
conclusion that, for the time being, no real progress in the field of Western 
European integration could be made. This pessimistic view of the future of the
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aims of his own policy was largely coloured by Beyen’s perception of French 
foreign policy as formulated by the Mendfcs-France Government. The Dutch 
Foreign Minister had had serious misgivings about the direction and underlying 
intentions of the policy of the French Government towards Western European 
Integration well before the debacle of the EDC Treaty. The rejection of the EDC 
Treaty by the French Parliament confirmed Dutch suspicions of French intentions, 
or lack o f intentions, in Western Europe. Beyen perceived this decision as an 
important and unpromising victory of nationalism over supranationalism in the 
foreign policies of Western European states, rather than as a protest against the 
rearmament of Western Germany105. The decision served as a vote of confidence 
for Mendds-France and his return to what was considered a pre-ECSC, 
nationalistic policy. Beyen showed himself deeply disappointed and concluded: 
T h e  history of the EDC has shown that for the present we should not place a lot 
of hope on further supranational organisation of Western Europe (whatever the 
scale and in whatever framework), considering that Mendfcs-France will probably 
continue playing the most important political part in France for a long time.’106. In 
the Queen’s speech on 21 September the government reconfirmed its adhesion to 
supranational political and economic integration107 and hence to the policy which 
Beyen had consistently pursued since September 1952. During the following 
months the government did not air an elaborated concept o f its European policy 
goals and ambitions.108
The failure of the EDC project, however, raised immediate, concrete 
problems. Western European Governments had still to resolve the fundamental 
question of the rearmament of Western Germany, and, therefore, the West 
German contribution to the whole Western defence effort. This problem was dealt 
with, in the course of a series of conferences held in London and Paris during 
September and October 1954, on the basis of a set of proposals presented by Sir 
Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary. The Paris Agreements were the 
outcome of these talks. In accordance with Eden’s proposals an agreement was 
reached that on the one hand allowed Germany and Italy to become members of
105. NA, 400, Notulen Ministerraad 13.9.1954.
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NATO, but on the other hand imposed certain restrictions on German rearmament 
within the framework of the Brussels Treaty109.
The Eden Solution was a solution founded on an intergovernmental basis. 
The Brussels Treaty Organisation, now transformed into the Western European 
Union (WEU) lacked the supranational features of the proposed EDC, which, in 
fact, was precisely why it was acceptable to the U.K. Government. The UK’s 
commitment to maintaining its military presence on the Continent on the other 
hand was, together with the restrictions on German rearmament, of the utmost 
importance in piloting the Eden solution through the French Parliament110.
For the Dutch Government, the Eden Plan was acceptable as a solution for 
the Western European defence problem. It was regarded a technical solution with 
a certain practical value. Its relevance for European economic integration, 
however, was considered null and void. British participation in WEU was, of 
course, looked upon favourably. Nevertheless, British participation excluded the 
possibility of considering WEU as a nucleus of future Western -European 
integration on a supranational basis111. Beyen wrote:
The WEU is an alliance which has come into being not owing to logic as 
such but because of a lamentable but undeniable reality, to settle the question 
of Germany’s rearmament. There is no fundamental difference from other 
forms of intergovernmental cooperation like NATO, OEEC, etc. It is not 
exaggerated to state that the furthering o f European supranational 
cooperation taking the WEU as a starting-point is bound to remain a castle in 
the air only leading to disappointing experiences because of (a) the United 
Kingdom being a member and (b) the attitude of the French Government.112
On this point Beyen was at odds with many of the ardent pro-European (i.e. 
federalist oriented) parliamentarians in the Netherlands, who generally stressed a 
need to prevent the stagnation of the movement towards Western European 
integration and to maintain the new-found momentum provided by the solution of 
the European defence problem by initiating further moves in the political and 
economic fields. Also (according to Beyen: therefore) they were inclined to regard
109. ‘La Conférence de Londres et Paris en septembre et octobre 1954’, in: Chronique de 
Politique Etrangère viii (1955), 1526; R. Massigli, Une comédie des erreurs 1943-1956, 
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the WEU as ‘a kind o f  EDC, now including the U.K. as well as the continental 
Six, and therefore, as a suitable starting point for ‘further’ or ‘real’ European 
integration within the framework of the WEU. This attitude was looked upon by 
Beyen with scorn. In his opinion it was futile, if not dangerous, to blur the 
borderline between cooperation and integration, that is between intergovernmental 
and supranational organisation. Apart from the practical limitations set by French 
and British policies as they were, cooperation and integration should be kept apart 
for the benefit of the realm.113
2.2 Patience and Defensive Reticence
This line of thought was enlarged upon in Beyen’s cabinet paper of 19 November, 
1954 on ‘The Policy of the Dutch Government concerning European 
Cooperation’114 The document comprised a long litany of woes against French 
foreign policy. It made the point that as far as European integration was concerned 
nothing constructive could be done while French European policy remained as it 
was. Moreover, because of the nationalist tendencies in France, such a change was 
not likely to occur in the near future. The Dutch government, therefore, should 
pursue a defensive policy. This policy should be aimed first of all at defending the 
existing supranational institution, i.e. the European Coal and Steel Community, 
against possible French attacks. The ECSC, Beyen expected, would be subjected 
to attempts to suppress its supranational identity, e.g. by extending the powers of 
the Council of Ministers at the cost of those of the High Authority. Beyen wrote:
The defence of the ECSC against impending undermining by the French is of 
the utmost importance both to our country and to the Benelux, firstly because 
we have to defend the principles of cooperation which have been accepted for 
this important economic sector and secondly because the Community offers 
facilities to protect our direct economic interests against protectionist 
tendencies.115
113. Min. BZ, I, GS, 913.10, inv. no. 663 Codetelegram Beyen/Luns - Ambassade Washington, 
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The interests of the Coal and Steel Community would be best served, Beyen 
continued, by concentrating on the realisation of objectives embodied in the 
original ECSC-Treaty. The point was that attempts to extend the powers of the 
Community to related economic sectors like transport could, in the present 
political situation, easily be counter-productive. Given the French attitude, any 
renewal of the political discussions on the Treaty might actually lead to a 
curtailment of these powers. In the circumstances, government initiatives aiming 
at such an extension (called for by the Strasbourg Assembly, with the support of 
Monnet and the High Authority) would be most undesirable and should be 
guarded against.
Secondly, this policy should defend the perspective for future European 
integration against attempts at what Beyen called fake integration: traditional 
constructions based on inter-governmental cooperation without political powers of 
their own and therefore without a political responsibility of their own to be carried 
independently from the national governments of the member countries. 
Cooperation and integration, Beyen argued, should be kept apart, not so much for 
the sake of tidiness in political theory as because of the danger that France, ‘by a 
dialectic of its own, already skilfully applied by Mendfcs-France’, would see its 
chance to render void the notion of supranationality and transform it into a 
political slogan serving the various needs of French foreign policy. The French 
proposals for a common Armaments Production Pool within the newly established 
Western European Union framework may serve as an example. These proposals 
presented as ‘first steps on the way towards a supranational solution’ were looked 
upon in the Dutch Cabinet as a scheme which was primarily designed to serve the 
French national interest in general and the French armaments industry in 
particular, without offering any clear commitment for a development towards 
supranationality. Under these circumstances, Beyen reasoned, the pressure of the 
ardent ‘pro-European’ (i.e. federalist) parliamentarians in the Netherlands, who 
wanted him to maintain the new-found momentum provided by the Eden solution 
of the European defence problem by initiating further moves in the political and 
economic fields, was naive and even dangerous116.
Thirdly, Beyen argued, the concept of ‘Integration on the basis of 
supranationality’ had to be defended against the threat of resurging bilateralism. 
He referred to the plans recently presented by the French and German
116. 22. Min, BZ, I; GS, 913.10, folder 663: Codctelegram Beyen/Luns - Ambassade Washing* 
ton, 8.11.1954. NA, MR (400). Notulen Ministerraad 20.9.1954.
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governments on October 26, 1954 concerning closer cooperation between these 
two countries, plans which foreshadowed a long-term Franco-German trade 
agreement advantageous both to German industry and to French agriculture. 
Clearly these plans constituted a potential threat to the Dutch and Belgian 
positions in intra-European trade. Moreover, he pointed out, there was cause for 
alarm in that these initiatives demonstrated once more the French tendency to deal 
with problems of a multilateral nature in a bilateral way: a tendency shown during 
the WEU negotiations and afterwards when the proposals for a European 
Armaments Pool were presented.
This approach, Beyen continued, constituted a threat to the smaller countries 
and to their interests. Under the circumstances close Benelux cooperation, 
especially in the field of foreign policy, was more than ever necessary. During the 
discussions in Cabinet Beyen put a lot of emphasis on this last point. Underlining, 
as far as supranationality and integration went, the extremely limited room for 
manoeuvre, he stressed the importance of defending multilateral cooperation as 
such, suggesting talks with Spaak on the question whether it would be feasible to 
undertake joint Benelux action to tackle this problem of resurging bilateralism. As 
a possible course of action Beyen mentioned the idea recently launched by Baron 
Snoy et d ’Oppuers, the Secretary General of the Belgian Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, that the Benelux countries might take the initiative to start discussions in 
the OEEC on the formation of a Free Trade Area117.
This last remark in particular demonstrates that, during the last months of 
1954 the Dutch Minister entertained no hopes whatsoever of a speedy economic 
integration of Western Europe along the lines of the Beyen Plan.
When discussed in Cabinet, Beyen’s policy met with little criticism. 
Pessimistic and defensive as it was -  and acknowledged as such -  it gained 
acceptance. In December the Foreign Minister told Parliament, which had exerted 
some pressure in favour of a new governmental or Benelux initiative aimed at 
new negotiations among the Six, that for the moment -  he prophetically 
mentioned a period of five months -  nothing should be done at all as far as 
European integration was concerned. Even after the ratification of the Paris 
Agreements, he argued, the room for manoeuvre would remain dependent on the
117. NA, MR (400), Notulen Ministerraad 25.10.1954, 1.11.1954 and 22/23.11,1954. Archief van 
het ministerie van Economische Zaken Den Haag (Archive o f  the Ministry o f Economie 
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willingness of at least six countries to accept the supranational idea. He therefore 
wanted to ‘wait for better weather’, he said, and made clear that government 
would refrain from initiatives on the European front as long as the Mendès-France 
Government remained in power118. In accordance with this policy line the Dutch 
government kept a low profile on European affairs during the next three months. 
Unlike the Belgians they refrained from theoretical discussions about the future of 
European cooperation and/or integration. Also they enthusiastically participated in 
the torpedoing of the French (‘fake integration’) plans for a European Armaments 
Pool.
Although some kind of Armaments Secretariat was set up within the WEU 
framework, the final result fell far short of the initial French proposals119. Also, 
when in January 1955 Pella, the President of the ECSC Council, made a tour of 
the Western European capitals in order to investigate the possibilities of further 
integration, Beyen urged him not to launch an initiative aimed at an extension of 
the ECSC, because of the threat to the supranational character of the Community, 
such renegotiation of the ECSC treaty would imply120.
2.3 New Policy Formulation in Belgium and Benelux
In Belgium, meanwhile, reactions to the failure of the EDC project were of a more 
activist nature. Almost immediately Baron Snoy et d ’Oppuers, a senior civil 
servant of the Ministry for Economic Affairs, started informal talks on the future 
of European integration with colleagues in both the Belgian and Dutch 
administration121. By November 1954, Victor Larock, the Belgian Minister for 
Foreign Trade, presented a number of ‘propositions d’ordre économique pouvant 
servir à une action politique à entreprendre par les pays de Benelux’ in order to 
arrive at a ‘relance d’intégration européenne’. He suggested a joint Benelux 
initiative aiming at the creation of a (Western) European Free Trade Area, limited 
to certain products, mainly manufactured goods, namely those for which the total 
factor costs were more or less equal in the participating countries. For those
118. NA, MR (400), Notulen Ministerraad 20.9.1954. Handelingen 1954-55. TK, 630-631.
119. NA, MR (401), Notulen 10.1.1955, 17.1.1955 and 24.1.1955. NA, MR (510): ‘Wapenpool- 
besprekingen, oprichting van een bewapcningscomité in de WEU’, 27.4.1955 and: ‘Draft 
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Committee on Thursday 21st April 1955’.
120. NA, MR (401), Notulen Ministerraad 17.1.1955.
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products alone tariffs and quantitative restrictions within the area would be 
abolished, while trade policies with regard to third countries remained to be 
decided upon by each individual government. The Larock Plan also comprised 
proposals for cooperation in public work projects and a common European plan 
for road construction. A common Fund for Restructuring would help to defray set­
backs and distortion caused by increased competition122. Larock’s proposals did 
not get far. Foreign Minister Spaak and his advisors were of opinion that the 
international political situation in Europe had to be handled with care and did not 
allow for daring initiatives of this kind. They refused to put the Larock Plan on the 
Benelux agenda123.
Spaak, indeed, thought along different and more cautious lines. During the 
last months of 1954 he had a series of talks with Monnet, the President of the 
ECSC High Authority, who intended to draw up a plan of action to put new life 
into his ideal of a united and supranationally governed Europe. Spaak was his 
main interlocutor. Possibly, Monnet’s role in what later was called the ‘European 
Relaunch’ has been somewhat exaggerated in the literature. Nevertheless, there
122. Archief van het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikke­
lingssamenwerking Brussel (Archive o f  the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and 
Development Cooperation, Brussels), (henceforth: Min. BZBrus), 17. 771/4 (Notes du 
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BZ, II, 913.100, no. 164, ‘De Belgische integratieplannen’, 24.3.1955 and ‘Relance de 
l’Integration européenne. Propositions d’ordre économique pouvant servir k une action 
politique k entreprendre par des pays de Benelux’ (undated). Larock’s proposals for a 
common European plan for road construction may well have been inspired by US president 
Eisenhower’s plan for an nationwide interstate highway system resulting in the the Federal- 
Aid Highway Act of 1956.
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seems to be little doubt that he exerted considerable influence on both the ideas 
and policies of at least this Belgian statesman.124
Monnet and Spaak shared the belief that ‘something' had to be done, to get 
out of a possibly indefinite impasse. At the same time, however, they were well 
aware of the fact that whatever initiative was taken the state of affairs of European 
politics called for the utmost caution: ‘Il fallait avant tout éviter un nouvel échec', 
wrote Spaak afterwards125. This meant that whatever the form of the eventual 
proposals they would have to be acceptable to the governments concerned. In fact, 
like Beyen, Spaak did not believe in the possibility of a successful move forward 
as long as Mendès-France and his adherents dominated French foreign policy. 
Consequently the Spaak-Monnet talks during the winter of 1954/55 were in the 
nature of preliminary theoretical discussions about what might be done in the 
future. Monnet managed to convince Spaak of the desirability of proceeding by 
extending the powers of the ECSC to related sectors, especially transport and 
energy. Moreover, inspired by the views of his collaborator Armand, Monnet 
proposed the creation of an entirely new High Authority for common research on, 
and the production of, atomic energy for civil purposes. In his ‘Atoms for Peace' 
address before the UN General Assembly in December 1953, US President 
Eisenhower had raised the perspective of sharing American technology and know­
how, as well as nuclear materials (Fissionable materials), with other countries for 
the sake of civil power programmes. Also, because of the recent scientific 
developments in this field Monnet expected atomic energy to lead to a ‘new 
industrial revolution’. Therefore, both he and Spaak regarded this sector as a 
promising nucleus for European integration in general: since the continental 
European countries lacked the facilities to develop the potentialities of atomic 
energy individually, there was a natural community of interests to arrive at close 
cooperation in the field126.
The Spaak/Monnet reasoning was bound to conflict with Beyen’s ideas, as 
the Dutch Minister had, as early as 1952, argued against the sector approach and 
had favoured a general approach to economic integration by means of creating a 
Western European customs union instead. For the moment, however, both Spaak
124. P. H. Spaak, Combats Inachevés. De l'espoir aux déceptions (Paris 1969). 61-62.); R. 
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and Beyen shared the negative consensus that time was not yet ripe for a new 
initiative.
Benelux co-operation would turn out to be of the essential. Shortly after the 
Drees’ Government’s decision, Beyen went to Brussels for a political ‘tour 
d ’horizon’ with his Benelux colleagues, Spaak and Bech. The downfall o f EDC 
had seriously affected Intra-Benelux foreign policy cooperation. By the end of 
1954 mutual consultation and policy coordination had reached something close to 
zero. During the final phases of the EDC negotiations in August when Spaak had 
launched a proposal containing far-reaching concessions to the French demands 
without having consulted his Benelux partners previously, lack of cooperation 
became blatantly obvious127. During the subsequent WEU negotiations the 
Benelux delegations had worked together again, but no fundamental discussion on 
the future of European cooperation and integration had taken place at the Benelux 
level. As a consequence, Spaak had embarked upon a course considerably 
different to that pursued by Beyen. Right from the beginning Spaak had had little 
sympathy for the free trade area idea generated by Snoy and his supporters in the 
Belgian Ministry of Economic Affairs. Contrary to the opinions of most political 
actors and observers at that time, Spaak had initially been in favour of a new 
effort to create a politically integrated Europe. Also he had considered the newly 
founded WEU a suitable organisational nucleus for such an attempt, an opinion 
which caused Beyen some anxiety. Apart from that, Spaak’s ideas corresponded 
with those o f his Dutch colleague to the extent that he too was more than sceptical 
on the question of whether it would be possible to bring about any progress 
whatsoever as long as the Mend£s-France Government remained in power128. At 
the Benelux summit of 25 November, 1954 Spaak, Beyen and their Luxembourg 
colleague, Bech, agreed on a passive stance on the European integration issue129.
For no apparent reason, Dutch sources on this Beyen-Spaak-Bech summit are 
rather vague. Beyen afterwards reported to the Cabinet that on ‘the most 
important points’ an agreement had been reached. By this he meant that Spaak 
had explicitly distanced himself from his earlier ideas about using the WEU as a
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starting point for new integration initiatives. In the course of the discussions 
Spaak presented his new ideas about an extension of the field of activity of the 
Coal and Steel Community but interestingly enough he did not limit himself to 
that: he also raised the question whether a common market ‘in a wider sense* 
would be worth considering. When his Dutch colleague referred to the 
Netherlands’ proposals on this topic as embodied in the Beyen Plan, he learned to 
his astonishment that Spaak was uninformed about them. An exposition by Beyen 
of his train o f thought on this theme was followed by a more general discussion 
on the perspectives of economic integration.130.
The available sources do not reveal any clear-cut decisions taken by the three. 
The fact, however, that Beyen reported agreement ‘on the most important issues’ 
to his government seems to indicate that the Benelux ministers at least agreed that 
the time was not yet ripe for a new initiative among the Six. That at any rate was 
what Beyen told the Dutch Parliament in December.
2.4 Spring 1955: the Origins of the New Beyen Plan
During the first months of 1955, the centre of the diplomatic stage was dominated 
by the Saar-problem, the French proposals for a European Armaments Pool, 
Germany’s return to sovereignty and the plans for French-German economic 
cooperation. On a more or less ‘subterranean’ level, however, the discussions on 
the future of European integration continued. It was clear that at some point the 
Western European Governments would have to decide on the future and form of 
the European integration process, if any. The most suitable occasion for common 
reflection, it seemed, would be the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign 
Ministers of the ECSC when the member countries were to decide on a successor 
for Jean Monnet as president of the High Authority. For various reasons, however, 
this meeting, originally scheduled to take place in February when Monnet*s term 
of office would expire, was postponed time after time. At first the French 
Government did not want to jeopardise the ratification of the Paris Agreements by 
the Conseil de la République by agreeing to a new ministerial meeting on the 
European issue. Then, after this ratification on March 27, it was the Germans who 
asked for a delay, firstly because of their wish to negotiate Europe’s future only 
after a complete restoration of (West) German sovereignty, and secondly because
130. Min. BZ, G S1,913.10, inv. no. 663, Codetelcgram Beyen 216, 25.11.1954; 
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they hoped to find a way out of their domestic differences between Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer and his Minister of Economic Affairs Ludwig Erhard over the 
stance to be taken by the Federal Republic13'.The period up to June 1,1955, when 
the meeting finally took place, has been baptised the ‘Period of Constructive 
Opportunism’. Indeed, throughout Western Europe, blueprints for future 
integration were drawn up and discussed. In the Low Countries alone, at least five 
distinct concepts for a European ‘relaunch’ can be identified. These were fuelled 
by resistance against the sectoral and supranationalist aspects of Monnet/Spaak 
approach. First of all there was the plan by Baron Snoy of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs for an OEEC Free Trade Area. Of more practical political 
importance, however, seems to have been the initiative of Belgian Minister of 
Foreign Trade Larock. He presented a number of ‘propositions d’ordre 
économique pouvant servir à une action politique à entreprendre par les pays de 
Benelux’ in order to arrive at a ‘relance de l ’intégration européenne’. Larock’s 
proposals originally dated from the Fall 1954. In March 1955 he obtained some 
kind o f official governmental support for his ideas which were now referred to, at 
least by the Dutch administration, as ‘the Belgian proposals’. Like in November 
1954, Larock suggested the creation of a Free Trade Area limited to certain 
products, mainly manufactured goods, namely those for which the total factor 
costs were more or less equal in the participating countries. For those products 
alone tariffs and quantitative restrictions within the Area would be abolished. 
Trade policy with regard to third countries would remain within the competence 
of the individual states.
Institutionally the Larock Plan was based on the principle of 
intergovernmental cooperation (supranationality, Larock suggested, might be 
introduced later on, on the basis o f a common agreement) and in connection with 
this the Belgian minister hoped for British participation. For France he suggested 
an empty chair policy: if  necessary this country would be allowed to join in a later 
stage when it considered that its economy was strong enough. Apart from the Free 
Trade Area idea, the Larock proposals were concerned among other things with a 
common Western European public works policy and a common plan for road
131. NA, MR (401), Notulen Ministerraad 11.3.1955; Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 20, ‘Conferentie 
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construction. A common Fund for Restructuring would help to defray setbacks 
and distortions caused by the increased competition132.
In addition to these two more or less governmental initiatives the Belgian 
ex-minister Van Houtte launched, on March 17, a plan which resembled the Snoy 
concept. He argued for a Benelux initiative within the OEEC for the formation of 
a group of countries which would be willing to accept a gradual tariff reduction 
over a period of ten to fifteen years and the simultaneous abolition of quantitative 
trade restrictions up to 100%133. Last but not least, the Dutch Member of 
Parliament Blaisse drew up a ‘pre-integration programme’, published in February 
1955. It took the line that, for the present, the political situation was not ripe for 
real economic integration. Free movements of goods, capital, labour and services 
between the Western European countries would require a preliminary European 
development programme aimed at the removal of both the economic and 
psychological barriers to integration. Among other things his programme 
comprised suggestions for an intergovernmental plan for the development of 
Southern Italy, a common project on agricultural productivity, and one for the 
construction of atomic energy and natural gas plants, and technical and financial 
cooperation in the field of housing. The Council of Europe was, according to 
Blaisse, the most suitable institution to start action along these lines134.
Moreover, this sudden accumulation of integration plans was not limited to 
the Low Countries. Also, in the ‘Strasbourg Parliament, the OEEC and the 
European League for Economic Cooperation, more or less original proposals were 
formulated. In Western Germany the 1953/54 debate between Adenauer and 
Erhard and their adherents was getting into full swing again: As Adenauer 
supported a political orientation towards Western Europe and therefore, 
preferential economic relations with that part of the Continent; whereas Erhard as 
his disciples advocated a fundamentally liberal policy without discriminatory 
elements aimed at world-wide free trade and hence frowned upon regional block 
formation.135
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Finally, Spaak continued and even intensified his deliberations with Monnet. 
The latter, who would remain President of the High Authority until a successor 
was appointed, was by now busy writing a declaration in which he embodied his 
ideas concerning an extension of the supranational powers of the ECSC to the 
energy sector (oil, natural gas and electricity) and to the transport sector (land, 
water and air transport including the railways). Moreover, inspired by the views of 
his collaborator Armand, he now proposed the creation of an entirely new High 
Authority for common research on, and the production of, atomic energy for civil 
purposes. Because of the recent scientific developments in this field Monnet 
expected atomic energy to lead to a ‘new industrial revolution’. Therefore he 
regarded it as a promising nucleus for European integration in general: since the 
European countries concerned lacked the facilities to develop the potentialities of 
this atomic energy individually, there was a natural community of interests to 
arrive at close cooperation in this field136.
Certainly, all this planning for the future of Europe was reinforced by the fall 
of the Mendès-France government on February 5, 1955. The subsequent 
formation of the Faure Cabinet, in which the ‘anti-European’ (i.e. anti-integration) 
Gaullist element was considerably weaker and in which the pro-European M.R.P. 
now held important posts, contributed to a resurgence of pro-integration hopes 
and expectations. In fact, Faure’s inaugural address to the Conseil de la 
République suggested that the new French Government would take a more 
positive stance than its predecessor. But the real objectives of French government 
policy remained as yet unclear; new supranational institutions would probably be 
impossible. As a result, the ‘new optimism’ of February/March 1955 was a 
cautious one.
It is noteworthy that all the schemes for general (or ‘horizontal’) economic 
integration discussed took the line that some form of intensified 
intergovernmental cooperation was the best, or at least the most realistic, goal to 
be aimed at. Faure too stated that the French interest would be primarily 
concentrated on ‘cooperation’ in the fields of electricity, transport and atomic 
energy; sectors which corresponded with those chosen by Jean Monnet for his
136. For a final draft see: Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 19, ‘Projet de Declaration’; Min. BZ, II, 
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sectoral supranational approach. Clarification of French intentions was to be 
delayed until the French Parliament had ratified the Paris Agreements137.
Nevertheless, a new political situation had developed with new hopes and 
European integration plans ‘springing up like mushrooms’, as Beyen commented 
at the end of March 1955 138. The Dutch minister himself and the Dutch 
Government in general, however, were not so easily affected by the winds of 
change. The change of tack came in March, sparked off by the Spaak-Monnet 
talks.
The fall of Mendès-France, the emergence of the Faure Cabinet and the 
development of a more optimistic climate in general had not failed to impress 
both Spaak and Monnet. During the last weeks o f February the latter arrived at the 
conclusion that his declaration on the future of Western European integration -  
originally meant to be his valedictory address and the programme of his projected 
pressure group for the United States of Europe -  might serve in the near future as 
the basis for a joint communiqué to be issued by the six community
13Qgovernments.
When the Benelux Foreign Ministers met on March 10, 1955, in order to 
discuss the problem of Monnet’s successor, Spaak proposed to hold a meeting of 
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the ECSC countries shortly after the 
ratification of the Paris Agreements by the French Parliament. At such a meeting 
the French could be invited either to produce, or to agree to, a declaration of intent 
on the future of European integration. Such a joint statement, Spaak argued,
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would serve as a basis for further governmental action. Also, if the French thus 
explicitly committed themselves to a new more positive European policy, the 
effect might be that Monnet would reconsider his resignation as President of the 
High Authority140.
Beyen’s reaction had been prepared. Armed with the news of the new 
Monnet-Spaak policy line Theo Bot, the Director of the Western Cooperation 
Section of the Dutch Foreign Ministry, had produced a preparatory note for the 
Benelux summit in which he implicitly suggested that the time had come to 
change tack and take a more active stance on the issue of Western European 
integration. The note briefly summarized the traditional Dutch objections against 
further sectoral integration either within or without the ECSC141 and taking into 
account these objections, a different course was suggested contrary to the one 
Monnet advocated:
In our opinion it would be preferable to pursue further integration by 
reverting to the basic ideas of the Beyen plan (gradual realization of a tariff 
community, the elimination of trade restrictions, the creation of a European 
Fund) and to prepare for its realization by a gradual ripening of both the 
European political climate and European economic conditions1 .
The wording of this note was cautious. Beyen however, now obviously 
convinced o f the necessity to embark upon a new and more active policy, did not 
limit himself to ‘gradual ripening’. At the Benelux summit he approved of 
Spaak’s plan to aim at an ECSC conference in order to provoke a clarification of 
French intentions. But, as he pointed out emphatically, this did not mean that he 
took sides with Monnet’s particular proposals for sectoral integration. On the 
contrary, within a fortnight Beyen drew up a discussion paper for Cabinet in 
which he proposed nothing less than a Benelux initiative for new 
intergovernmental negotiations, aimed at the creation o f a Western European
140. NA, MR (401), Notulen Ministeiraad 11.3.1955, Jean Monnet, Mémoires (s.l. 1976), 47.
141. Implicit in the extension of the existing community, he argued, was the danger that the 
administration of the new sectors concerned, might be dominated by, and subordinated to, 
the interests o f the coal and steel sectors.
The objection against sectoral integration in general was that the distinct fields of economic 
activity were so closely connected with each other that the sector approach as compared with 
the general approach could not really work: the sectoral divide could only be artificial and 
would create problems of its own.
142. Min. BZ, II, 93.100, no. 139: ‘Bijeenkomst Benelux-Ministers van Buitenlandsc Zaken\
8.3.1955.
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Economic Union. The Beyen plan had thus been resurrected. Once again, the 
Dutch would launch an initiative for horizontal integration on a supranational 
basis in Western Europe143.
Beyen’s bold proposal was based on several motives, most of them 
mentioned by Beyen in his note or presented during the Cabinet discussions. He 
referred to the recent changes in France and the subsequent mushrooming of 
integration and cooperation plans. He discussed briefly the ideas of Larock, 
Monnet, van Houtte, Blaisse, the European Movement and the activities of the 
Strasbourg Parliament and concluded that there was the imminent danger of 
enormous confusion. It would be most unfortunate, he argued, if the Dutch found 
themselves in a position in which they could only react to proposals put forward 
by others. Such a situation would weaken the Dutch position considerably. 
Consequently, in cooperation with the Benelux partners the Government should 
take a positive stand of its own. Stating the policy goals which should be 
embodied in this stance, Beyen defined in a rather classical way the combination 
of commercial self-interest and European idealism, which seems to have governed 
Dutch European policy during the 1950’s: ‘We aim at a real intensification of 
cooperation between the European Countries and at the development and 
stabilisation of the European market (for our exports)144.'
In view of all this, the course then proposed by many advocates o f European 
integration was hardly attractive for the Dutch. The choice against further sectoral 
integration, embodied in the Luxembourg resolution, was still as valid as ever and 
thus the objection against the Monnet approach still held. Moreover, he 
deprecated the general opinion that horizontal economic cooperation in Europe for 
the present would only be possible on an intergovernmental basis and cooperation 
on a supranational basis would only be possible for specific sectors, related to 
those administered by the ECSC.
As things stood, Beyen wrote, such general statements about Europe’s potential in 
the field could neither be proved nor refused. Admittedly, the gusto for horizontal 
integration on a supranational basis, especially in France, was not particularly 
impressive. He refused, however, to take for granted that the fate of the EDC had 
proven that Western Europe was not ripe for supranational institutions in general.
143. NA. MR (401), Notulen Ministerraad 11.3.1955. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 19: ‘Nota inzake
dc Europese integraue', accompanying letter 24.3.1955.
144. Min, BZ, II, 913.100, no. 19: ‘Nota inzake de Europese integrate', accompanying letter
24.3.1955.
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Moreover, the many supporters of integration who, boasting of their ‘realism’ and 
now advocating intergovernmental schemes or sectoral integration, were under an 
illusion; neither of the two would, as such, lead to general economic and political 
integration of Western Europe. In brief: ‘The ruining of the EDC project has not 
affected the approach of the Dutch Government’. Therefore, there was no reason 
whatsoever why the Dutch should not try to revive the EPC-negotiations, and to 
aim at a new European Community, now with an exclusively economic task on 
the basis of the Beyen Plan.
The first Dutch goal should be a Benelux initiative along these lines. So 
far Spaak had not gone deeply into the problem. Given their previous discussions, 
however, it was quite feasible that he would sympathize with the proposed idea, 
Beyen argued. Also, such an initiative would not necessarily be incompatible with 
possible extension of the ECSC to transport and energy. As before, the Dutch 
would not fundamentally resist proposals to that end. And again, as before, they 
would not accept integration schemes for the WEU. Finally, in order to improve 
its chances of realization, the Benelux proposal should allow for a special 
transitional period for France in order to enable that country to modernize its 
economy, as well as a system of exceptive clauses for agriculture145.
Beyen’s proposal gave rise to an extensive debate within the Dutch 
Government. Prime Minister Drees spoke in plain terms of his scepticism. He and 
his policy advisors were o f the opinion that there was not much chance of making 
a success of the proposal. The other European countries would not forego the 
possibility of protecting their national economies. Hence, in view of the former 
EPC negotiations, there was a serious risk that a new supranational institution 
without real administrative powers would be the lamentable result. He would not 
disapprove of a supranational institution if a real customs union were to be 
realized, but he did not think that feasible, also because his Ministry seriously 
foresaw the return to power of Mendes-France. Drees’ advisors were inclined to 
regard Beyen’s proposal as a rather unhappy result of parliamentary pressure. The 
Prime Minister himself would prefer an approach along the lines of the Van 
Houtte Plan, i.e. aiming at a Western European market without the clutter of 
supranational organs and joint policies. All things considered, he was in favour of 
an attempt to investigate possibilities for common action at the Benelux level146.
145. Ibidem.




The extreme opposite stance was taken by Sicco Mansholt and his Ministry 
of Agriculture, a stronghold of die-hard supporters of the ‘institutionalist’ and/or 
‘federalist’ approach to European integration. Here the Foreign Minister’s 
proposal for a Benelux initiative equally met with a kind reception. Beyen’s ideas 
with regard to the contents of such an initiative however were considered ’an 
error’. Once more, it was argued, the accent was laid on the traditional Dutch 
interest, the furthering of intra-European trade and the creation of a customs union. 
France, Italy and Germany would not go along with this approach. EPC 
experience, they reasoned, had made clear that general economic integration could 
not be created on the basis of intergovernmental negotiations: new talks on the 
formation of a customs union would once again lead to endless discussions about 
elementary preconditions like the harmonisation of Fiscal, social and monetary 
policies. Complex problems of this magnitude should not be dealt with by 
intergovernmental negotiations and an intergovernmental treaty. They needed to 
be resolved gradually by supranational organs. Therefore the Dutch initiative 
should aim at the creation of a political community administered by a supra­
national institution with powers for the gradual development of a joint economic 
policy. Political integration should be the basis and starting point for a 
development towards economic integration (exactly the reverse of Beyen’s 
thinking)147.
Zijlstra, the Minister of Economic Affairs, basically agreed with Drees in that 
he emphasized the importance of the aim of arriving at a customs union. With 
regard to supranationality he was more positive than the latter: referring to the 
Benelux experience he underlined that for the final aim, i.e. a fully-fledged 
economic union, supranational institutions would be inevitable for the formulation 
of common policies. For the First phase -  a ‘simple’ customs union -  one could, 
however, do without such common institutions. Here too Benelux could serve as 
an example. More generally Zijlstra showed interest in the Larock concept of 
horizontal integration limited to a selected number of sectors and products.
Mansholt was not present at the discussion in Cabinet. Consequently Beyen 
found himself in a rather isolated position when he tried to defend the values of a 
supranational stance as such. The Foreign Minister ‘had a hard time’ reported 
Mansholt’s substitute. According to the latter Beyen had to give in, in that he was
147. Archief van het Ministerie van Landbouw en Visserij Den Haag (henceforth: Min. Landb.), 
GS archief 5.631 Eur. integr. bespr. 1955-56: Note by Van der Lee for Mansholt, 25.3.1955. 
Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 19: letter Mansholt to Beyen, 26.3.1955.
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made to accept the primacy of the customs union aim over the supranationality 
goal, now willing to regard the latter as the coping-stone. Beyen also had to deal 
with severe criticism of his suggestion concerning a special set of clauses for 
France. This was considered a premature concession which might be misused by 
the French negotiators. Generally speaking the reactions in Cabinet can be 
characterized as rather sceptical. Nevertheless, it was agreed that Beyen would 
continue the preparations for a Benelux initiative ‘to moot the question of 
economic integration*.148
2.5 The Benelux Memorandum for a European Relaunch
On April 4, 1955, Beyen sent Spaak a note, basically an abridged version of his 
cabinet paper, suggesting a joint Benelux initiative. The time had come, he wrote, 
for a ‘prise de position commune nettement définie de la part du Bénélux*. The 
three Benelux governments should work together in order to launch an initiative 
for the forthcoming ECSC Foreign Ministers Conference. The aim of such an 
initiative would be the creation of ‘une communauté supranationale, ayant pour 
tâche de réaliser l’intégration économique de l’Europe au sens général en passant 
par la voie d ’une Union Douanière à la réalisation d’une Union Economique’149. 
Beyen realized, he wrote, that proposals of this kind ‘pourraient rencontrer une 
opposition assez sérieuse de nos amis français*. That however was not sufficient a 
reason for withholding those proposals. Also he underlined the compatibility of 
general integration with further sectoral integration and suggested that the new 
Community would be a most suitable institution for carrying out the development 
programme and the other ‘interesting suggestions* of Larock.
Meanwhile, the French Parliament had ratified the Paris Agreements and 
Spaak, who was still in close contact with Monnet, had reached the same 
conclusion: that the time for action had come. On April 2, 1955, without prior 
consultations with the Benelux partners, he sent the foreign ministers of France, 
Germany and Italy a proposal for a joint declaration on European integration for 
the forthcoming ECSC meeting (which at that time was scheduled to take place in 
late April). Spaak proposed that the six countries should express their common
148. Landb., GS archief 5, 631 Eur. integr. bespr. 1955-56; ‘Aantekening voor de heer Minister; 
betreft Ministerraadsvergadering van 28 Maan - Benelux initiatief voor hervatting Europese 
integratiebesprekingen*, 28.3.1955. NA. MR (401), Notulen Ministerraad 28.3.1955.
149. Min. BZ, 11,913.100, no. 19: ‘N ote\ (GS no. 46999-1751).
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intention to pursue the process of integration by an extension of the powers of the 
ECSC into the sectors of transport and conventional energy; they should create a 
new organ for atomic energy, linking it to the ECSC. In order to draw up a treaty 
to this end a governmental conference should be organized, presided over by 
Monnet.
The Spaak proposal, which did not mention anything concerning horizontal 
integration, was not received favourably. The French had not yet made up their 
mind and did not want to pursue such a direct course of action. Also, Prime 
Minister Faure felt little sympathy for Monnet and would not agree to a European 
relaunch presided over by the latter. The Germans were still occupied with their 
domestic differences and did not like the idea o f integration in the field of nuclear 
energy. The Italian reply was vague; the Rome Government did not want to 
commit itself150.
This disappointing experience may have contributed to Spaak’s interest in the 
ideas of his Dutch colleague. His reaction to Beyen’s note was positive although 
at the same time pessimistic. He would gladly support Beyen’s cause, he wrote, 
but doubted seriously if the proposal would he acceptable to the French. 
Nevertheless, he agreed with Beyen that they ought to give it a try.151 Still, in his 
opinion, it would be advisable to make sure that there would be a possibility of 
‘orderly withdrawal’ (‘position de repli’); a suggestion which can hardly have 
been encouraging for Beyen. Referring to the latter’s statement on the 
compatibility of general/sectoral integration Spaak proposed to combine tactics: 
‘On peut mener à la fois la lutte, pour obtenir un grand marché européen et en 
même temps tâcher de régler certains problèmes par secteur’152.
Both approaches could be embodied in a Benelux proposal, he concluded. He 
continued by an exposition on the Monnet approach, stressed the importance of a 
governmental conference to draw up a Treaty for further sectoral integration (!), 
and voiced his expectation that a development along these lines would make 
Monnet reconsider his resignation and stand for a second term of office.
150. P. H. Spaak, Combats inachevés. 62-63, Snoy et d’Oppuers, ‘Un témoin*, 23-24.
151. As he wrote in his lctter of April 7, 1955: ‘Les idées que vous (...) défendez me paraissent 
excellentes et fondamentalement, je suis d'accord avec vous. Mais je me demande si la 
politique que vous préconisez a quelque chance de succès. Je me demande, notamment, si le 
Gouvernement français peut l’accepter. Peut-être et je serais prêt à me rallier à cette idée 
devons-nous faire l’expérience’, II, 913.100. no. 19: letter Spaak to Beyen. 7.4.1955.
152. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 19: letter Spaak to Beyen, 7.4.1955. Min. BZ, II. 913.100. no. 139: 
codetelegram embassy Brussels to Beyen. 5.4.1955.
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Obviously Spaak did not have great faith in the possibility of a governmental 
conference on the formation of a customs union.
Beyen wrote back on April 14. He concluded that agreement had been 
reached and emphasized: ‘Je ne m’oppose nullement à l’idée d’une extension des 
compétences de la C.E.C.A.’. Such an extension might be useful, Beyen agreed, 
although it would not enhance political solidarity in Europe and as such would not 
lead to European unification. Moreover, Beyen wrote, on a  more practical level he 
had some doubts if all subsectors o f transport and energy could be administered 
by a sectoral authority in a viable way. For oil, for instance, such an 
administration might be rather difficult to realise. As far as electricity was 
concerned, he was not sure that this sub-sector would really need supranational 
organisation. Also, there was no denying that transport integration was urgently 
needed: but was the EC SC the best framework for such an operation, he 
wondered.153 In spite of this criticism Beyen’s reply constituted a landmark, in 
paving the way for a joint Benelux proposal, comprising suggestions for both 
general and sectoral integration.
Meanwhile, within the Dutch Government, the discussion on the customs 
union approach continued. In practice this meant that several attempts were made 
to change Beyen’s mind and to convince him of alleged errors and risks attached 
to his initiative154. For starters, the Foreign Minister had to deal with severe 
criticism within his own department. Beyen had written his March 24 cabinet 
paper alone and apparently without using preliminary drafts of civil servants. 
Consequently, the Directorate-General for the Economic and Military Aid
153. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 139: letter Beyen to Spaak, 14.4.1955. Beyen's doubts reflected the 
results o f the discussions in the Dutch Cabinet on the advantages and disadvantages of the 
sectoral approach: Oil should be omitted, it was argued, in order not to jeopardise relations 
with the oil companies. Moreover there was the fear that ‘oil-integration’ within the ECSC 
would lead to extra levies on this product (meaning higher consumer prices) in order to 
finance a low coal price policy. Equally, responsibilities for the ECSC concerning transport 
did not seem a good idea, because this would probably lead to low costs of railway carriage 
policy and a corresponding need for Government subsidies - both contrary to Dutch railway 
policy.
Finally, with regard to electricity, cooperation at OEEC level had, according to the Cabinet, 
produced satisfactory results. NA, MR (401), Notulen Ministerraad 12.4.1955.
154. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 139: ‘Nota betreffende Benelux-initiatief tot hervatling van de 
integratie-besprekingen*, 14.4.1955. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 19: letter Beyen to Mansholt,
22.4.1955. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 139: letter Mansholt to Beyen, 28.4.1955. Min. BZ, II,
913.100, no. 19: letter Spierenburg to Beyen, 27.4.1955. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 131: letter 
Zijlstra to Beyen, 27.4.1955.
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Programme (DGEM) could, taken by surprise, only react after its discussion in 
Cabinet. In the beginning of April DGEM director Van der Beugel produced a 
note in which he denounced the new Beyen Plan as unrealistic. Referring to the 
experiences of the EPC negotiations and the lessons which could be drawn from 
Benelux, he stated that a custom union administered by a supranational organ 
would not be acceptable, neither for France, nor for the other ECSC countries: this 
initiative could only lead to lengthy discussions. Likewise, in his opinion, there 
was a real danger that the Beyen scheme would be used as the grounds for 
creating a supranational organisation without any real power. The institutionalist 
approach of Mansholt’s Ministry of Agriculture provided a convincing illustration! 
An extension of the Coal and Steel Community competence, on the contrary, was 
feasible and this could be the alternative the Dutch should aim at. Admittedly, the 
traditional objections against sector integration were still valid as far as the 
creation of new pools was concerned; he argued that they would be considerably 
less valid in case of an extension of the already existing ECSC. The sole use of 
stressing horizontal integration would be that it would provide an opportunity to 
expose the Dutch long-term goals. Beyen himself replied that he failed to see why 
he should not moot the question of a customs union -  ‘What are we afraid of?’ he 
asked his fellow ministers -  and reiterated that he would not resist an enlargement 
of ECSC powers.155
Beyen’s conviction could not hide the fact that in his own Ministry only the 
Western Cooperation Section of the Foreign Ministry showed itself committed to 
the New Beyen Plan. Apart from the traditional economic arguments, this section 
presented a number of typically political motives, most of which concerned 
Germany. Horizontal integration and supranationality, for example, were deemed 
to be considered in order to avoid both the political neutralization of Western 
Germany and resurging nationalism in that country156.
Beyen, however, stuck to his guns. An official of the Ministry of Agriculture 
informed minister Mansholt about Beyen’s position in no uncertain terms:
155. Min. BZ. II, 913.100, no. 19: memorandum no. 775 from Van der Beugel to Beyen, 5.4.1955. 
Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 134: memorandum no. 815 from Van der Beugel to Beyen,
12.4.1955. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 151: ‘Europese economische integratie’, 7.4.1955.
156. Min. BZ, II, 913.100. no. 19, memorandum Van der Beugel to Beyen, no. 775, 5.4.1955; 
Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 134, memorandum Van der Beugel aan Beyen. no. 815,12.4.1955; 
Min. BZ II, 913.100, no. 151, ‘Europese economische integratie', 7.4.1955.
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Drs. van der Beugel informs me that Minister Beyen clings with desperate 
tenacity to the Customs Union idea as the starting point for the new talks. 
Allegedly nothing can put the scheme out of his head, although both 
supporters and antagonists of integration at his Department do not agree with 
the Customs Union approach.157
Reactions from outside the Foreign Ministry were hardly more encouraging. 
At the Agricultural Ministry two notes were drawn up to demonstrate the 
desirability o f aiming at the creation of common institutions, with initially rather 
limited powers on the one hand, and a lack of feasibility of the customs union idea 
on the other.158 Spierenburg, the Dutchman on the High Authority, sent the 
Foreign Minister the most recent draft of Monnet’s ‘Declaration’. In the 
accompanying letter he wrote that in his opinion the ECSC countries would be 
able to agree with one another only on the point of sectoral extension of the 
existing Community. Minister Zijlstra of Economic Affairs sent Beyen an essay of 
his own hand on the merits o f the Larock Plan159. Various observers and advisors 
pointed to recently started Franco-German negotiations on intensified economic 
cooperation between those two countries, seemingly predicting a return to 
bilateralism rather than a move forward to supranationalism. Serious blows to 
Dutch trade could be the consequence160.
All in all, the sources suggest that Beyen within his own Ministry as well as 
in Cabinet and Benelux, was in an isolated position in that he was one of the few 
who was actually convinced of both the desirability and the feasibility of his 
scheme161. Indeed, notwithstanding a general lack of encouragement, Beyen stuck 
to his point o f view. On April 21, in a speech before the Council of the European
157. Landb., GS archief 5, 631 Eur. integr. bespr. 1955-56: note Van der Wee for Mansholt,
19.4.1955.
158. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 139, ‘Nota betreft Benelux-initiatief tot hervatting van dc 
integratie-besprekingen', 14.4.1955; with accompanying letter Mansholt to Beyen, 
20.4.1955; BA., t l ,  913.100, no. 19, Letter Beyen to Mansholt, 22.4.1955; Min. BZ, II,
913.100, no. 139, Letter Mansholt to Beyen, 28.4.1955.
159. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 19, letter Spierenburg to Beyen, 27.4.1955; Min. BZ, II, 913.100, 
no, 131, letter Zijlstra to Beyen, 27.4.1955.
160. Min. BZ. II, GS, 913.10, Europese integratie deel IV, ‘Toezegging door Faure aan de M.R.P, 
gedaan bij zijn kabinetsformatie', 15.4.1955; and: Codetelegram, Van Boetzclaer - Den 
Haag, 19.4.1955; Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 139, Codetelegram Van Boetzclaer - Den Haag. 
13.4.1955; 3.Z., 11, 913.100. no. 19, ‘Notitie over de economische aspecten van de 
Frans-Duitse samenwerking', March 1955.
161. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 131: memorandum Bot to Beyen, 7.4.1955.
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Movement he made his proposals public, thus confronting the opposition against 
it, within as well as without the Foreign Ministry, with a fa it accompli. 162
The Benelux Foreign Ministers met on April, 23, in The Hague. Bech, who 
had been informed by Spaak about the latter's discussions and correspondence 
with Beyen, had not been able to come to the meeting (but would approve of the 
results afterwards). Beyen and Spaak had discussions on the basis of the latest 
draft o f Monnet's declaration. Initially, the President of the High Authority had 
frowned upon Beyen’s customs union’s proposal: ‘U ne croyait pas opportun de 
heurter de front par l’idée d’un Marché Commun les puissantes traditions 
protectionistes de la France’ 163. And only the final draft of Monnet’s paper 
allowed for something that could be described as a second phase, i.e. after the 
enlargement of ECSC competence, in which the member countries would begin to 
‘fixer les conditions et le programme d’une intégration générale’164 From Beyen’s 
point of view the Monnet proposal was embarrassing by its lack of ambition. In 
accordance with what they had decided upon, the Benelux ministers chose for a 
different course: sectoral and horizontal integration could be combined to 
complement one another and were to be equally proposed. On the basis of their 
instructions a team of Dutch and Belgian civil servants drew up a joint 
‘Memorandum des Pays Benelux aux Six Pays de la C.E.C.A.’ for the 
forthcoming foreign ministers conferences of the Six. The argument of the 
document was that the moment had come to enter a new phase in the process of 
European integration and that such integration had to be realized first of all on the 
economic level: A unified Europe could be created by means of developing 
common institutions, the progressive fusion of the national economies, the 
establishment of a great common market and the progressive harmonisation of 
social policies. This was worked out in a set of practical proposals for sectoral 
integration in the fields of transport, classical energy and atomic energy (prepared 
by the Belgian administration) and one for the establishment of an economic 
community based on a common market along the lines of the Beyen Plan 
(prepared by the Dutch administration). Also, the harmonisation of social policies 
(regulations on the length of the working week and holidays, overpay and 
nightwork etc.), was mentioned as an indispensable aim in its own right. An 
intergovernmental conference should be charged with studying these projects and
162. Pascaline Winand, Op. Cit., 73.
163. Snoy et d’Oppuers, ‘Un témoin’, 23-24.
. 164. Min. BZ. II, 913.100. no. 19: ‘Projet de Déclaration’.
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the drawing up of a treaty. The Memorandum was carefully worded: In the 
institutional proposals neither the idea of ‘supranationality’ nor the concept of a 
‘High Authority’ were mentioned. Nevertheless, for both the Atomic Pool and the 
Common Market ‘common authorities’ were suggested, for classical energy and 
transport on the other hand an ‘organism’ would do. Clearly, Spaak and Beyen did 
not want to awaken the strong anti-supranational sentiments in France and 
elsewhere. The institutional framework therefore, they proposed, should be 
worked out by the above mentioned intergovernmental conference. Also, the 
common market proposals, although based on the original Beyen Plan, were much 
more open-ended and flexible than the rigid set of detailed regulations the Dutch 
had so vehemently stuck to in 1953/54. Generally, the document was 
characterized by a ‘certain vagueness’, which, according to Beyen, had the 
advantage that it facilitated the adherence of the other governments to the basic 
idea of organizing a conference on the issues raised by the Benelux, Equally, the 
mentioning ‘expressis verbis’ of the need to harmonize social policies meant an 
important recognition of traditional French claims on this issue, suggesting a new 
Dutch policy line165. Benelux experiences appear to have played a part on this 
issue (See Chapter 3).
The Beyen/Spaak Memorandum was not favourably received by the Dutch 
Government. The diluted New Beyen Plan proposals and, generally, the ‘hybrid’ 
character of the Memorandum met with criticism. Unfortunately for the critics, 
the dual approach which it embodied was an inevitable consequence of the way it 
had come into being, i.e. as a compromise between the Benelux partners. 
Consequently, only a few minor changes were introduced. On May 9, 1955, the 
Dutch Cabinet grudgingly consented the official presentation of the Memorandum 
to the French, West German and Italian Governments166.
2.6 Getting Down to the Brass Tacks at the June 1955 Messina Conference
In spite of the careful tactics underlying the Benelux initiative, it did not receive 
an ecstatic welcome in the Western European capitals. The Paris government, 
diplomatic sources revealed, would continue to block any decision by the Six 
which would force it to submit a new European treaty for parliamentary approval
165. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 139: ‘Memorandum des Pays Benelux aux six pays de la C.E.C.A.’ 
and: codctelegram Beyen/Luns to Washington. 23.5.1955.
166. NA. MR (401), Notulen Ministerraad 6.5.1955 and 9.5.1955.
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in the short run, i.e. before the 1956 elections. And on the general economic 
integration proposal a lengthy Parisian debate resulted in the conclusion that the 
establishment of a common market had to be considered as a very long term 
project which could create considerable problems for the French economy and 
which was closely connected with the problem of the future of the French 
overseas territories167. In Bonn the Benelux proposals led to a revival of the 
conflict between chancellor Adenauer and economics minister Erhard and their 
respective allies. For Adenauer, primarily concerned with making the 
Bundesrepublik a full fledged partner in the Western Block, European integration 
in general was of the utmost importance. Erhard and his supporters, however, 
considered European economic integration potentially dangerous for trade 
liberalization on a world wide scale, because it would lead to regional 
protectionism and state dirigisme. Erhard had denounced the Beyen Plan ever 
since 1953. The Bonn memorandum for the forthcoming foreign minister’s 
conference, written in reply to the Benelux one, thus bore the marks of a difficult 
compromise, showing that within Germany the reticent forces were still strong168. 
True, the German memorandum subscribed to the principal ideas of the Benelux 
proposal and, as Kiisters points out, constituted a landmark in that for the first 
time general (or horizontal) integration was explicitly accepted as an end o f 
German foreign policy169. The point of departure of the German reasoning, 
however, remained the work done in GATT and OEEC, the primacy of which was 
equally explicitly stated. Liberalizing measures between the Six in fact would 
have to allow for the gradual establishment of a common market. New institutions, 
let alone supranational ones, were not envisaged: within the ECSC a consultative 
organ had to be charged with the elaboration of practical proposals for 
cooperation.
In Brussels and The Hague the conclusion was drawn that the 
Bundesregienmg would not give its support to new supranational initiatives. In 
fact, German reticence on this issue reflected not just anti-integrationist and
167. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 131: ‘Rapport uit Parijs inzake Europese integratie*, 25.4.1955. 
Min. BZ, II, GS, 913.10 Europese integratie IV: codetelegram Paris 5.5.1955. Min. BZ, II,
913.100, no. 134: codetelegram, Van Boetzelaer, 27.5.1955.
168. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 139: ‘Memorandum der Bundesregierung iiber die Fortführung der 
Integration’, accompanying letter 27.5.1955.
169. Kiisters, Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 118. The German Memorandum even complemented its 
Benelux counterpart in proposing the gradual introduction of free movement of labour within 
the future common market, (he drafting up of a set o f rules for fair competition and the 
creation of a capital fund for promoting productive investments.
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anti-supranational sentiments in the Bonn government itself, but also the wider 
spread opinion that since France, like before, was the potential stumbling block 
for new integration efforts, no proposal should go beyond what the French 
government could accept170.
Faced with these discouraging reactions Beyen and Spaak decided to present 
their proposal in an even more open and flexible fashion. Before the proposed 
intergovernmental conference would start drafting up treaties, Beyen suggested, 
the ground should be prepared by an experts conference: these experts should 
explore independently from their national governments the room for common 
action on the issues singled out by the forthcoming ministers conference. Their 
report should then serve as a basis for the actual treaty negotiations. Also, the 
experts’ conference should occupy itself with all possible kinds of future 
cooperation in Europe, intergovernmental schemes included; this would enable 
countries from outside the Six, especially the U.K., to participate in the 
proceedings. All this, Beyen reasoned, would facilitate a positive French reaction 
while the need for supranational solutions would nevertheless be demonstrated. 
Spaak agreed, adding the suggestion that the secretary-general of this expert’s 
conference should be a ‘political personality’. Clearly the Belgian minister had in 
mind the unsatisfactory results of the 1953/54 EPC conferences when national 
experts had been unable to come to terms with each other. In the new set up the 
political personality’s chairmanship should squeeze a maximum of agreement out 
of the delegates, he reasoned. Thus, in reaction to the alleged French and German 
reticence the original Benelux proposal was extended with a procedural 
supplement171.
Indeed, the last weeks before the ministers’ conference, which was finally 
scheduled to take place at Messina (Italy) during the first two days of June 1955, 
the perspectives for the Benelux initiative seemed to be far from revenu. This 
induced Spaak, Beyen and Bech to adopt a minimalist stance: discussing tactics 
on the morning before the start of the conference they decided not to oppose their 
colleagues’ choice, be it in favour o f sector integration or the common market 
approach. Instead they would throw in all their political weight for getting the
170. Min. BZ, II, 91.3.100, no. 139: codetelegram Lamping. 27.5.1955.
II, GS, 913.10 Europese integratie IV: codetelegram, Van Boetzelaer, 5.5.1955.
171. Min. BZ, II, 913.1000, no. 20: ‘Betreft Conferentie van Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken 
der Zes op 1 Juni 1955', 19.5.1955; Min. BZ, II, 913-100, no. 19: posttelegram Van 
Harinxma, 25.5.1955. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 134: memorandum Chef DWS, 25.5.1955. 
Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 21: ‘Projet de Resolution’, accompanying letter 25.5.1955.
Benelux procedural proposals accepted172. The minutes of the Messina conference 
show that this turned out a wise approach. Both the French foreign minister Pinay 
and the German assistant secretary o f state Hallstein, though both pro ‘European’ 
themselves, made clear that their room for manoeuvre was extremely limited. 
Pinay stated that his government was in favour o f an effort at sector integration 
for energy and transport. With regard to the common market proposal, however, 
he would not be able to bind his country to any clear cut commitment:
Après l’échec auquel a abouti le Traité de la C.E.D., lui semble-t-il opportun 
de ne pas s’engager dans la voie de ce qui paraîtrait idéalement souhaitable, 
mais de rester sur le terrain de ce qui est pratiquement possible. [...] Par 
conséquent, M. Pinay estime qu’il y aurait avantage à procéder d’abord par 
secteurs, parce que cette méthode permettrait un départ immédiat et une 
action rapide, tandis qu’une intégration générale postulerait l’harmonisation 
progressive des conditions économiques et sociales dans les six pays173.
Hallstein showed himself more in favour of the common market approach. 
On the institutional issue, however, the federal government did not want to go 
further, at least for the moment, than a consultative organ, he told his colleagues. 
And generally, as far as new organizations were concerned ‘le Gouvernement 
fédéral est d ’avis qu’il faut éviter de créer de nouvelles institutions 
européennes’174. These statements showed that no far reaching decisions were to 
be expected and both Spaak and Beyen, though stressing their fundamental belief 
that without supranationality no real solution could be expected, made clear that 
they were aware of this and underlined the openness and flexibility of their 
proposals. Spaak explained that he, ‘more desirous to obtain concrete results than 
to defend a theory’ had considered it wise to put the emphasis on sector 
integration. If the meeting, however, preferred to embark on the more ‘audacious’ 
course of general integration as well, so much the better... And Beyen frankly 
stated that his government did not expect the meeting to come up with real
172. Snoy et d'Oppuers, ‘Un témoin', 23-24, J. Snoy et d'Oppuers, ‘Le role du Benelux dans la 
relance européenne en 1955*: in Belgisch buitenlands beleid en internationale betrekkingen. 
Liber amicomm, Prof. Gui de Raymaeker (Leuven 1978) 232, J. Snoy et d’Oppuers, ‘Les 
étapes de la coopération européenne et les negotiations relatives à une zône de libre échange’ 
Chronique Politique Etrangère 12 (1959), 590,
173. Min, BZ, II 913.1000, no. 21: ‘Projet de procès-verbal de la réunion C.E.C.A., des Ministres 




decisions or even statements of principles. For the moment what could be done 
was to indicate the issues and to organize an intergovernmental conference to 
work them out.
It was along these lines, in fact, that the deputies under the chairmanship of 
Belgium’s Snoy et d’Oppuers finally worded the compromise which was accepted 
by the ministers early in the morning of the 3rd of June: The so-called Messina 
declaration envisaged an intergovernmental conference prepared by an experts 
conference under the chairmanship of a ‘political personality’ as suggested by the 
Benelux countries. Moreover, the Declaration was heavily based on the Benelux 
memorandum in that it mentioned all its proposals for both sectoral and general 
integration. However, it did not mention them as aims on which agreement had 
been reached but explicitly as objects of study and possibly negotiations. Also, the 
Benelux wordings had been robbed of the last clear-cut policy content they had. 
Particularly its institutional suggestions were suppressed; even with regard to 
atomic energy, an issue on which everybody seemed to agree that a common 
effort would make sense and for which the Benelux had proposed a ‘common 
authority’, the Declaration stated nothing more than the intention to ‘study’ the 
creation of a ‘common organization’. Yet, under the circumstances this was the 
best possible result for the Benelux countries and it was recognised as such by 
both Spaak and Beyen175.
2.7 Discussion
From a Dutch foreign policy point of view the so-called ‘Relance européenne’ 
was not so much a European relaunch rather than a continuation of existing 
national policies. Ever since 1952 the main aim of Dutch Euro-policy had been an 
economically integrated Western Europe along the lines of the Beyen Plan, i.e. a 
non-protectionist customs union or common market administered by a 
supranational institution.
The failure o f the EDC and EPC marked a temporary setback for these 
aspirations but did not undermine or alter them significantly. Fear of ‘fake 
integration’ and resurgence of French-German bilateralism, as well as the 
awareness that no concrete results were within reach made Beyen originally adopt
175. Ibidem. NA, MR (511): ‘Résolution adoptée par les Ministres des Affaires Etrangères des 
Etats membres de la C.E.C.A., réunis à Messine les 1. et 2. juin 1955*. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, 
no. 21: codetelcgram Beyen/Luns to Washington, 8.6.1955.
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a defensive stance. The fall of the French Mendès-France government then 
fulfilled the most important condition for a more active policy. The desire to take 
the initiative instead of being obliged to follow others’ acted as an extra 
inducement in making the Dutch foreign minister aspire to get the Beyen Plan 
back on the European negotiation table.
Beyen’s position, however, turned out to be an isolated one: in both the 
Dutch Cabinet and Benelux, as well as in his own ministry, few were convinced 
of both the desirability and the feasibility of his proposal. The conviction that, 
whatever the contents of a future initiative, common Benelux action was to be 
regarded a ‘conditio sine qua non’ for its success, made Spaak and Beyen arrive at 
a political compromise. The Benelux memorandum for the Messina conference 
combined Spaak’s Monnet-inspired proposals for sectoral integration with a 
relaunching of the Beyen Plan for general economic integration.
Its ‘hybrid’ character, though, may well have been decisive in making the 
Benelux proposal a success at Messina: it had something to offer for everybody 
and yet pinned no party down on drastic commitments. The importance of the 
Messina Conference and Resolution, therefore, has been exaggerated in the 
political and historical literature. For some they have even got mythical 
proportions. The primary documents suggest a more detached approach. What 
basically happened at Messina is threefold: firstly, it put European integration 
back on the negotiation table; secondly, it was decided that the new talks would 
be on economic integration and thirdly, a certain method for these talks was 
agreed to.
Thus Messina created the conditions for successful negotiations, rather than 
being a decisive break-through in political terms. Beyen’s ‘desperate tenacity’ 
changed the mind sets of his Ministry, of the Dutch government as well as of his 
Benelux-colleagues. Combining their forces, Beyen and Spaak managed to exert 
substantial engineerial influence which, with the wisdom of hind-sight, changed 
the agenda of the Six fundamentally.
Much of the Messina effect is to be attributed to Spaak and the way he 
subsequently put the Messina bridgehead to use. Securing appointment as the 
‘Political Personality’ in charge of the negotiations enabled him to split the expert 
talks in the fall o f 1955 into two main groupings, one on Euratom and one on the 
Common Market. Time and again he would tell the delegates in the latter forum 
that their task was to work out a method how to realise the common market, not to 
pass judgement on its desirability. Looked upon from this angle, of all his efforts
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during the Relance Beyen’s success in gaining Spaak’s support for relaunching 
the common market ideal may have been the most significant.
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Chapter 3: Between Example and Spectre. The Impact of Benelux on 
the Netherlands’ European Policy in the 1950s
3.0 Introduction
The significance of Benelux for the process of European integration during the 
fifties and sixties is stressed in the historical and economic literature in a twofold 
manner, both suggesting valuable resources for exerting engineering influence by 
the smaller powers concerned. In the first place, Benelux is portrayed as a 
precursor to the European Economic Community, which came into being from 
1957 onwards. The economic and political experiences gained by Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg as part of their Benelux co-operation are supposed 
to have played an important role in their negotiations with France, Italy and the 
Federal German Republic to achieve a broader based economic unity. The fact is 
that Benelux embodied the first actually realised attempt to come to 
regional-economic bloc formation in post-war Western Europe. Thus it acted as a 
test laboratory for European integration, a laboratory which pioneered real life and 
practical examples for both academic theory and political practice of economic 
integration processes. The lessons drawn from the Benelux experiment could be 
used in the fifties for stands and stances of both the Benelux delegations 
themselves and those of their future EEC partners during the intergovernmental 
talks on the foundation of a European Political Community (EPC) and the 
subsequent EEC negotiations.
Secondly, foreign policy cooperation on European integration among the 
Benelux countries is emphasized. By streamlining their mutual positions as much 
as possible, Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourgian delegations are supposed to have 
succeeded in talking in near unison during the European negotiations fora as a 
result of which they were able to acquire a disproportionately large influence in 
their talks with their French, German and Italian colleagues.176
176. In Grosbois' analysis, this foreign policy empowerment aim was the most important one: 
‘car la création de cette organisation régionale n’avait pas pour objectif premier la réalisation 
d’une intégration économique entre les trois pays signataires. En exil à Londres. les pays 
membres de l ’union Benelux y ont adhéré avant tout dans le but de créer une sorte de groupe 
de petites nations de l’Europe occidentale, afin que, dans les négociations internationales, 
leur point de vue soit désormais pris en compte par les grandes puissances’, (emphasis mine, 
A G I!), Thierry Grosbois, ‘La Belgique et le Benelux: de l’universalisme au régionalisme’,
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In the publications of the policy makers who were involved in EEC 
negotiations at the time great significance is given to both aspects of the role of 
the Benelux. Looking back, Dutch foreign minister Stikker (1948-1952) wrote in 
his memoirs: ‘Benelux during this initial period of European economic 
organization and cooperation, served as an inspiring model for the idea of 
unification.’ Benelux, ‘as a unit’ gave ‘much greater power to Belgium, 
Luxemburg and The Netherlands than they could possibly have had as individual 
states’177 Former permanent secretary of the Department of Economic Affairs in 
Brussels and co-signer of the EEC treaty, J.C. Snoy et d ’Oppuers says: ‘C’est 
ainsi que dans la rédaction du Traité de Rome, un grand nombre de formules qui 
ont été finalement adoptées, étaient inspirées par l’expérience des pays de 
Benelux’178
Likewise, discussing the impact of Benelux during the fifties and sixties, 
Woyke draws the following conclusion: ‘Das internationale Gehör, das sich 
Kleinstaaten durch Integration in Europa verschafft haben, steht in keinem 
Verhältnis zu ihrer tatsächlichen Bedeutung’179 According to him, Benelux has 
managed to retain this political significance up until the sixties. Only at the time 
of entry by Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1973 the Benelux 
countries are supposed to have had to let go of their common power stance within 
the European Community.
More recent integration studies, based on primary source material from 
Western European negotiations in the fifties, fine-tune this image of an influential 
and far-reaching Benelux co-operation. On the one hand, the importance of the 
role of the Benelux states in the EPC and EEC negotiations comes more and more 
to the fore. In these studies there is specific reference to the initiatives worked out
in: Michel Dumoulin. Geneviève Duchenne and Anhe van Laer (ed.). La Belgique, les petits 
états et la construction européenne (Brussel 2003), 59-91 (60). Although distinct, Hirsch 
argues, the two power resources, to wit the test laboratory experience and foreign policy 
cooperation, were far from separate. Benelux, precisely by using ‘seine eigene Erfahrung als 
Imegraiionslaboratorium’ tabled ‘Memoranden [...] die sich als wegweisend erwiesen*. 
Mario Hirsch, ‘Benelux ist mehr als nur ein geographischer Begriff: Ein Motor der 
europäischen Integration’, in D. Kneip and E. Stratenschulte (eds.) Staatenkooperaton in der 
EU, (Opladen 2003), 43-50 (49).
177. Dirk U. Stikker, Men o f Responsibility (New York 1965), 178,181.
178. J.C. Snoy et d’Oppuers, ‘Les étapes de la coopération Européenne et les négociations 
relatives à une zone de libre échange’ in: Chronique de Politique Etrangère, vol. XII (1959). 
(569-623) 584.
179. Wichard Woyke, Erfolg durch Integration - Die Europapolitik der Benelux-Staaten von 1947 
bis 1969 (Bochum 1985) 387.
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by the Dutch Foreign Minister J.W. Beyen and to his blueprint for a future 
customs union between the six ECSC states. (See chapter 1). The successful 
relaunch of the Beyen Plan in 1955 at the Messina conference, where the 
foundation for the actual EEC negotiations was set down, also receives much 
attention in more recent historiography. Yet we also find that the successes of the 
Benelux countries could only, to a certain degree, be attributed to a really 
effective Benelux co-operation. On many an issue during negotiations the points 
of view of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg diverged considerably. The 
intended co-ordination of their foreign policies was often inadequate. Personal 
disputes between the ministers concerned and interdepartmental struggles within 
national delegations hampered concerted actions. Where and when the Benelux 
delegations did act successfully, for example, when presenting their memorandum 
for the Messina conference, this did not so much reflect a unity as regards content 
but rather a painstakingly achieved tactical compromise (see chapter 2).180 Thus, 
diplomatic successes of the Benelux states were only in a moderate way the result 
of a concerted Benelux policy on European integration.
Such dressing down of external concerted actions of the Benelux encounters 
a parallel in the historiography on the internal development of Benelux co­
operation. Here, more than ever, the difficulties on the road to the eventual 1958 
Economic Union-treaty are emphasised. The many exception clauses and secret 
protocols of the Benelux agreements of the late forties and early fifties evoke an 
image of Swiss Emmentaler cheese. In lieu of an intrepid integration attempt and 
an important predecessor of the EEC, Benelux rather proves to have been an 
awkwardly functioning intergovernmental collaboration on sub-sectors of 
economic policy. In extremis181 we are presented with the image of a Benelux 
which went bankrupt internally as an integration concept, although, nevertheless, 
was bailed out for the sake of an external facade for purposes of foreign policy. It 
so happened, as the argument goes, that the ‘Benelux myth’ proved to be a
180. Sec for instance: A.E. Kersten, Maken drie kleinen één grote? De politieke invloed van de 
Benelux 1945-1955 (Bussum 1982); R.T. Griffiths and A.S. Milward, ‘The Beyen Plan and 
the European Political Community' in: Wemer Maihofer (ed.), Noi si mura. Selected 
working papers o f the European University Institute (Florence 1986) 595-621; Anjo G. 
Harryvan en Albert E. Kersten. ‘The Nethcrlands. Benelux and the Relance Européenne 
1954-1955’, in: Enrico Serra (ed.), La relance européenne et les traités de Rome (Brussels 
etc. 1989) 125-157.
181. AJ. Boekestijn, ‘Een nagel aan Adam Smiths doodskist. De Benelux-onderhandclingen in de 
járen veertig en vijftig’, in: E.S.A. Bloemen (ed.), Het Benehix-effect (Amsterdam 1992), 
143-168.
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convenient vehicle both in acquiring a considerable sum of Marshall aid as well as 
in strengthening the concerted positions at the European bargaining tables.
Quality ideas, when they are both inspiring and catching on, are among the 
most effective instruments a smaller power finds in its foreign policy tool kit 
when aiming at engineering influence. Following up on the strong indications that 
the Benelux countries put their regional integration experiences to good use in 
their European policies, we scrutinise in this chapter academic analysis and 
political practice of the Benelux lessons on regional economic integration, as well 
as the way these results of the ‘Benelux research station on regional integration*, 
were incorporated and put to use into the Netherlands’ policies on Europe.
3.1 The Benelux Lessons
From the beginning, expectations that Benelux could function as a research station 
were voiced by many. As early as 1946 The Economist spoke of a new model of 
democratic international co-operation.182 Following Kuin, Weisglas referred to it 
as an ‘example and laboratory’ towards a European customs union.183 In 1949 
Bareau described Benelux as a practical test case, on which every instrument in 
the economic laboratories of Europe should be focused.184 Robertson also alluded 
to the Benelux as the equivalent o f a laboratory experiment in economic 
integration.185 In 1960 Gay and Wagret portrayed Benelux as a ‘laboratoire du 
marché commun’.186
The notion that Benelux actively played such a role is emphasised by Hartog 
who, in his ‘Nederland en de Euromarkt’ from 1971, states: ‘In all probability, 
without Benelux there would have been no EEC’.187 In Hartog’s opinion, trying 
out economic integration on a small scale has been the Benelux states’ most 
important contribution towards the materialisation of the EEC. Moreover, as
182. The Economist, 17-8-1946; cited in: M. Weisglas, Benelux, van nabuurstaten tot 
uniepartners (Amsterdam/Brussel 1949) 341.
183. M. Weisglas, op. cit. 339.
184. Paul Bareau, ‘Rifts in the Benelute’, in: The Spectator, 9-9-1949, (319-320) 319.
185. W. Robertson, ‘Benelux and problems of economic integration’, in: Oxford economic 
papers, (new series), vol. 8, no. 1 (35-50) 35.
186. François Gay and Paul Wagret, Le Benelux (Parijs 1960) 115.
187. F. Hartog, Nederland en de Euromarkt (Leiden 1971) 10.
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Belgian economist Samoy puts it, Benelux has not only been ‘the pioneer, the 
lab', it also continued to play this role well into the 1970s.188
From the late 1940s onwards we can discern an epistemic community of 
academics and civil servants aimed at monitoring and analysing Benelux' 
economic and political lessons. This epistemic community comprised some thirty 
individuals sharing a common policy enterprise, to vid monitoring and sharing 
analysis of Benelux' economic development and its concomittant policy 
experiences, as well as drawing conclusions from the latter in terms of academic 
insights and policy lessons for the Netherlands, Benelux and potential wider 
regional-economic cooperation frameworks. Three leading economic journals, 
Zakenwereld, De Economist and above all Economische-Statistische Berichten 
provided the participants in this epistemic community with vessels to divulge 
experiences and discuss findings and opinions.
High-ranking civil servants played a key rol in this exchange of views: Hans 
Hirschfeld, the powerful government commissioner for Marshall Plan Affairs, 
Jaap Kymmell as the minister’s economic advisor at the Foreign Ministry, Jozias 
Wemelsfelder as director at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and F.W. Dirker a 
regional economics expert at the same ministry, G. Brouwers and J.E. van 
Dierendonck in similar positions at the Ministry for Social Welfare, H. van 
Blankenstein was the economic integration specialist at the Ministry of Finance, 
W.P.H. van Oorschot was the trade specialist of the Directorate-General for 
External Economic Relations (BEB) in the Ministry of Economic Affairs. M. 
Weisglas headed the Press Service of the same ministry, to mention some of the 
more prominent policy practitioners.189
A second caucus consisted of the network of Jan Tinbergen, the founder and 
director of the Centraal Plan Bureau (CPB), the Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis. This group comprises Petrus Verdoom, Tinbergen’s 
deputy, Groningen economics professor F. Hartog, co-founder o f the CPB, as well 
as IMF economist Jacques Polak (J.J. Polak). Like Tinbergen Polak had worked 
as an economist with the League of Nations during the 1930s. Under Tinbergen’s
188. Achiel G. Samoy, ‘Benelux, de Europese pionier' in: Belgisch buitenlands beleid en 
intemationafe betrekkineen. Liber amicorum prof. dr. Omer de Raevmaeker (Leuven 1978) 
(221-225)221.
189. For an overview of the policy competences and division of labour among the various 
governmental departments see ‘A Note on the Making of the Netherlands’ European Policy 
during the 1950s and 1960s’ at the end of this book.
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direction the CPB developed in an authoritive interface between Academia and 
policy making on a whole range o f questions, among which the Benelux issue.190
A third group consisted of various other academics and publicists like Pieter 
Kuin, a Unilever Director and personal acquaintance of foreign minister Beyen, as 
well as monetary and fiscal expert H.W.J.A. Vredegoor.
The groups were closely interrelated. Kuin e.g., aside from being a business 
director had been president of the Raad voor de Economische Unie (Benelux 
Central Council)191 until the late 1940s. He had taken a PhD in economics and 
published on -  among other issues -  transport problems and the relation between 
universities and business life.192 Many of the participants were either trained or 
teaching at the Rotterdam School of Economics.193 The community appears to 
have been a relatively open one, with a reading knowlegde of Dutch being the 
only hard condition for participation. A few Belgians participated, like the pro- 
Benelux Cl. De Bièvre as well as L.L. Sermon, who was of a rather Benelux 
sceptic persuasion. Research findings were communicated to a larger public 
(Wemelsfelder, Hartog) and published in larger international fora by, above all, 
Kuin, Wemelsfelder and Verdoom, where they were picked up and recycled by 
Meade and Balassa.194
The outcomes of the ‘Benelux laboratory* relevant to European economic 
integration as discussed by the epistemic community and in the academic
190. As F. Hartog worded it in 1970: ‘When the CPB has spoken all possibilities are still open, 
but we know to what extent.’ J. Passenier, Van planning naar scanning. Een halve eeuw 
planning in Nederland (Groningen 1994), 363. In 1968 Tinbergen was honoured with the 
first Nobel prize for economics.
191. II.G. Schermers en H.A.H. Audretsch.'De instellingen van de Benelux', in: Benelux in de 
kijker, 50 jaar samenwerking (Tielt 1994), 138.
192. P. Kuin and H.J. Kcuning, Het vervoerswezen (Utrecht 1948) and P. Kuin. Universiteit en 
bedrijfsleven (s.l. 1952).
193. The Nederlandsche Handelshoogeschool was founded in 1913, renamed as Nederlandsche 
Economische Hogeschool (NEH) in 1938 and created a name for itself by its innovative 
contribution to econometrics. H.P. van Dalen and A. Klamer, ‘De Rotterdamse econoom 
tussen wetenschap en handel’, ESB 24.12.1999,958-960.
194. P.J. Verdoom, ‘A Customs Union for Western Europe -  Advantages and Feasibility’, World 
Politics, July 1954, 482-500; P. Kuin, ‘Lessons of Benelux’, Progress. Autumn 1953; J 
Wemelsfelder, ‘Benelux. An Experiment in Economic Integration*, Economia 
internazionale: revista dell’Istituto di Econmia Internazionale 1955, 543-557; J.E. Meade, 
The Theory o f Customs Unions (Amsterdam 1955); J.E. Meade (ed.). Case Studies in 
European Economic Union. The Mechanics o f Integration (London 1962); Bela Balassa, 
‘Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market’, The Economic 
Journal, Vol. 77, no. 305 (March 1967), 1-21.
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literature of its days basically concern three areas: development of trade between 
the participating countries within a customs union, the role of economic and social 
policies within the integration process and, finally, the consequences of 
integration for the structures of the economies concerned and the adjustment 
problems consequently encountered. We will discuss these issues seriatim.
3.1.1 Development of Benelux trade: the ‘elasticity pessimists* versus the 
‘Benelux effect*
Initially politicians and economists were reluctant to answer the question apropos 
the consequences for internal trade between Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg as a result of the 1948 Benelux customs union. It was deemed 
certain though that abolishing tariffs and quantitative restrictions to regional trade 
would have positive effects on trade. However, it was much more difficult to 
determine the extent of accompanying trade and expected GDP growth. 
Comparable examples of experiments with regional economic bloc formation 
dated from the 19th century and more recent experiences with the Belgian 
Luxembourgian Economic Union (BLEU) dating from 1921 and the customs 
union between Liechtenstein and Switzerland (1923) did not quite comply with 
the Benelux state of affairs which, in terms of economic weight of the 
participating states, was on a more equal footing.195 The shaping of theories on 
regional integration had only just begun -  Jacob Viner would publish his ‘The 
Customs Union Issue’ in 1950 -  and where calculations were produced they 
dampened expectations: eliminating tariffs would, on average, make Dutch 
products on the BLEU market cheaper by approximately 7% and 
Belgian-Luxembourgian products exported to the Netherlands by some 10%. No 
great illusions were harboured about the price elasticity as to how import demands 
would react to such developments. At a broadening of demand by two per cent 
points at each per cent in price decrease, increase of trade volume would be
195. The other experiments in European regional economic integration during the Interbellum 
were a result of the post WW I peace treaties or otherwise politically tinged, like the customs 
unions between Danzig and Poland (1920-1939). the Saar territory and France (1920-1935), 
the Memel territory and Lithuania (1923-1939), Albania and Italy (1939-1943). All of these 
were relatively short-lived and collapsed when they lost their political relevance. Hence, 
Kohr observes, Benelux (1948) constituted ‘the first major common market to be established 
in the twentieth century'. Leopold Kohr, ‘The History of the Common Market*, Journal o f  
Economic History, vol. 20 (1960), 441-454 (444).
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restricted to 20% at the most.196 Academics and policy-makers were largely in the 
dark, though, with regard to the dynamic effects of the customs union, the long­
term effects of the expansion o f the market and the possibilities of ongoing 
division o f labour.197
Be that as it may, by Dutch policy makers Benelux was considered of great 
importance, in that it could provide the country with an enlarged home-market 
and thus -  at least partly -  compensate for the loss of the traditional export 
markets in Germany and Indonesia. Equally, Benelux was deemed an important 
catalyst for the ambitious national industrialisation policy, aimed at a substantial 
increase in industrial exports. From the Dutch point o f view, Weisglas argued in a 
resounding 1948 PhD analysis, complementarity o f the two economies (the 
Netherlands as a predominantly agricultural economy and Belgium as a 
quintessentially industrial one) was anything but a ‘conditio sine qua non’.198
In order not to lose the political credit with the United States gained through 
the Benelux initiative and the subsequent chances for large Marshall financing, 
Benelux-expectations were opportunely stretched in a considerable way. The most 
optimistic prognoses are to be found in the ‘Second memorandum concerning the 
long term program of the Benelux countries’ of October 1948 drawn up for the 
OEEC. The United States had asked the Marshall countries to each draw up a long 
term program in which they were to outline exactly how they thought to arrive at 
a viable economy and a stable balance of payments by the time of the projected 
end of Marshall aid in 1952. The Americans thought that reducing European 
dollar shortages called for a resurgence of intra European trade. To further this 
aim, one or more European customs unions would be of great importance. They 
were served hand and foot with the Dutch Benelux-expectations (see Table 1). 
Cabinet reports stated that trade in the Benelux in both directions would be 
doubled around 1952/53 in comparison to its 1947 volume. It remained entirely 
unclear how this development was to be realised in the real world. Government’s 
Marshall-plan chief Hirschfeld was none too happy about the speculative figure 
juggling carried out to make target figures converge with American expectations.
196. P. Kuin and P.J. Verdoom, Welke zijn de achtergronden en vooruitzichten van de 
economische integratie in Europa en welke gevolgen zou deze integratie hebben, met name 
voor de welvaart in Nederland' (Pracadviezen Ver. Voor Staathuishoudkunde), ('s Graven- 
hage 1952) provides us with a ‘pessimistic’ calculation of trade effects of a customs union 
between the six Coal and Steel Community countries, based on an assumed elasticity of -2.
197. M. Weisglas, op. cit. 15-17.
.198. Ibidem.
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He tartly noted that these kinds of ‘negotiation schedules’ were not founded on 
well-considered economic policies.199
The actual developments in intra-Benelux trade, however, exceeded the most 
optimistic expectations. From the late 1940s onwards, exchange of goods in both 
directions rose explosively. Within a few years exchange of goods between 
Benelux countries rose to a previously unseen high level both in value and in 
percentage o f its entire import and export packages. The import-export series, 
deflated by the price index-figures also showed a doubling of trade volumes for 
the period 1948-1952. Where Belgian imports from the Netherlands before the 
war amounted to 9% of total Belgian imports, this figure had risen to 13,8% in 
1953 (see Table 2). Trade in the opposite direction was even more telling: before 
the war Belgium’s share of Dutch imports moved around 11%; during the early 
fifties this had risen to around 17 to 18 per cent.
Table 1. Development o f  intra-Benelux trade 1948-1953, as foreseen in the 
second Benelux Long Term Program o f December 1948 (in millions o f US dollars)
1936-38 1947 1948-49 1949-50 1952-53
Export




Netherlands 221.3 181.1 192.5 267 370.7
Source: Tweede Memorandum betreffende het programma op lange termijn van 
de Benehalanden, 3 in: Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal 
1948/1949, 1021-2 (16 december 1948). The figures for the period 1936-1938 
have been corrected for the 1948 price level by a 3.75 multiplier. In 1948 the 
fixed exchange rate between guilder and dollar was 1 $ = ƒ  2,65.
199. ‘Tweede memorandum betreffende het programma op lange termijn van de Benelux-landen* 
in: Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. 1948/49, 16-12-1948, 1021-2. 
Pierre van der Eng, De Marshall-hulp. Een perspectief voor Nederland, 1947-1953 (Houten 
1987)69, 76-77.
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In two articles in ‘Economische Statistische Berichten’ in September and 
December 1953, Hartog ascribed the sharp increase in bilateral trade between 
Benelux countries to the ‘Benelux effect’. According to Hartog, the tariff 
advantages which were brought about by the realisation of the customs union had 
a greater effect than the ‘elasticity pessimists’ had expected. Rather than the 
expected -2, the value of substitution-elasticities for Belgian and Dutch import 
markets turned out to be around -5, according to his calculations. Extrapolating 
Benelux results, he calculated a substitution elasticity o f about -4 for the customs
Table 2. Intra-Benelux trade 1948-1960 in millions o f  guilders at current prices 
and as percentages o f  total imports.
Export Netherlands Export BLEU
to BLEU to Netherlands
Value in As % o f total Value in As % of
Year millions of BLEU imports millions of total Dutch
guilders guilders imports
19481 435 8.2 732 14.7
19492 491 9.3 761 14.3
19503 743 10.1 1.437 18.4
1951 1.058 10.9 1.774 18.3
1952 1.232 13.3 1.451 17.2
1953 1.263 13.8 1.556 17.2
1954 1.297 13.4 1.841 17.0
1955 1.430 13.3 2.205 18.1
1956 1.624 13.1 2.680 18.9
1957 1.847 14.1 2.816 18.1
1958 1.868 15.7 1.459 17.8
1959 2.065 15.8 2.747 18.3
1960 2,234 14.9 3.155 18.3
1) 1000 Bfr. = ƒ  60.50
2) 1000 Bfr. = ƒ  64.80
3) 1950-1960:1000 Bfr. = ƒ  76.00
Source: Benelux Economische Unie. Documentatie (s.l.s.a.), 7
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union between France, Italy, West Germany and the Benelux countries as 
proposed in the Beyen Plan. This meant that the establishment of such a customs 
union on a broader European scale would entail important consequences for 
multilateral trade between participating countries.200
Hartog’s findings did not remain uncontested. Thus, Polak observed a general 
increase in the exchange of goods between medium-sized West European trading 
nations for the period 1945-1952. For example, exports from Benelux countries to 
Italy and Switzerland had risen in percentages comparable with those of intra- 
Benelux exports. Therefore, broadening of trade within the Benelux area did not 
appear to be a phenomenon specifically attributed to the customs union but rather 
part of a more general development.201
Polak’s findings, in turn, were challenged by Tinbergen. The latter argued 
that, in light of the relatively high starting level, trade development between 
Benelux countries, on the basis of growth percentages, could not be accurately 
compared with trade increases with, for example, the Scandinavian countries. 
Also, because of this high starting level ‘reduced surpluses’ were to be expected 
in the relative growth figures.
He concluded that, in comparison with pre-war patterns of trade flows, 
Benelux trade, in both directions, had undergone a more than average increase. 
The Benelux effect had most definitely played a role in this.210 Calculations by 
Kristein, in spite of his criticism of Hartog’s methods, supported the latter’s 
findings about the significance of this Benelux effect: half of all Dutch imports 
from the BLEU was to be attributed to the Benelux customs union.201
Economic and historic literature of a later date puts the significance attributed 
to the ‘Benelux effect’ into perspective. Development of Dutch trade with BLEU 
during the first post-war years was predominantly the outcome of governmental 
policies204 on the basis of political-monetary considerations under extraordinary
200. F. Ilartog, ‘I let Benclux-effect*, in Economisch-Statistische Berichten (ESB), 23.9.1953. 
747-749. F. Ilartog, ‘Naschrift*. ESB. 16.12.1953.1012.
201. Letter to the editor by J.J. Polak, ESB, 16.12.1953,1010-1012.
202. J. Tinbergen. ‘De economic der Beneluxlandcn voor 1940 cn na 1945. He invlocd van Bene­
lux op hcl bedrijfsleven* Zakenwereld, 1956. no. 17. (27-32) 30.
203. Marvin Kristein, Benelux. Son influence sur ies exportations beiges a destination dcs 
Pays-Bas. Comité Benelux, (s.I., 1956) 10.
204. In reality, until the end of 1949, the Dutch-Belgian border was *the toughest frontier m 
Europe to move anything across*, according to M. Hoffman in the New York l imes of 31 
July 1949, as quoted in J.E. Meade (cd.). Case studies in European hUtmomtc Union. Vie 
mechanics o f  integration (London 1962), 152. Actual liberalization of Dutch imports from 
Belgium started only with the coming into effect of the Benelux l*re-l*mon Treaty in October
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circumstances such as, for example, the temporary loss of West Germany as the 
Netherlands’ most important supplier of capital goods. Tariffs played a part in 
this, albeit on a minor scale. Only with the sharpening of intra European 
liberalisation policies, within the framework of the European Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation, (OEEC) did tariffs recapture their trade political edge.205 
In light of ex-post calculated elasticities for the bilateral trade development of 
EEC member states, Hartog’s estimate seems to have been on the high side.206 
This does not alter the fact, that, in accordance with Hartog’s later claim, the 
prosperous development of intra Benelux trade and the recognition of a 
Benelux-effect may have been important weapons in the battle against ‘elasticity 
pessimism’. Indeed, the Benelux-effect appears to have played a role in Beyen’s 
campaign for establishing a customs union on a broader European basis, in 
constituting an empirically based argument in its favour.207
3.1.2 Liberalisation and Harmonisation: The Role of Economic Policies
The substantial growth of intra Benelux trade had a troubling drawback: At the 
time of the commencement of the so called ‘Voor-Unie’ (Pre-Union) in 1950, the 
Dutch deficit on the bilateral balance of trade with Belgium, which on a monthly 
basis had already grown from around 10 million guilders to more than 20 million 
guilders between 1946 and 1949, rose to DFL 80 million per month in 1950. It so 
happened that the Netherlands had had a substantial structural deficit with 
Belgium before the war. Back then, this could be compensated for with Dutch 
income from third countries, as well as oil revenues from the Dutch East Indies.
1949 and initially covered a limited 30% of Dutch imports from the BLEU. ‘If we conclude 
an attractive trade deal with Switzerland or the South Pole, we do not pretend to have given 
birth to a ‘pre-union’ either*, sneered Belgian economist Sermon. (L.L Sermon, ‘Benelux, 
test de l'unification économique de l'Europe?’ in: Revue general belge, no. 49, (November 
1949), (110-123), 110.
205. Richard T. Griffiths, T he abortive Dutch assault on European tariffs 1950-1952’ in: Michael 
Wintle (ed.), Modern Dutch Studies. Essays in honour o f  Peter King, (London 1988), 
(186-208) 188-189.
206. Cf. P.J. Verdoom, T h e  intra-block trade of the Benelux’, in: E.A.G. Robinson (ed.), 
Economic Consequences o f the Size o f Nations (London 1960), 291-332. Eliminating all 
other factors, Verdoom attributes 22% of intra-Benelux trade expansion to the customs 
union. Likewise, Bela Balassa, ‘Trade creation and diversion in the European common 
market: an appraisal of the evidence’, in: B. Balassa (ed.), European Economic Integration 
(Amsterdam etc. 1975), 79-118. According to Balassa’s calculation for the periods 1953- 
1959 and 1959-1970 elasticities of intra-trade among the Six were, respectively, 2.4 and 2.6.
207. F. Ilartog, Nederland en de Euromarkt (Leiden 1971) 12-13.
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During the first post-war years, however, the Dutch balance of payments was in 
deficit on all fronts due to war damages as well as the loss of German trade and 
loss of income from the Dutch Indies. This resulted in The Hague having to pay 
for the deficit with Belgium with ad hoc means of financing such as Belgian 
credits, Marshall funds and, as of 1950, the use of Dutch credit margins within the 
European Payments Union (EPU). This situation gave rise to sharp criticism. In 
the ideal world of a fully fledged economic union, which the Benelux partners 
were striving to achieve in order to satisfy the criteria of the ‘Voor-Unie’ treaty, 
such a financing problem would not present itself. The guilder and the Belgian 
franc would be mutually convertible, or at least the economic policies of the two 
partners would be aligned in such a way that deficits of such proportions could lx* 
prevented. None of these options proved feasible because, and here one 
fundamental weakness of the Benelux construction came to light, in the real world 
of the early 1950s, economic and monetary policies of the Netherlands and those 
of the BLEU differed considerably and, in some respects, were even aimed in 
opposite directions: Belgian economic policies were pre-eminently liberally 
orientated leaving wages, prices and investments by and large to market forces, 
whilst in its monetary and budget policies the Belgian government pursued a tight 
monetary policy and small budget deficits. The Dutch government, on the other 
hand, in its pursuit of economic recovery and industrial expansion, emphatically 
kept a tight rein on wages, prices and investments. It maintained a low interest 
rate while running a substantial budget deficit.
This contradiction in policies would prove to be an important obstacle for the 
prosperous development of Benelux into a genuine economic union. In the 
opinion of some it undermined the credibility of Benelux co-operation and. at the 
same time, its potential as a role model for European co-opcration on a broader 
scale. Belgian monetarist Sermon described Benelux as a classic example of how 
things should not be done: the Benelux partners should have begun by making 
their currencies mutually convertible and by co-coordinating their monetary 
policies. A stable trade balance and convergence of prices and wages were to be 
considered salutary consequences of, rather than conditions for, regional 
economic integration. He argued that Benelux, in its dependency on an agreement 
to international payments at a European level, in no way could be seen as a 
definitive test for Europe’s economic unification. It was more the other way 
round: a case of a European monetary agreement being a necessary precondition
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for further Benelux development.208 Towards the end of 1951, Kymmell wrote, in 
similar vein, that such a monetary agreement, which in the meantime had been 
realized in the form of the EPU, had been the foundation and precondition for 
everything that had been achieved within the Benelux framework. Conversely, 
Benelux had been more o f a hindrance than an advantage to the EPU. The extreme 
debtor position of the Netherlands as a result o f intra Benelux liberalisations and 
Belgium’s extreme creditor position had threatened EPU’s ability to function. 
Also, he argued, Benelux failed to qualify as a trade political trump card for its 
member-states’ relations with the United States. Kymmell reasoned that from an 
international monetary and trade political viewpoint, EPU was much more 
interesting than Benelux. He drew the conclusion that ‘the fact that postponing the 
Benelux economic union would be a blow to European integration, for which 
pursuance this union was supposed to be a shining example, is an argument which 
only very few will dare to uphold.’209 Along with Kymmell, various other authors 
likewise stressed the dependency of Benelux’ unimpeded functioning on 
facilitating European constructions. In 1954 for example, even Hirschfeld seems 
to have lost confidence in an independent pioneering role for Benelux. According 
to him, the only way towards completion of Benelux Economic Union was within 
the framework of international co-operation on a larger scale.210
In 1951 and 1952, continuation of Dutch economic recovery and a 
deflationary change in government policies led to a considerable improvement in 
the national balance of payments. The country’s debtor status within EPU 
changed to a creditor status and, through a combination of substantial increases in 
Dutch exports to Belgium and a decline of Belgian-Luxembourgian exports to the 
Netherlands, the intra Benelux deficit was reduced considerably. The boom 
reversal, instigated by the Korean War, in an otherwise mild recession formed an 
important background to this development. Because o f deflationary restraints on 
domestic demand Dutch production became available for international markets at 
attractive prices, hence the reward of the Drees government’s restrictive policies 
on wages and prices. Conversely, the Belgian export package had become 
relatively expensive, due to considerable wage increases made possible by 
Brussels’ liberal-economic policies. At the Benelux level, this meant that, in a
208. I.J. Sermon, op. cit. 121.
209. J. Kymmell, ‘De economische unie; reculer pour mieux sauter?’ In: ESB, 18.4.1951 (292- 
293) 292. J. Kymmell, ‘E.P.U. en Benelux' in: ESB, 5.12.1951 892-894.
210. H.M. Hirschfeld, ‘Benelux en de wijdere Europese samenwerking*. Internationale Spectator, 
jrg. 1954, 643-660.
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number of branches of Belgian industry Dutch competition had made a heavy 
impact. Notably, layoffs and business closures in Belgian textile, leather, tobacco 
and furniture industries resulted from the supply of inexpensive Dutch products 
on the Belgian market. For the first time in the history of the Benelux process, 
economic interest groups found themselves actually harmed by Benelux 
liberalisation. This provoked serious reactions in Belgium: in general, employers’ 
organisations and trade unions blamed low Dutch wages and social security rates 
and the subsequent difference in competitiveness as being the cause of Belgian 
problems. Dutch ‘wage dumping’ ought to be overcome by mutual adjustment of 
economic-social policies of the Benelux countries.211 Politically this stand was 
translated into Belgian claims on escape clauses, by means of which threatened 
sectors, through levies and import restrictions, were to remain protected from 
‘unfair’ and ‘destructive’ Dutch competition. With regard to the future 
development of Benelux the basic assumption among Belgian politicians was that 
further liberalisations in trade should go hand in hand with a full mutual 
alignment of the two partners’s wage and price policies. From Brussels* point of 
view, a considerable measure of socio-economic equality was a precondition for 
free trade among the Benelux-countries.
In the Netherlands increased self-confidence translated into firm insistence 
on further liberalisation of trade within Benelux. In the academic and political 
debates on the ‘Belgian problems’ the importance of ‘directorial’ Dutch wage 
policies and their impact on competitiveness were played down::i: Looked upon 
on a European scale, Dutch wages were not extremely low. Belgian wages, rather, 
were extremely high. In the analysis by Dutch academics the blame lay with the 
Belgians themselves who, because of a highly overvalued Belgian Franc, 
exorbitant indirect taxes, an inflationary budget policy and a general lack of 
planning, appeared to have priced themselves out of the international markets. 
Harmonisation of policies was surely advisable, but it was up to Belgium to adjust
211. Cl. de Bièvre, ‘Economische Unie tussen 'lc miracle beige’ en ‘Ie miracle hollandais". ESlt. 
24.9.1952 724-728. Meade, op. cit. 129.
212. Wrongfully so, as Van Zanden demonstrates. J.L van Zanden. ‘Geleide loonpolitiek en de 
internationale concurrentiepositie van Nederland. 1948-1%2’. Maandschrift Economic. 52 
(1988), (464-477), 473-474. According to Van Zanden in 1947-1953 Dutch businesses 
experienced a substantial improvement in competitiveness mainly as a result of government 
policies. Among these, two offensive devaluations played a part. Generally, low and 
declining costs of living facilitated wage controls. Declining costs of living, in their turn, 
were a consequence of government keeping fixed rents in place and a successful cheap Kxxl 
policy.
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to Dutch policies and not the other way around. Furthermore, such a 
harmonisation should not be put forward as a precondition towards further 
liberalisation of trade. On the contrary, the former ought to be a consequence of 
the latter. Wage levels, price levels and the underlying policies of the two 
countries should converge driven by the mechanisms already in place within the 
Benelux common market.213
In accordance with Belgian demands a ‘Protocol concerning co-ordination of 
economic and social policies' was agreed upon between the Benelux-countries in 
July 1953. It provided for a  system of escape and arbitration clauses whereby, by 
virtue of joint consultations between both the governments and representatives of 
the various industries in the three countries, protection on a temporary basis could 
be given to branches of industry which were heading for a crisis. Nevertheless, the 
underlying fundamental differences were not solved by this agreement. Against 
the Belgian demand for overall harmonisation of policies as a precondition for 
further liberalisations, the Dutch government put its willingness to agree to 
limited co-ordination in those specific cases where this would prove to be 
desirable. W ith regard to the problem of policy harmonisation in general, 
however, only a few common fundamental principles were formulated with which 
the national policies of the three countries should be in line. The Secretary 
General of the Brussels Department of Economic affairs, J.C. Snoy et d ’Oppuers, 
observed that these fundamental principles left ample space for ‘essential 
differences’. 214 They did not offer any perspective for a political solution 
concerning the problem of uneven competition within the Benelux. With this, the 
core of Dutch policy remained intact: trade liberalisation was the first and 
foremost means to accomplish economic interweaving between the Benelux 
partners. Full co-ordination of economic policy was seen as a work lasting years 
and years which ‘in the end [was to] give maximum effect to meanwhile 
accomplished integration’.315
213. G. Brouwers, ‘Prijzen en Ionen in Nederland en België’, ESB, 14.5.1952 372-374; II.W.J.A. 
Vrcdegoor, ‘Belgic en Benelux na “Ie miracle hollandais"*, ESB, 27.8.1952 648-652; J.E. 
van Dierendonck, ‘Komt er een “miracle Benelux”?’, ESB, 15.10.1952 784-786; II.W.J.A. 
Vredegoor, ‘Versterking van de Belgische internationale concurrentiepositie als voorwaarde 
voor “un miracle Benelux” ’, ESB. 22.10.1952, 805-808; Mcade, op. cit. 171.
214. J.C. Snoy et d’Oppuers, ‘Benelux, doelstelling en taak’, in: Zakenwereld, 1956, no. 17, 
(25-26) 26. A. Rom Colthoff, ‘Benelux-stapvoets voorwaarts', ESB. 4.8.1954. Meade, op. 
cit. 131-135.
215. G. Brouwers, ‘Benelux’, in: ESB, 2.9.1953, (681-684) 683.
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The controversy on policy harmonisation proved to be the most important 
restraining factor towards further development of Benelux co-operation into a full 
fledged economic union. Further agreement on a more freely cross-border 
exchange of production factors was now largely dependent on the extent to which 
-  as a result o f a change in politics or changing international circumstances -  
wages, prices, interest rates and tax rates would converge. At the time when, in 
1954, both interest and budget policies of Belgium and the Netherlands had 
converged considerably, it proved possible to greatly liberalise the transfer of 
capital within the Benelux on this basis. On the other hand, liberalising trade in 
agricultural produce, much sought after by the Netherlands, was rendered 
practically impossible due to great differences in production costs and price 
guarantee schemes. Likewise, on the matter of harmonising excises and other 
indirect taxes, also propagated by the Netherlands, progress was very slow, so that 
until 1958, the would-be economic union operated custom checks even at its 
internal borders.
In the literature, various conclusions are drawn from the Benelux experiences 
with the liberalising of cross-border exchanges of goods, services, capital and 
labour and concomitant policy harmonisation. There is an undisputed observation 
that the input o f economic co-ordination, necessary for achieving an economic 
union, proved to go considerably beyond what the concerned governments had 
initially presumed adequate to meet the case. Meier, and many with him, blamed 
failing policy harmonisation for trade liberalisation turning out to be a tiresome 
and often stagnant process. In this respect, he concludes, the development of 
Benelux ‘renders a clear picture of the dangers which an inadequate co-ordination 
of social-economic policies produce/ 216 Such failing to tune up diverging national 
policies is often connected with the absence of supranational institutions within 
Benelux-co-operation with their own powers. Taken from this viewpoint the lack 
of a common political basis made the future of Benelux a hazardous affair, 
remaining entirely dependent on the political willingness and the opportunities of 
successive national governments to implement, consolidate and extend the 
Benelux integration experiment.217
216. Emile Meier, De Europese economische integratie. diss. Tilburg 1958. (Ixiden s.a.) 47.
217. Robertson, op. cit., 50. In 1959. Benelux secretary-general. Van Lynden. emphatically 
advocated a long-lasting debut of intra-Benelux economic policy harmonization, lest ‘lines 
that now converge will start diverging again*. That such divergence was not manifest yet. he 
reasoned, was to be attributed to good fortune, rather than to intergovernmental policies and 
cooperation. C.D.A. van Lynden. ‘De Benclux-integratie als voorbecld voor dc integratie van
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Others, however, have drawn attention to Benelux’ manifold 
accomplishments, the many things that were accomplished, despite the absence of 
supranational bodies and inadequate policy harmonisation. Thus Heilperin 
thought Benelux a profoundly encouraging precedent for the EEC in the making, 
precisely because the Benelux experiment proved to be successful in spite of the 
absence o f both supranational institutions and monetary integration, in 
combination with a limited policy harmonisation.218
Hartog drew the conclusion from the Benelux practice that important 
differences in economic and social policies proved to be compatible with a large 
degree of economic freedom in inter-Benelux trade. ‘Apparently the main 
emphasis o f economic policies within an integrated economic area can remain 
with the national governments.219’ The same was to be expected for integration on 
a larger scale than Benelux, says Hartog. Again, the national level of economic 
policies would remain by far the most important.
3.1.3 Structural Changes and Adaptation Problems in the Benelux 
Economies
At the implementation of the Pre-Union Treaty in 1949, Weisglas predicted that 
the economic structures of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg would not 
undergo any fundamental changes due to the formation of Benelux. Precisely the 
fact that these economies were not mutually complementary meant there would be 
little chance of one-sided specialisation and conflicts of interests which could 
hamper the due convergence of economic policies.220 The history of Benelux 
development during the fifties would indeed demonstrate that the transfer of 
national markets into the larger encompassing Benelux market took place -  albeit 
not without hitches -  without serious structural changes for the economies 
concerned. Eliminating trade restrictions resulting in increased competition led in 
some industries to loss of capital and loss of jobs. In general, however, such 
adjustment problems were limited and of a temporary nature.
Europa’, in: De huidige economische ontwikkeling/Benelux Verslag Account an tsdag AVA 
19.11.1958, published by Taylor, Efficiency-Bureau voor Administratieve Organisatie 
(Nijmegen 1959), 53-64,59.
218. Michael A. Heilperin, ‘Europe edges toward a Common Market’, in: Fortune, September 
1956,(142-165) 142.
219. F. Hartog. Het economisch wereldbestel (Amsterdam 8th ed.), 121.
220. Weisglas, op. cit.. 10.
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In the literature up to now various causes are illustrated for this mild 
character of the Benelux adjustment process. During the decades before 1949, the 
economies concerned were protected by relatively low tariffs, so that mutual 
competition was not a completely new phenomenon.221 The fact that all three 
countries already experienced a relatively high level of industrialisation could also 
have been the reason for deep cutting shifts as a result of comparative cost 
benefits ‘staying at a minimum’.222 The fact that a particularly sensitive sector, to 
wit agriculture, was largely excluded from the Benelux integration process, 
equally played a major part.
However, of similar great importance was the fact that division of labour and 
economic specialisation resulting from Benelux liberalisations were not so much 
manifesting themselves between but more within the existing branches of 
industry. Thus Dirker noted in 1954 that the union partners were complementing 
each other more and more in their mutual trade. While Dutch industrial export to 
the BLEU was applying itself more to finished consumer products, the growing 
Belgian outlet on the Dutch market specialised in raw materials and, particularly, 
in semi manufactured products.223 This trend reflected the success of the Dutch 
industrialisation campaign. In 1938, the share of industrial end products in 
Belgian imports from the Netherlands had been 16%; in 1953 this had increased 
to 45%. Keen competition edged Belgian employers into productivity 
improvement and further specialisation. Thus, Dutch industrial expansion was not 
at the expense of Belgian economic development. In the textile industry, for 
example, Belgian companies opted for specialising in the export of yams and 
fabrics. Their Dutch counterparts put their comparative advantage to use by 
specialising in fabrics and manufactured end products. Both groups reaped the 
profits of such a division of labour. In 1938 the Netherlands and the BLEU each 
exported 13% of their total textile exports to each other; in 1953 this amounted to 
25%. In the steel industry, where Belgian employers were specialising on the 
production of capital goods, a similar development occurred.224
Although the problems stemming from liberalisation were generally 
manageable, they did necessitate some adjustment of production pre-sets and
221. Notwithstanding bilateral trade and payments agreements seriously hampering such 
competition during most of the 1930s.
222. Meade, op. cit., 10.
223. F.W. Dirker, ‘De ontwikkeling van het handelsverkeer tussen de B.L.E.U. en Nederland', 
ESB, 7.4.1954 271-274.
•224. Robertson, op. cit., 40.
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management. In the view of Dutch politicians and economists, such an adaptation 
to Benelux relations should, as mentioned before, take place on the Belgian side. 
In a much quoted article from 1954, ‘Benelux as an example of economic 
adjustment’ Wemelsfelder describes as the core of the Belgian adjustment 
problem the necessity to  force back the disproportional development of wages 
between the consumer goods sectors on the one hand and, the capital goods 
sectors on the other. Here the advent of Benelux had sharpened a previously 
existing problem. The moral o f Benelux experiences for future regional 
integration was that governments and trade unions should practise self-discipline, 
if  need be accepting wage reductions, to let inevitable adjustment processes run 
their course as smoothly as possible.225
In the practice of Benelux development during the second half of the fifties, it 
was not so much reduction of Belgian wages rather than Dutch wage increases. 
which diminished the difference in competitive conditions between the two 
economies. In 1954-1955, as a result of the favourable economic situation and 
improved Belgian labour productivity, many of the protective measures meant to 
shield Belgian branches o f industry against excessive Dutch competition could be 
withdrawn, whereby the problem lost a great deal of its acute character.226
Hence, in the literature regarding the Benelux adjustment process, both the 
before mentioned intra-sectoral specialisation and the so-called dynamic effects of 
Benelux integration are emphasised. The Dutch industrialisation miracle and the 
Belgian capacity for ‘reconversions remarquables’ constituted an 
acknowledgement of the wholesome effect of increased competition caused by 
Benelux liberalisation. Integration in a broader European context was expected to 
benefit from a similar mechanism: The dynamic effects of regional integration 
could be relied upon to greatly diminish differences in competitive production 
conditions.227
225. J. Wemelsfelder, ‘Benelux als voorbeeld van economische aanpassing’, ESB, 23.6.1954, 
492-496.
226. W.P.H. van Oorschot, ‘Enige aspecten van de ontwikkeling van de intra-handel en de buiten­
landse handelspolitiek van de Beneluxlanden sedert de laatste oorlog’, Zakenwereld, 1956, 
no. 17 (261-264), 263.
227. Gay en Wagret, op. cit., 125-126, Hartog, Euromarkt, 13-17.
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3.2 Impact of Benelux experiences on Dutch policies on Europe, 1952-1954
The assumption that experiences gleaned from the functioning of Benelux have 
had a significant impact on Dutch and Belgian policies with regard to regional 
economic integration in a broader European context is plausible in view of the 
large overlaps between the groups of policy makers involved. As we argued in the 
previous section, many of the higher placed civil servants involved in the political 
and academic debate on Benelux played an equally prominent part in determining 
the Netherlands’ policies on the EPC and EEC negotiations. In the Dutch case 
Hirschfeld, Kymmell, Wemelsfelder, Brouwers and Van Dierendonck, Van 
Blankenstein, Van Oorschot, mentioned in the previous section, all occupied 
influential posts, be it as senior civil servants or as departmental advisors to the 
ministers of Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs, Social Welfare, and Finance, 
respectively. On the Belgian side, notably high-ranking civil servants Snoy et 
d’Oppuers and Van Tichelen, both from the Belgian Department of economic 
affairs, left their marks equally on Belgian Benelux policies as on the country’s 
European integration policies.
At the ministerial level too, Benelux formed an important background for the 
thought process behind European policies. This was the case in Belgium, when in 
1954, Spaak once again took charge o f the Brussels Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
During the war years, he had taken part in the London talks of the exiled Belgian 
and Dutch governments and thus had stood at the cradle of Benelux. After 1945, 
he had also been closely involved in developing those wartime treaties. The most 
important lesson he had learned from the ‘Benelux adventure’, Spaak argued in 
his memoirs, had been a political one: problems of international integration could 
not be solved by expert conferences and technical working groups, but, solely 
through the political willingness of the responsible decision makers at the top. 
And with that, he criticised those West European politicians who, in their 
endeavours towards West European integration, had hidden themselves behind 
technical problems put forward by their civil servants, dodging their political 
responsibilities for cutting the knots. Without the primacy of political will, of the 
‘volonté politique’, nothing would have become of the Benelux, he said. This 
‘volonté politique’ would indeed become the anvil on which Spaak, in his role as 




pound.228 Like Spaak, Dutch foreign minister Beyen had been actively involved in 
the war time negotiations on Benelux. Hence, although he did not bear direct 
responsibility for Benelux-matters, (these resided with his fellow Minister without 
portfolio Luns), this did not prevent him, on several occasions, from putting 
Benelux at the forefront as an example of the possibilities as well as problems that 
would occur with regional integration. In that, he rushed himself in order to 
forestall criticisms: the fact that the Benelux countries had succeeded in 
overcoming important problems even without supranational institutions was by no 
means a guarantee for institutional success with integration on a broader scale. He 
stressed the geographical size of the three countries, their common history and an 
alleged mutual solidarity among the Benelux nations, propitious conditions which 
could not be counted upon in the case of regional integration among the Six. On 
no account did Beyen want the Benelux co-operation experience to be used as an 
argument against his Beyen Plan towards West-European economic integration on 
a supranational basis.229
Throughout the drawing up and fine-tuning of the Beyen Plan, Benelux 
conceptions and experiences were put to use in interdepartmental discussions and 
decision-making. When, at first, there was considerable confusion as to the 
formula, i.e. the concrete politico-economic concept by which the intended 
regional economic integration between the Six should be achieved, in the final 
wording o f the Beyen Plan the endeavour was presented as a customs-union to 
subsequently evolve into a common market.230 Beyen* s chief economic advisor, 
Van der Beugel, advocated the customs union concept as a concrete goal that 
would appeal to the public, as Benelux had demonstrated. 231 Whether the 
integration enterprise of the six countries would be sufficiently strong to realise a 
customs union was an entirely different question. Blankenstein, the economic 
integration specialist of the Department of Financial Affairs thought that,
228. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 52: ‘Projet de procès-verbal de la réunion de ministres des Affaires 
étrangères des Etats membres de la C.E.C.A., Noordwijk, 6 septembre 1955’, 28.9.1955. 
Paul-Henri Spaak, ‘La Relance Européenne' Société Belge d'Etudes et d ’Expansion 159 
(1956), (132-153) 147-148.
229. See e.g.: Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 132, ‘A survey of the development of European 
integration’. A report presented by Beyen at the European Movement’s Rome conference, 
May 1957, 26 and passim.
230. In the terminology confusion of those years, a customs union was often labelled as a ‘tariff 
community’, even though a customs union along the lines of GATT, article XXIV was 
meant. Min. BZBrus, 17.771, ‘Note pour monsieur le ministre des affaires étrangères', 
26.5.1953.
231. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 14, Van der Beugel to Beyen, 12.11.1952.
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particularly in the light of Benelux experience, there was little hope in this matter. 
It was far from evident that the problems like those which prevailed in Benelux 
could be solved in a projected grouping of the Six.232
The debate within the Dutch policy-making elite on the pros and cons of a 
West-European customs union concentrated on the consequences such a co­
operation framework would have on the development of the Dutch economy in 
general, and its foreign trade in particular. In this discussion the above mentioned 
‘elasticity- pessimistic’ analysis of Verdoom played an important role. Many 
policy makers, amongst whom Prime Minister Drees, feared that the trade 
expanding effects as set down in Beyen’s customs union, would be undone by the 
expected damage in trade relations with third countries. After all, the common 
external tariff by which the customs-union would operate could well turn out to be 
substantially higher than the current Benelux tariff, as a result of which the Dutch 
price level would rise considerably. If the worst came to the worst the Dutch 
economy would end up being locked up in a protectionist trade block. Beyen 
himself thought this possibility to be improbable and found himself supported by 
calculations by Wemelsfelder and the Centraal Plan Bureau, which showed that 
even if the external tariff would rise from the Benelux average of 8% to the 
‘Schuman-average’ of 13%, the Dutch price level would increase by no more than 
3%.233
Drees’ opposition was not targeted at the idea of a West European customs 
union as such. On the contrary, the Prime Minister thought regional- economic 
liberalisation and integration of the utmost importance for the Dutch economy. 
Nevertheless, he feared that the framework of EPC would either lock up the 
Netherlands within a protectionist continental grouping or turn out to be 
politically unfeasible, leading to nothing at all. Be that as it may, Beyen’s creed, 
‘no political integration without economic integration’, garnered enough support 
within the Cabinet to carry this statement.234 Once the Ministerraad had given the
232. Min. Fin., Gen.Thcs.. BBV, 1262-8, H, van Blankenstein, ‘De verschillende plannen tot ver­
laging der tarieven', 20.3.1953.
233. NA, MR, Notulen Ministerraad, 29.4.1953. Min. BZ, I, 913.100 no. 66, ‘Nota betreffende 
eerste voorlopige uitwerking van het door Nederland gedane voorstel inzake een Europese 
tariefgemeenschap', 25.3.1953, 14-17. Min. BZ, I, GS, 913.10 ‘Europese integratie deel II’: 
‘Rapport van de Economische Sub-Commissie’ 22.4.1953, with annex: ‘Enkele zeer 
voorlopige calculaties omtrent de gevolgen van een tariefgemeenschap voor Nederland’. J. 
Linthorst Homan, Europese integratie. De spanning tussen economische en politieke 
factoren (’s-Gravenhage 1955), 158.
234. Seechapter2.
green light to Beyen’s policies, Drees supported them completely, in spite of some 
differences of opinion between the two men on the strategies which were to be 
pursued. During the years leading up to the signing of the Treaty of Rome, Drees 
would make the realisation of a West European customs union and common 
market as a precondition for Dutch participation in further European integration. 
W ith that, in his opinion, Benelux remained an example, albeit not in every way 
shining, yet surely worthy of emulation. After all, as Drees would argue in 
February 1956, Benelux’ rugged course notwithstanding, its common market was 
definitely an asset: ‘there is a common external tariff and, except for agriculture, 
hardly any barriers to trade left’. 235
The suggestions which, in 1953, were put to the other EPC countries in the 
wordings o f the Beyen Plan reflected a vision of integration also pursued by the 
Netherlands on Benelux level. Vital to these proposals, economic integration was 
largely identified with liberalisation, whereby the liberalisation of cross-border 
exchange o f goods was put at the forefront. Should liberalisation lead to serious 
disruptions in economic life then, the country concerned was to apply for a 
temporary lifting of treaty obligations with the supranational executive body, to be 
granted on the basis of an escape clause. The Dutch proposals did not provide for 
obligations in policy harmonisation. As in Benelux, mutual alignment of 
economic, social and monetary policies would have to come from liberalisation of 
trade.236
In Belgium and Luxemburg, Benelux experinces too had had an impact on 
formulating national policies with regard to European integration, albeit in quite a 
different way. The importance o f regional economic integration was fully 
underscored by the Belgian policy makers. Less obvious, in their view, was the 
road along which this aim was to be achieved, according to the Dutch proposals, 
to wit, the tariff community/customs union construction. In Belgian policy 
considerations, the unsatisfactory Benelux experiences in the field of interstate 
finance, fierce Dutch wage competition and the related problem of policy 
harmonisation came predominantly to the fore. In its analysis of the Beyen plan, 
the Brussels Department of Foreign Affairs criticised the one-sidedness of the 
Dutch drive for liberalising trade. The lack of enthusiasm shown by The Hague 
for liberalising capital movements in Benelux, something which the Belgians had 
emphatically called for, and Te redoutable problèm e de Y harmonisation des
235. NA, MR Notulen Ministerraad 27.2.1956.
236. See chapter 2.
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salaires’237 were seen as important and dangerous omissions in the Beyen plan. 
Referring to the fortunes of EPU, a solid settlement of the balance of payments 
problems was deemed necessary if further regional integration was to be realised. 
Thus the conclusion was that regional integration without thorough preliminary 
work on these issues ‘ne peut conduire qu’à des déceptions semblables à celles 
qui attristent à présent les plus ardents protagonistes de Benelux’.238
These negative Benelux connotations were predominantly present in Belgian 
preparations for the EPC negotiations. The most outspoken point of view was 
worded by Blero of the Department of Agriculture. Basing himself on Benelux 
experiences, he wondered whether regional integration with countries where 
producers worked in conditions quite different from Belgian ones was possible or 
at all desirable. Generally, Belgian policy makers were of the opinion that the 
starting point for regional economic co-operation was to be set up on rather a 
broader basis than was foreseen in Beyen’s proposals in order to avoid the 
problems experienced in Benelux. In the Belgian way of thinking, instead of a 
customs union, a fully-fledged common market, based on the Tour freedoms’, 
was to be preferred, whereby free trade in goods would be complemented by free 
movement of labour, services and capital. The problems of adjustment which 
liberalisation would bring about were not so much to be solved by means of 
escape clauses, as hitherto proposed in the Beyen Plan, but rather prevented 
through co-ordination of the economic, social and financial policies of the 
member states. It was generally acknowledged that for such a major operation 
considerably more institutional leverage was needed than, as Van Tichelen of 
Economic Affairs described it, the ‘rudimentary’ Benelux organisation. A 
readjustment fund, clear agreements on the timely realisation of the treaty 
obligations in time, rights to appeal to a European Court of Justice and a 
supranational authority were deemed indispensable.239
During the EPC negotiations, which took place from the summer of 1953 
onwards, the Netherlands proved to be in an isolated position with regard to its
237. Min. BZBrus, 17.771/1, ‘Note pour monsieur le ministre des affaires étrangères. Elude du 
3mc Memorandum néerlandais concernant la Communauté Européenne*.
238. Ibidem.
239. Min. BZBrus. 17.771/1 ‘Réunion du groupe de travail du lundi 1er juin 1953’; Min. BZBrus, 
17.771/1, ‘Rapport’, with accompanying letter Daufresne de la Chevalerie to Scheyven, 
6.6.1953. In the former document Van Tichelen commented on Benelux as something from 
the past: ‘Le Benelux était une organisation assez rudimentaire', (emphasis mine. AGH). In 




trade in goods centred approach. With the exception of France, which did not 
want any economic integration whatsoever within the EPC framework, the 
participating delegations preferred the grand scheme o f a common market over the 
Dutch concept, in which a customs union was projected as a first base on the road 
to the four freedoms, and they attached great value to a mandatory agreement on 
the alignment of policies and common policy competences for an envisaged 
supranational institution. Preventive harmonisation rather than repressive escape 
clauses were to make the integration process bearable.
Whereas the Netherlands, in the Benelux co-ordination protocol of 1953, had 
managed to hold the ship of harmonisation at bay, European-wise it had to give 
way. Throughout 1953 the Hague defended the position that the supranational 
authority should not go beyond issuing non-binding recommendations to the EPC 
member-states’ governments on matters of economic policy alignment. In March 
1954 the Netherlands withdrew its reservation on this issue. This meant that, in 
certain cases to be defined subsequently, supranational competencies resulting in 
binding directives became conceivable. Whether this concession, for which Beyen 
had to take a lot of flack from the Ministry of Financial Affairs, would suffice to 
secure an agreement among the Six remains doubtful.240 Be that as it may, due to 
the problems concerning the ratification o f the EDC treaty by France, the EPC 
talks were put on the backbumer. Eventually, the rejection of the EDC treaty by 
the French Assemblée Nationale entailed their final demise.
3,3 The Benelux Factor in the EEC negotiations 1955-1957
For the Benelux countries, the negotiations taking place from July 1955 to March 
1957, leading to the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty of Rome, 
unfolded under a decidedly more fortunate ascendant than the previous 1952-1954 
EPC talks. Grip on the agenda, hitherto unsuccessfully sought for, made for much 
of the difference. Belgian foreign minister Spaak, appointed by the Six as political 
director of the negotiations, exerted decisive leadership throughout the 
negotiations. Also, immediately after his appointment, invoking Beyen’s
240. Min. BZ, I, GS, 913.10, no. 663: ‘Conférence pour la Communauté Politique Européenne, 
Rapport aux Ministres des Affairs Etrangères*. Min. Fin., Gen. Thés., BBV, 1262-9, ‘Alge­
mene beschouwing over de economische besprekingen ter Parijse studieconferentie E.P.G. 
van 7 januari tot 8 maart 1954’, 6.3.1954. Min. Fin., Gen. Thes., BBV, 1262-9, ‘Vergadering 
Commissie-Beyen inzake Europese Politieke Gemeenschap op 12 maart’, W. Drees jr. to 
minister Van de Kieft, 12.3.1954.
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pioneering role on the issue, Spaak secured chairmanship of the Common Market 
committee for the head of the Dutch negotiation team, Verrijn Stuart.
The Common Market upgraded, to Dutch delight
The Common Market issue, as will be recalled from chapter 2, came to the post- 
Messina negotiation table in Brussels as one among the many subjects to be 
scrutinized and reported upon by the national delegates. At Messina, one can 
argue, the topic was ‘smuggled in’ by means of Beyen-Spaak salami tactics,241 
together with apparently more promising and less controversial looking issues, to 
wit integration in the areas of transport, classical energy and above all the 
proposed new nuclear energy integration effort Euratom. As Spaak himself 
candidly put it at Messina, deliberations on the Beyen Plan could be useful, if and 
to the extent that they would not delay ‘des résultats plus limités, mais plus 
rapides, dans des secteurs économiques particuliers’.242
This de facto  secondary status, however, did not last long. At the Noordwijk 
ministers’ conference, after three months of negotiations Spaak, admitting his 
change of view explicitly, drew the conclusion that ‘le véritable progrès qui a été 
fait à Messine a consisté à donner, comme hypothèse de travail, la réalisation du 
marché commun, l’ensemble des autres efforts à réaliser en vue de l’intégration 
économique européenne devant s’ordonner autour de cet objectif principal’.243
Spaak’s observation hit the nail on the head. Between June and September 
1955, to the delight of the Dutch delegation in Brussels, the Common Market 
issue indeed made a remarkable transformation from additional topic to principal 
objective of the economic integration negotiations.
The Belgian foreign minister himself had been the chief operator in bringing 
about this spectacular upgrading. Spaak’s conversion from accepting to actually
241. Jean Monnet Oral History Project ‘Vraaggesprekken met Ncdcrlandse beleidsmakers inzake 
Europcsc integratie’, ‘Addendum bij het gesprek van drs. R.P.B.A. Dingemans en drs. J. 
Schram met Dr. E.P. Wellcnstein’ (Den Haag/Groningen 2001). 4.
242. Min, BZ, II 913.1000, no. 21: ‘Projet de procès-verbal de la réunion C.E.C.A., des Ministres 
des Affaires Etrangères des Etats membres de la C.E.C.A. Messine 1er et 2 juin 1955’, 
Luxembourg, 13.6.1955, 20-21; Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 52, ‘Beknopt verslag eerste 
bijeenkomst Messina Studie Commissie te Brussel, 9 Juli 1955 o.l.v. Minister Spaak’, DWS 
to Beyen, 11.7.1955.
243. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 22, ‘Verslag van de Conferentie der Ministers van Buitenlandse 
Zaken der zes landen, leden der E.G.K.S., gehouden te Noordwijk op 6 September 1955'; 
‘Projet de procès-verbal de la réunion des Ministres des Affaires étrangères des Etats 
members de la C.E.C.A, Noordwijk, 6 septembre 1955’, Brussel 28.9.1955.
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embracing the Beyen side of the Messina-agenda was greatly enhanced by a 
report of a young economist by the name of Pierre Uri representing the ECSC’s 
High Authority at the conference: ‘Note sur l’intégration économique génerale 
d ’après l ’expérience de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier 
(présentée par le représentant de la Haute Autorité)’, as presented to the Brussels 
conference on 27 July 1955. The Uri report, analysing the High Authority’s 
experiences in regional integration and summing up the lessons to be drawn from 
the latter for future horizontal integration, was an immediate and outstanding 
success with Spaak and among the Brussels’ negotiators and their political bosses 
at home. Even today, more than half a century after its publication, it is not 
difficult to acknowledge its remarkable qualities: written in a crystal-clear French, 
the report addresses the quintessence of regional-economic integration and 
discusses the political choices to be made in the process in an amazingly thought 
provoking way. Political economy at its best. Spaak went for it hook, line and 
sinker, singing its praise, declaring it ‘compulsory reading’ for the delegates, 
dominating the discussions on its conclusions and instructing the national 
delegates in the classical energy, transport and other sectoral commissions to 
ensure that their reports fitted in with those of the common market committee. 
‘The Common Market issue is to dominate all other issues of the Messina 
resolution’ Dutch chief negotiator Linthorst Homan reported to Beyen, ‘not only 
according to the wishes of the Dutch delegation, but now also in the view of 
mister Spaak in his capacity of chairman of the negotiations.’244
Thus, the Dutch delegation in Brussels as well as The Hague’s foreign policy 
elite, had ample reason indeed to be pleased as punch with the Uri report and its 
recommendations. Most importantly, it provided the Dutch and Spaak with a 
convincing academic as well as political argument for establishing a Western 
European Customs Union and Common Market along the lines of the Beyen Plan. 
As the Dutch delegation in Brussels put it: ‘In its general approach document no. 
65 is entirely in line with the Beyen Plan and it usefully expands on a number of 
aspects of the latter on the basis of the ECSC experiences’. Amongst such useful 
expansions was the argument, helpfully in line with Dutch Benelux-based claims, 
that cross-border differences in wages and social security expenses had to be
244. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 47, ‘Note sur l'intégration économique générale d’après 1' 
expérience de la Communauté Européenne de Charbon et de l’Acier (présentée par le 
représentant de la Haute Autorité) 27 juli 1955; Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 89, Homan lo 
Beyen, 22.8.55 and Kymmell to Van der Beugel, 24.8.1955.
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regarded like other comparative cost advantages and disadvantages and as such 
should not justify or give rise to a general harmonisation of wage policies as well 
as social policies in general.245 The Uri report proved indeed most helpful in 
keeping preliminary policy harmonization at bay. Overall levelling of wages and 
social securities advocated by the French and Belgians and much feared by the 
Dutch, stopped being an issue. Dutch negotiator Linthorst Homan was adamant: 
‘What we strived for all these years, what we failed to gain victoriously in Paris, 
what we advocated to no effect in Benelux, [has] now been achieved rather to our 
own surprise, above all because of the academic and political strength of 
Document no. 65 of the Coal and Steel Community on this issue.’ Consequently 
instead of a precondition for the projected customs union entering its crucial 
second phase, social policy harmonisation entered the EEC Treaty as a long term 
aim of the horizontal integration process.246
Thus, already in an early stage of the talks, it became clear that a 
breakthrough could be achieved on this matter in the sense that, apart from the 
French, all delegations agreed that policy harmonisation should not be aimed at 
total levelling or unifying policies and pre-sets for competition and should instead 
be restricted to a ‘correction de distortions’. Nevertheless, before a final 
agreement on this basis including France became possible the Netherlands had to 
take a further step down in the form of a sizeable concession to the French 
demand for an ‘effort special’ to level labour conditions. Amongst others, 
harmonisation of the number of days’ vacation per employee and the principle of 
equal pay for men and women had to be accepted. On the basis of this last 
concession the famous Article 119 on equality between women and men in
245. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 89, Homan to Beyen, 22.8.1955. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 47 
‘Note sur l’intégration économique générale d'après l’expérience de la Communauté 
Européenne de Charbon et de l'Acier (présentée par le représentant de la Haute Autorité) 27 
juli 1955,’ 9. ), Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 52, Linthorst Homan to Van der Beugel 11.10.1955 
(with accompanying letter Van der Beugel to Beyen 14.10.1955).
246. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 53, Linthorst Homan to Van der Beugel, 2.11.1955. Spaak made 
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Gründung der europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (Baden-Baden 1982), 328. Min. BZ, II, 
913.100, no. 52, Van der Beugel to Tuyll van Serooskerken, 21.8.1955. Marcel Ermers & 
John Kragt, ‘Tussen tradities en traktaten. Minister Beyen en de Europese integratie 1952- 
1956’ (MA thesis, History Department of the University of Nijmegen, August 1988), 150.
115
matters of employment and occupation became manifest, ultimately the comer 
stone of EEC emancipation policy.247
The new course of events in Brussels did not fail to impress Beyen’s staff at 
the Foreign Ministry. Was the Beyen Plan going to be a success after all? 'We 
were mistaken, all of us’, Van der Beugel, previously Beyen’s most outspoken 
critic amongst the minister’s advisors, wrote to Van Tuyll van Serooskerken, the 
ministry’s Secretary-General. 'H ow  were we to envisage that the French would be 
willing to pay the price of a customs union for getting the bomb?’ Likewise, 
Ermers and Kragt observe a noticeable rise in Beyen’s status amongst his staff. 
Their renewed association with their political boss entailed a more supportive and 
constructive attitude to his policy goals, as well as a conspicuous increase in the 
expression ‘our minister’ in departmental correspondence.248
Of course, Spaak’s agenda revolution in general and the upgrading and 
progress of the Common Market negotiations in particular did not take place in a 
diplomatic vacuum. From the start of the Brussels deliberations onwards Dutch 
diplomats observed a change in attitude and atmosphere in comparison with the 
1952-1954 talks. France and the Netherlands, representing the extreme stances as 
before, appeared to have reconsidered their positions. France, although sticking to 
its ‘intégrer pour libéraliser’ approach, in which alignment of economic, social, 
financial and fiscal policies were regarded as a precondition for trade 
liberalisation, from August 1955, gave indications o f having lifted its overall ban 
on the customs union approach. At the September 1955 Noordwijk ministerial 
conference, when French foreign minister Pinay referred to the Common Market 
negotiations as ‘the most difficult’ of ‘the tasks at hand’, this sanguine 
interpretation found -  implicit- confirmation.249
247. Min. BZ. II, 913.100, no. 54, ‘De Europese Gemeenschappelijke Markt en het probleem der 
sociale harmonisatie’ with accompanying letter Van Dierendonck to Van der Beugel. 
24.8.1956; and: ‘Nederlandse positie ten opzichte van sociale harmonisatie’ 12.9.1956. (post- 
Nice article 119 was renumbered article 141).
248. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 52, Van der Beugel to Tuyll van Serooskerken, 21.8.1955. Marcel 
Ermers & John Kragt, ‘Tussen tradities en traktaten. Minister Beyen en de Europese 
integratie 1952-1956’ (MA thesis, History Department of the University of Nijmegen, 
August 1988), 150.
249. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 22, ‘Projet de procès-verbal de la réunion des Ministres des 
Affaires étrangères des Etats members de la C.E.C.A. Noordwijk, 6 septembre 1955’, 
Brussel 28.9.1955, 15. Min. Fin., Gen. Thés., correspondentie en documenten Nederlandse 
delegatie t/m aug. 1955, D.C. Breedveld, ‘Brusselse conferentie over integratievraagstuk­
ken’, 9.8.1955. Bossuat too signals a fundamental change in the French government’s attitude 
towards the Common Market issue, but somewhat later, in October 1955. ’La conférence de
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The Netherlands, while adhering to its iibéraliser pour intégrer’ stance, 
according to which liberalisation o f cross-border trade constituted the logical road 
to economic and social policy alignment, equally engaged in renewed soul- 
searching. At the time, The Hague’s above mentioned March 1954 concession 
allowing for binding directives on socio-economic policy harmonisation had come 
way too late to make any constructive difference at all. A year later, discussing the 
same issues on the basis of the Messina agenda, such an originally ill-timed 
concession obtained a second chance to bear fruit. In discussing the Dutch 
chances in Brussels with his Hague superiors, chief-negotiator Linthorst Homan 
did not mince his words: in view of the March 1954 concession ‘and recent 
Benelux development on this issue’ the five partner countries expected the Dutch 
to take a more flexible stance than previously. With characteristic vehemence he 
worded this message in a letter to his superior, economics minister Zijlstra: A 
broadminded approach would be indispensable, he wrote, continuing in capital 
letters, ‘OM DE MARKT EN DE UNIE TE VERKRUGEN’ ( ‘To get the market 
and the Union’).250
Messine se tient, et on se rend compte, comme dit François Valéry, que Pinay, ministre des 
Affaires étrangères a “l 'intention de contracter” un accord mais n’a pas pris “un engagement 
de contracter”. Les Français comprennent pourtant qu'ils ne peuvent maintenir une attitude 
dilatoire et en octobre 1955 proposent de s’engager dans un marché commun pour une 
première étape de 4 ans’. Bossuat also stresses the role of the new Mollet government which 
came to power at the end of January 1956. From 1953 onwards Mollet had been in favour of 
striking a deal with the Dutch on the common market: ‘Pour comprendre l’attitude
finalement positive de Guy Mollet sur le marché commun, alors que le gouvernement 
précédent (Edgard Faure), était, comme on le voit, très réticent, il faut mettre en avant ses 
choix européens en son adhésion au Comité d’action pour les Etats-Unis d’Europe. Ainsi, en 
1953, sur le marché commun, estimait-il qu’il faudrait transiger avec les Hollandais.’ Gérard 
Bossuat, ‘La vraie nature de la politique européene de la France (1950-1957)*, in: Gilbert 
Trausch (ed.), Die Europäische integration vom Schuman-Plan bis zu den Verträgen von 
Rom (Baden-Baden 1993), 191-239 (220-221). In a conversation with the Dutch ambassador 
in Brussels, Spaak underlined French and German agreement with the common market 
concept as important results of the Noordwijk conference. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 22, 
Netherlands’ ambassador Brussels to Beyen, 14.9.1955.
250. Min, BZ. II, 913.100, no. 89, Linthorst Homan to Zijlstra, 21.7.1955. An additional factor in 
the Brussels agenda reshuffle appears to have been lack of progress on the ‘technical issues’. 
The transport committee was regarded by many delegates as an unnecessary duplication of 
the work done in the Conference Européenne des Ministres de Transport (CEMT). The 
general feeling in the classical energy committee was best described by the question ‘What 
are we supposed to be doing here?’. Progress on nuclear energy proved difficult. Min. BZ, II. 
913.100, no. 89, Linthorst Homan to Minister of Economic Affairs, 21.7.1955.
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Failure o f  Benelux cooperation
The Spaak presidency, although generally acknowledged as crucial for bringing 
about the Brussels’ conference most important result, the European Economic 
Community Treaty of Rome (1957) did not translate into enhanced leverage for 
Benelux co-operation. On the contrary, in spite of intensive liaising between the 
three delegations, reaching common ground on important issues proved often 
impossible. Throughout the deliberations leading to the May 1956 Spaak Report 
as well the subsequent intergovernmental negotiations leading to the March 1957 
EEC Treaty, Dutch negotiators in their reports to The Hague complained that 
precisely the Spaak presidency of the negotiations jeopardized reaching common 
stances with the Belgian as well as the Luxembourg delegation. Time and again, 
Benelux foreign policy co-operation remained inoperative, either because of 
Spaak explicitly instructing the Belgian delegation not to team up with their Dutch 
counterparts, or alternatively, due to fears on the side of the Belgian delegates, 
that supporting a Dutch point of view would not find favour with the Belgian 
foreign minister. ‘Like on more issues, on this one, a common stance of the 
Benelux-delegations has not been achieved’, Linthorst Homan reported on the 
institutional file. ‘All efforts in this respect resulted in a horrible failure’.251
Part of the blame, some delegates felt, was to be attributed to the coterie of 
French advisors with whom Spaak surrounded himself: Thirty years later, looking 
back on the EEC negotiations, Van der Beugel was adamant:
The Common Market Treaty is a French treaty. And that is because Spaak 
was surrounded by the economists and legal advisors of the Quai d ’Orsay252, 
of the ministère des Finances, Uri, Van Helmont253, Michel Gaudet254, enfm , 
that entire crowd encircled Spaak to mind the French interests. And Spaak 
was obsessed by the idea to accomplish his mission.255
251. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 53, ‘Mogelijkheden inzake het Spaak-rapport’, 14.3.1956.
252. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
253. J. van Helmont, High-ranking French civil servant, assisted Jean Monnet in the High 
Authority of the ECSC and in Monnef s Action Committee for the United States of Europe.
254. M. Gaudet, legal advisor o f the ECSC’s High Authority.
255. Interview with Ernst van der Beugel in: A.G. Harryvan, J. van der Harst and S. van Voorst 
eds., Voor Nederland en Europa. Politici en ambtenaren over het Nederlandse Europabeleid 
en de Europese in te grade, 1945-1975 (Den Haag 2001), 31-61, 47. Upon publication Van 
der Beugel’s observation was deprecated by Edmond Wellenstein, formerly of the High 
Authority, in no uncertain terms: ‘It is not correct to say that Spaak when drafting his Report 
and the Treaty was surrounded by civil servants from Paris (Quai d ’Orsay and Ministère des 
Finances) sent by the French government. Quite the contrary, they were officials of an
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Relations with the other Benelux partner Luxembourg did not help things either. 
Like before, the Luxembourg delegation kept a low profile at multilateral 
negotiations among the Six. In the past, Luxembourgian enthousiasm for Dutch 
European plans had been lukewarm at best.256 Wary of losing its national 
economic independence to some supranational construction had made the country 
originally reject the Beyen Plan. Thus, at the 1953 Rome conference, foreign 
minister Bech had opposed the Dutch ‘no political integration without economic 
integration’ approach:
‘D ne me semble pas indiqué, entre autres, que la réalisation d’un marché 
commun dans un delai nettement déterminé et suivant un plan arrêté 
préalablement, d ’une façon definitive et automatique, devrait constituer une 
condition indispensable pour la création d’une autorité politique européenne.’257
Two years later Bech, although in favour of a ‘relance europénne’, deemed 
the Common Market paragraphs of the common Benelux Memorandum for 
Messina unfortunate. Since their inclusion was at the heart of the Dutch-Belgium 
understanding, however, he could not resist them in principle. As Trausch worded 
it: ‘Solidarité bénéluxienne oblige!’.258
During the EEC negotations, such reticence was again a dominant force in 
the Luxembourg stance. By April 1956 Dutch observers even obtained the
outspoken ‘communitarian’ persuasion, whom the president of the High Authority René 
Mayer, provided Spaak with at the latter’s request.’ (letter Dr. E. P. Wellenstein to the 
author, 3.8.2001). And likewise: ‘The same goes for Van der Beugel’s remark "It is a French 
treaty". Yes, it is. But in the sense that Uri and his team were French nationals. 'French 
officers’, they were not, quite the contrary. This misunderstanding permeates the entire 
interview text. [...] I wrote to Van der Beugel, explained him my misgivings and ended "In 
brief, I would hate to see that the four persons mentioned (Uri, van Helmont. Gaudcl and the 
one I mentioned, Delouvricr) will go down into history as the managers of the French 
establishment. The opposite was the case’’. Van der Beugel answered me jocularly: "After 
such a long time, what a familiar sentiment to disagree with you!’’.’ Dr. E. Wellenstein in a 
letter to the author, 12.9.2001.
256. J.W.L. Brouwer, ’In het kielzog van Frankrijk? Enkele opmerkingen over het buitenlands 
beleid van het groothertogdom Luxemburg, 1945-1950’, in E.S.A. Bloemen. Het Benelux- 
effect, België, Nederland en Luxemburg en de Europese integratie, 1945-1957 (Amsterdam 
1992), 33-53 passim.
257. Archives Nationales Grand Duché de Luxembourg (Luxembourg National Archives), 
(henceforth ANLUX) régime AE (henceforth: RAE), no. 5960, Speech Bech at 1953 Rome 
conference.
258. Gilbert Trausch, ‘Le Luxembourg face aux traités de Rome. La stratégie d’un petit pays’, in: 




impression that Luxembourg would prefer to refrain from joining the Common 
Market, if such were practicably possible. Luxembourg head of delegation Schaus 
voiced his government’s concern whether by the realization of such a far-reaching 
project as the Common Market Luxembourg would continue to exist as a small 
but independent state.259
This led to a negotiation behaviour of a decidedly defensive nature which has 
been judged by some observers as passive and unambitious. Such verdicts strike 
us as somewhat unfair, in view of the Luxembourgian interests at stake and the 
way the country was treated by its five partners.
First and foremost, Luxemburg’s interests were of an economic nature. The 
country’s agriculture and viticulture, both heavily protected by barriers to trade, 
were unlikely to survive competition within a common market amongst the Six. 
That is: unless some special regime providing the country with an exemption 
status would be created, comparable to special arrangements created for 
Luxembourg in BLEU, Benelux and GATT. Free cross-border labour movement 
would also constitute a problem for the country, in which by the mid-1950s, 
already 27% of the industrial workforce was o f foreign extraction. Luxembourg 
policy-makers entertained an understandable fear that in a liberalised cross-border 
labour market their country’s prosperity and high salaries would attract even more 
foreign workers, possibly raising their numbers to socially and politically 
unacceptable levels.260
Primary material in the Luxembourg and Netherlands archives demonstrates 
how the Luxembourg delegation struggled for an exemption status for what they 
called a ‘limited list’ of treaty articles and products.261 This the Dutch delegation 
experienced differently: ‘The perennial so-called “limited” list was tabled again, 
containing the products Luxemburg wants to protect. It lists just about everything: 
dairy, meat, grain, wine!’ 262 In pursuing their campaign, the Luxembourg
259. BZII, 913.100, no, 53, Kymmell to Beyen, 21.4.1956. This sentiment was more widespread: 
in the Luxembourg archives we found a copy of ‘Document de travail no. 4 ' of which the 
section on the abolishment of quota and tariffs has been embellished by a drawing of a 
tombstone with the legend ‘Luxembourg’ surrounded by sardonic looking hobgoblins. 
ANLUX, RAE, no. 7695, ‘Document de travail no. 4  (26me redaction)', 2.12.1955,
260. ANLUX, RAE, no. 9701, ’Relance européene*, Schaus to Bech, 3.11.1955 Annex 3 
’Observations du Ministère du Travail au sujet du Document no. 338’, 3.11.1955.
261. ANLUX, RAE, no. 7695, ‘Comité Intergouvememental - Question agricole', Schaus to 
Bech, 13.3.1956.
262 M in. BZ, II, 913.100, No. 90, ‘Verslag van de besprekingen in de kring der Iloofden van
> Delegaties ter Bmsselse integratie-conferentie op 7-9 maart 1956.' 10-3-1956 (12).
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delegation, found themselves facing a dilemma: given the country’s limited 
economic significance the other five delegations were willing to grant the Grand- 
Duché the special regime it requested, but then equally expected its delegation to 
refrain from pushing its views on the general character o f the Common Market 
and the EEC Treaty. Luxembourg’s refusal to go along with this expectation 
caused irritatation with, amongst others, the Dutch. A March 1956 report by 
Linthorst Homans to The Hague may serve as an example: ‘[Luxembourg wants 
to be treated as] an exceptional case. In the past the Netherlands agreed not to 
object against this wish. As we said in Rome and Paris the Netherlands’ point of 
view is that it is better to make an exception for Luxembourg, than drafting the 
articles in such a way that they end up more protectionistic for all countries 
concerned. Luxembourg, however, should not try and do both: trying to dilute the 
articles first and then apply for an exemption status on top of it.’263 The biggest 
bully of all turned out to be Spaak’s right hand Pierre Uri. Luxembourg’s head of 
delegation, Schaus, reported the following quote: ‘Pour ma part, je voudrais qu’on 
vous donne tout de suite tout ce que vous demandez en particulier, mais qu’alors 
sur le plan général, vous nous laissiez tranquilles’.264
For Luxembourg such treatment made questions on the political future of the 
country and its 300.000 citizens in a future Euromarket of some 150 million 
Europeans more pertinent than ever. The conclusion was drawn that sovereignty 
and independence could only be safeguarded if sufficient national representation 
in the new Community’s institutions could be arrived at. Such representation was 
also deemed elementary since Luxembourg would have to pay its part of the 
Community’s budget.265
In the end, Luxembourg obtained most of what is wanted, both in terms of its 
exemption regime and representation. The Dutch did not receive the support from 
their Benelux ally they had hoped for, due to conflicting interests as well the 
reticent Belgian stance. Additionally, a psychological element may have played a 
role: Dutch disapproval of and irritation with Luxembourg stances was sometimes 
tinged with arrogance.266
263. Ibidem, 11.
264. ANLUX, RAE, no. 7695, Schaus, to Bech, 13.3.1956 (9).
265. Trausch, op. cit., 442-448.
266. A report by ministerial advisor Kymmel to Van der Beugel in March 1956 provides us with 
an example of such Dutch disdain: ‘We were presented by a lovely motto for the entire 
integration excercize out of the mouth of Luxembourgian ambassador Schaus, not a 
particularly talented person. Discussing Luxembourgian agriculture he told us that his
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Institutions, the fight fo r  a supranational community
The discussions on the institutional set-up of the new European co-operation 
framework provide us with a case in point regarding the break-down of Benelux 
cooperation: At Messina, Beyen and Spaak saw eye to eye on this issue. The 
Benelux countries, Spaak stressed, had gone to great lengths to avoid the 
expression ‘supranational organization’. Nevertheless, alluding to Texpérience 
acquise dans Íe fonctionnement du Benelux, il souligne la nécessité absolue de 
prévoir la création d ’un organisme doté de certains pouvoirs d’autorité’. In the 
same vein, Beyen told his colleagues, that the coming into existence of both 
Euratom and the common market necessitated a ‘supranational solution’ and, 
hence, a strong ‘common executive’.268
By late September 1955 this consensus was in jeopardy: Spaak’s deputy, 
Snoy et d ’Oppuers, candidly suggested his Dutch opposite number Van der 
Beugel that on the institutional issue Belgium expected the Dutch to pull the 
chestnuts out of the fire ‘since Spaak as chairman of the conference did not want 
to take a stance that would deter the French’. Also, Snoy et d’Oppuers let on, 
Spaak had now grown much more aware of the many objections and misgivings 
in Belgian industrial circles against ECSC-like structures. The German delegation 
fully supported Spaak’s institutional reticence: ‘we are not supposed to discuss 
supranationalism, because of the French’, Linthorst Homan summarized their 
attitude. For Beyen, however, an ECSC-like structure with a strong executive and 
majority voting in the intergovernmental forum was quintessential for the success 
and irreversibility of the entire horizontal integration enterprise.269
government now had come to the conclusion that the time had come “pour mettre frein à 
l ’immobilisme”, (loud laughter).’ At a more general level, Brouwer and Pijper observe, the 
Netherlands - itself a Smaller Power in Europe - when dealing with Luxembourg finds itself 
in the role of a Larger Power and tends to behave accordingly. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 53, 
Kymmell to Van der Beugel 12.3.1956. Jan Willem Brouwer and Alfred Pijpers, ‘Nederland 
en Luxemburg: een grote en een kleine mogendheid?', IS 53 (1999), 31-36,32.
267. In this section we will concentrate on the supranational issue during the EEC negotiations. 
Chapters four and five provide the reader with a more elaborate view of the Netherlands’ 
stance on the institutional dimension of European integration.
268. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 21, ‘Projet de procès-verbal de la réunion des Ministres des 
Affaires Etrangères des Etats members de la C.E.C.A., Messine 1er et 2 juin 1955’, 
Luxembourg 13.6.1955,12, 22.
269. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 157, Linthorst Homan to Van der Beugel, 17.9.1955 (quote); Min. 
BZ, II, 913.100, no. 52, Van der Beugel to Beyen, 21.9.1955. Van der Beugel’s commentary: 
‘If everybody is afraid to deter the French (also take note of the German stance) we are not 
going to make much progress. Van der Beugel is referring to the German stance on the
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The Hague Foreign Office was not to be deterred and stuck to its guns. On 
the institutional issue, Beyen and Luns informed the Cabinet in late October, the 
Brussels conference had remained rather vague:
Only our delegation, followed with a certain degree of doubt by the Belgians, 
have expressed themselves clearly, and above all in favour of, a supranational 
institution endowed with policy competences. We are of the opinion that this 
stance should be maintained. The Dutch point of view has been and will be in 
future that our co-operation framework with little Europe of the Six only 
makes sense if such co-operation is organized on a different footing than the 
one we are familiar with in international organizations. This fundamental 
difference must find expression in its institutional set-up and, first and 
foremost, by a transfer of policy competences [to the Community 
executive].270
This touched upon, as Beyen and Luns argued, an essential issue: ‘(...) to wit 
that supranational organization is, annex to other manifestations of co-operation in 
Europe, both desirable and feasible. Co-operation amongst the Six, however, not 
bearing the Community characteristics, is deemed not attractive to the 
Netherlands. It is [HM government’s delegation]’s task to further this view’.271
institutional issue as exposed by the Federal Republic's representative to the Brussels* 
conference a few days before at the occasion of Belgian-Dutch-German dinner party: 
‘Supranationality, according to the Germans, should not be a topic of discussion, because of 
the French. If the French did not exist, they responded to a pertinent question, the Germans 
would be willing to discuss supranationalism (...) Do we have to bring the matter up in Bonn 
with a view to getting more spunk into Ophucls? Any urchin would have gone beyond what 
Germany's new Ambassador in Brussels went yesterday’ Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 157, 
Linthorst Iloman to Van dcr Beugel, 17.9.1955.
270. NA, MR, Notulen Ministerraad 31.10.1955.
271. Ibidem. At the 4.11.1955 meeting of the Beyen Committee, Beyen once again stressed the 
importance of supranationalism for bringing about the common market, i f  the French do not 
want supranationalism, it were better if they said so, even though that would mean that 
nothing would come of the plans currently under debate. If that is the case one can try and 
construe a new co-operation framework with Britain and the Scandinavian countries. If you 
were to argue than that supranationalism could not be arrived at in such an alternative 
framework, my response would be that - contrary to our efforts among the Six - it would not 
be strictly needed.’ [....] ‘He is of the opinion that the French efforts are directed at avoiding 
all initiative by a higher authority, while maintaining for themselves all freedom of action. It 
is rather parallel to aiming at a right to veto, something that has well outlived its course.’ 
Min. Fin., Gen. Thes.. Corr. en doc. Nedcrlandse delegatie, sept.-dec. 1955. ‘het hoofd van 
de afdeling multilaterale zaken* (J. Grooters) aan de minister, via de Thesaurier-Generaal,
4.11.1955.
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And so they did. The March 1956 Spaak report turned out to be by and large 
in line with the Dutch wishes in terms of engineering influence. The proposed 
executive, the ‘European Commission’ was to establish and subsequently manage 
the common market, a ‘Council o f ministers’ was to be in charge of co-ordinating 
member-states governments’ policies. This was a much better result than 
influential parts of The Hague’s foreign policy elite had expected: In February 
1956, for instance, the legal department of the Foreign Ministry had warned 
against the negotiations resulting in a ‘Societas Leonina’, in which the political 
influence o f the larger member-states would -  using an admittedly exaggerated 
metaphor -  result in ‘economic annexation of the smaller countries under the 
pretext of integration’.272
In comparison, the eventual outcome of the negotiations was a source of 
disappointment. In Spring 1956 the institutional question came on the agenda 
again. Very quickly the conclusion had to be drawn that lacking Benelux-support 
the Netherlands was completely isolated on the issue. A sombre stock-taking 
showed that the perceived need to protect national interests meant that a major 
proportion of Community tasks was going to be assigned to the Council of 
Ministers. ‘The difference with intergovernmental co-operation is getting smaller 
and smaller’, a tormented Van der Beugel reported to the Beyen Committee in 
November 1956: Decisions were going to express compromises between 
diverging national interests, in which process the interests of the larger countries 
could well prevail over those o f the smaller countries. By November 1956 it 
became equally clear that the prospective EEC-member-states were definitely not 
prepared to endow the European Commission with the powers envisaged by the 
Spaak report. For months, the Netherlands kept battling for High Authority-like 
centrality o f the European Commission in the decision-making of the projected 
European Economic Community. Then Beyen’s successor, (since October 1956) 
Luns, settled for a Spaak-proposed compromise whereby the new Community 
would arrive at decisions by majority voting by the Council on the basis of 
Commission proposals.
Meanwhile, Dutch negotiators did succeed in limiting the negative aspects a 
little. In the EEC Treaty as signed on 25 March 1957, the cases where a qualified 
majority with weighted votes was required in the transitional period and thereafter 
were exhaustively listed. Equally important was the provision, embodied in article
272. Min. Fin., Gen. Thes., Corr. en doe. Nederlandse delegatie, map 2 (landbouw, instituties), 
JURA, ‘Memorandum' 20.2.1956.
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149 EEC that in a number of cases of importance, the Council could depart from 
the Commission’s proposal only unanimously.273
These concessions were unable to satisfy the Dutch government. As it 
declared to Parliament: ‘Though one must certainly not underrate the importance 
of the Commission has taken on in the Treaty, the Commission’s own decision­
making possibilities are nonetheless limited, and more limited than the Dutch 
government would have wished.’274
All in all, despite their persistent efforts, the Dutch did not succeed in 
empowering the European Commission as the EEC’s central decision making 
body. This came as a great disappointment to the leader of the Dutch delegation 
(since June 1956) at the intergovernmental negotiations, Linthorst Homan. 
Throughout the negotiations he aired his anxiety that in the absence of unity 
within the Council of Ministers, treaty agreements would be sabotaged: ‘What 
grief Benelux has already caused us on this matter’.275
Trade with third countries
On an equally disputed issue, trade relations with third countries, Benelux co­
operation failed in a similar fashion. Here, the common external tariff (CET) of 
the projected common market was at stake and hence its liberal, or protectionist 
nature. The Dutch took the low Benelux tariff as a starting point, counting on 
Belgium and Luxembourg to follow suit. Since France would insist on a high, 
even prohibitive CET, The Hague reckoned with a compromise in a later phase of 
the negotiations, along the lines of GATT Article 24 on the CET maximum, i.e. 
the weighted average of the tariff levels of the four constituting trade areas 
(France, Germany, Italy and Benelux). This proved an illusion. In November 1955, 
the Belgian and Luxembourgian delegations told their Dutch counterparts that 
they sided with the Dutch ‘in principle’. However, since they did not dare to 
annoy Spaak in his attempt to arrive at a compromise their support for 
maintaining as much as possible of the low Benelux-tariff against the French 
demands could not be firm. Consequently, Linthorst Homan observed, in the
273. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 66. Van der Beugel to Beyen Committee, 1.11.1956 and 
13.11.1956; H.J. Klisters, Die Gründung der europüischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 
(Baden-Baden 1982), 398-399.
274. Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 1956-1957, no,. 4725, Memorie 
van toelichting, 4.
275. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 53: ‘Mogelijkheden inzake het Rapport-Spaak’, 14.3.1956.
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subsequent talks the Netherlands would be ‘speaking on behalf of three countries, 
albeit that it is not at liberty to say so’.276
Such fears proved well justified. Belgium and Luxembourg refrained from giving 
the Netherlands their formal support or tabling a common Benelux proposal. 
‘They appeared to be under strong pressure from Mr. Spaak, who wants a 
unanimous report without dissident voices’, Dutch diplomats reported.277 Thus, as 
on previous occasions Benelux cooperation remained inoperative. Rather 
unexpectedly, in lieu of the Benelux partners, Germany became the Netherlands’ 
principal ally in the struggle to keep CET as low as possible.278
Benelux experiences in regional economic integration, model and countermodel
Despite a number of crises, the 1955-1957 EEC negotiations went off in a 
considerably more constructive atmosphere than had been the case with the EPC 
talks. The enhanced flexibility of the French and Dutch delegations was of great 
importance in this matter. Apart from exchanging points of view, the negotiators 
engaged in free exchanges of ideas in which Benelux experiences were drawn 
upon numerous issues. Thus, in discussions on tax policies, internal and external 
trade policies, liberalisation o f capital movements and agricultural problems, 
Benelux policy agreements were brought into the talks. This often happened on 
the initiative of one of the Benelux countries themselves. At times, however, 
Benelux references and comparisons were instigated by one of the other 
delegations.279
276. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 53, Linthorst Homan to Verrrijn Stuart, 25.11.1955.
277. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 39, Kymmell to Beyen, 26.11.1955. Elsewhere even more 
poignant: ‘Ze durven niet tegen de heer Spaak in te gaan' ( ‘They don’t dare to contradict Mr. 
Spaak’), ‘Weekbericht no. 11, 28 november- 4  december 1955’.
278. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 66, ‘Concept-nota aan de ministerraad inzake het buitentarief van 
de gemeenschappelijke markt’, H.W. Maas, with annex, 28.11.1956. On this issue, Beyen 
was under considerable pressure from various Dutch business communities, stating that a 
low CET was an absolute condition for making a customs union among the Six attractive for 
the Netherlands. See, for example, Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no 49, Chamber of Commerce 
Amsterdam to Beyen, 19.3.1956.
279. Some examples: Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 89: ‘Algemeen overzicht der z.g. ‘eerste lezing’,
5.8.1955, 4; idem: ‘Weekbericht No. 6’, 4. Min. BZ, II, 913.100. no. 158, ‘Verslag van de 
besprekingen over de agrarische zijde der Douane Unie, Brussel, 11 januari 1956’ with letter 
Linthorst Homan to Beyen, 13.1.1956, 3. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 90: ‘Weekbericht no. 8. 
Periode 17 t/m 20 september 1956’, 16.
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On the inevitably recurring question of harmonisation of economic policies, 
for instance, the other delegations made play with examples of Benelux 
experiences, examples which would supposedly show- the necessity of 
far-reaching alignment of these policies.280 The embarrassed Dutch, on the other 
hand, came up with empirical cases and arguments to the contrary from 
elsewhere. They provided, amongst others, figures showing the considerable 
differences in social standards between the various Swiss cantons without 
entailing any market disturbances whatsoever/81
A considerable sense of humour was indispensable in this line of work. 
Linthorst Homan wrote to Van der Beugel, passing on a new', 'particularly fine 
example’: While the Dutch delegation in the EEC negotiations was fighting tooth 
and nail against France’s policy alignment claims, a Benelux ministers’ 
conference one street away, equally in Brussels, produced a communique in 
which changes in the terms of intra-Benelux competition were called upon to 
justify certain social policy measures.
Tomorrow, at our conference I will get that flung into my face. I do 
understand of course that these bits of humour arc inherent to political life. 
All the same there is a large number of issues on which we act differently in 
Benelux than we advocate in the wider [European] framework/’’2
Such divergence between Benelux policy and the Netherlands’ stance on 
European integration was a source of concern for Van der Beugel, precisely 
because -  as he wrote to Beyen ‘Benelux is rather important in our talks on 
European integration. We and our partners frequently refer to Benelux practices to 
adstruct and underline what we deem desirable, or to illustrate what we consider 
necessary, or rather the opposite’.283
In case of divergence between European aims and Benelux practice the 
Dutch delegation pursued a line of argument which we can summarise as follow s: 
Of course, establishing a customs-union between three countries has a lot in 
common with getting the same job done for six countries. In theory one is dealing 
with the same set of problems. But that does apply to theory only, in that the
280. Min. Landb., ’s-Gravenhage, GS5,631, Europese intcgraticbcsprckingcn 1955. ‘Aantekening 
bij weekbericht no. 3*.
281. Min. BZ, II. 913.100. no. 54, ‘Verschillen in sociale politiek in de Zwitserse kantons’, with 
accompanying letter Linthorst Homan to Van der Beugel e.a., 16.5.1956.
282. Min. BZ, II. 913.100, no.52. Linthorst Iloman to Van der Beugel. 11.10,1955.
283. Min. BZ, II, 913.100. no. 130, Van der Beugel to Beyen. 16.11.1955.
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difference between a merger of two economies (Netherlands and BLEU) on the 
one hand and a fusion o f the Six on the other is enormous. Moreover, the strong 
political, cultural and economic ties between the Benelux countries are almost 
personal, which makes the Beneluxers realise that their history and geographic 
and strategic location gives them no alternative but to unify. Hence they can 
afford themselves an empirically oriented incremental approach, because they 
know they will reach their aim and know and understand each other inside out on 
this issue. Consequently, there is a world of difference between Benelux’ concrete 
policy results and the virtually white sheet of paper the post-Messina conference 
of the Six has to deal with. Thus summarised, Van der Beugel qualified this policy 
line as ’a nice argument, containing a lot of truth on top of it’284, but no longer 
adequate to cope with an increasing number of divergencies. In his letter to Beyen 
he discussed three of these
Firstly, he recounted Linthorst Homan’s experience on the issue. The Dutch 
view on policy harmonisation in Benelux was by and large countermarching the 
stance taken in the Messina negotiations.
On the very same day we emphatically argued in Brussels that differences in 
wages and social security costs do not constitute a barrier to the 
establishment of a customs union, in the Benelux framework the ministers 
published a press statement, in which such differences were explicitly 
mentioned as competition affecting conditions.285
Secondly, whereas the Dutch delegation in Brussels declined a special 
treatment for agriculture, which it wanted to be dealt with as an integral part of the 
Common Market, agriculture within Benelux was routinely subject to special 
regimes.
Thirdly, and even more seriously, Van der Beugel deemed the differences on 
the institutional issue: In Benelux, although in its development way beyond the 
customs union discussed by the Six and preparing for perfection by the 
establishment of a fully-fledged Benelux Economic Union, nonetheless ‘even the 
slightest degree of supranationality (...) is dismissed as unimaginable’ And yet, in 
the post-Messina-negotiations the Dutch strongly demanded supranational 




After discussing these cases of extreme divergence ( ‘1 limited myself to three, 
many others could be brought up’), Van der Beugel wondered how they could be 
dealt with to make the Dutch position in Brussels less ‘unworkable'. On the 
institutional issue, in particular, he argued that the ban on supranationalism within 
Benelux was historically rooted, in that supranationalism was unheard o f when 
Benelux was conceived, i.e. during the Second World War. Van der Beugel’s 
conclusion was clear: either divergence between Benelux policies and the Hague’s 
stance on European integration had to be explained more convincingly, or, the 
divergence itself had to be tackled. With regard to the latter option, he would 
appreciate it, if, in the Benelux talks on Economic Union, ‘a rudiment of 
supranationalism could at least be on the agenda’.286
Supranationalising Benelux as a means to save the Netherlands’ face in 
Brussels! Van der Beugel’s pressing letter, airing despair and seeking refuge in 
sarcasm, mooted a problem The Hague did not manage to solve; a problem that 
would hamper The Netherlands’ stance in Brussels throughout the EEC
•  •  287negotiations.
As reported by Van der Beugel, agriculture was one of the issues at stake. 
The delegations of France, Germany and Italy showed a keen interest in the 
Benelux regulations on agriculture. The latest Benelux agricultural agreement of 
May 1955 was distributed as a conference item much to the displeasure of the 
Dutch agriculture minister Mansholt who was not in the least satisfied with the 
slow rate of progress of Benelux liberalisation in the field. He proved himself 
anxious that the many protective stipulations in favour of Belgian producers and 
preferential arrangements, which he was trying to get rid of in the Benelux, would 
creep in again through the European back door. The Dutch delegates disassociated 
themselves from such Benelux practices and proposed a common agricultural 
policy along the lines of Mansholt’s original ‘European Agricultural Community’ 
proposals as launched during the early 1950s. Amongst themselves they referred 
to the emphatic interest of particularly the French delegates in Benelux 
agricultural arrangements as ‘extremely naughty’. Thus, on agriculture too, the 
Netherlands was given a taste of its own Benelux medicine.288 With foresight,
286. Ibidem.
287. Min. BZ, 913.100, no. 25, Beyen io Prime-Minister Drees, 15.5.1956.
288. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 158, ‘Verslag van de besprekingen over de agrarische zijde der 
Douane-unie, Brussel. 11 januari 1956' with accompanying letter Linthorst Homan to Beyen, 
13.1.1956, 3. NA, MR, Notulen Ministerrraad, 4.3.1957. For Mansholt's early plans for a
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Mansholt deemed that in order to give substance to the principles o f a Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), the EEC was to avail of a means of pressure on the 
Council o f Ministers in the form of an executive body with important 
supranational powers.289
Such a necessity to provide the new Community with a powerful 
supranational institution, equipped with powers of its own, was indeed a crucial 
underlying idea of the new Beyen Plan. After the downfall of the EDC and in 
view of French public opinion, this striving for supranationality was, at first, held 
back by the Benelux partners. However, from the Messina June 1955 conference 
onwards, Beyen, referring to the institutional problems in Benelux, had argued the 
‘nécessité absolue’ of such an institution.290 Since then the Dutch delegates had 
frequently and with well-nigh-ritual references to the institutional weakness of 
Benelux advocated a strong executive.
Euratom: a red herring?
If one takes a helicopter view of the Netherlands’ policies on the 1955-1957 
negotiations leading to the treaties of Rome one observation stands out: In 
comparison with the attention focused on -  and energy invested in -  the Common 
Market negotiations, the concurrent talks on the creation of a European Atomic 
community (EURATOM) were treated in a stepmotherly fashion. O f course, one 
can interpret this in terms o f the Common Market project (or ‘realising the Beyen 
Plan’) being the spearhead of Dutch diplomacy in Europe, absorbing means and 
manpower more than anything else. This explanation notwithstanding, this state of 
affairs also reflects the limited intrinsic significance Beyen and his successor, 
Luns, attached to the Euratom negotiations. Within the Dutch government this 
point of view was far from self-evident. Economics minister Zijlstra and other 
members of the Cabinet repeatedly emphasized the potential importance of atomic 
energy for the Netherlands as the largest energy importer among the Six. 
Nevertheless, Beyen’s view prevailed. He and his collaborators suspected that 
nothing much would come of the nuclear scheme: To which extent would the
European Agricultural Community see: Alan S. Milward en Richard T. Griffiths, The 
European Agricultural Community, 1948-1954, EUI working paper (Florence 1987).
289. NA, MR, Notulen Ministerrraad 19.11.1956.
290. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 21, ‘Projet de procès-verbal de la réunion des Ministres des 
Affaires Etrangères des Etats membres de la C.E.C.A., Messine, 1er et 2 juin 1955',
13.6.1955.
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participating countries be willing to terminate their bilateral nuclear projects with 
third countries, like the Netherlands own nuclear cooperation project with Norway? 
How feasible was the projected Euratom monopoly on fissionable materials? 
Could one design an effective nuclear control regime, both acceptable to Germany 
and France, while the first was compelled to refrain from military use of atomic 
power and the second insisted on it? Would France indeed be willing to share its 
nuclear know-how with the Five? Would the American ‘Atoms for Peace’ offer 
still stand if this were to facilitate France in developing a nuclear bomb? All of 
these were moot questions and Beyen’s answers tended to be in the negative. 
Above all, Beyen deemed, Euratom would not work because, as yet another 
technical cooperation project, it ‘lacked psychologic appeal’: hence it would not 
enthuse public opinion as the Common Market would.291
In pointing out these limitations to the Euratom project in comparison with 
the Common Market approach Beyen’s stance was the complete opposite of both 
Jean Monnet and the American government on the issue. As Skogmar points out, 
talks with various officials among the Six made the US representative to the 
ECSC, Robert Eisenberg, estimate that the Common Market constituted ‘a pretty 
nebulous project’. In their talks with American officials Monnet and his 
emissaries used exactly the same expression when explaining their preference for 
Euratom over the Common Market proposals. Hence, until well into 1956, official 
American government attention on the post-Messina negotiations was almost 
exclusively focused on the Euratom negotiations.292
American support for Euratom did remain intact, but otherwise Beyen’s 
reservations were proven right. In January 1957 Luns told the government that 
Euratom's projected monopoly was seriously compromised, due to the French 
wishes to maintain Paris' independence on the matter, not least with a view to
291. Richard Thomas Griffiths and Wendy Asbcek Brussc, ‘The Dutch Cabinet and the Rome 
Treaties* in: Enrico Sena. The Relaunching of Europe and ihe Treaties o f Rome (Brussels 
1989), 461-493 (482^491). Wendy Asbeek Brusse, ‘Euratom*, in R.T. Grifftihs, The 
Netherlands and the Integration o f Europe 1945-1957' (Amsterdam 1990), 209-224, (209).
292. Gunnar Skogmar, The United States and the Nuclear Dimension o f  European Integration 
(Houndmills 2004), 122-125 (123). Pascalinc Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United 
States o f Europe (New York 1993) 83-87 (83).
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military applications.293 Griffiths and Asbeek Brusse characterize feelings in 
Cabinet towards the eventual Euratom Treaty as ‘downright hostile.’294
In spite of its doubtful and dwindling intrinsic value Beyen and Luns 
considered Euratom an important enterprise in political terms. From the 
relaunching of the Beyen Plan onwards, Euratom constituted the carrot that would 
keep the donkey moving, i.e. prodding France forward on the road that would lead 
her to accept the Common Market.295 Considered this way, Euratom’s downsizing 
in the course of the multilateral negotiations did not basically change the rules of 
the game. In this respect it was -  bye and large -  immaterial whether France 
wanted Euratom with a view to developing a nuclear bomb, or in order to prevent 
Germany from doing the same296, or for domestic public opinion consumption as 
a sop for accepting the Common Market. For Beyen and Luns Euratom was the 
price-tag attached to realising the Beyen Plan. Tactically, the Hague supported the 
German Junctim  which linked the signing o f the Euratom Treaty to the EEC 
Treaty, thus ensuring that France too would live up to its part of the deal.297
In the greater scheme of things the question remains open as to which extent 
the EEC Treaty would have been ratifiable in France without a simultaneous 
Euratom agreement. Skogmar argues that if the nuclear issue had not been ‘solved 
in a way that was acceptable to France the result might have been international 
cooperation but not integration \  298 In the same vein one can pose with Skogmar 
a second counterfactual question, i.e. whether the Common Market project would 
have survived, had it been opposed by the US.299 This leads us to surmise that 
Euratom may have been a red herring, but from a European point of view it was a 
remarkably functional one.
293. MR (405), 21.1.1957
294. Griffiths and Asbeek Brusse, op. cit., 492.
295. NA, MR (401), Notulcn Ministerraad 6.5.1955.
296. Skogmar cites French chief Euratom negotiator Maurice Faure: '[.-1 If there were no 
Euratom, the Americans would have to make a bilateral treaty with Germany. Germany had 
already been allowed to have an army. With a powerful atomic industry she would have the 
fundamental elements of nationalism.' Skogmar, op. cit., 118.
297. Griffiths and Asbeek Brusse, op. cit., 485.




Even if Benelux were a myth, it would be an illustrious myth. From the first steps 
on the road to regional integration up to our own times, politicians and academics 
of intriguing variety have derived inspiration from -  and at times proved to he 
fascinated by -  the impact of Benelux as a role model, pioneer and testing station 
for economic integration on a wider European scale. In economic and historical 
literature the experiences acquired within Benelux are presented as lessons to be 
learned for subsequent efforts in integration. The outcomes of this ‘Benelux 
laboratory for regional integration' are, however, ambiguous.
From the Dutch point of view. Benelux demonstrated that the benefits of 
regional economic integration, in terms of economic growth, went well beyond 
the forecasts of ‘elasticity pessimists’. A substantial increase in intra-Benelux 
trade at low adjustment costs was imperative for advocating the application of the 
Benelux model as a model for economic integration among the Six. Likewise, The 
Hague’s governing elite distilled from Benelux experiences the lesson that policy 
harmonisation could indeed be the result of, rather than a condition for, market 
liberalisation. On top of the tempestuous development of intra Benelux trade, the 
role of economic and social policies vis-à-vis that development, as well as the 
impact on the structures of national economies and the adjustment problems 
brought about by Benelux, provided insights which had their effects on national 
European integration politics of, in any case, the Benelux countries themselves. In 
the Netherlands, the success of Benelux liberalisation encouraged policy makers 
in their trade oriented liberal approach on European economic integration, 
whereas in Belgium, due to discontent with the unexpected side effects of 
Benelux, alternative integration models for Western Europe were advocated. 
During the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Rome. Benelux experiences acted 
as points of reference, sometimes as an example and sometimes as a spectre.
Benelux foreign policy cooperation did indeed play a vital role in Dutch 
diplomacy, for most of the period under discussion. As a source of engineering 
influence it provided The Hague with a leverage it could never have had on its 
own. Spaak’s presidency of the EEC negotiations (1955-1957), however, while 
crucial for bringing the hoped for Common Market into existence, also narrowed 
the chances of a Belgian-Dutch teaming up considerably. Lastly, since on 
essential issues Benelux was far from practicing what it preached, its diplomatic
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use as an empirical point of reference to support the Hague’s European stances 
was never self-evident, at times even counterproductive.
Beyen and his successor (from October 1956 onwards) Luns did obtain the 
Common Market that had been the central goal of the Netherlands* European 
policy since 1952. Their prize-pig, coveted as it was, was a common market 
according to such specifications as the Six had agreed upon: overly protectionist 
in its relations with third countries, rather vague on its future policies on the 
Netherlands* most important export sector (to wit agriculture), an executive 
endowed with considerably less powers than the Hague had wished and coming at 
a steep price in terms of levelling labour conditions as well as (as will be dealt 
with separately in chapter 8) financial contributions to France’s colonial 
development policies.
Looked upon this way, the story of the Netherlands, Benelux and the EEC 
negotiations is an awkward bedfellow for the school of thought which states that 
the 1957 EEC Treaty and its subsequent implementation constituted nothing but a 
diplomatic triumph for the Netherlands. External factors, above all Franco- 
German understanding on the major issues, severely limited the leeway for Dutch 
engineering influence. 300 The Uri report was decisive in bridging Beyen’s 
economic abstractions and Spaak’s perception of the political realities and 
economic possibilities of Europe in 1955. Nevertheless, as Griffiths demonstrates, 
without the constant pressure from the side of the Netherlands there might never 
have been a common market at all.301 For exerting this pressure Benelux, both as a 
myth and as a reality, did serve as a valuable policy instrument.
300. Mathieu Segers, Tussen verzoening en verval De nationale standpuntbepaling van de 
Bondsrepubliek Duitsland gedurende de beraadslagingen en onderhandelingen over de ver  
dragen van Rome (PhD thesis Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen [2006]), passim.
301. Richard Griffiths, T he Common Market’, in: R.T. Griffiths, The Netherlands and the 
integration o f Europe, 1945-1957 (Amsterdam 1990), 183-208 (204).
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PART II:




Chapter 4: Supranationauty or Britain? The Netherlands and the 
Fouciiet negotiations 1959-1962
4.0 Introduction
With hindsight, it could well be argued that the shipwrecking of the Fouchct 
proposals ranks among the Netherlands’ important contributions to European 
integration in the 1960s. Indeed, the blocking of French president De Gaulle’s 
proposals for an intergovernmental European Political Union, headed by a 
Council of Heads of State or Government in which the communitarian Brussels’ 
institutions were to be integrated, reflected a strong support for the European 
Communities* institutions. This substantially delayed their 
‘desupranationalisation’, even though the latter could not be forestalled 
completely. Eventually, with what became known as the 1966 ‘Luxembourg 
compromise’, European decision making was -  or appeared to be -  set on a 
predominantly intergovernmental footing for over thirty years;02
During, as well as after, the Fouchet negotiations the plea for 
supranationalism in the Dutch stance was criticised as incompatible with that 
other basic aim of Dutch European policies, namely, British EC membership. 
Since the intergovernmental preferences of the United Kingdom were well know n, 
such an extension would preclude political integration on a supranational basis, it 
was argued. After the breakdown of the negotiations the French President 
commented, clearly hinting at the Dutch position: ‘It is true that the proposals 
made by France met with two objections, which incidentally were entirely 
contradictory although put forward by the same critics’/ 0'
This contradictory, or at least paradoxical, nature of Dutch European policy 
has been the subject of scholarly research as well as of political debate. In his 
study of the negotiations, Alessandro Silj argues that opposition by The 
Netherlands to the French plan was essentially motivated by The Hague’s refusal 
to support De Gaulle’s bid for French leadership of ‘Little Europe’ as well as by
302. For the Netherlands’ policy on the January 1966 ‘Luxembourg compromise1 see Chapter 5. 
For a more elaborated discussion on the laucr’s impact sec: Jcan*Mane Palayrci. Helen 
Wallace and Pascaline Winand (eds.). Visions, Voles and Vetoes. Vie fJnpty Chair Cmu 
and the Luxembourg Compromise. Forty Years On (Brussels 2006).
303. European Parliament, Towards Political Union. A Selection of Documents with a Foreword 
by Mr. Emilio Battista (s.1.1964), 45.
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their refusal to accept any form of European integration, except in the field of 
economic and social policies. According to the Silj analysis, the Dutch had always 
been lacking true enthusiasm for supranationalism and indeed when, as during the 
Fouchet negotiations, they put this concept to use, it was basically for window 
dressing purposes. In the Dutch view, the choice at stake was one between strong 
Atlantic ties with the USA, or a politically united Europe ‘having some of the 
ambitions o f a third-world power'.304 In a European foreign policy structure, apart 
from the Netherlands themselves, only Great Britain could effectively 
counterbalance anti-Atlanticist French policies. Nationalist Gaul list France and 
Atlanticist Holland had been the two poles around which, since 1958, the 
Community had been revolving, while the other member states, tried, for as long 
as possible, to avoid making a choice. In the end they did and were ‘punished’ by 
De Gaulle’s veto in January 1963 against British accession to the European 
Communities.305 Robert Bloes, in his analysis of the Fouchet negotiations, also 
points to a ‘choc idéologique franco-hollandais’ as the latters’ central issue. Bloes 
also argues that, while feigning to advocate ‘federalism’ and ‘supranationalism’, 
the Dutch government was in fact never disposed to go beyond functionalist 
economic institutions. Clearly, the Netherlands’ transnational companies (Philips, 
Shell, Unilever, and AKZO) and other economic interest groups were influential 
in that they managed to gain domination for Atlanticsm even though such ‘pro- 
Americanism’ was a trait of an economic elite rather than the population in 
general.306 Susanne Bodenheimer, in her detailed and sophisticated study of the 
Fouchet negotiations, is slightly more positive about The Hague’s 
supranationalism and Dutch views on European foreign policy cooperation and 
integration. Acknowledging that for the Dutch parliament ‘their principal concern 
was for the Communities, rather than for Britain’ she pictures the government as 
dominated by ‘Atlanticists’, who think of Europe in terms of what is appropriate 
for The Netherlands.307 Admittedly, the country’s claim to supranationalism finds
304. AUesandro Silj. Europe's Political Puzzle. A Study o f the Fouchet Negotiations and the 1963 
Veto (Harvard 1967), 60 ‘third-world power', one could argue, should be read as ‘third 
worldpower'.
305. AUesandro Silj, op. cit., passim and particularly 40-64.
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recognition in her description of Dutch European policy in the latter half of the 
1950s: while not accepting the federalist solution, the Dutch government 
recognized that future development lay in integration and became active 
advocates of supranationality within functional institutions. ‘They even cast their 
lot with the continental bloc, at the expense of ties with Britain . Nevertheless, like 
Silj and Bloes, Bodenheimer regards the duality of The Hague’s stance as a fig leaf 
for what boiled down to Atlanticst considerations. Dutch policy toward political 
union had been governed by the criterion of British participation, rather than that 
of ‘supranational institutions or Britain’. By phrasing their policy as a set of two 
alternatives, the Dutch delegates left the impression that they wanted both, while 
actually insisting on one of them.308
More recent studies based in part on the extensive primary source material in 
the Dutch national archives present a somewhat different pathology of the 
‘contradiction hollandaise*. Nijenhuis, though confirming the primacy of Atlantic 
considerations over European aims in The Hague’s policies and characterizing 
Dutch Fouchet policies as ‘extremely opportunistic*, argues nonetheless that there 
was a clear-cut philosophy behind the Dutch ‘paradox’: a united Europe of the Six 
was too limited for The Hague’s political and economic purposes. Therefore. 
British EC membership was aimed at. If and as long as the UK did not join, the 
second best cooperation option among the Six should be of a supranational 
character and, so as not to cripple NATO, remain limited to economics alone.'1'1 
And Riemersma, recalling that outsiders were often perplexed by how The Hague 
managed to square a predilection for supranational decision-making with the 
advocacy of British membership of the EEC, arrives at a similar conclusion. 
Dutch foreign Minister Luns cum suis may have overrated the extent to which 
Great Britain would feel bound to the ‘acquis communautairc', Riemersma argues, 
and Luns almost certainly felt too optimistic about the Dutch possibilities to play 
off the UK as a counterweight to the Paris-Bonn axis, ‘but it would be wrong to 
deny his course of action a high degree of pragmatism and logic*.110 This line of
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argument is carried forward by Bouwman, stressing London’s 1958 declared 
agreement with majority voting on the ministerial council o f the projected ‘Grand 
Design’ free trade area. Bouwman depicts this policy statement as ‘London’s 
Copemican Revolution’. Therefore, Luns was quite right in assuming that the 
British government underwent a process of ‘socialisation’ and realisation that in 
the era of interdependence, decision-making should move beyond the nation-state. 
Heath’s October 1961 assertion that Britain was ready to accept and play its full 
part in the EEC institutions corrobated the Dutch minister’s interpretation of a 
reformed British stance.311 All in all, Dutch European policy of the early 1960s 
may have been seemingly paradoxical and as such detrimental to The Hague’s 
credibility. Nevertheless, as we aim to argue in this chapter, considering the 
deeper motives behind Dutch Atlanticism and supranationalism, these policies 
appear to lose a lot of their apparent ambivalence.
4.1 The Netherlands* policy on the De Gaulle proposals
Concern and suspicion characterized the Dutch response to the 1960 French- 
Italian proposals for European political cooperation and the subsequent Fouchet 
proposals for a European Political Union. During the summer foreign minister 
Luns told his colleagues in the Cabinet that the country had to prepare itself for an 
isolated stance in resisting French hegemonic attempts. The Hague would 
probably stand alone in resisting proposals for institutionalized foreign policy 
cooperation between the six EEC-countries; proposals aimed at a revision of the 
Treaties o f Rome, derobing the supranational Communities of their powers and 
subjugating them to a structure of intergovernmental committees within the 
framework o f a European Political Union. Prime Minister De Quay argued that 
De Gaulle’s apparent attempt at political leadership among the Six and the 
establishment of a ‘third force’ between the USA and the Soviet Union could 
equally lash back at France itself, putting Paris, rather than the Hague, in an 
isolated position. Much would depend, it was agreed, on the German stance and 
the extent to which Adenauer cum suis would be willing to stand up for 
supranationalism.312
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Urns’ vigilance was well grounded. In the months to come, the basic aims of 
Dutch foreign policy appeared to be at stake: the integrity and supranational 
character of the European Communities, Britain’s EC membership and, last but 
not least, NATO unity and American leadership. Luns and De Quay turned out to 
be both right, in that, initially The Netherlands, but eventually France, was to find 
itself completely isolated. The Dutch-French argument on European political 
cooperation would turn out to be crucial for the outcome of the Fouchet 
negotiations.
The Hague’s concern should be understood against the recent straining which 
Dutch-French understanding had undergone on essentials of European and 
Atlantic policy. As will be argued later on, serious doubts had left their marks in 
The Hague as to whether De Gaulle’s assumption of power was a cure for, rather 
than an expression of, the ailments of the French fourth republic. More in 
particular, De Gaulle’s September 1958 letter to Macmillan and Eisenhower, 
proposing a ‘triple directorate’ of NATO consisting of the USA, the UK and 
France, had shocked The Netherlands’ government as well as the nation’s public 
opinion. The way France had been rebuffed by Washington and London had been 
a relief rather than a reassurance for the The Hague government.
Traditionally, the scope, contents and room for manoeuvre of Dutch 
European policy were limited by the demands of NATO membership in general 
and the country’s security dependency on the USA in particular. Awareness that, 
at the end of the day, only US conventional and nuclear military power could 
safeguard The Netherlands’ territorial integrity made Dutch foreign policy makers 
judge every European policy option in the light of its possible consequences for 
the Dutch-American relationship and the functioning of NATO. European options 
threatening to damage NATO credibility and effectivity and possibly the Dutch- 
American understanding, were discarded for that very reason. NATO loyalty and 
the primacy of the transatlantic linkage were called into question only when they 
appeared to threaten the country’s self image as a middle sized power and Dutch 
colonial interests. Thus, president De Gaulle’s attempts at ‘restoring French 
grandeur’ in the world, were scorned by the Dutch policy makers as undesired 
competition for American leadership and a weakening of Western defence against 
the Soviet threat.
Moreover, since European policies had to fit into the Atlantic mould, Parisian 
initiatives aimed at bringing about a collective Western European foreign and
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security policy identity could, according to the Dutch, create leverage for the 
aforementioned French claims at co-directing NATO, and consequently result in 
undermining the Alliance. In view of the large differences in foreign policy views 
between the Six, Luns was convinced that ‘national ambitions rather than a 
European spirit’ lay at the base o f the I960 Franco-Italian proposals for political 
consultations among the Six. Basically, as Silj worded it later, the proposed 
political structure was meant to enhance France’s claims to address the world 
powers as the recognized representative and leader of the Six.313
Thus, a limited continental political grouping under French or Franco- 
German guidance, was considered detrimental to Dutch interests. The Hague 
argued against such a block formation, for Atlantic, but equally for domestic 
reasons: The fact that Western Europe was economically split in two rivalling 
blocks, EEC and EFTA, was bad enough and should be corrected as soon as 
possible. An additional political division of Western Europe over and beyond the 
economic one should be avoided at all costs, was the argument from The Hague. 
Therefore, prime minister De Quay and his government had ardently advocated 
enlargement of the EEC and during the unsuccessful ‘Grand Design’ negotiations 
of 1958-1959, strongly resented Paris’ de facto  opposition to the establishment of 
a free trade area between the EEC and the UK and Scandinavian countries.
In June 1959, foreign minister Luns had worded Dutch irritation with 
France’s policies during a formal conversation with the French ambassador in the 
Hague. He did not mince his words: Paris’ attempts at forcing through French 
policies at the expense o f the economic interests of other EEC member states 
would ‘sooner or later lead to fundamental difficulties between the two countries’. 
The Dutch government was most concerned by the French refusal to further a 
wider association of European countries. As far as De Gaulle’s suggestions for 
foreign policy cooperation among the Six were concerned, Luns was not amused. 
An economic and political division of Western Europe would be most unwelcome. 
If the French wished to play a leading role in Europe they should try more 
traditional methods rather than abusing the concept of ‘political integration’, for 
which such intergovernmental continental alliance schemes didn’t have any
• 314meaning.
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While dining with his French counterpart Couve de Murville in July 1959, 
Luns clarified the Dutch position. The Netherlands would favour political 
integration as the final phase of a more comprehensive integration process in due 
time, to wit if and when truly communitarian decision making would be ‘de 
rigeur\  Only a lengthy process of economic integration could bring about the 
community of interests which, in Luns’ view, was to be considered a conditio sine 
qua non for such political integration to take place. Meanwhile, however, The 
Netherlands would oppose the establishment of ‘old-fashioned political alliances’ 
under the cloak of ‘political integration’, boiling down to the exclusion of the 
other European countries and detrimenting NATO.315
In the fall of 1959, after lengthy negotiations, the Six had managed to reach a 
compromise. The French obtained the regular consultations on matters of 
international policy between the EEC foreign ministers on which they had been 
insisting. The six ministers would meet every three months. According to Dutch 
wishes, however, the consultations would be conducted ‘without prejudice to 
consultations in NATO and the WEU’ and, would be in no way binding, neither, 
in the absence of a common secretariat, ‘institutionalized’. 316 Informal non- 
institutionalized exchanges of views between the Six fitted in very well with The 
Hague’s concept of ‘silent’, if not ‘secret’ diplomacy.
Contrary to Dutch hopes, the 1959 compromise did not settle the political 
consultations’ question for long. When, during the summer of 1960, Luns and his 
colleagues in Cabinet were informed of new German-French talks on foreign 
policy cooperation, this matter, as well the bilateral Franco-German basis on 
which it was discussed, was viewed with suspicion. Of course, The Hague 
applauded smooth Franco-German relations as an important condition for 
effective European cooperation and integration. Intensive bilateral contacts 
between those two countries, on the other hand, when and if these lead to a ‘fait 
accompli’ understanding between these two larger European states, through 
bypassing their European partners were considered dangerous. Such bilateral 
understandings, it was argued, could well be to the detriment of the other EC 
member states and the European Communities as well as, according to some, 
foster hegemonic tendencies and even trigger off attempts at ‘leadership’,
315. Min. BZ, II, GS 913.10, 1881, Luns to SG 22.7.1959.
316. European Parliament, Towards Political Union. A selection o f documents with a foreword by
Mr. Emilio Battista (s.l. 1964) 5.
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underpin the formation of a ‘political directorate’ etcetera. In this respect, the 
Adenauer-De Gaulle summit at Rambouillet caused anxiety among policy makers 
in The Hague.317
In the aftermath of the Adenauer-De Gaulle summit Luns consulted Benelux 
partners Belgium and Luxembourg and visited the Italian government in Rome. 
From the minutes of these meetings it can be learned that Luns’ view of the world 
and the European policy situation had, apart from fundamental differences, a 
number o f elements in common with the philosophy of De Gaulle. Like the 
French president, Luns was aware that the forthcoming American presidential 
elections paralysed US foreign policy, thus creating a temporary political 
leadership vacuum in the Western World. Likewise, Luns criticised the practical 
functioning of NATO and the executives of the three European Communities.
The Hague’s philosophy on how to solve these problems, however, differed 
widely from that of De Gaulle. First of all, NATO should remain the main forum 
for coordinating the military and foreign policies of Western Europe’s 
democracies. France’s uncooperative Atlantic policies, rather than the absence of 
a Big Three directorate, were to blame for the Alliance’s political malfunctioning. 
Luns welcomed a reinforcement o f policy cooperation between the Six, but in a 
setting that would promote Dutch national interests, i.e. one respecting the 
Communitarian framework, rather than the intergovernmental anti- 
Communitarian set-up which De Gaulle had pleaded for and ‘which was bound to 
lead to a French policy for the whole of Western Europe’. The French attitude in 
NATO had demonstrated that Paris did not truly wish to discuss her foreign policy 
problems with her allies; the creation of new institutions would not change this. 
Also, Luns pointed out, the Council of Heads of State or Government which De 
Gaulle now advocated would result in constitutional problems318 and the proposed 
ministerial committees would undermine the European Economic Community. 
Instead of setting up these new institutions, the Six should act in order to avoid a 
wider economic and political division of Europe, tackle the problem of economic
317. Min. BZ, PV-EEG Brussel, 996.0, dossier Plan De Gaulle I, Luns 47, 18.6.1959 and 
Linthorst Homan 182,4.7.1959.
Min. BZ, II, GS, 913.10, 1884, Luns to Paris and Bonn embassies 1.8.1960.
318. In the Netherlands, the establishment of a Council of Heads of State or Government dealing 
with foreign policy would create a constitutional problem in that the prime minister of the 
Netherlands is a primus inter pares among his cabinet colleagues rather than a leader of 
government. Foreign policy and defence etc. are the primacy of the respective ministers 
rather than the Prime Minister's. See the note on the making of Dutch European policy at the
* end of this book.
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cooperation between the Six and the Seven, and. finally, adhere to the Treaties of 
Rome. To the Dutch government the institutional framework of the three 
European communities was sacrosanct: proposals affecting the Communities were 
to be scrutinized on their supranational calibre. The Hague did not oppose the 
extension of the ‘Community method’ to other areas, but it fundamentally 
opposed discussion of issues within the realm of the Communities outside their 
executives and councils of ministers. Opposition to French moves that would 
undermine the supranational European edifice was called for. In short. The 
Netherlands judged the De Gaulle plans negatively.319
At the end of August 1960, the French proposals and the Dutch approach were 
directly confronted with each other during a meeting of president Dc Gaulle and 
Luns, the latter accompanied by Dutch prime minister De Quay, in Paris. Not 
surprisingly, the two views appeared incompatible. De Gaulle presented his well 
known concept of the states as the representatives of the peoples and the pillars 
upon which Europe should be built. The French president criticised both NATO 
and the EEC for not sufficiently representing the national identities of the 
participating countries and advocated a stronger say by the national governments, 
which should not forego their responsibilities as the most important carriers of 
authority, in these organisations; whereas Luns stressed the importance of 
supranationality, the core-role of the Communities as a nucleus for further 
economic and political integration and the undesirability of creating new 
institutions. The problems of the supranational Communities should be resolved 
by strengthening these institutions, by a merger of their three executives in 
particular, rather than replacing them by new political bodies on an 
intergovernmental basis.320
During the fall o f 1960, it became increasingly clear that the Dutch were not the 
only ones critical of De Gaulle’s as yet informal propositions, as described in the 
French President’s press conference on 5 September. Adenauer’s initial full 
support for the Rambouillet-proposals, including their anti-NATO and anti-
319. Min. BZ. II, GS 913.10. 1884, 'Verslag der bespreking tussen Minister Ijuns en zijn 
Italiaanse ambtgenoot. Minister Segni, op 16 augustus 1960 in VcnctiC', 16.8.1960 and lams 
to Secretaris-Generaal, 30.8.1960.
NA, MR, Notulen Ministerraad 15.7.1960,19.8.1960.
Min. BZ. II, GS 913.10. 1887, Luns to Ambassade Bonn 9.11.1960.
320. Min. BZ. II, GS, 913.10. 1885. Luns circulaire 60.1.9.1960.
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Communitarian overtones, had rather worried and puzzled the Dutch. How can we 
possibly explain, a high ranking policy maker wondered, that a couple of hours 
sufficed to convince the Chancellor that a policy he had pursued for years now 
suddenly was to go down the drain?321 More reassuring for the Dutch were those 
diplomatic contacts which suggested that a considerable part of the German 
administration structurally disagreed with the Chancellor’s policy of 
accommodating De Gaulle and was as critical of the perspective of French 
leadership o f  a continental block as the Dutch themselves.
By November, the German state secretary Carsten, in a discussion with the 
Dutch Ambassador in Bonn, Van Vredenburch, concluded that the debate on the 
Rambouillet-plan had become ‘ziemlich still* (rather silent) and he informed his 
interlocutor that the German federal government could well live with that 
situation and would certainly not come forward with new initiatives. The German 
Chancellor himself wrote Luns that he would wait for the opinion of the new US 
government before deciding on his position.322
This positive news, however, did not mean that Luns felt certain that at the 
next move by De Gaulle they would find the Chancellor on their side. On the 
contrary, Adenauer’s admiration for De Gaulle lent the Federal Republic’s stance 
a degree o f unpredictability and the Dutch remained anxious about a possible 
Franco-German agreement which would subsequently be presented as a would-be 
‘fait accompli’ to Italy and the Benelux-countries. When finally, in February 1961, 
De Gaulle’s Rambouillet proposals were formally discussed by the Six in a 
conference of the Heads of State or Government in Paris, Dutch fears of ‘fait 
accompli’ policies turned out to be well founded.
Diplomatic sources suggested, Luns told the Cabinet before the Paris meeting, 
that the conference would not approve institutionalizing meetings of the Heads of 
State or Government and that, for this and the other French proposals, the most 
probable outcome was a study group with a sufficiently vague mandate. De 
Gaulle’s proposals constituted a threat to NATO as well as to the European 
Communities. On foreign policy, the Dutch stance was to be that the United 
Kingdom should participate if foreign and security policy was to be discussed 
between the Six on an institutionalized basis. British participation was to be 
considered necessary in order to avoid a political division of Western Europe and
321. NA, MR, Notulen Ministerraad 19.8.1960.
Min. BZ, II, 913.10, 1888, Vredenburg aan Tuyll van Serooskerken, 13.2.1961.
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would equally facilitate the upkeeping of NATO interests. In fact, when preparing 
for the conference, Luns had secured a promise from British foreign minister 
Heath, that the UK would gladly join the talks if  the Six invited her to do so. An 
alternative approach, aimed at initiating foreign policy cooperation among the Six 
within the Brussels framework of the European Communities and with 
participation of the European Commission, was suggested and briefly discussed. 
Luns agreed that he would table it in Paris, although he didn’t think that such a 
proposal would stand a chance, especially not with the French government.323
In fact, at the Paris conference, Luns and De Quay turned out to be the sole 
opponents to De Gaulle’s proposals. At the occasion of another bilateral meeting 
on the eve o f the conference, De Gaulle had secured Adenauer’s support for 
institutionalized and periodical meetings of the Heads of State and Government, 
as well as of the Six ministers of foreign affairs. For the preparation of such 
meetings and the implementation o f decisions to be taken a permanent secretariat 
was to be established. Franco-German pressure and promises (e.g., Italy gained 
the seat of the projected European University for Florence) eventually made all 
but the Dutch delegates agree with a previously prepared draft communiqué along 
these lines. Luns expressed his objections to institutionalized meetings leading to 
a political division of Western Europe in two separate blocks. If the other 
governments, in spite of these objections, preferred to proceed on this matter, UK 
participation in the negotiations would be a condition for Dutch approval. In lieu 
of arriving at decisions there and then, a study commission should be established, 
to report on what was possible and desirable in terms of extended cooperation 
between the Six and the provisos of British participation. The ensuing discussion 
between De Gaulle, Adenauer and Luns gained interesting dimensions. The 
French president qualified the Dutch point of view as illogical: how could The 
Hague combine the ideal of an integrated common foreign policy on a 
supranational basis, which thus would preclude British participation, with 
demanding British participation as a condition for foreign policy cooperation on 
an intergovernmental basis? Once more, Luns explained Dutch apprehensions 
concerning block formation within NATO and the undesirability of adding a 
political split to the economic one in Western Europe. ‘I was unable to convince 
De Gaulle’, Luns reported to the Cabinet, ‘neither was the opposite the case,
323. NA, MR, Notulen Ministerraad27.1.1961 and3.2.1961.
Min. BZ, II. GS, 913.10 1888 ‘Conferentie op 10 februari 1961 te Parijs van Regeringslei­
ders en Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken’, 2.2.1961.
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naturally’. According to Luns’ report of the conference, Adenauer’s reaction to 
the Dutch blockade was downright aggressive. The German Chancellor 
commenting on the institutionalization issue regarded it a ‘reine Dummheit’ 
(genuine stupidity) to spend more than three minutes on such a matter of course. 
The Dutch proposal to suffice with the creation of a study group to deal with the 
issue he deemed ‘lächerlich’ (ridiculous). Eventually, the conference could do 
nothing but agree on the utmost the Dutch were willing to accept: the 
establishment of an official study group which would report to a second meeting 
of the Heads o f State or Government.324
Back in The Netherlands, Luns showed himself pleased with the result but 
highly critical of the course of events and pressure exerted by France and 
Germany at the conference. Not only had Benelux cooperation cracked down 
completely, the proceedings elegantly demonstrated the fate lying ahead for the 
smaller nations in the kind of confederal structure which De Gaulle cum suis had 
in mind, boiling down to France and Germany calling the shots and expecting the 
smaller countries to play the cheerleaders’ part. Dutch resistance to this kind of 
politics would toughen, Luns promised his colleagues in the Cabinet. Indeed, he 
summoned the five ambassadors and instructed them to tell their governments that 
The Hague was anything but pleased at the ‘fait accompli’ the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy had been confronted with and in this respect 
expected the forthcoming meeting to be distinctly different.325
This concerned as well as defensive reaction set the tone for the Dutch stance 
during the months to come. In the newly established study group, chaired by 
French Ambassador to Denmark, Fouchet, The Netherlands continued its policy 
o f aiming at British participation and, more in general, procrastinating, meanwhile 
trying to minimise the damage for NATO and the Communities. As a possible 
Dutch concession, annual meetings of the EC Council of Ministers at prime- 
ministers’ level was contemplated, but not tabled.326 At the first meeting of the 
study group the Dutch delegates reiterated The Hague’s demand that the United
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Kingdom should be invited to participate in the negotiations. The other delegates 
refused, arguing that if the UK felt like participating in the political cooperation 
negotiations, she should apply for membership of the European Communities first. 
And, since Belgian Foreign Minister Wigny did not wish to team up against the 
French proposals, Benelux cooperation was powerless and the Dutch delegates 
found themselves isolated once again327. The Netherlands’ delegation formally 
stated that The Hague no longer considered itself committed to the outcome of the 
deliberations. Even so, the Dutch stayed in Paris and continued negotiating, 
hitting back by proposing direct elections for the European Parliament, a merger 
of the executives of the three Communities and similar ‘supranational’ measures, 
i.e. typically aimed at fostering the ‘Communitarian system’ as laid down in the 
Rome treaties. Luns was pleased to see that four of the five partner countries 
responded positively and that on such issues, France and not The Netherlands, 
found itself standing alone. Likewise, as far as the institutionalization of the 
proposed foreign policy cooperation was concerned, the ‘other four’ appeared to 
have second thoughts, in that regular meetings of the ministers of defence and an 
extensive organizational framework as desired by the French, were rejected. 
Finally, the proposals for regular meetings of the Heads of State or Government 
were now referring to ‘coordinating’ foreign policies, instead of arriving at 
‘common decisions’ mentioned in earlier drafts. These were hopeful signs and 
constituted important arguments against walking out of the negotiations altogether, 
an option seriously considered in March 1961. EC founding father and former 
foreign minister Beyen strongly advised against such a course; delegation leader 
De Vos van Steenwijk on the other hand suggested that the other Five would not 
pursue without Dutch participation. During the Spring of 1961, both in the Paris 
study group and the The Hague Cabinet, lengthy, though largely academic 
discussions were held about supranationalism and its suitability for foreign policy 
decision-making. 328 Some emphasized that the French proposals lacked 
supranational perspectives, like Agricultural Minister Marijnen in whose view 
France was attempting the establishment of a confederation rather than extending 
integration from economics to politics: ‘If the French aimed at political 
integration the way they agreed to economic integration in 1955, The Netherlands
327. Min. BZ, II, GS 913.10. 1889, Luns to S. 20.3.1961 and De Vos van Steenwijk to M., 
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would not reject such a course’. 329 Foreign Minister Luns clearly was of a 
different opinion; the time was neither ripe for political integration, nor for a 
common foreign policy among the Six. As he had pointed out in July 1959:
Presently, policy consultations in general -  as well as among the Six -  can 
serve at the very most coordination of the policies of the participating 
countries. This is different from setting up a common foreign policy which 
can only emerge as a result of a previous integration process. An essential 
condition for political integration, however, is the development of a 
substantial community of interests over a wide range of topics, particularly as 
a consequence of economic integration. Thus, a realistic attempt at political 
integration needs to be directed at the development of such an internal 
community of interests and not at the creation of a common foreign policy 
that can only emerge as the coping stone of the integration process.330
In The Hague, a sizeable minority of Cabinet ministers insisted on British 
participation as a ‘conditio sine qua non’ for whichever Dutch commitment to 
foreign policy cooperation might evolve. Others preferred an ‘upgrading’ of the 
Paris proposals by removing the latters’ anti-NATO and anti-Communitarian 
features. The latter tendency prevailed. In Paris, the Dutch delegation tabled a 
compromise proposal, wherein meetings of the Heads of State or Government 
were feasible if subjects ‘concerning NATO structure and strategy’ were excluded 
from the agenda and each meeting was accompanied by parallel consultations 
within the framework of the Western European Union (thus allowing for British 
participation). Since discussing NATO-related issues among the Six was the 
‘raison d’être’ of the French proposals, the first condition alone sufficed in 
making this proposal unacceptable for the Paris government.331
In order to avoid an embarrassing échec, the second meeting of the Heads of 
State or Government was postponed and when it eventually took place, resulted in 
nothing but a vaguely worded pseudo-compromise. In accepting the communiqué 
of the 18 July 1961 conference in Bonn, The Netherlands acquiesced in 
institutionalizing foreign policy cooperation, in return for explicit references 
stressing the importance of the Atlantic Alliance and the European Communities.
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The foreign ministers would meet ‘to compare their views, to concert their 
policies and to reach common positions in order to further the political union of 
Europe, thereby strengthening the Atlantic Alliance’. The preparatory committee 
headed by Fouchet was instructed by the Six to draft concrete proposals ‘on the 
means by which a statutory form can be given (...) to the union of their 
peoples’.332
Luns, though hardly pleased with this result, considered the Bonn declaration 
a statement of lofty intentions aimed at the long term, rather than a deal for 
practical purposes on the purpose and limits of foreign policy cooperation. 
Nothing of substance had been agreed upon and, in his minimalist view, he 
expected subsequent negotiations to result in institutionalizing the 1959 
compromise on policy consultations among the Six. More important than the 
wordings of the Bonn Declaration, he considered the fact that, on issues of 
substance, France, rather than The Netherlands, had found itself in an isolated 
position. This fact reflected among other things, successful restoration of Benelux 
cooperation; now that Paul Henri Spaak took reluctant Wigny’s place at the 
Brussels Foreign Ministry, at last the Netherlands’ delegation found an ally on 
most arguments concerning NATO and the fate of the European Communities.333
An even further de-isolation of the Dutch stance came into view when at the 
end of July 1961 British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan at last announced what 
the Dutch had been hoping for: Britain now wished to join the European 
Economic Community. In view o f the agreement among the Netherlands’ five 
partners in which only Community members were to engage in political 
cooperation talks, the British membership application constituted ‘a godsend for 
the Dutch’.334 Denmark and Ireland followed suit and entry negotiations started in 
October. In Luns’ analysis these developments profoundly changed Europe’s 
political landscape. The United Kingdom’s entry in the EEC should, according to 
him, coincide with British participation in the projected treaty on policy 
cooperation.
Precisely this later perspective was, according to Luns, what the French 
government wanted to preclude when Fouchet, only a few days after MacMillan’s
332. European Parliament, Towards Political Union. A selection o f Documents with a foreword by 
Mr. Emilio Battista (s.l., 1964), 9-10.
333. NA, MR, Notulen Ministerraad 21.7.1961.
Min. BZ, II, GS. 913.10, 1892. Fack 333 from Bonn, 18.7.1961 and Luns circulaires 63 and 
64, 21.7.1961 and Kymmell to Italianer, 31.7.1961.
334. Dingemans and Boekestijn, ‘Netherlands and enlargement', 235.
151
1
announcement, tabled a complete draft treaty for a Political Union between the 
Six. This French proposal, apparently based on De Gaulle’s original proposals, 
suggested cooperation in the field of foreign policy, culture and defence. No 
reference was made to NATO, nor to the exclusion o f NATO-related issues from 
the deliberations of the Heads of State or Government. As far as the European 
Communities were concerned, the draft prescribed a general review, with a view 
to ‘centralizing’ the latter within the framework of the new Union of European 
Peoples, three years after the treaty had come into force.335
Clearly, as Luns had told his audience at the national ambassadors’ 
conference in September 1961, De Gaulle attempted ‘to make hay while the sun 
shines’; once more essential concerns regarding the Communities and NATO 
were ignored, once more political cooperation without the UK was attempted.336
Spaak and Luns managed to delay negotiations on the Fouchet draft for a 
number of weeks, insisting on British participation in the talks, ‘D n’est logique, 
ni correcte, ni sage de tenir les Anglais à l’écart’ Spaak argued.337 This Belgian- 
Dutch ‘préalable anglais’ proved effective in that a number of concessions 
containing safeguards for NATO and the Communities were agreed upon. On the 
main question, however, whether the Six should proceed without British 
participation, no agreement could be reached and in December 1961, Spaak broke 
the common Benelux front, bowed to the majority and agreed to negotiations 
between the Six on the basis o f the Fouchet draft. 338 The Belgian minister’s 
desertion came as a nasty shock to Luns, who had invested high hopes in renewed 
Benelux’ cooperation as a policy instrument which could make crucial difference 
in Europe. Spaak had expressed himself in the same vein, shortly after retaking 
office, in June:
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à
1 Le maintien de l’unité des pays du Benelux est certainement l’un des points
’ que nous devons nous efforcer d’atteindre Quand [...] nous pouvons
' trouver un point de vue commun et le défendre ensemble, je crois que nous
sommes alors une puissance, je  ne dirai pas avec laquelle it faut compter, ceci 
pourrait paraître excessif, mais dont certainement le potentiel ne peut être 
négligé dans les discussions. 339
| Such hopes were now turned into disillusion. Once more, The Netherlands found
j itself isolated. Luns stuck to the ‘préalable anglais’, reminding his colleagues in
the Cabinet of the fact that The Hague had ratified the 1957 Rome Treaties, 
convinced that the free trade area negotiations with the UK would bear fruit. Since 
• nothing had come of the latter, ‘this time we want to be sure’.340 In practical
| policy this meant that the Dutch delegation supported the substantial pro-
I Communitarian improvements to the Fouchet draft which Belgian, German and
I Italian co-pressure brought about, while insisting on British participation.341
| Interestingly enough, it was De Gaulle who came to the rescue of the Dutch
| negotiators. In his second draft treaty proposal of 18 January 1962, nearly all
j French concessions agreed upon during the Fall of 1961, were withdrawn. The
| Council of Heads of State or Government was to have intergovernmental
( preponderance over the supranational Brussels institutions. References that could
( be interpreted as acknowledging NATO’s primacy in defence matters had been
I erased. As De Gaulle biographer Lacouture would argue afterwards, a few pencil
j strokes sufficed in making the French position entirely untenable: ‘En quelques
“coups de crayon” le général avait ruiné les efforts de ces négociateurs qui 
I savaient ne pouvoir aboutir qu’en ménageant à la fois Washington et les
I organismes de Bruxelles...Ce soir-là, le négociateur français Jean-Marie Soutou
j nota tristement sur son carnet: ‘C’est la fin de tout cela...’.342
j What induced the French president to kill his own brain-child? Following
I Vanke, we can assume that it was done intentionally: De Gaulle had hoped to
I unite the Six behind French international positions. This unacknowledged
intention was recognized by the Dutch, who tactically insisted on British 
membership since this would obstruct De Gaulle’s undeclared purposes. As De
339. Christian Franck, ‘La politique européenne belge: une continuité de quarante ans', in: Michel 
Dumoulin, Geneviève Duchenne and Arthe van Laer (ed.), La Belgique, les petits états et la 
construction européenne (Brussel 2003), 261-277,266,
340. Min. BZ, II, GS, 913.10, 1893, ‘Frans ontwerp-verdrag Europcse ’Union', Luns to Cabinet, 
1.11.1961 and Celer to various embassies, 23.11.1961.
341. Min. BZ, GS, II, 913.10, 1894, Luns 3 to embassy Brussel, 22.12.1961.
342. Jean Lacouture. De Gaulle, 3. Le Souverain 1959-1970 (Paris, 1986), 321-322.
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Gaulle preferred his project’s absolute failure to its dilution he let it run 
aground.343
4.2 Dutch supranationalism and Atlanticism: some interpretative comments
For all practical purposes De Gaulle’s January 1962 interception killed the 
Fouchet negotiations. Be that as it may, in February 1961, the French president 
had been right in detecting a seemingly ‘illogical’ element in Dutch European 
policy, in that two apparently irreconcilable aims, supranationality and British 
membership of the European Communities, were presented as mutually 
exchangeable.
Indeed, Dutch Foreign Minster Luns’ supranationalism was not tarnished by 
a high federalism content. Supranationalism was deemed necessary to guarantee 
the carrying out of the Rome treaty obligations against policies and interests of 
individual member states. As such, the Foreign M inister’s stance reflected -  and 
should be understood against the background o f Dutch institutional philosophy on 
European integration as it had developed since the early 1950s.
The Dutch view regarding the institutional form to be given to European 
organizations and frameworks had always been closely bound up with the 
objectives the government had set itself in its European policy. Initially, from the 
end of World War II, up to 1952, intergovemmentalism prevailed. Hence, during 
the negotiations that led to the creation of the ECSC, the Netherlands sought to 
limit the powers of the High Authority and worked successfully towards the 
setting up of a Council of Ministers to act as a ‘watchdog’ to ensure that the 
ECSC would adequately respect national interests. However, when Jan Willem 
Beyen took over the Foreign Ministry in 1952, a fundamental policy change took 
place. Hesitantly at first, Dutch policy makers grasped that only transfers of 
national sovereignty could materialize the bigger-than-Benelux market they aimed 
at.
For Beyen himself, as we argued in Chapter 1, the rationale of negotiating in 
the limited context of the Group of Six, was precisely this possibility of arriving at 
horizontal integration on a supranational footing, something seen as impossible in 
wider bodies such as the OEEC.
343. Jeff Vanke, ‘An Impossible Union: Dutch Objections to the Fouchct Plan, 1959-1962’, Cold 
War History, vol. 2, no. 1 (October 2001), 95*112.
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In 1955, at the historical Messina conference, the Dutch reiterated their view 
that a supranational executive equipped with far-reaching powers was a necessary 
condition for the actual achievement of a Customs Union and. ultimately, a 
Common Market. During the ensuing EEC negotiations, the Dutch delegations 
advocated an institutional structure in which decision-making powers in the 
Community would lie with the Executive, that is, the European Commission, on 
all questions related to the achieving and the smooth running of the Common 
Market. This stress on the Commission’s position as the pivot around which the 
other actors in the decision-making process were to turn, was in line with Dutch 
concepts on governmental responsibility for economic and social conditions 
within The Netherlands itself and was attributable to various factors. Firstly, the 
conviction among Dutch policy makers that an intergovernmental organisation 
would be insufficiently capable of circumventing important national interests 
where this was necessary to implement Treaty provisions, played an important 
part. This applied in particular to the sought for Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), so important for Dutch exports. An intergovernmental set-up of such a 
policy, agricultural minister Mansholt argued, would lead to major influence by 
farm interest groups, particularly in Germany, France and Belgium, with the result 
that the CAP would either not come into being or else take on a heavily 
protectionist character. A second reason for placing the European Commission at 
the fore was constituted by the experience Dutch policy makers had accumulated 
in the Benelux context. The slow, difficult progress in developing Benelux from a 
customs union towards a full economic union was, in their view, the fault of its 
weak institutional structure. It was precisely because Benelux, as an intergovern­
mental organisation, had no supranational agencies with their own powers that it 
was so difficult to adjust the policy of the three participatory states to each other 
and bring about a genuine free market in farm products. If primacy in the deci­
sion-making process was not placed with the Commission. Treaty agreements 
would be torpedoed in the Council of Ministers because of the lack of 
unanimity344 (See chapter 3). In short: Benelux was taken as a countermodcl for
344. Anjo G. Harryvan, ‘Tussen voorbeeld en schrikbeeld. De doorwerking van de Bcnclux-crva* 
ringen in de Europese integratiepolitiek van Nederland en België. 194X-195X*. in: ES.A. 
Bloemen (ed.). De Benelux-factor. België, Nederland en htxemburg en de integratie van l  u- 
ropa 1948-1957 (Amsterdam 1992), 169-191.
The transformation of Benelux itself into a supranational organisation was indeed proposed, 
but met with great objections in both Brussels and The Hague. It was completely 
inconceivable for a larger number of seats on the supranational executive to be held by cither
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the administrative organisation o f the EEC. A third factor was the consideration 
that the rights and interests of medium and small Member States would best be 
respected in a supranational context. Precisely this consideration testified to the 
Dutch fear of being locked into a protectionist block dominated by a Franco- 
German directorate. Failing British participation in the Communities, The Hague 
sought guarantees against such domination in the incorporation of Member States 
on as equal a footing as possible in Community decision-making. In this latter 
respect particularly, supranationalism embodied the defensive trait clearly 
recognisable during the Fouchet negotiations in Dutch policy makers’ attacks on 
intergovernmental decision making structures in which smaller nations, though 
formally entitled to a veto, de facto  found themselves forced to follow the lead of 
the larger ones and the fait accomplis with which the latter confronted them.345
This view towards the institutional base of European integration and 
supranationalism set the tone for the decades to come. From the establishment of 
the Community in 1958 onwards, The Netherlands attempted to defend the 
powers of the European Commission, advocated their extension, supported the 
principle of majority vote in EEC decision making, as well as stressing the basic 
equality of the EC Member States. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that this 
stance generally reflected a functional or instrumental approach towards suprana­
tionalism rather than a federalist creed. Supranationalism, like European 
integration as a whole, was considered as a means rather than an end. Although 
among high-ranking civil servants, and in the Cabinet, supporters of European 
federalism could be detected, Foreign ministers Luns and most policy makers in 
his wake were of a different persuasion and advocated, what could be called, 
‘instrumental supranationalism’ as a vehicle for realising the Common Market and 
checking the larger powers. O f course, The Hague showed itself critical of the
Dutch or Belgian representatives. But with an equal number of seats, in the event of conflict, 
Luxembourg would have the casting vote, something unacceptable to either government.
345. Penders and Kwast mention the need to integrate Germany in Western Europe as an 
additional argument for supranationalism, since only a supranational EC acting as a 
Community could perform this function. Jean Penders and Maija Kwast, ‘The Netherlands 
and Political Union*, in: A. Pijpers (ed.), The European Community at the Crossroads 
(Dordrecht 1992), 253-270, 254.
For a more elaborated discussion o f Dutch supranationalism during the EC’s ‘formative 
years’ see Anjo G. Ilarryvan, ‘The Netherlands and the administration of the EEC: Early 
principles and practices (1952-1965)’, in: Die Anfänge der Verwaltung der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft/Les débuts de l'administration de la Communauté européenne [Hrsg. Erk 
Volkmar Heyen] (Baden-Baden 1992) (Jahrbuch für europäische Verwaltungsgeschichte; 4), 
239-254.
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practical functioning of the European Commission. Neither did Luns expect to 
live and see the day that a communitarian foreign policy would be decided upon 
by majority voting among the EC member states. All the same, De Gaulle’s 
aggression towards and policies concerning that assembly of ‘technocrates qui 
veulent dinger l’Europe, as the French president worded it, were deemed 
decidedly more dangerous and provocative than Hallstein cum suis. Thus, Luns’ 
defence of the European executives was the heart and soul of his instrumental 
supranational ism, or, as he -  significantly enough -  preferred to call it, the 
‘communitarian method’.
Although instrumental supranationalism or ‘the communitarian method’ 
rather than European federalism was the dominant approach among the Dutch 
foreign policy elite, during the late 1950s and most of the 1960s the Tweede 
Kamer (lower house of Parliament) was in the grip of an outspoken and 
vociferous majority of ‘Europeanen’ (federalists), which, as we will argue in the 
next chapter, seriously influenced the tone and direction of the country’s 
European policy.
The communitarian method and its underlying aims proved compatible, rather 
than contradictory, with traditional Dutch Atlanticist policies. For five out of the 
six partner countries, British membership of the Communities was to be 
welcomed. In The Hague, the primacy of Atlanticism was never seriously at stake. 
The ‘contradiction’ De Gaulle was hinting at, was apparently not experienced as 
such. On the contrary, British accession to the EEC and a modest degree of 
supranationalism by means of the ‘communitarian method’ were considered 
complementary conditions for realising the larger European common market, The 
Hague’s ultimate aim.
When analysed at the level of the underlying motives, Dutch Atlanticism and 
supranationalism appear to be serving a common goal. During the Fouchet 
negotiations, Luns repeatedly stressed that ‘the establishment of a European block 
would endanger the basis of NATO, i.e. the equality of her members’.346 It can 
well be argued, indeed, that the prime motive for Dutch Atlanticism was (and is) 
political rather than military in nature: The Netherlands prefer leadership ‘at a 
distance’ from the USA over bids for dominance from large neighbouring 
European states, especially Germany and France. Cultural and historical suspicion 
of these two countries, Van den Bos argues, constitute the main motive for the
346. Min. BZ. PV-EEG Brussel. 996.0 EEG Plan De Gaulle II. Luns/Van de Vos van Steenwijk
13.5.1961.
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primacy of Atlanticism. By accepting the dominance of the USA, all European 
partners find themselves at the same, second level. Thus American leadership of 
NATO underpins ‘equality before the USA’ and precludes hegemonic attempts of 
the larger European countries. 347 Viewed in this light, Luns’ Atlanticism in 
general, and the ‘préalable anglais’ in particular, served the same purpose as his 
defence of the EC-executives’ powers.
Dutch fears of Franco-German hegemonic attempts reflected a tradition of 
anti-continentalism in The Hague’s foreign policy. Since the end of World War II 
onwards, however, Dutch foreign policy appeared somewhat ambiguous in this 
respect. On the one hand Luns cum suis were convinced that Franco-German 
understanding was a condition for -  as well as an important object of -  Western 
European cooperation and integration. On the other hand, intensive bilateral 
contacts between these two countries were deemed dangerous, if and when they 
would lead to fa it accompli understandings to the detriment of the other EC- 
member states and the European Communities.
During the 1959-1962 negotiations such fears of a Paris-Bonn axis appear to 
have been fostered by De Gaulle’s apparent influence on German Chancellor 
Adenauer and, more in general, by the image in the Netherlands of the new 
French republic and the policies o f its president.
Public opinion and the press showed themselves concerned about the 
developments and institutional changes in France during the late 1950s, a concern 
shared by the Netherlands’ foreign policy elite. De Gaulle’s return to power in 
1958 was received with mixed feelings. True, the crises of the Fourth Republic 
and its inherent political weakness, made some dramatic change appear inevitable 
in what was generally considered the ‘sick man of Europe’.348 Also, for the 
chances of carrying through the EEC and its customs union, De Gaulle’s return to 
power and the relative political and economic stabilization in its wake, turned out 
to be crucial. A cause o f alarm, however, were the accompanying authoritarian 
tendencies and crisis o f democracy, indicated by the Dutch press. Commentators 
and politicians alike showed themselves unconvinced that De Gaulle and the new 
Fifth Republic were indeed a cure for, rather than an expression of, the ailments of 
France’s political system. At the time of De Gaulle’s assumption of power in May 
1958, the major newspapers agreed that France’s democracy was in danger. The
347. Bob van den Bos, ‘Tussenstation Maastricht: op weg naar een Europese veiligheidsidentiteit’, 
Nieuw Europa, December 1991,40-44.





leading Handelsblad described the situation as ‘suicide of a democracy’. 
Although De Gaulle himself, as was generally underlined, was not to be 
considered a dictator or fascist, comparisons with the demise of the German 
Weimar Republic in 1933 and Spanish dictator Franco’s coming to power 1936 
* were made. After all, it was deemed, the principles of democracy were not Firmly
! rooted in French political culture and De Gaulle -  as well as the French in general
[ -  appeared to be ‘living in the past’. One of best informed Catholic journalists
I noted ‘an unpleasant pre-fascist climate in France’.349 Such misgivings turned out
I to be exaggerated, and by September 1958, De Gaulle’s effectivity at stabilising a
! country that had been at the brink of a civil war found the admiration it deserved,
j The democratic quality of the new regime, however, remained in doubt. The new
Constitution expressed authoritarian traits by concentrating power at the executive 
I level, while diminishing the role of parliament. The results of parliamentarian
j elections under the new electoral law in November 1958 were considered
shocking. Dutch observers, used to proportional representation, pointed to the fact 
I that the Gaul list party, with a number of votes roughly equal to that of the
I Communists, eventually obtained twenty times the latters’ number of seats and an
j overwhelming majority in parliament.350
j For the years to come, in the Netherlands, the image of the French Republic
j remained characterized by what could be called an ideologically one-sided set of
j negative judgements, expectations and prejudices. The new French republic was
| considered potentially unstable and democratically not quite up to the mark, heir
I to and thus tarnished by ‘collaboration, communism, corruption and coups
I d ’états’.351
! Of course, and fortunately, such popular images played a limited role in
j foreign policy making and it should be stressed that large areas of Dutch-French
349. II.L. Wesseling, ‘De tcrugkcer van De Gaulle. Ncderlandse reacties op 1958', in: 1I.L. Wes- 
seling, Oorlog lost nooit iets op, (Utrecht 1993). 238-250.
350. Ibidem.
351. II. van Galen Last, op. rit.
Former State Secrctary E.H. van der Beugel offered a fine example of Dutch consciousness 
on this matter in a contribution to ‘Le monde Diplomatique* in 1963: ‘Cet enthousiasme 
envers la politique de coopération et la chaleur des sentiments en faveur de l’Europe intégrée 
n'ont jamais été remis en cause, bien qu’étant parfois tempérés par une certaine crainte quant 
à la composition de l’Europe des Six. Les Pays-Bas sont une nation éprise de stabilité et 
pourvue d ’une solide tradition démocratique. Les mois puissants partenaires des Pays-Bas 
dans le cadre de l'Europe des Six ont un passé différent sous ce rapport’,
E.II. van der Beugel. ‘De la nouvelle relance européenne?’, in: Ernst Hans van der Beugel 
65 jaar, s.l. 1982, 27-31,28.
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bilateral relations remained untouched by this negative image. Luns himself went 
to lengths to stress that, in spite of differences of opinion, bilateral relations with 
France were blooming. In most EEC matters, indeed, the two cooperated 
smoothly. Likewise, in (post)colonial affairs mutual understanding and help was 
the norm. French support for The Hague during the Dutch New Guinea conflict 
was returned by Dutch support for Paris in the Algerian war.352 In both Atlantic 
and European matters, however, in dealing with France, Dutch policy makers 
reputed for their composed and down to earth attitude, expressed and recorded in 
their files multitudinous indications of personal feelings of surprise, bewilderment, 
amusement and indignation vis-à-vis French demeanour and diplomacy.
Undoubtedly, these reactions partly reflect a wounded sense of pride of a 
former colonial power trying to deal with its diminished importance, as well as the 
aforementioned concern for Franco-German leadership aspirations. ‘We have to 
make clear that we don’t want to officiate as ‘decotfiguranten’ for French or 
German performances or display of power, the way we are being treated during 
the last few months’ an angry high-ranking civil servant wrote to Luns. ‘Pour qui 
nous prend-on?’ an exasperated colleague had asked rhetorically during the 
preceding negotiations.353 On several occasions, as will be recalled, the Foreign 
Minister himself saw signs of Franco-German attempts at domination in the way 
he was confronted with fait-accomplis and raised his voice against them.
On top of this, however, the French republic’s poor image in the Netherlands 
played its part. As mentioned above, De Gaulle’s September 1958 letter to 
Macmillan and Eisenhower, proposing a ‘triple directorate’ of NATO consisting 
of the USA, the UK and France, left the Netherlands’ government and public 
opinion flabbergasted. France’s policy makers apparently had lost their sense of 
proportion, it was agreed. As the German negotiator Mueller Roschach aptly 
worded it a year later: ‘We are all smaller countries. The difficulty is that one of 
us is living with the illusion of being a great power’.354 Dutch delegation leader 
De Vos van Steenwijk, commenting on French European policy, did not mince his
352. Dominique Bocquet, ‘France - Pays Bas, vers une meilleure comprehcnsion?’, Nieuw 
Europa, March 1992, 18-22.
Min. BZ, PV-EEG Brussel, 996.0 EEG, Plan De Gaulle III, Luns via Beyen to Min. BZ, 
18.4.1962.
353. Min. BZ, II, GS, 1893, DIE to M., ‘Ministeriële bespreking 10 december over ontwerp­
verdrag Europese Unie*, 29.11.1961,4,
Min. BZ, PV-EEG Brussel: 996/0 EEG Plan De Gaulle II, Van de Vos van Steenwijk, via 
Beyen and Min. BZ to Brussel, Celer 13.11.1961.
354. Min. BZ. II. GS, 1883. Bonn (Fack) to Min. BZ, 27.7.1960.
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words either. ‘Due to the Algerian crisis and leadership by a defiant and 
chauvinistic individual, this country is in a condition of intoxication. 
Consequently, its political reflexes are primitive. In European affairs it aspires to 
hegemony’/  Some of these compliments, as well as Tesprit des anti gaullistes 
de La Haye et de Bruxelles’, were returned:
On ne peut pas forcer Spaak et Luns à adhérer à une Union des Etats. 
D ’ailleurs, quels Etats représentent-ils? Et si ces deux ministres dressent tant 
de barrières devant la conclusion d’un accord, combien en dresseraient-ils 
devant son application? Je me demande si la Belgique et la Hollande n’ont 
pas peur de faire l’Europe, tout en prétendant que c ’est leur plus cher désir. 
Elles se sentent toutes petites en face des plus grands. Elles espèrent que, si 
l’Angleterre se joint à la bande, les grands seront tellement opposés les uns 
aux autres que les petits pourront jouer de l’antagonisme des premiers.356
In the low countries themselves, however, Belgian-Dutch foreign policy 
cooperation was considered far from victorious. Rather, Benelux cooperation was 
and is looked upon, as, in fact, the major victim of the Fouchet episode. As 
Stelandre rightly points out, precisely the attempts among the Six to arrive at 
cooperation in foreign policy on a European level demonstrated to the Benelux 
governments the divergence of their views on the matter: whereas the Dutch were 
opposed to a restricted continental European framework, Luxembourg was 
inclined to support the Fouchet proposals while the Belgians ‘adoptent des 
attitudes variées qui ne manquent pas d’agacer leurs voisins du Nord’.357 To put it 
mildly. The Dutch-Belgian differences on Europe’s political future might lead, De 
Vos van Steenwijk told his Belgian interlocutors in March 1961, to the political 
break-up of Benelux itself.358
355. Min. BZ, II, GS, 913.10, 1894, De Vos van Steenwijk to M., ‘MinisteriCle confercntie 10 
december over ontwerp-politiek statuut voor Europa’, 2.12.1961,6.
Another example of De Vos van Stecnwijk's ‘méfiance inquiète’: ‘The idea that this 
cooperation would result in the common denominator of the political stances of the Six 
seems illusionary. France will endeavour to impose its policy on the others. The ultimate 
reason why we cannot accept institutionalized cooperation as desired by De Gaulle, is the 
danger incorporated, in the Dutch view, in De Gaulle's policies and person*.
Min. BZ, II, GS, 913.10,1891, De Vos van Steenwijk to M, ‘Franse plannen inzake politieke 
samenwerking’, 5.6.1961, 3.
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The Dutch ‘engineering’ stance during the Fouchet negotiations was basically a 
conservative one. U rns’ ‘instrumental supranationalism’ was expressed in 
tenacious opposition against De Gaulle’s attempts at disrobing the Communities 
of their powers and subjugating them to a structure of intergovernmental 
committees within the framework of a European Political Union. Thus, with Silj, 
we may conclude that the Fouchet plan was rejected because it represented a 
departure from the Community system; that is from the existing European 
institutions. The French plans were considered by the Dutch as an attempt to 
cripple these institutions, by transferring their powers to a new political structure 
of an intergovernmental character.
The seeming incompatibility o f supranationalism with pleas for enlargement 
and particularly British membership strikes the eye. Clearly, Atlanticism had been 
at the heart of Dutch reticence when responding to the Franco-Italian proposals of 
1959 for political consultations among the Six. Throughout the 1960s UK 
membership was viewed as an insurance against French or Franco-German 
attempts at dominance on the European continent.
Nevertheless, considering the deeper motives behind Dutch Atlanticism and 
Dutch supranationalism (or ‘the community method’), these policies lose their 
seeming incompatibility. Dutch ‘instrumental supranationalism’ was first and 
foremost a means to an economic and political end, namely the realization of a 
sizeable internal European market and the checking of the bigger members, if and 
where these pursued hegemonic policies. Likewise, British membership was 
considered useful because it would preclude hegemonic attempts by Germany or 
France.
As such, the gist of Dutch supranationalism was pragmatic-instrumental 
rather than federalist, in nature. UK membership was, to a considerable degree, 
interchangeable with ‘the community method’ in that it equally held out prospects 
of realizing the same two policy goals.
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Chapter 5: A Successful Defence of the Communitarian Model? The 
Netherlands and the empty ciiair crisis
5.0 Introduction*
When De Gaulle's empty chair crisis hit the Netherlands, it hit a country with a 
mission. From the early 1950s onwards, the creation of a European common 
market had been the core objective of Dutch European policy. Free trade in 
Western Europe would bring the Netherlands the export markets, agricultural and 
otherwise, it so desperately needed for both its economic growth as well as the 
ambitious industrialisation schemes proposed by successive governments. Hence, 
‘realising the Beyen Plan' was at the centre of The Hague’s diplomacy from 1952 
onward, when the foreign minister, Jan Willem Beyen proposed the gradual 
establishment of a customs union among the Six to be subsequently transformed 
in a fully fledged common market in a time-tabled process supervised by 
supranational institutions (See chapter 1). After its initial demise, due to the 
shipwrecking of the European Political Community and European Defence 
Community, Beyen re-launched his plan at the 1955 Messina summit. Two years 
later he enjoyed the pleasure of witnessing the coming to life of his brainchild in 
the form of the Rome Treaty’s European Economic Community (See chapters 2 
and 3). Since implementation of this Treaty, however, was far from certain, 
particularly after the breakdown of the Fourth French Republic in 1958 and the 
coming to power of De Gaulle, constructing the common market remained at the 
heart of Dutch European policy as a consummation devoutly to be wished and 
worked for. In this policy tradition, supranationalism was deemed a necessary 
means to further the Netherlands’ European interests. A powerful and independent 
European Commission and decision-making based on majority voting in the 
Council, in particular, were considered indispensable for bringing about the 
common market. Both were rightly enshrined in the Rome Treaty, not for 
federalist sentiments, but to guarantee the effectiveness of the EEC’s decision­
making. Limited to European economic integration, such ‘functional
An earlier version of this chapter was published as: Anjo G. Harry van, ‘A Succesful Defence 
of the Communitarian Model? The Netherlands and the Empty Chair Crisis*, in : Jean-Marie 
Palayret. Helen Wallace & Pascaline Winand, Visions, Votes and Vetoes. The Empty Chair 
Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise Forty Years On, (Brussel 2006), 129-152.
163
supranationalism’ or ‘instrumental supranationalism’ was not at odds with the 
Hague-coveted primacy of Atlanticism in the realm o f high politics
Nevertheless, The Hague’s Atlanticism sometimes collided with the 
aspirations held by other European partners, as was the case in the early 1960s 
when the French government launched its Fouchet Plan with the aim of creating a 
forum for intergovernmental political cooperation on the European continent, 
outside of the EEC’s institutional framework. As we argued in chapter 4, the 
Dutch government considered the creation o f a European Political Union (EPU) 
without British participation to be detrimental in the longer run to Atlantic unity 
and American leadership thereof.
Furthermore, The Hague was shocked by President De Gaulle’s unilateral 
decision in January 1963 to veto British membership o f the EEC. On that occasion 
Foreign Minister Luns did not mince his words. The spirit of the Community had 
been ‘seriously compromised’: ‘I do not exaggerate, Mr. Chairman, when I say 
that what has happened today has made it a black day for Europe.* As we have 
seen, British entry was welcomed in the Netherlands for various reasons, among 
which the perceived importance o f the UK as a counterweight to possible Franco- 
German attempts at dominating the Community. Luns also suspected that the 
creation of an EPU on an intergovernmental basis would have a negative -  
possibly contagious -  impact on the forthcoming supranational development of 
the EEC (See chapter 4).
In this chapter we analyse the Dutch handling o f the empty chair crisis of 
1965-1966 and the extent to which the Hague government managed to defend and 
further its European policy goals under the conditions brought about by the crisis.
5.1 Agriculture: the motor behind supranationalism?
At the outbreak of the crisis, the functional supranationalist approach to European 
integration was the dominant line in the Foreign Ministry as well as being 
supported by a majority in the Ministerraad (Dutch Cabinet), which had been 
chaired by Prime Minister Jo Cals since April 1965. Cals headed a coalition 
government (as was customary in the Netherlands) consisting of Labour (PvdA), 
the Catholic party (KVP) and the Protestant party (ARP), that had sound reasons 
to be satisfied with the integration process as it was developing in Brussels: the 
common market was well under way, thanks to a strong and active Commission 
and high economic growth, enabling trade liberalisation between the Six ahead of
the EEC Treaty schedule. For the Netherlands, as the largest agricultural exporter 
of the Six, the proposed common agricultural policy (CAP) was of great 
importance as well. European Commissioner Sicco Mansholt, who was Dutch, 
had managed to successfully implement the rather loosely worded agricultural 
commitments of the Treaty of Rome. As qualified majority voting (QMV) was to 
be introduced only in the third Treaty phase, i.e. from 1966 onwards, until that 
year unanimity in the Council was a precondition for the adoption of legislation. 
Mansholt and his fellow Commissioners and staff devised ingenious package 
deals containing more or less equally distributed benefits for each of the member 
states. Thus, from 1962 onwards, agriculture gradually became the main engine o f 
European integration. By the time the Cals government came to power ‘EEC’ 
more or less equalled ‘agriculture’, as 95% of the EEC budget, 90% of its 
regulations and 70% of the time spent on Council meetings was CAP-related.359 
In its government policy statement of April 1965, the Cals government stated its 
unwavering support for the Brussels integration process and emphasised ‘the 
speedy completion of the common market* as an ‘elementary economic interest of 
our country’.360 In this respect, QMV, to be introduced by January 1966, was 
more than welcome.
However, as we argued in chapter 4, in the Lower House of the Netherlands’ 
Parliament, the Tweede Kamer, functional or instrumental supranationalism 
represented a minority position under constant and severe pressure from a rival 
approach. By 1965 a large majority in Parliament, as well as a sizeable minority in 
the Cabinet, were of an outspoken federalist persuasion. This is not the place for 
an in-depth analysis of the political and psychological origins of federalist 
convictions in Dutch politics and public opinion. The transformation is aptly 
characterized by De Bruin: from the late 1950s onwards, he quipped, ‘the 
Netherlands joined the European Communities the way other people join a 
religious order.’( ‘Les Pays-Bas sont entrés dans / ’Europe communautaire comme 
d'autres entrent en religion. *)361 Federalism as a ‘secular religion’ went beyond 
the traditional left-right divide and found support among the rank and file of all 
the larger political parties. The resulting federalist pressure on the government 
was substantial: ‘The only foreign policy issue with clear roots in the population
359. J.C.J.F. van Mcrriënboer, ‘Het avontuur van Sicco Mansholt’, Centrum voor Parlementaire 
Geschiedenis, Politieke Opstellen, 15/16(1995/1996) 137-168.156.
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and thus in Parliament was Europe. ( ...)  Parliament has functioned as an engine 
on the Europe issue’, as Secretary of State for European Integration Ernst Van der 
Beugel (1957-58) phrased it.362 The federalist majority in Parliament, pursuing a 
policy in which European unification, economically and politically, was an aim in 
its own right, going well beyond serving the Netherlands’ economic interests, 
engaged in a permanent campaign for the construction, extension and 
empowerment of supranational European governmental institutions. Arguably, 
this pressure for supranationalisation was at its peak by the mid-1960s. From its 
inception, the Cals government showed an awareness that its diplomatic success 
in Europe, or its lack thereof, could well determine its longevity: T he government 
will continue (...) to insist on a substantial expansion of the powers of the 
European Parliament (EP). It shares the opinions expressed on this issue by the 
Tweede K am er\ it wrote in the aforementioned government policy statement of 
April 1965.363
Thus, when the crisis hit, the Cals government saw two of its vital interests at 
stake. Firstly, the unhampered completion o f the common market, under threat 
from French unilateralism. Secondly, its own survival and the threat of being 
voted out of office at the hands of the multi-party federalist majority in the Hague 
parliament.
5.2 The Hague and the Commission’s package proposal
Not surprisingly, in 1965, the Commission banked on the success of its earlier 
package proposals by again putting agriculture at the heart of its new initiative. 
The first element in the Commission’s package, therefore, dealt with the issue of 
how to fund CAP in the future and how a uniform price system for all agricultural 
products should be implemented. The Commission’s intention was to introduce 
such a common system by 1 July 1967. By early 1965 the member states still 
strongly disagreed on how to shape the CAP and in particular the French and 
German views on the financing of agriculture were strongly divergent. The 
Commission attempted to harmonize the various stances on the CAP by
362. Interview with Ernst van der Beugel in: A.G. Harryvan, J. van der Harst and S. van Voorst 
eds., Voor Nederland en Europa. Politici en ambtenaren over het Nederlandse Europabeleid 
en de Europese integratie, 1945-1975 (Den Haag 2001), 31-61,54-55.
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introducing a proposal on financial settlement that aimed at pleasing all the 
member states involved.
Secondly, the Commission insisted that it should have an independent source 
of revenu ( ‘own resources’ was the term used be the Commission) from which it 
could finance its future policies and activities. Until then the Commission had 
been entirely dependent on direct contributions by the member states from their 
national treasuries, but President Walter Hallstein wished to obtain more room for 
manoeuvre for his Commission from the tariffs and duties levied on imports -  
both agricultural and industrial -  from third countries.
Thirdly, the European Parliament, until then a lame duck leading a rather 
anonymous existence, wished to acquire substantial powers for itself, especially in 
terms of control over the EEC budget. The low-key assembly aspired to become a 
parliament wielding genuine powers of control, and in that respect, the 
Commission proposal contained certain promising elements, in that Parliament 
would gain substantial authority to scrutinise the Commission’s receipts and 
expenditure.
The latter two proposals were closely connected, because if the Commission 
were to gain an autonomous budgetary role, independent from the member states, 
then there would also be an obvious need for democratic control of its finances. 
National parliaments lacked authority over the Commission, so here an 
opportunity for extending the European Parliament’s powers presented itself.
If adopted, the Commission proposal would certainly enhance the EEC’s 
supranational character and standing and it was for this reason that the latter two 
elements of the package were strongly supported by the Dutch government. The 
Hague welcomed both the attribution of own resources to the Commission and, 
more in particular, the simultaneous extension of the Parliament’s powers over the 
EEC budget. In this regard, the Dutch national Parliament had repeatedly spoken 
out in favour of equipping the EP not only with scrutiny functions but also with 
legislative authority. The federalist majority of MPs urged that the European 
Parliament should be in the position to amend or even veto European legislation 
and they put strong pressure on Joseph Luns, the Foreign Minister to raise and 
defend this desideratum in the EEC Council of Ministers. In Cabinet, this line of 
thinking was represented most significantly by the social democratic members Ivo 
Samkalden (Minister of Justice), Joop Den Uyl (Economic Affairs; future Prime 
Minister) and Anne Vondeling (Finance). In their pleas for furthering democracy 
in Europe, the Bureau of the six Socialist parties in the EEC member countries
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backed them. 364 The Christian Democrat Barend Biesheuvel (Minister of 
Agriculture) was more lukewarm about this proposal. During a Cabinet meeting in 
early June, he contended that a radical emphasis on the extension of the 
Parliament’s powers risked adversely influencing European negotiations on the 
setting of agricultural prices, especially for cereals and dairy products. He feared 
that there would be no room for manoeuvre if the Cabinet proved overly receptive 
to the national Parliament’s supranational demands. Foreign Minister Luns 
(Catholic Party) took up an intermediate position during the Ministerraad 
deliberations. He endorsed Biesheuvel’s plea for progress in the CAP talks, but 
also sympathized with the MPs and the social-democratic insistence on granting 
more powers to the EP -  perhaps not so much out of supranationalist enthusiasm, 
but rather as a tactical tool or counterweight to French attempts at curtailing the 
powers of the Commission and continuing to limit the Parliament’s role to that of 
a harmless talking shop.
Hallstein’s package met with a mixed response in the other member states. 
By early June 1965 it was clear that France largely supported the proposal 
concerning agriculture but vehemently opposed strengthening the position of 
Commission and Parliament. The French government made clear that it was 
prepared to pay a price -  in terms of an additional payment for the CAP -  if  the 
provisions on the EP’s budgetary control were withdrawn from the negotiating 
table. Belgium was rather undecided because at that stage -  following the general 
elections of 23 May -  it had to cope with the laborious task of forming a new 
government. Germany and Italy grosso modo agreed with the supranational 
contents of the package, but mistrusted the expected implications of the proposal 
on agriculture. Both countries complained about the course the CAP had taken 
since its inception in 1962 and felt that because of their relatively high 
contributions to the European budget, they indirectly helped to subsidize foreign 
farmers, without much compensation for themselves in other political or 
economic sectors.365
In this respect they differed from the Dutch position: although the 
Netherlands had initially preferred a system of free trade and free prices for 
agricultural commodities -  because of its efficient and highly productive
364. NA, MR (784), Notulen Ministerraad 4.6.1965.
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agricultural sector -  in the early 1960s, The Hague had decided to go along with 
the French design for a more interventionist European agricultural policy, in view 
of the undeniable advantages for its national farmers. But the Dutch government 
had always maintained an ambivalent attitude towards the CAP, also because of 
the problems it created in worldwide trade negotiations. A consequence of the 
Commission’s proposal was that the Netherlands would have a bigger share in the 
financing of the CAP than before. The government emphasized that it was only 
prepared to pay more for the CAP if this was accompanied by a corresponding 
increase in the EP’s scrutinising and legislative powers. As before, France and the 
Netherlands found themselves taking up opposite positions: both were prepared to 
raise their contributions for agriculture, albeit for entirely different reasons. Once 
again, Dutch ambitions proved high, when, under pressure from their national 
parliament, the delegation at the negotiations on the Commission package 
advocated the introduction of some form of parliamentary veto over agricultural 
directives. It was obvious, however, that none of the other member states shared 
this ambition, although Italy came close to it. In the course of June, the Dutch 
Cabinet decided to drop the issue. From then on, it concentrated on the attribution 
of budgetary powers to the EP, to become effective simultaneously with the 
introduction of a common price system for agriculture, as proposed by the 
Commission.
Urged on by the Hague Parliament, the Dutch government insisted on the 
indivisibility of the three elements of the Commission package, but at the same 
time feared that its desire to link CAP financing with supranationalism was not 
shared by all the participants involved. During the Cabinet meeting of 25 June 
1965, a possible scenario was sketched in which France would successfully insist 
on a quick solution for CAP financing, on the basis of EEC Directive 25, Articles 
5 and 7 -  and that it would then convince the Commission of the need for a more 
‘flexible’ strategy on the position o f the Commission and the Parliament, thereby 
delaying progress on the other two elements.366 The Hague suspected that the 
Commission -  including the ‘own’ Commissioner Sicco Mansholt -  would be too 
vulnerable to French pressure and persuasiveness, without regard to the other 
members’ preferences.367 During the month of June, the Cabinet held its belief 
that any attempt at untying the package was simply unacceptable; as long as the
366. NA. MR (784). Notulen Ministerraad 25.6.1965.
367. NA, MR (784), Notulen Ministerraad 4.6.1965.
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Commission stood by its proposals, it could depend completely on support from 
the Netherlands.
5.3.1 First phase: An inevitable clash?
Although the timing of De Gaulle’s abrupt withdrawal from the Community’s 
decision-making process unquestionably came as a surprise, in the longer run, 
many in The Hague considered a major conflict with France on the future of 
European integration inevitable. In early June, Foreign Minister Luns stated that 
at that stage it would be tactically foolish to give in to French demands on the 
Parliament’s position, if  Paris was planning to wage a battle on majority-voting in 
the Council later in 1965. ‘Whatever happens now’, he argued, ‘it is almost 
certain that towards the end o f the year we shall be in conflict with France, since 
the Treaty prescribes an end to unanimity rule by then’. The Hague should 
therefore reserve its position for the time being, and avoid being drawn into any 
discussion of possible compromises that might be acceptable to the 
Netherlands.368
Luns’ colleagues in the Cabinet agreed that unity among the Five against 
possible French sabotage had to be the first priority, which justified backing the 
Hallstein package, even though its proposals for enlarging Parliament’s powers 
were too modest for Dutch liking.369
As hoped for, in the course of 1965 the Five drew closer together. Unlike the 
initial stage of the Fouchet negotiations, when the Netherlands was seen as the 
most quarrelsome and obstructive member, now the Dutch government was elated 
to find ample support in yet another confrontation with France. This time, for a 
change, The Hague found a faithful ally in Germany, where Chancellor Erhard 
had clearly distanced himself from the ‘French-indulgent’ policy of his 
predecessor Adenauer, with the German delegation sharing Dutch insistence on 
the indivisibility of the Commission package and on the expansion of the EP’s 
powers of scrutiny. But Germany certainly had its own desiderata too: Bonn was 
no longer prepared to cough up the lion’s share of EEC spending on agriculture if 
no further concessions were made to Germany in terms of political integration, 
fiscal harmonization and market liberalization for industrial products. Bonn put 




part of the package to German preferences.370 In response, the French delegation 
tabled a counter proposal in late June, seeking a continuation of EEC funding 
from national contributions until at least 1970, the year the common market was 
due to be introduced. This counter proposal met, however, with fierce criticism 
from the other member states, the Netherlands included. Italy, in particular, 
complained about its projected financial obligations to Brussels and urged a 
fundamental revision of the entire financing system.371
Consequently, by the end of June 1965 the national positions were strongly 
divided, with France finding itself more and more isolated from the other 
delegations. The night of 30 June-1 July, while the conclusive Council 
deliberations on the Commission package were taking place, French Foreign 
Minister Maurice Couve de Murville abruptly terminated the negotiations in the 
face of fierce objections by the other participants.372 From then on, France refused 
to attend any further meetings of the Council of Ministers; consequently, for a 
period of seven months, decision-making in the Council was to be stalled, because 
of the French empty chair.
At first, the French move was met with surprise, scorn and irony. The 
technical and political issues at stake did not justify the dramatic move Paris had 
indulged in. Apparently, (some of) the parties involved, Foreign Minister Luns 
quipped, needed some time off ‘on a political summer holiday’ away from 
Brussels. There was no reason to doubt the member states’ ability to arrive at 
some sort of compromise, serving the interests of all concerned.373 Likewise, 
irrational motives were supposed to have played a role in making the French act 
as they did, as was illustrated by Franz Italianer, the then Director of the European 
Integration desk of the Dutch Foreign Ministry, and present at the Council 
meeting of 30 June-1 July. Italianer recounts that Couve de Murville was in a bad 
temper that day and that he expressed his displeasure in plain terms during the 
entire meeting. The frosty mood was not helped by a cold draught that caught him 
on the neck, attributable to the malfunctioning air-conditioning system in the 
conference room, rather than any of the difficulties in the discussions. Couve even
370. Ludlow, ‘Challenging French Leadership in Europe*, 236-241.
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decided to adjourn the meeting to have the air-conditioning repaired. When the 
meeting resumed he was entirely unwilling to search for a compromise, maintains 
Italianer. Italianer accuses Couve of an ‘abuse’ of his chairmanship when he 
unexpectedly ended the session without setting a date for a new meeting.374
All in all, The Hague initially regarded the French outburst as a temporary 
inconvenience and no more than that. More disturbing, Luns argued in Cabinet, 
was the ‘peculiar capitulation’ practised by the European Commission, which 
shortly after the infamous Council meeting had published its new proposals in 
which the French demands on the CAP were largely met.375 In a memorandum of 
22 July, the Commission suggested -  consistent with initial Dutch suspicions -  
sticking to the contents and timetable of the agricultural section of its original 
package and delaying a decision on an independent source of revenu for the EEC 
and Parliament’s budgetary control.
The Dutch government’s response to the Commission’s memorandum was 
negative at first but, faced with an isolated position on this issue and conscious of 
the importance of maintaining a united bloc of Five countries, it conceded that the 
attribution of own resources to the Commission and of budgetary powers to the 
Parliament could be postponed until 1970, more than two years after the 
establishment of a common price system in agriculture.376 Following the previous 
concession in June -  on the EP’s legislative powers -  the Cabinet must have felt 
rather uncomfortable to suffer another defeat on this matter, also considering the 
discontent in the national Parliament, the moving spirit behind the campaign for 
strengthening the EP’s powers.
In retrospect and given the Commission’s early white flag, the most 
remarkable feature of the empty chair crisis may well have been the fact that the 
five countries attempted and eventually succeeded in maintaining a united bloc 
vis-d-vis France. This was not a foregone conclusion. During the months of 
August and September, the Dutch government complained that its Benelux 
partner, Belgium, was leaning too closely to the French side. Immediately after 
the inauguration of the new Belgian government on 28 July, Foreign Minister 
Paul-Henri Spaak undertook to act as an intermediary between De Gaulle and the 
Five, but this self-appointed role was by no means appreciated in The Hague.377
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The Dutch felt much closer to the German delegation which had explained 
unequivocally that it was not prepared to make concessions to France, either on 
agriculture or on supranational!sm. Foreign Minister Luns expressed his 
satisfaction about the constructive and persistent role German Foreign Minister 
Gerhard Schröder had played during the Council negotiations378 and blamed his 
Benelux partners for being too vulnerable to pressure and advances by the French 
government. As pointed out by John Newhouse, with the Commission’s original 
package superseded by its new July 22 memorandum, Luns was freed from the 
position of fully supporting the package proposed by the Commission, about 
which he had been dubious in the First place. Consequently, the Netherlands and 
Germany reached agreement on maintaining a common position. On the domestic 
front, Luns had to overcome pleas from Minister of Agriculture Biesheuvel to 
placate France in order to avoid jeopardizing the advantageous CAP. Luns’ tactic, 
aimed at putting his government’s full weight behind Schroder’s position, appears 
to have been instrumental in encouraging and strengthening the latter’s stance, 
both within Germany and among the Six. The chances were good that, with 
Belgium and Luxembourg concurring, Italy too would rally towards the common 
Dutch-German position. In spite o f their disappointment, the Tweede Kamer and 
its Committee on Foreign Policy backed the Minister on this new, clearly more 
defensive approach.
During the second half of 1965, the *atmosphère de guerre sainte’ (holy war 
atmosphere) that had characterized the parliamentary debates in June gradually 
gave way to increasing political support for Luns and his tactics, centring on the 
German-Dutch common position. The five major parties reiterated their desire for 
‘Démocratisation of the Community’ (i.e., strengthening the powers of the 
European Parliament), a subject that, during the Council’s ill-fated June 30 
meeting, had not been addressed at all. ‘Démocratisation’, however, had ceased to 
be the priority, for federalists and functional supranationalists alike. Above all, 
this was the time for all good men (of both genders) to come to the aid of the 
European Commission and its prerogatives. Luns agreed with the Tweede Kamer, 
stating that parliamentary control by the European Parliament had indeed been an 
important victim of the crisis. The Dutch government, however, he promised 
would continue to promote ‘démocratisation’. The annual Queen’s Speech of 21 
September 1965 underlined the basic creeds of the Dutch view on Europe: ‘The 
construction of the European Communities shall be continued on a supranational
378. NA, MR (785), Notulcn Ministerraad 23.7.1965.
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and democratic base and shall be inseparable from Atlantic co-operation.’ Thus, 
the empty chair crisis resulted in newly found unity between government and 
Tweede Kamer, effectively taking away the risk of the former being voted down 
due to lack of zest on the European front.379
5.3.2 Phase two: deteriorating relations towards France and a deepening 
crisis
Spaak’s favourable orientation regarding Paris, did not last for long. The turning 
point was a press conference held by De Gaulle, early in September 1965, during 
which the French President fulminated against the EEC in general and particularly 
opposed the use casu quo extension of majority voting in the Council of Ministers. 
The Treaty of Rome specified that by 1 January 1966 policy issues on which 
majority voting was applicable would be extended to transport, agricultural prices, 
trade policy and capital movements. In his speech, full of invective against the 
Commission and the European Parliament, De Gaulle made clear that he 
considered such an alteration o f the voting procedure wholly unacceptable. Spaak, 
fearing a serious violation of the EEC Treaty and the infringement of the working 
of the institutions, changed his mind and joined the group of member states in 
opposition to France. Before long, the Luxembourg government was to follow his 
example.
Even though a collision with France on the majority voting issue was deemed 
by many, including the Dutch government, as inevitable, the timing of the next 
French move took The Hague by surprise. The then Deputy Permanent 
Representative with the EEC, Charles Rutten, recalls: T remember as if it were 
yesterday that we were discussing the crisis with Luns and Mansholt in between 
one of those Council meetings, when Mansholt said: “I have got news from Paris 
that it’s no longer the financing of CAP alone that is at stake, it’s about 
completely different issues too. Majority voting is also involved’” . This was an 
issue that, until then, had not been tabled for discussion at all, but its disclosure 
did not come as a complete surprise, according to Rutten. ‘Although the way in 
which it happened -  the French drawing the conclusion at midnight that the 
discussion had run aground and that there was no sense in continuing and the 
French delegation’s immediate départ from Brussels, not to return for a
379. John Newhouse, Collision in Brussels. The Common Market Crisis o f 30 June 1965, London 
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considerable time span -  all that was quite a surprise and fairly shocking for all 
concerned. Indeed, such were the manners deemed applicable by some in those 
days, at least within the ranks of the Gaullist government'. 380
5.3.3 Third phase: France out, Britain in?
By October 1965, the Dutch Cabinet openly started to worry that France, with its 
head-on approach, was seeking to torpedo the supranational foundations of the 
Community by insisting on a rigorous revision of the Treaty of Rome and on 
downgrading the Commission’s position. After all, new intelligence suggested 
that from the early spring onwards France had been preparing for a showdown 
and that Couve de Murville had been acting under explicit orders to close the June 
negotiations 'avec éclat’ (with a bang).381 Couve de Murville’s address to the 
French parliament on 20 October expanded on his President’s 9 September news 
conference: Paris required a révision d'ensemble (general revision) of the 
Community system and the establishment of a ‘political Europe’, presumably 
along the intergovernmental lines of the Fouchet proposals.382
The polarizing strategy followed by De Gaulle and his government shocked 
the Cabinet, as appears from the unanimity in condemnatory judgment during the 
meeting of 22 October. Prime Minister Cals suggested taking France to court if it 
refused to comply with its treaty obligations concerning majority voting in the 
Council.383 Minister Samkalden stated that the French government deliberately 
aimed to destroy the institutional mechanism of the European Communities while 
Minister of Social Affairs Jacob Suurhof added that the crisis should no longer be 
regarded as just another French ploy aimed at securing an advantageous CAP 
settlement: ‘The French government is determined to destroy the EEC’, he 
claimed echoing Samkalden.384 Under these circumstances, the Cabinet rejected a
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proposal by Spaak to convene a meeting o f the six Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
outside the EEC framework, to pacify the French. The general feeling in The 
Hague, in government circles and a fortiori in Parliament, was that au contraire 
the blame for the crisis should be openly put on France.
During the Cabinet meetings, there was widespread speculation about the 
possibility of going ahead in the EEC without France. Immediately after the start 
of the empty chair crisis, a group of legal experts under Willem Riphagen from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs investigated the issue of whether the Treaty of 
Rome allowed the taking of binding decisions among the Five, without France 
participating. Unlike their colleagues in Germany, the group concluded that the 
relevant treaty articles were too ambiguous to permit an incontestable ‘go-it- 
alone’ by the Five. 385 The Netherlands was prepared to convene so-called 
restrictive Council meetings, with the authority to deliberate on policy matters but 
not to decide on them.
Thus, with the legal aspect of the crisis being dealt with cautiously, Cals and 
his staff did not refrain from addressing the political issue at the heart of 
government policy-making. By November, Luns had repeatedly told his 
colleagues in the Cabinet that, if  the efforts to make France resume cooperation 
within the EEC framework were to fail, the government would have to make a 
decision in principle in favour of continuing integration with the four remaining 
partner countries.386 Likewise, State Secretary for European Affairs Anton de 
Block concluded that the Five’s teaming up did not suffice; now that France was 
disengaging itself from the Rome Treaty, a more fundamental exchange of views 
was called for. A new common market among the Five, the future of European 
cooperation within NATO and the evolution of Germany’s position within the 
West were among the issues to be addressed.387
Contingency planning on alternatives to cooperation among the Six should, 
as Samkalden pointed out to his colleagues in the Cabinet, be on a multiple 
scenario basis: with or without French membership, the EEC could survive; an 
associate status might be offered to France as an alternative for full membership; 
and under the prevailing conditions entry negotiations with the United Kingdom 
might be embarked upon soon. The combined efforts of Luns, Biesheuvel and
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Den Uyl, however, brought about a postponement of policy preparations along 
these lines, partly because of the political impact such planning might ha\c on the 
ongoing negotiations with the Five and France and, partly, because of doubts as to 
whether the partners, Italy in particular, were ready to discuss a Community 
without French membership.388
In a memorandum by the Foreign Ministry in November, the prospects of a 
continuation of an EEC of six countries were portrayed as gloomy, especially at a 
time when the French position in NATO was also considered troublesome. On 
various issues, among which the long-running debate on creating a Multilateral 
Nuclear Force, France had moved away, slowly but surely, from its Atlantic 
partners. The drafters of the memorandum were rather circumspect in their policy 
recommendations regarding the crisis. On the one hand, they found it hard to 
envisage an EEC of five countries, at least as long as cooperation with France in 
NATO -  however fragile -  would last. But if France’s EEC membership were to 
end, the Foreign Ministry contended, Germany’s economic weight would result in 
a position of predominance for that country, necessitating immediate entry 
negotiations with the United Kingdom and other European countries.’
In November, De Gaulle told his European partners that, in order to 
overcome the deadlock, he was prepared to discuss political issues with them, but, 
to the annoyance of the Dutch government, he refused to tackle urgent economic 
problems of the time. Minister of Agriculture Biesheuvel pointed to the adverse 
impact of the empty chair crisis on the agricultural sector in Europe and on the 
evolving trade negotiations with the US within the Kennedy Hound. As before. 
Biesheuvel, in his position as representative of agricultural interests, was the 
minister most inclined to look for ways to stay in contact with the French, even if 
this implied making concessions in areas other than agriculture. He warned that 
the farming community in Europe would be in serious trouble if no agreement 
was reached on common prices for cereals, beef and dairy products. In November, 
he suggested a temporary ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ with France, in order to solve 
the most pressing agricultural problems.390 He also urged a quick resumption of
388. NA, MR. (879), Notulen Raad voor Europese Zaken 22.10.1965.
389. Min. BZ, III, 913.100 F/12591/65a, ‘Mogelijkheden tot oplossing van de huidige o u n  in de 
Europese Gemeenschappen’, s.a. [16.11.1965]: NA. MR (785). Notulen Ministerraad 
22.11.1965. The French-instigated NATO crisis, which started in late 1965. apjvars to ha\c 
affected the empty chair problem in a number of ways which will not be dealt with in thi\ 
chapter.
390. NA, MR (785), Notulen Ministerraad 22.11.1965.
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trade negotiations with the US, not least because after 30 June 1967 the US 
President’s special negotiating authority on trade would expire, which was 
expected to hamper -  temporarily, in any case -  progress in transatlantic tariff 
reductions.
W ith hindsight, Biesheuvel’s way of thinking was destined to carry the day. 
Deep down, there was always the feeling that, one way or another, the French 
delegation could not but return to the negotiating table. There were crucial 
interests at stake for all parties concerned. To reach a solution on agricultural 
questions concerning cereals and dairy products and for the continuation of the 
Kennedy Round on tariff reductions, full French participation was an absolute 
requirement. And, vice versa, France, with its enormous agricultural and industrial 
interests in Europe, could not abstain for too long from the Council meetings. At 
the end of the day, France’s stakes in the Community could be protected only by 
its own presence. The mutual oath-taking of the Five, as Newhouse describes it, 
‘meant that before very long France would have to return to Brussels’. 
Nevertheless, the general feeling was that it would be hard to find a mutually 
acceptable agreement until after the French presidential elections in early 
December.391
5.3.4 Fourth phase: Retaining unity and calling bluff
Thus, from Spring 1965 onwards, by maintaining their united front, the Five were 
able to ‘call France’s b luff, as Ludlow would have it.392 In late October, in 
response to De Gaulle’s demands for an overhaul o f the Communitarian system, 
the Five issued a Council declaration asserting their common determination to 
stand by the principles of the Treaty and inviting France to take part in a special 
meeting of the Council, without the customary presence of members of the 
Commission. For once, as Ludlow points out, the Dutch were not relegated to 
their customary position of the lone voice raised against the French. The Five 
continued to operate the Community machinery. Yet Paris held up approval of the 
EEC and Euratom budgets and nothing was conceded on either side. 
Disintegration and a definitive rupture loomed, Dutch policy-makers feared, since
391. NA, MR (879), Notulen Raad voor Europese Zaken 22.10.1965; John Newhouse, Collision 
in Brussels. The Common Market Crisis o f 30 June 1965 (London 1967), 142.
392. Ludlow, ‘Challenging French Leadership in Europe'. Ludlow, however, applies the term in a 
more restricted way, to the May/June negotiations alone.
majority decisions by the Five on the budgets (which France viewed as 
unacceptable) could not be postponed much longer. An ‘ordinary'* Council 
meeting to that end was scheduled for 31 January 1966.?9i
Early in 1966, however, electorally weakened after the presidential elections 
of December and under pressure from private interest groups (both farmers and 
industrialists), De Gaulle’s government returned to the European negotiating table. 
Since the Five insisted on negotiating within the Community framework and 
France refused to negotiate in Brussels, the city of Luxembourg was chosen as the 
venue of an extraordinary session of the Council on 17 January 1966, the first 
Couve de Murville was to attend in over six months. He tabled a ten-point 
memorandum, thereafter referred to as the ‘Decalogue*, aimed at reaching an 
understanding on curbing the Commission’s powers and proscribing majority­
voting in the Council, finalized by a time-table indicating when these and other 
measures would have to be agreed upon among the Six. The Decalogue met with 
a flat refusal from the Five who had agreed not to accept any change in the Treaty, 
neither by means of amendment, nor on the basis of a common interpretative 
statement. As expected, the majority-voting issue appeared to be the major 
problem. France insisted on a guarantee that it could not be outvoted: the Council 
would have to refrain from majority-voting if one of the member-slates such 
desired. Such a right to veto was unacceptable for the others. Of course, German 
Foreign Minister Schröder argued, when taking a vote the Council was to consider 
and respect the vital interests of all member states concerned. But according to 
Schröder a unilaterally invocable right to veto was out of the question. Such a 
veto would constitute a breach of the Rome Treaty, his Italian colleague Emilio 
Colombo added. Luns pointed to the OECD as a spectre of the paralysing effects 
of rights to veto. Guarantees against rash or incautious decisions were perfectly 
feasible, in his view, but no more than that. Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak 
surprised his colleagues unpleasantly by unexpectedly tabling a compromise 
proposal initiating a second and third reading for proposals affecting a country’s 
vital interests before taking a vote on the matter. Colombo suggested that 
agreement might be reached on refraining from majority decision-making 
concerning a number of issues during the third ‘transitional period’, i.e. until 1970. 
Since none of these concessions met the French demands by a long shot. Spaak’s
393. Min. BZ, III, 913.100, no. 5490, ‘Verslag vergadering Coördinatie Commissie voor Euro­
pese Integratie en Associatieproblemen op 18 november 1%5' and ‘Verslag vergadering 
* Coördinatie Commissie voor Europese Integratie en Associaiieproblcmcn op 6 januan l 'M '.
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and Colombo's stepping out of the line of Five remained without consequences. 
Since the parallel negotiations on the European Commission’s ‘style’ (a 
euphemism for the way in which the Commission was conducting its affairs and 
exercising its powers) proved equally unsuccessful, the meeting was adjourned.394
Back in the Netherlands, Luns showed his disapproval of what he considered 
‘untimely concessions’ by Belgium and Italy and sang -  as he had done before -  
the praises of the intensive bilateral German-Dutch cooperation that had saved the 
day. Fortunately, he added, the continuous pressure on Germany and the relentless 
attacks on Schroder in the French press created a boomerang effect in stiffening 
the coalition of the Five. He showed himself confident that France would back 
down and reconsider its Decalogue; if that were to be the case, a number of 
compromises, particularly with regard to the Commission’s modus operandi 
appeared attainable. On the majority voting issue, France was to accept a 
compromise ‘within the limits o f the EEC Treaty’. Unlike some of his fellow 
ministers, Luns was optimistic about the chances of arriving at such a compromise 
in the short term. To that aim, a second adjournment of the Council was to be 
avoided. When in London on 25 January, Luns added to the existing pressure on 
Paris by telling the British press that the possibility of a European Community 
without France was ‘not to be excluded’. The real cause of the French objections, 
he stated, was that the Community was on the threshold of maturity which would 
‘necessitate strengthening its supranational character’. Discussing the policy 
options o f the Five, he referred to the four-power Control Commission crisis in 
Germany in 1948 as an example o f how a group was able to carry on functioning 
in the absence of one member, in this case the Soviet Union.395
When on 28 January the Council meeting was resumed, again in Luxembourg, 
Luns’ optimism was proved right. A general overhaul of the institutions was no 
longer the issue, although limits were set to the ambitions of the European 
Commission. It was agreed that before adopting ‘any important proposal’ it would 
be ‘desirable’ that the Commission should take up ‘the appropriate contacts with 
the governments of the member states’. On the voting issue, however, the 
delegations agreed -  in the famous wording of the Luxembourg Compromise -  
that their divergence of views on what should be done if unanimous agreement
394. Min. BZ, III, 913.100, no. 1382 Codetelegram 1520, Brussels to The Hague, 19-1-66F/ 
319/66. ‘Raadszitting te Luxemburg op 17 en 18 januari 1966 inzake de crisis in de Europese 
Gemeenschappen’ s.a.
395. NA, MR (812), Notulen Ministerraad van het Koninkrijk (Council of ministers of the 
Empire) 21-1-1966 and NA, MR (813), Notulen Ministerraad 21.1.1966.
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proved unattainable, did not prevent the Community’s work being resumed in 
accordance with the normal procedures. The Five had not reneged on majority 
voting. On Schröder’s proposal, the Five conceded that if vital interests of one or 
several member states were at stake, the Six would try to arrive at solutions 
acceptable to all members of the Council; ‘within a reasonable period of time’, 
Luns hastened to amend, in order to prevent interpretations which might exclude 
the possibility of majority voting.396
The outcome of the Luxembourg deliberations received a mixed, but for the 
most part, positive reception in the Netherlands. In his report to The Hague, the 
Dutch Permanent Representative in Brussels Dirk Spierenburg stressed that the 
effort to arrive at consensus was strictly limited to decisions on the basis of 
Commission proposals, and did not forestall a possible majority vote. The French 
attempt to insert the clause ‘pour éviter des difficultés graves' (to avoid serious 
difficulties) in the formula was successfully averted. True, the Commission stood 
corrected on some of its attempts to expand its international diplomatic activity, 
but considerably less so than originally proposed by the Paris government. The 
French Decalogue had been reduced to seven items which had been successfully 
reworded to the point that in the final agreement ‘hardly any criticism of the 
Commission’ was expressed.397 Luns concluded that the outcome constituted a 
serious blow to the credibility of future French threats to leave the Community. 
The fact that Paris had not obtained what it wanted, however, did not compensate 
for the fact that the position of the European Commission had been weakened and 
cohesion among the Six had been seriously damaged. The continuing 
disagreement on the issue of majority voting might remain a bone of contention, 
but the probability of this happening was not large enough to justify a 
prolongation of the empty chair crisis.398 State Secretary De Block emphasized 
that the Rome Treaty was left unscathed by the crisis. He mentioned domestic 
political problems, financial and agricultural difficulties and the fear of German 
dominance as the factors behind the sizeable concessions made by France. 
Economics Minister Den Uyl, although pleased that a rupture in the Community 
had been kept at bay, proved more sceptical: the Luxembourg agreement had not
396. Min. BZ, III, 913.100, no. 1382, Codetelegram Spierenburg from Brussels to Foreign 
Ministry no. 1851, 31.1.1966. ‘The Luxembourg Agreement’ in: A.G. Hanyvan and J. van 
der Harst (eds.), Documents on European Union, Houndmills 1997,151-152.
397. Min. BZ. III. 913.100, no. 1382. Codetelegram Spierenburg no. 1851,31.1.1966.
398. Min. BZ, III, 913.100, no. 1382, Luns circulaire 6, referentie no. 614, 31.1.1966 and 
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solved the issues at stake and constituted only the beginning of the tug of war on 
the majority -voting issue.
5.4 Discussion: Causes and Effects, Winners and Losers?
In January 1966 a high-ranking Dutch official compared the intergovernmental 
power struggle we now refer to as the ‘empty chair crisis’ to a game of poker, its 
outcome ‘depending on the endurance and nerves of the participants’.400 As such, 
the crisis may be characterized as yet another episode in a series of diplomatic 
disagreements on the future o f European integration during the 1960s. As in the 
past, the French Republic and the Netherlands represented pole positions: The 
Hague putting up an indefatigable defence of the European Community’s 
supranational character against determined attempts by Paris to undo the 
communitarian elements of the Rome Treaty. Due to their common front, the 
Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg managed to maintain a 
united stance against French pressure; these five countries carried the day and The 
Hague ‘left the battlefield victorious’, as the then State Secretary for European 
affairs in the Netherlands worded it.
As to the origins of the empty chair crisis, the Dutch primary source material 
confirms the established views in the literature on European integration. Rather 
than Piers Ludlow’s revisionist thesis, which attributes the outbreak of the crisis 
to a ‘rebellion’ of the Five against ‘French leadership’, the crisis originated in 
French resistance to the Commission’s package proposal. As far as the Dutch 
were concerned, no evidence for a teaming up against France by the Five has been 
found. Though criticizing the European Commission for not being tough enough 
on the supranational issues, The Hague took the Commission’s package proposal 
entirely seriously. ‘French leadership’ never was the issue, as it was a concept that 
was unacceptable to The Hague in any case and opposition to it had already led to 
the emphasis on supranationalism, not to mention the torpedoing of the ‘Fouchet 
Plan’. Six countries engaged in multilateral negotiations were confronted with a 
deadlock. Dutch surprise at France’s decision to withdraw its negotiators appears 
entirely genuine.401
399. NA, MR (813), Notulen Ministerraad 4.2.1966.
400. Min. BZ, III, 913.100, F/319/66 ‘Raadszitting te Luxemburg op 17 en 18 januari 1966 inzake 
de crisis in de Europese Gemeenschappen’.
401. Ludlow, ‘Challenging French Leadership in Europe’, 232-236.
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At the outset of the crisis, Dutch diplomacy was, to a large degree, dictated 
by domestic policy considerations. A well-organised cross-party federalist 
majority in Parliament saddled the Cals coalition government with an outspoken 
European agenda and coupled its political survival to its record on supporting 
European institutions. Hence, the Commission’s original proposals were 
favourably received in The Hague, in that they supported the long term policy 
aims, settling CAP financing in particular, as well as being in line with 
Parliament’s federalist wishes. When French unilateralism cruelly killed this ‘best 
of both worlds’ luxury, The Hague’s emphasis shifted rapidly from the offensive 
towards the defensive, prioritising the maintenance of the common front of the 
Five in order to protect the EEC and its communitarian character. This policy was 
successful at both the international as well as the domestic level. The firm will of 
the Five not to give in made sure that on this occasion it was France, not the 
Netherlands, which found itself in an isolated position. In addition, within the 
Netherlands the common front of the Five facilitated and justified the quiet 
downgrading of Parliament’s federalist claims. Throughout the stalemate, Luns 
and his fellow ministers appear to have gained gradually more leeway in their 
handling of the crisis. As such, the poker game referred to above, resembles the 
two-level game model described by Robert D. Putnam, in which the outcome of 
international negotiations is determined at two interacting levels, the 
intergovernmental one and the domestic one.402 Initially parliamentarian federalist 
pressure severely limited the government’s win-set, i.e. the set of domestically 
acceptable outcomes. The confrontation with the French shifted attention to the 
second poker table, the European one. Domestic reality was superseded by 
international reality, allowing for a considerably larger win-set for the Cals team 
in the process. Parliament, far from sending them packing for underperformance 
in Europe, rallied around the Dutch flag.
As regards the effects of the empty chair crisis, there is considerable room for 
historical debate. To which degree did the main actors manage to reach their aims? 
With the Luxembourg ‘compromise’ De Gaulle succeeded in achieving some of 
the goals he had set at the start o f the crisis: the introduction of own resources for 
the Commission and control by the Parliament over these resources were 
postponed for a number of years; the CAP was finally and firmly established in 
1968 with favourable arrangements for French farmers; the attempt at
402. Robert D. Putnam. ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games', 
International Organization 42,3 (Summer 1988). 427-460, passim.
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strengthening the Commission’s position had been thwarted and the extension of 
majority voting in the Council was kept within limits. Although French victory in 
the Luxembourg ‘compromise’ was debatable, De Gaulle did not hesitate to use 
the outcome in January 1966 for domestic political reasons and portrayed himself 
-  often successfully ~ as the defender of the nation state.
In the greater scheme of things, the net value of the ‘politics of grandeur’ of 
President De Gaulle and his Foreign Minister Couve de Murville remains 
questionable. ‘What is clear’, observed the Economist in its obituary of Couve de 
Murville in January 2000, ‘is that in its pursuit of la gloire France managed to 
upset, and sometimes anger, its closest friends ( ...)  creating distrust for French 
policies that persist to this day’.403
In The Hague, the immediate aftermath of the empty chair crisis produced 
mixed feelings, all the more so as almost simultaneously -  in March 1966 -  
France decided to leave NATO’s military command, thereby seriously 
challenging the Dutch-hailed Atlantic unity.404 The Hague’s attempts at creating a 
more supranational Community had been thwarted. Particularly its efforts to 
strengthen the controlling and legislative powers of the European Parliament had 
proved ill-fated.
On the other hand, the long-term prospects for the EEC were not too gloomy: 
1968 witnessed the creation of the desired customs union and an agreement on a 
final settlement of a genuine common agricultural policy with a unified price 
system for all products: a common trade policy was about to be established; in 
Luxembourg, the Decalogue -  aimed at curtailing the Commission’s powers -  had 
been largely neutralized; the EP’s position was substantially boosted in the 
aftermath of the Hague summit of 1969; likewise agreement was reached amongst 
the Six on an independent source of funding for the Community. On these issues, 
the Luxembourg ‘compromise’ brought about postponement rather than a radical 
change.
Whether its wordings on the majority-voting issue constituted an exception to 
this rule, is a question that goes beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, 
the view that ‘Luxembourg’ represented a de facto , albeit not de jure , acceptance 
by the Five of a right to veto, as demanded by De Gaulle, thus profoundly
403. ‘Maurice Couve de Murville. Obituary’, The Economist, 8.1.2000.
404. Luns instructed Dutch embassies everywhere to put out the line to the local authorities ‘that 
for the Dutch government French activities regarding Atlantic co-operation constituted a 
significant reason for continuing to refuse political consultations among the .Six’. (Min. BZ, 
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affecting decision-making and setting the decision-making parameters closer to 
the French President’s ideal,405 is increasingly becoming an issue worthy of 
debate.
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, in the most encompassing analysis of the 
Council’s institutional development so far, criticise as far too simplistic the 
picture that until the 1987 Single European Act decisions in the Council were 
mostly subject to the unanimity rule and to the implicit acceptance of the right to 
veto.406 They argue, Firstly, that the heavy reliance on consensus, practised during 
the first half of the 1970s, was, above all, inspired by functional reasons. 
Consensus was sought with a view to encouraging compliance. The progressive 
strengthening of Community law began to provide an alternative guarantee for 
compliance and the implementing of Community decisions in domestic law. 
Second, votes started to be taken more often during the late 1970s, and with 
increasing frequency in the early 1980s. Budget appropriations, CAP rules and 
trade issues, in particular, frequently led to decisions being taken by QMV. Many 
decisions on internal market issues were taken in this same way well before the 
ratification of the Single European Act in 1987. Third, the Luxembourg 
‘compromise’ did affect the Council, but in a more nuanced way than has been 
widely assumed. Legally no more than an entry in a footnote to the minutes of a 
Council meeting, the views on its status as an operating norm differed widely. 
Generally speaking, its major effect may well have been psychological, in 
inducing delegates in the Council not to push their colleagues too far, when these 
were facing serious domestic constraints.
The Hayes-Renshaw/Wallace analysis is supported by the testimony of 
Charles Rutten, the Netherlands’ Permanent Representative in Brussels from 1980 
to 1986.407 He, too, refers to ‘a widespread misunderstanding’, needing correction: 
‘When the Treaty allows for QMV, QMV is almost always applied. The aim to 
arrive at a consensus, however, is always present. QMV is only applied when 
consensus cannot be attained and yet a decision has to be taken. But those 
occasions constitute an exception to the rule, in that -  ‘vital interests’ or no ‘vital
405. See e.g. Alain Guyomarch, Howard Machin and Ella Ritchie, France in the European Union, 
(Houndmills 1998) 25; and Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics o f the European 
Union, (Houndmills, 4th edition 1999), 168-169.
406. Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace. The Council o f Ministers (2nd edition, Houndmills 
2006), 263-270.
407. In earlier years, from 1960 to 1969 Mr. Rutten was Deputy Permanent Representative. His 
long-term involvement in the Brussels* decision-making process provides him with an 
excellent overview on the impact of the Luxembourg ‘compromise*.
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interests’ apart -  it is in nobody’s interest to outvote countries time after time. (...)  
I think that the number of cases decided upon by QMV after ‘Luxembourg’ is 
quite considerable. Almost all budget decisions were arrived at by QMV, because 
reaching consensus on the budget was always extremely difficult and yet 
decisions had to be taken. On matters of trade policy, as well as in some other 
areas, issues were decided upon by QMV’.408 These observations gain corrobation 
from Golub’s quantitative analysis of 759 proposed Directives in the 1966-1981 
period. To the extent that these years were marked by legislative paralysis, the 
latter was caused by formal unanimity rules and the diverging preferences of 
member-states. The ‘Luxembourg compromise’ had little or no lasting effect and 
it did not render inoperative formal rules for QMV: legislative input and output 
under QMV grew steadily after 1966 and QMV consistently expedited EEC 
decision-making. Golubs’ point is clear the EEC member-states deliberately 
included QMV in the 1957 Rome Treaty in order to get things done and this 
original bargain survived De Gaulle’s challenge.409
Andrew Moravcsik equally criticizes the importance traditionally attached to 
the Luxembourg ‘compromise’, but on completely different grounds. Since all of 
the ‘rapid movements’ of the 1960s, he argues, were decided upon with unanimity, 
before as well as after the empty chair crisis, the ‘compromise’ did not make 
much difference. Nor did it add substantially to the Treaty guarantee that all new 
policies were to be decided upon unanimously. Approvingly, he quotes John 
Lambert’s remark that ‘as regards the long-term issues of the federalist-nationalist 
conflict, the 1965-66 crisis changed nothing’.410
408. Interview with Charles Rutten, in: Ilarryvan, Van der Harst and Van Voorst, Voor Nederland 
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On the issue of QMV after the Single European Act there appears to be a 
convergence of opinion (with Andrew Moravcsik possibly again as an important 
exception) on the growing importance of QMV in the EEC’s and EU’s decision­
making practice.
We may thus conclude that the outcome of the empty chair crisis was 
possibly a short-term success for France -  also in view of the opportunities it 
offered for domestic propaganda -  but, that at a more substantial level and, in the 
longer run (as in the case of majority voting), developments were to take a turn 
not unfavourable to the Netherlands and its partners.
In comparing the aftermaths of the empty chair crisis and the Fouchet 
negotiations, we are faced with an interesting mirror image of the two events. In 
contrast to the Luxembourg ‘compromise*, the failure of ‘Fouchet’ was generally 
considered a diplomatic victory for the Netherlands. With great skill, Luns had 
managed to block the creation of a continental European political body on an 
intergovernmental basis and had forestalled French attempts at undermining the 
supranational structure of the EEC. However, satisfaction with this diplomatic 
result was short-lived. During the 1970s, we witness the foundation of two new 
EEC-related bodies, the European Political Cooperation Forum and the European 
Council of Heads of State and Government. Both encountered a rather sceptical 
reception in the Netherlands -  mainly because of their intergovernmental purport 
-  but were welcomed in France as late ‘heirs’ of the original Fouchet design.
In contrast, early in 1966, France could well be considered the short-term 
winner o f the empty chair crisis. However as stated above, subsequent 
developments proved that in the longer run the German-Dutch communitarian 
approach was to prevail over De Gaulle’s short-term successes. Today’s European 
Union, in which qualifying majorities and blocking minorities are the order of the 
day and the co-decision procedure has upgraded the European Parliament to a co­









C h a p t e r  6 : S w a n  S o n g  o r  C o c k  C r o w ?  T i ie  N e t h e r l a n d s  a n d  t h e  
H a g u e  C o n f e r e n c e  o f  D e c e m b e r  1969
6.0 Introduction*
During the 1960s, French-Dutch relations had deteriorated, mainly as a result of 
EC controversies, such as the French vetoes on British entry, the heated 
discussions on the Fouchet plans, the empty chair crisis and unwillingness by 
Paris to confer real powers to the embryonic European Parliament. Nevertheless, 
by the end of the decade Dutch European policy-makers would have a number of 
successes to look back upon. Riding the tide of economic prosperity the ‘Original 
Six’ managed to establish the customs union as agreed on in the Rome Treaty by 
July 1968, well before it was due, thus realising the Netherlands’ most important 
European policy goal since the launching of the Beyen plan in 1952. True, the 
French taste for high external tariffs was still looked upon with scorn, but the 
GATT’s Kennedy Round had eased part of the pain.
Throughout the 1960s, however, fear of remaining ‘locked up’ in a limited 
and protectionist continental block constituted a major motive for Dutch 
insistence on enlargement of the Communities, also known as the ‘prealable 
anglais’. The government’s political motive for enlargement was poignantly 
worded by Prime Minister Piet de Jong during a Cabinet (Ministerraad) meeting 
late in 1967; he deemed it ‘irresponsible to lead the Netherlands towards a 
European satellite state under French, and after De Gaulle’s death, under German 
hegemony. History teaches us that French or German hegemony does not leave 
democratic principles in safe hands. British and Scandinavian accession is of the 
highest importance for maintaining democracy in Europe’.411
Of equally high importance as British accession was, in the government’s 
view, the establishment of the Community’s common agricultural policy (CAP). 
On this issue, France and the Netherlands saw eye to eye, at least to a 
considerably larger degree than on institutional matters and enlargement. Benelux 
had taught the government the hard way that under no condition was this sector to 
be exempted from the general process of economic integration. As the largest
An earlier version of this chapter was published as: Anjo Harry van and Jan van dcr Ilarst, 
‘Swan Song or Cock Crow? The Netherlands and The Hague Summit Conference of 
December 1969’, Journal o f European Integration History, vol. 9 (2003), no. 2, 27-40.
411. NA, MR (845), Notulen Ministerraad 27.10.1967.
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agricultural exporter among the Six, the Netherlands needed European outlets for 
its agricultural surplus production as offered by the EEC’s common agricultural 
market. The resulting Dutch-French coalition had managed to dominate the 
Community’s agricultural decision-making process during the CAP’S formative 
years (1958-1963).412 Such positive results, however, did not conceal the fact, that 
by the end of the decade disagreement between France and the other five member 
states on a number o f institutional, financial and foreign policy issues had led to a 
virtual standstill of the Community’s integrative momentum.
The Hague summit of heads of state and government of December 1969 is 
generally regarded as the diplomatic breakthrough that ended this stagnation. This 
chapter analyses Dutch European policy and resulting engineering influence with 
regard to the Hague summit and the extent to which this summit was deemed 
instrumental for re-launching European integration.
6.1 Signs of hope and reappraisals
De Gaulle’s resignation as French president in April 1969 raised new expectations 
among advocates o f European integration and co-operation, both in the 
Netherlands and abroad. De Gaulle’s successor Georges Pompidou clarified his 
intentions to re-launch Europe soon after his inauguration in mid-June. On 29 
June, exactly two weeks after Pompidou’s coming to power, the Dutch Cabinet 
referred to the announcement of a French plan for a European summit to be held 
in the autumn of 1969. Although the plan obviously needed further elaboration 
and clarification, the Netherlands welcomed it as the first signal of a changing 
climate in France.413 Apparently, Pompidou realised the importance of keeping 
the European integration process alive and attractive for West Germany. In this 
respect, Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik constituted an obvious success for 
the Federal Republic as well as a challenge for France. Fear of a German 
Alleingang appeared to make palatable what had been unacceptable for
412. It is interesting to note that the Dutch-French agricultural coalition reached its peak 
simultaneously with the clash between Paris and The Hague over De Gaulle’s proposals for a 
European Political Union, in the framework of the so-called Fouche I-negotiations. J.H. 
Molcgraaf, Boeren in Brussel. Nederland en het Gemeenschappelijk Europees Landbouwbe­
leid 1958-1972, (Utrecht 1999), 291-292. For a detailed analysis of the Dutch and French 
impact on the CAP negotiations in the early years of the EC, see also A.C. Lauring-Knudsen, 
‘Defining the Politics of the Common Agricultural Policy. A Historical Study', PhD thesis 
EUI, Florence, 2001,
413. NA, MR (952), Notulen Ministerraad 27.6.1969.
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Pompidou’s predecessor. The degree to which France would be willing to commit 
itself to enlargement and British membership, however, remained to be seen.414
At an earlier stage, at the Rome conference of 1967, Foreign Minister Joseph 
Luns had raised objections to summit conferences in general. In the Dutch 
political system he and not the prime minister was to be responsible for the 
country’s foreign policy. Traditionally, the Dutch prime minister is a primus inter 
pares rather than the government’s political boss. Consequently, Luns rather than 
De Jong represented the country at international conferences. Also, summitry 
smacked of undermining -  à la Fouchet -  the communitarian system. Thus, the 
fact that Luns did eventually acquiesce in the Hague summit is an indication of 
the value he attached to a breakthrough from the integrative impasse. 
Institutionalisation of summitry, however, was a phenomenon to be guarded 
against. Dutch and, for that matter, Benelux agreement necessitated a Council 
resolution stating that ‘cette conférence des chefs d ’Etat et de gouvernement ne 
doit pas être considérée comme la première d ’une série’.415 In the context of the 
Hague conference, the joint editing of this text proved one of the few occasions of 
successful collaboration between Luns and his Benelux colleagues. Personal and 
political convergences hampered combined action of Belgium and the 
Netherlands in the framework of the Six. Bmssels tended to criticise Luns for self- 
willed and tactless behaviour, whereas the Netherlands blamed its southern 
neighbour for being over-sensitive to French views on enlargement and 
agriculture.
On 4 July, during an extensive Cabinet discussion on European integration 
issues, Foreign Minister Luns noticed an internal struggle within the new French 
government -  headed by Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas -  between the 
so-called ‘European’ group (represented by Minister of Agriculture Duhamel, 
Minister of Finance Giscard d ’Estaing, Minister of Foreign Affairs Schumann and 
State Secretary for Foreign Affairs De Lipkovsky), other moderate Gaullists and 
orthodox Gaullists. On 1 July, the Netherlands had begun its six-month 
chairmanship of the EC Council of Ministers and the government sought to use
414, Molegraaf, Boeren in Brussel, 261.
415. "U moet het genuanceerd zien', vraaggesprek met D.P. Spierenburg’, in: A.G. Harryvan, J. 
van der Harst and S. van Voorst (eds.), Voor Nederland en Europa. Politici en ambtenaren 
over het Nederlandse Europabeleid en de Europese integratie, 1945-1975 (Amsterdam 
2001), 261-283 (277-279). and M.T. Bitsch, ‘Le sommet de la Haye. La mise en route de la 
relance de 1969’, in: W. Loth (ed.). Crises and Compromises: the European Project, 1963- 
1969 (Baden-Baden 2001), 539-565, 544-547 (quote: 547).
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this period and position to launch new initiatives, particularly regarding the 
Community’s enlargement. Since the early 1960s, the Netherlands had developed 
into a fervent advocate of UK membership, but during the entire decade De 
Gaulle successfully managed to thwart Dutch ambitions by blocking enlargement 
unilaterally.
De Gaulle’s departure opened new avenues. Luns urged the Ministerraad to 
approach the new French government with caution -  in order to spare sensitivities 
-  and suggested developing a carefully worded declaration of intention regarding 
EC enlargement, including a proposal on starting accession negotiations with the 
UK as of 1 January 1970. The Cabinet supported Luns in drafting such a 
declaration, to be presented to the European partners. The Foreign Minister 
further hoped that France would retake -  without loss of face -  its seat in the West 
European Union (WEU), after having abandoned this seat in the spring of 1969. 
To pacify the French government, the WEU Council should draft a list o f 
sensitive issues that should not be raised, Luns suggested.
A more controversial topic discussed at the Ministerraad meeting was 
agriculture. France urged the speeding up of EC talks on finding a definite 
arrangement for the financing of common agricultural policy, but the Dutch 
Cabinet feared that too much progress in this area would endanger the prospect of 
British entry, for two reasons. Firstly, there was the risk that the Pompidou 
government would relapse and revive its resistance against British entry, once the 
financial arrangement had been agreed upon. Secondly, it was felt that the latter 
would entail further price-increases for farm products on the continent. This 
would be disadvantageous for Britain with its tradition of low agricultural prices. 
Consequently, even though the interests of France and the Netherlands, as two 
major agricultural producers and exporters which would both profit from a 
generously financed CAP showed considerable overlap, no EEC agreement could 
be reached on the matter, due to the differences on British accession. A few 
Cabinet members suggested some way of British involvement -  ‘in the wings’ -  
in the ongoing discussions on finding a definite solution for CAP financing, but 
Minister of Agriculture Lardinois disagreed. Rather than having the British 
involved, he thought it sufficient to ‘inform’ London of progress in the CAP talks. 
In all circumstances, Lardinois expected a long transitional period for British 
agriculture to adapt itself to European standards, so there was no need of a special 
treatment of Britain at this stage.
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The Cabinet meeting of early July also discussed a monetary integration plan 
put forward by European Commissioner Raymond Barre and supported by the 
French government. The plan provided for some form of mutual credit support 
between the six EC member states. The Hague’s view was that integration in this 
area was only open to discussion after British entry into the Community, in line 
with the wording of a recent Benelux memorandum on this issue. Likewise, the 
government made progress in political integration conditional on the results 
booked at the enlargement negotiations.416
Luns’ declaration of intention regarding EC enlargement met with a striking 
lack of interest abroad. In particular, France was unwilling to accept the date of 1 
January 1970 to open membership negotiations with Britain. It seemed that the 
Hague’s cautious diplomacy vis-à-vis France had failed to produce the desired 
effect. Instead, the French government reconfirmed its preference for convening a 
summit of the heads of state and prime ministers of the six EC countries, to be 
held in the month of November. State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Hans de 
Koster warned the Cabinet for a further delay of EC enlargement ‘with at least 
four months’ if the French got what they wanted.417
6,2 Towards a European Summit: Passing the Buck and a Triptych 
Emerging
Late in July, the government came to realise that there was no credible alternative 
to dropping the declaration of intention and accepting the plan for holding a 
European summit. In an attempt to justify this early concession, De Koster said 
that French Foreign Minister Schumann had proved to be much more co-operative 
than his two predecessors, and that France thus deserved a fair chance to 
demonstrate its European intentions. As chairman of the Council, the government 
therefore proposed to organise the conference in the Hague. At the Cabinet 
meeting of 24 July, the discussion centred on the preferred location for the summit: 
either the historic buildings of the Binnenhof in the centre of town or the more 
modem and spacious but lesser charming Congresgebouw (Conference hall). For 
security reasons, the eventual decision turned out in favour of the Ridderzaal 
(Knights’ Hall) located on the Binnenhof. The government emphasised that the 
meeting should be held in mid-November at the latest and, that in the meantime
416. NA. MR (953), Notulen Ministerraad 4.7.1969.
417. NA, MR (953), Notulen Ministerraad 18.7,1969.
193
the European Commission should not waste time, but continue its work on 
updating the 1967 advice on enlargement. The government also stipulated a  
proper and equal Commission representation at the summit meeting. This was 
another bone of contention with Paris, the latter preferring a much lower 
Commission profile during the conference.418
Concerning agriculture, the Cabinet supported minister Lardinois in his 
resistance to a coupling o f agricultural financing and enlargement; a parallel 
treatment of the two issues was to be preferred. This seemed to confirm both the 
importance of CAP’S implementation to the national economy and the prominent 
position the Minister of Agriculture held in the Cabinet.419 As Lardinois worded it, 
linking CAP financing and enlargement *(•♦•) would not constitute a problem for a  
country like Italy. The Netherlands’ interest in a common agricultural policy, 
however, [was] way too large for such a course o f action.’420 After all, he argued, 
the country topped the bill of intra-EEC agricultural exports, making a speedy 
CAP arrangement o f vital importance. Issue linkage would, at the very least, lead 
to adverse effects on the level of national contribution to CAP. In spite of 
Lardinois’ protestations, it was agreed that for tactical and diplomatic reasons, 
minister Luns would be allowed to use the word ‘coupling’ during the 
negotiations with France and the other European partners.421 Lardinois felt uneasy 
about this, and urged Luns continuously to be very reticent in using the term.422
In August 1969, the ‘honeymoon’ in the Dutch approach of the new French 
government was suddenly over, when Paris announced a devaluation of the 
French franc, without prior consultation with the European partners. Apart from 
irritations about French unilateralism, the Netherlands feared a substantial 
increase in farm prices, particularly of dairy products as a result of the French 
decision. In the context of enlargement, this was seen as unpropitious. Eventually, 
the pain was eased by the introduction of an intricate system of import subsidies 
and export levies for France during a period of three months (lasting till 
December) which succeeded in keeping prices under control. Despite this quick
418. NA, MR (953), Notulen Ministerraad 24.7.1969.
419. This had also been the case with Lardinois’ predecessor Biesheuvel, who had a dominant 
impact on EC discussions within the Cabinet, for example during the Empty Chair crisis of 
1965; see chapter 5.
420. NA, MR (953), Notulen Ministerraad 4,7.1969.
421. NA, MR (953), Notulen Ministerraad 4.7.1969 and 24.7.1969.
•422. NA, MR (953), Notulen Ministerraad 24.10.1969.
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solution, the government’s suspicions regarding French intentions started to 
become more evident and contributed to a hardening of tone regarding EC matters.
At the same time, the political situation in Italy was a matter of concern. In 
August, Mariano Rumor was appointed prime minister of a Christian Democratic 
minority government, dependent on parliamentary support of the Socialist and 
Republican parties. The Hague feared political instability in Italy, not so much 
because of the abundant size of the Rumor government (consisting of 33 ministers 
and 55 state-secretaries, as Luns could not resist telling his colleagues) but mainly 
because of the seemingly unstoppable rise of the Communist party. Communist 
presence in a future government was no longer to be excluded.423 In spite of these 
misgivings, Italian support for British membership was deemed as important as 
ever.
In September, the government discovered that France was not prepared to co­
operate on any European issue (including enlargement), as long as a definite 
agreement on agricultural financing was not secure. However, Luns thought that 
the Ministerraad should allow the summit to take place -  in mid-November -  on 
the strict condition that, during the meeting, a positive decision would be taken on 
British entry. It was still unclear then when the negotiations on UK membership 
would begin. In July, France had rejected the date of 1 January 1970, and March 
1970 was also considered as too early. The Cabinet deliberated on the minimum 
conditions to be fulfilled before it could agree on holding the conference. Most 
members wondered whether a rigid approach was realistic, given that the 
Netherlands, being the host of the meeting, should ‘not incur the odium of 
torpedoing the negotiations’. Luns remarked that Italy’s stance on enlargement 
was similar to that of the Netherlands and he therefore preferred to ‘pass the buck’ 
(for criticising the French position and promoting enlargement) to the Italian 
Foreign Minister Moro.424 This is what eventually happened.
New developments broadened the projected summit’s agenda. The Cabinet 
meeting of 3 October centred on the expected revaluation of the German mark, as 
the fluctuating exchange rate of the Mark caused great anxiety in the 
Netherlands.425 A couple of weeks later, at the end of October, the Cabinet proved 
apprehensive of rumours concerning a revaluation of the Belgian franc.426
423. NA. MR (953), Notulen Ministerrad 22.8.1969.
424. NA, MR (953), Notulen Ministerraad 12.9.1969.
425. NA. MR (953), Notulen Ministerraad 3.10.1969.
426. NA, MR (953), Notulen Ministerraad 31.10.1969.
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Monetary problems in Europe proved persistent and eventually induced the 
Belgian government to develop a plan for monetary co-operation to be presented 
at the conference in the Hague.
In mid-October, the Council of Ministers convened in Luxembourg and 
agreed on a common trade policy, implying that after 1 October 1970 bilateral 
trade arrangements with third countries were no longer to be allowed. Although 
the Ministerraad was pleased with this important result, it also worried about the 
exceptional provision accepted in Luxembourg that for a period of three years and 
under certain conditions, bilateral agreements were still possible, particularly with 
Eastern European countries. Luns said that on this point France, initially claiming 
an exception for five years, had made a concession, and added that his French 
colleague wanted to ‘prevent this issue from becoming contentious’ during the 
summit in the Hague.427 It was clear that, in the short run, Paris had other, more 
pressing problems that needed to be solved in a European context.
Early in November, it was decided to postpone the European summit -  
originally scheduled for 17 and 18 November -  to 1 and 2 December 1969. The 
official reason given was a serious illness of Italian Foreign Minister Moro, but 
the Ministerraad also pointed to internal political problems in Italy as another 
important cause for the delay. The Cabinet anticipated that the conference would 
be characterized by general observations, rather than thorough discussions on 
technical issues. The Ministerraad meeting of 7 November used, for the first time, 
the terms ‘completion, widening and deepening’ (voltooiing, verbreding en 
verdieping), the so-called triptych, to describe the objectives of the forthcoming 
Hague summit. As for enlargement (widening), the Ministerraad was rather 
pessimistic about the results of preliminary talks with the French government. As 
has been said above, the fixing of a concrete starting date for the negotiations with 
Britain was rejected, and the Cabinet now felt itself forced to accept ‘an indication 
for the start of the negotiations’. This position was far from the original preference 
to begin the enlargement talks on 1 January 1970. Another point of contention 
with France concerned the degree of Commission representation at the summit. 
The Ministerraad noticed that Paris was now prepared to accept Commission 
attendance at the second day o f the conference, but not on the first day. For the 
government, preferring unrestricted Commission participation, this was at least 
something, after France’s initial point-blank refusal.428
427. NA, MR (953), Notulen Ministerraad 24.10.1969.
428. NA, MR (954), Notulen Ministerraad 7.11.1969. For a more detailcd analysis of the
196
Concerning political integration (deepening), Luns refused to make 
concessions. He reiterated his stance of 4 July that the Netherlands was not 
prepared to allow progress on this issue, unless the other delegations accepted the 
quid pro quo of British membership.429
However, another aspect of ‘deepening’, monetary integration, gave more 
room for discussion in the Minmerraad. Belgium had just launched the Snoy 
plan430, which advocated further steps in this area, motivated by European 
exchange rate problems in the autumn. Likewise, in July, Jean Monnet’s Action 
Committee for the United States of Europe had called for a fully-fledged 
Economic and Monetary Union.431 The Hague was confronted with a difficult 
dilemma. It had always regarded monetary integration as a potential coping stone, 
i.e. final phase, of the economic integration process rather than an issue of 
immediate political concern. Moreover, Finance Minister Witteveen was anxious 
not to throw good money after bad and, with some justification, suspected France 
of attempts to make Germany and the Netherlands foot the bill for its own 
financial and monetary problems. At the same time, the government realised that a 
flat refusal of the Snoy plan was tactically inexpedient. It therefore decided to a 
‘forward escape’, announcing that the plan was acceptable if accompanied by 
closer co-operation on economic and financial policies and real parliamentary 
control; ‘if this was accepted, one should also add the social and income 
policies’.432 As we have argued elsewhere433, the prospect of the Hague summit 
did have an important impact, in that it brought traditional Dutch reluctance to 
monetary cooperation outside the Bretton Woods institutions (including the Bank 
for International Settlements and the Group of Ten) to a close. Monetary co­
operation within a European framework was no longer considered an issue for
Commission's position and its representation at the summit, see N. Piers Ludlow, ‘An 
Opportunity or Threat? The European Commission and the Hague Council of December 
1969’, Journal o f European integration History, vol. 9 (2003), 11-25.
429. NA. MR. (954), Notulen Ministerraad 21.11.1969.
430. The Snoy plan comprised the gradual establishment of a European monetary community and 
the introduction of a single currency in three stages.
431. ‘Resolutions et déclarations communes adoptées par le Comité. Quinzième Session, 15 et 16 
juillet. Bruxelles’, Private collection Max Kohnstamm.
432. NA, MR (883), Notulen Ministerraad 28.11.1968. For a more elaborate discussion of Dutch 
European policy with regard to the monetary integration issue: J.W. Brouwer and A.G. 
Harryvan, Les Pays-Bas et la coopération monétaire européenne, 1968-1972, in: Le rôle des 
ministères des Finances et de l'Economie dans la construction européenne (1957-1978), 
Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France (Paris 2002), 85-108.
433. Ibidem.
197
some distant future but from now on a valid topic for present-day political 
discussion and an acceptable mid-range policy goal. As before, sound economic 
and fiscal policies by all countries involved were deemed an essential 
precondition for Dutch co-operation on this issue. Under no circumstances should 
intra-European solidarity foot the bill resulting from a lack of financial discipline 
by national governments. Thus, Witteveen viewed mutual credit mechanisms as 
proposed in the Barre plan with caution. Emphasis on preceding harmonisation of 
economic and fiscal policies characterized Witteveen’s policy at the Hague, as 
well as during the subsequent negotiations leading to the Werner report.
6.3 Meeting in the Hague: completion, w idening and deepening
On 1 and 2 December 1969 the long awaited conference took place on the 
Binnenhof in the Hague. Although the Foreign Ministry had to cope with a 
number of logistical problems and setbacks, most of them could be solved in time. 
The efforts of the French embassy to convince the owner of the local pub Chez 
Pompidou to change the name of his establishment were, however, to no avail.434 
While the background noise of demonstrations by ardent federalists and their 
clashes with the police heightened the spirits, deliberations in the Ridderzaal 
commenced. The Dutch delegation consisted of Prime Minister De Jong and 
Foreign Minister Luns, assisted by the top civil servants Hartogh, Italianer, De 
Ranitz, Ringnalda and Spierenburg. Contrary to Dutch preferences and 
expectations, the various proposals for monetary co-operation as well as 
suggestions for revitalising Euratom, in fact attracted considerable attention 
during the plenary meeting. De Jong had intended to start the conference by 
discussing the enlargement issue, arguing that the other two subjects were to be 
dealt with in the presence of the European Commission, i.e. on the second day of 
the conference. The French delegation, however, supported by Belgium and 
eventually Germany, successfully argued in favour of prioritising the EC’s 
‘completion’, in the form of finding a definitive arrangement for the financing of 
agriculture first.435 According to some analysts, this order was adhered to so as 
not to endanger a previously prepared compromise between Pompidou and
434. F. Italianer, ‘Terugblik op een ambtelijke loopbaan\ in: Il.J. Labohm (ed). De waterdragers 
van het Nederlandse Europabeieid. Terugblik op 40 jaar DGES (Den Haag 1997), 53-81,66.
435. Min. BZ, III, 999.0 Europese Gemeenschap, Europese topconferentie ‘s-Gravenhage. 1-2 
dccember 1969, deel II, dec. 1969 tVm 1970, Tekst van communiqué uitgegeven na afloop 
van Frame Ministerraadsvergadering. 5 December 1969.
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Brandt.436 It is questionable, however, that such a pre-conference compromise 
ever saw the light of day. True, an exchange of letters between Brandt and 
Pompidou and a series of preparatory bilateral talks among all participating 
governments, cleared the air substantially and -  at least with hindsight -  
foreshadowed possible compromises. Perhaps equally important, these 
confidence-building interactions led Brandt to the conviction that this time the 
French veto could indeed be lifted. But agreement had not been reached yet, as the 
disappointing lack of progress on the first conference day would show. In his 
memoirs, Brandt indicates that decisive agreement was reached only after the state 
banquet at the end of the first day.437 All in all, it appears safe to conclude with 
Marie-Thérèse Bitsch that up to the start of the summit, the governments had 
‘assoupli leurs positions mais rien n’est acquis lorsque la conférence s’ouvre le 
1er décembre’.438
With French, German and Dutch support the issue of CAP finances was 
resolved quickly, providing for a financial regulation by 31 December 1969. On 
this issue, like many others, the final communiqué was cautiously worded and did 
not go beyond stating the participants’ intention o f arriving at a definitive 
arrangement before the end of the year. Analysts do point, however, to the geest 
van Den Haag (‘spirit of The Hague’) when explaining how the hoped-for 
agreement did actually materialise. The debate on how to finance CAP was 
relieved of the strongly ideological overtones it had carried in 1965, which had 
hitherto made compromise impossible. Indeed, on 22 December, the Council 
would reach agreement on CAP finance as well as the own resources issue. No 
longer burdened by the accession conflict, overlapping interests and converging 
stances could at last prevail. At least in this respect, the positive ‘spirit of The 
Hague’ appears to have been of overriding importance.439
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The Belgian plan for monetary union was taken up, somewhat transformed 
and strongly supported by the West German government. Federal Chancellor 
Brandt considered an Economic and Monetary Union imperative: EMU, as 
previously proposed by the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, to 
which Brandt adhered, would meet concerns caused by FRG’s Ostpolitik in 
linking the country to Western Europe ‘in such a way it could no longer cut loose’, 
as Pompidou worded it. Likewise, EMU and the ultimate introduction of a 
common European currency served as an indication that Germany did not intend 
to use its economic and Financial strength to gain economic and possibly political 
supremacy in Europe. Lastly, a European monetary agreement would facilitate the 
establishment of a common monetary policy vis-à-vis the United States.440 Thus, 
the conference agreed upon designing a plan for creating an Economic and 
Monetary Union in stages. This did not imply that Brandt’s support for monetary 
integration was unqualified. On German, Dutch and Luxembourg insistence, the 
communiqué prioritised the harmonisation of economic to monetary policies and 
the European Reserve Fund was scheduled to emerge only at the end of the 
transition to economic and monetary union. Therefore, as Dyson and Featherstone 
observe, the EMU paragraph of the communiqué was by no means a clear victory 
for Pompidou. The French, strongly supported by the Belgian delegation, did 
succeed in getting monetary integration on the EEC’s negotiation table, but the 
issue was to be dealt with along the lines of a German/Dutch agenda.441 Franco- 
German preparatory talks on this issue had remained limited in scope. Brandt had 
shown himself willing to go along with the creation of a European reserve fund, 
as an expression o f monetary solidarity among the Six. At the conference, 
however, he presented this fund in the much broader context of a general 
development towards EMU, which came as a surprise to Pompidou as well as, 
presumably, the other delegations.442 Pompidou, however, gave the German 
proposals his full support.
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Dutch Finance Minister Witteveen was only partly convinced. He deemed the 
EMU set-up too far-reaching, advocating informal exchanges of opinion among 
the EEC finance ministers instead. Luns’ view that France being ‘demandeur’ on 
the monetary issue was ‘convenient’ and should be put to good bargaining use 
won the day.443 As late as June 1970 Witteveen complained about the pressure the 
Foreign Ministry had exerted on him to accept the EMU compromise at the Hague 
summit, six months previously.444
Thus, at the Hague, the EMU decision laid the foundation for the subsequent 
heated discussions its corollary, the October 1970 Werner report, would give rise 
to. In prescribing communitarisation of economic and fiscal policies, the report 
would go well beyond what was acceptable for the rank and file Gaullists, led by 
Michel Debré, necessitating Pompidou and his finance minister Giscard d’Estaing 
to distance themselves hastily from its contents. This made The Economist cast 
doubt on the sagacity of Pompidou’s earlier stance at the Hague summit:
Then, in what can only be regarded as a political fluke, the French president 
at the now famous summit meeting at the Hague a year ago picked up the ball 
of monetary union and ran like a bull with it for the line. There is good 
reason to believe that President Pompidou would not have done what he did 
if he had realised where it might lead.445
Further talks on ‘the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political 
unification’ were to take place ‘within the context of enlargement’, as worded in 
the communiqué. This formula was reassuring for -  and indeed insisted upon by -  
the Dutch government as far as the struggle for British membership and against a 
continental ‘Third Way’ was concerned. But its vagueness made this formula 
utterly unsatisfactory in terms of the hoped-for strengthening of Community
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institutions, the Commission and European Parliament (EP) in particular. Much 
like Commission president Jean Rey, the Hague government regretted that there 
had been ‘hardly any mention of political union and no discussion on 
strengthening the Community institutions’, such strengthening deemed ‘crucial to 
the progress of the Communities’.446 The subsequent success of the Davignon 
Committee and its proposal for European Political Co-operation (EPC, see also 
chapter 7) were far from evident at the time of the summit. Actually, the lines that 
were to give birth to EPC were tucked away as the penultimate paragraph in the 
final communiqué. As Hill and Smith rightly comment: ‘Even the interested 
observer might have been forgiven for failing to notice’447, and George argues that 
the paragraph was generally considered a sop for Pompidou’s Gaullist supporters 
and few observers thought it would amount to anything.448 The clause ‘within the 
context of enlargement’ was inserted on Dutch insistence, expressing the thought 
that political co-operation concerned a wider circle than the Six alone.449 
Nevertheless, on at least two occasions, Luns had to remind fellow Cabinet 
ministers that European political co-operation, once Britain were to join the 
Community, was not a bad thing.
At first sight the Dutch delegation appeared to have been left short-changed 
as far as enlargement was concerned. Pompidou refused to commit himself to 
mentioning a concrete starting date in the final communiqué. Although in a 
private conversation with Prime Minister De Jong, he pledged himself to 
enlargement -  by giving his word of honour450 - an official written statement, 
even an indication, was considered impossible at that stage. At the suggestion of 
the Belgian delegation De Jong proposed to use Pompidou’s own wordings on the 
matter, as registered on tape, to which the latter could scarcely object.451 Thus the 
conference communiqué stated that the states ‘agreed that the essential 
preparatory work for establishing a basis of negotiation [with the applicant
446. W.F.V. Vanthoor, A Chronological History o f  the European Union 1946-1998 (Cheltenham 
1999), 39.
447. Chr. Hill and K.E. Smith, European Foreign Policy. Key Documents (London 2000), 72.
448. S. George, Politics and Policy in the European Union (Oxford, 3rd ed., 1996), 261.
449. J.K. de Vree and M. Jansen, The Ordeal o f Unity. integration and Disintegration in Modem 
Europe (Amsterdam 1988), 291.
450. Studies by Hiepel (op. cit.) and Guasconi (op. cit.) provide evidence that Pompidou’s word 
of honour was also given to the other prime ministers present at the meeting.
451. U.K. Public Record Office London, PRO, Telegram Sir P. Garran no. 619 to Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office London, 2-12-1969 (with thanks to prof. Alan Mil ward).
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countries] could be undertaken as soon as practically possible.’452 Moreover, De 
Jong secured permission for issuing a press statement, saying that all delegations 
were of the opinion that ‘preparations of the Six for negotiations with Great 
Britain will have to be finished by 30 June 1970 at the latest and the negotiations 
were to start immediately afterwards’. 453 Which is how things turned out 
eventually.
But in December 1969, these ideas still had to take shape. Hence, reviewing 
the conference a couple of days afterwards, the Ministerraad felt rather 
uncomfortable about the outcome, not only regarding enlargement, but also in 
view of its initial desire to reinforce the position of the European Parliament. The 
Dutch delegation had pleaded for both EP control over CAP financing and the 
Community’s own resources, as well as direct elections for the Parliament, but 
these desiderata had remained largely unfulfilled. Likewise, the summit had failed 
to widen the possibilities for majority voting in the Council of Ministers, as the 
government had hoped for. De Jong diagnosed that the conference ‘had been 
neither a resounding success, nor a failure’. State Secretary for European 
Integration De Koster blamed the French president for having shown lack of 
commitment, deeming the latter’s European debut ‘disappointing’. On the other 
hand, he gave high praise to the Federal Chancellor, complimenting Brandt for 
having ‘saved the meeting’.454
In Kersten’s analysis, ‘only at the Hague summit of December 1969 did Luns 
become convinced that Bonn dared to confront Paris. Thus his long-time 
perception of the Federal Republic as a hesitant supporter of further European 
integration finally fell apart.’455
In other European capitals Dutch summit diplomacy was looked back upon 
with equally mixed feelings. The Belgian government felt that Luns had 
overreacted against the negative attitude of Pompidou, with the lamentable result 
that on the first evening the conference was in disarray. On the other hand there
452. ‘Final Communiqué of the meeting of heads of state or govemment of the EC Countries’, 
Bulletin o f  the European Communities, 1970, no. 1,11-16.
453. Italianer, ‘Terugblik’, 66; De Vree and Jansen, The Ordeal o f Unity, 308.
454. NA, MR, (954), Notulen Ministerraad 5.12.1969.
455. A. Kersten, ‘De langste. Joseph Antoine Marie Ilubert Luns (1952-1971)', in: D. llellema, 
B. Zeeman and B. van der Zwan (eds.), De Nederlandse ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken in 
de twintigste eeuw (Den Haag 1999), 211-227,224.
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was general praise for Prime Minister De Jong and the way he had presided over 
the conference.456
6.4 Discussion
‘How should the summit be typified: as a swan song or cock crow?’457 In an effort 
to assess the results of the meeting, State Secretary De Koster brought up this 
question during a parliamentary debate at the end of December. It was another 
sign of the government’s initial ambivalence regarding the outcomes. To what 
extent did the Ridderzaal event constitute a real breakthrough in European 
integration or ‘had [it] all been rather more like a normal council meeting than a 
summit’, as Foreign Affairs delegate Hartogh lamented.458 In the immediate 
aftermath of the conference, this was far from clear.
The Netherlands’ original condition for agreeing to a summit of the Six 
turned out to be eventually, from the government’s perspective, its most important 
outcome: the French promise to go along with enlargement negotiations with 
Britain in the near future. At least, that was what the French president had acceded 
privately. Otherwise, in the short run, the Hague results were to be considered 
rather disappointing: little or nothing of substance had been agreed upon in terms 
of progress towards European economic and monetary union on a communitarian 
footing. The empowerment of the European Parliament fell short of Dutch wishes 
and further intergovemmentalisation of the decision-making process was looming.
In the greater scheme of things, however, ‘the Hague’ would turn out to be 
the summit that initiated both -  the first attempt at -  EMU as well as EPC, plus 
the actual beginning of the first enlargement, all three to become of the greatest 
importance in the Communities’ development during the 1970s and later decades 
to come. Moreover, at the Brussels conference of 21 and 22 December, agreement 
was reached to give some budgetary powers to the European Parliament.
456. U.K. Public Record Office, PRO, Telegram Sir J. Beith no. 408 to Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office London, 3-12-1969 (with thanks to Prof. Alan Mil ward); Brouwer 
and Van Merriënboer, Van buitengaats naar binnenhof, 199-200. Possibly, some of the 
Belgian irritation was aggravated by the bleak picture offered by Benelux foreign policy 
cooperation before and during the summit. Attempts at Belgian-Dutch co-operation were 
scarce and unsuccessful.
457. Handclingen Staten Generaal Tweede Kamer (HTK) 1969-1970. 36e vergadering, 23 
December 1969,1751.
458. U.K. Public Record Office London, PRO, Telegram Sir P. Garran no. 626 to Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office London, 3-12-1969 (with thanks to Prof. Alan Mil ward).
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Thus, in terms of engineering influence, the historical importance of the 
Hague summit is by and large to be attributed to the subsequent implementation 
and follow-up of the conclusions it arrived at. Had the Brussels conference, the 
Werner and Davignon committees and the enlargement negotiations been 
unsuccessful, the by now famous triptych ‘completion, widening and deepening’ 
would have remained null and void. In this respect the ‘spirit o f the Hague’ 
appears to have been of more importance than the actual wording of the 
compromises arrived at in the Ridderzaal.
What is fundamentally new about the Hague summit was the decisive role 
played by the West-German government, led by Chancellor Brandt. The German 
contribution went well beyond its advocacy o f EMU. As worded by Kersten: ‘Die 
Regierung Brandt hatte sich zugunsten der Erweiterung und Vertiefung 
entschieden und nicht versucht, die Gegensätze innerhalb der EWG durch einen 
vagen Kompromisz zu vertuschen, der den Anschein eines französischen Sieges 
gehabt hätte’. 459 As such, the German performance heralded a new era in 
European integration. The Bundesrepublik definitely freed itself of its historically 
determined reticence in post-war European affairs and, thus emancipated, was 
ready and willing to lead the Community towards further integration and against 
future attempts at dominance. It had excellent reasons to embark upon this course 
since international support for its Ostpolitik was both required and on offer. In this 
respect, one can agree with Urwin’s statement that with ‘the exception perhaps of 
De Gaulle’s dramatic press conference vetoes o f British entry, the Hague summit 
was the most significant event within the Community since its inception’.'460 For 
the Netherlands, now that the préalable anglais was about to be fulfilled, such 
further European propositions were again open for consideration.
Both the 1965-1966 empty chair crisis and the outcome of the Hague summit 
conference of 1969 underline the fundamental importance of German Chancellor 
Adenauer’s departure from active politics in 1963. Until then, room for 
manoeuvre for the Netherlands and its Benelux partners was by and large 
determined by the ongoing relationship between France and Germany. Konrad 
Adenauer had been the key figure in determining the leeway for the Netherlands
459. A.E. Kersten, ‘Das Europäische Gipfeltreffen in Den Haag 1969’, in: J.W.F. Wielenga (ed.). 
Nachbarn. Niederländer und Deutsche und die Europäische Einigung (Bonn 1997), 45-49, 
49.
460. D.W. l'rwin, The Community o f  Europe. A History o f European Integration since 1945 
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and its Benelux partners. If and when the German Chancellor decided to prioritize 
on a Franco-German understanding -  and this was generally the case -  Benelux’ 
chances at effectively promoting diverging negotiation outcomes were slender, at 
least on major issues. Adenauer’s successors in Bonn, by prioritizing a European 
understanding amongst the Six, considerably broadened The Hague’s room for 
manoeuvre. Likewise, France’s president De Gaulle’s unilateral policy choices 
contributed to a new power constellation within the EEC, in which it was France, 
rather than the Netherlands that painted itself into a comer and lost out against the 
new reality in which a basic understanding between Germany, Italy and the 
Benelux countries (The Five) on the communitarian destiny of the Community 
and its open character prevailed. The emancipation of Germany’s European policy, 
effective cooperation between the Five and a new dawn in France collectively 
triumphed in the Hague summit of December 1969.
In this way, T h e  Hague’ demonstrated that within the framework of the 
international organizational framework of the European Communities, Smaller 
Powers like the Netherlands by being part of an effective coalition could bridge 







Chapter 7: Learning Interdependence tiie Hard Way. The 
Netherlands, European Political Co-operation and the first O il 
Crisis
7.0 Introduction*
Today, co-operation on foreign policy, as well as its gradual upgrading into a 
common foreign and security policy constitute long-standing ideals of European 
integration. Towards the end of the 1960s the foundations for a far-reaching 
integrative framework were laid, eventually resulting in the EU’s present-day 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). For the Netherlands, a former colonial power 
with global presence and strongly ‘atlanticist’ foreign policy traditions, a 
European identity in the area of high politics was far from self-evident. Singled 
out for an oil boycott by Arab OPEC-countries due to The Hague’s policies on 
Israel and the Palestine issue, the Netherlands learned to appreciate European 
Political Co-operation (EPC) as a significant and occasionally important foreign 
policy instrument.
This chapter deals with the question of the extent to which the establishment 
of EPC reflected a cleavage in Dutch policy on European integration, as compared 
with the period of the 1960s. To which extent did the European Community, in 
lieu of a threat to Dutch Atlanticism, grow into an actively pursued policy forum 
for engineering influence in the area of high politics? The research is based on 
primary source material, the minutes of the Ministerraad (Cabinet) meetings in 
particular, a number of recently published monographs on Dutch foreign policy, 
as well as interviews with some of the protagonists.
7.1 Finding New Bearings. The Hague’s Views on EPC during the 1960s
The Hague’s approach towards European Political Co-operation was first and 
foremost a cautious one. Since the foundation of NATO in 1949, the Netherlands 
prioritised the Atlantic security alliance with the United States and feared that 
developing European alternatives for or within NATO, would damage
An earlier version of this chapter was published as: Anjo G. Harryvan and Jan van der Harst, 
‘Learning Interdependence the Hard Way. The Netherlands, European Political Co-operation 
and the Oil Crisis, 1967-1977', in: Franz Knipping, Matthias Schftnwald (eds.), Aufbruch 
zum Europa der zweiten Generation. Die europäische Einigung 1969-1984 (Trier 2004), 
150-164.
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transatlantic cohesion and therefore provoke Washington into weakening the 
security link, deemed necessary to defend the country against communist 
aggression. The government also suspected that, within a strictly European 
framework, France would attempt to become the political leader of Europe, 
possibly in an alliance with the Federal Republic of Germany. This was also the 
reason why, during the 1960s, the Netherlands strongly favoured British entry into 
the EC. In The Hague’s reasoning, UK membership would not only boost Atlantic 
partnership, but would also neutralise tendencies directed towards Franco-German 
leadership of the Community. The government did not hide its irritation when in 
the 1960s French President De Gaulle unilaterally blocked British entry to the 
Community.
As pointed out in chapter four the Dutch stance on the Fouchet negotiations, in 
the early 1960s, had been of an equally conservative nature. The Gaullist version of 
the Fouchet plan was rejected because it represented a departure from the 
Community system, that is from the existing European institutions. The French plans 
were considered by the Dutch as an attempt to cripple these institutions, by 
transferring their powers to a new political structure of an intergovernmental 
character. In tenacious opposition to De Gaulle’s attempts at subjugating the 
Communities’ powers to a structure of intergovernmental committees within the 
framework of a European Political Union, Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns 
advocated the concept of ‘instrumental supranationalism’. Pragmatic rather than 
federalist in nature, instrumental supranationalism was first and foremost a means to 
an economic and political end, namely the realisation of a sizeable internal European 
market and the checking of the stronger members, if and where the latter pursued 
hegemonic policies.461 Likewise, British membership, although difficult to relate to 
supranationalism, held out prospects of realising the same two policy goals.
European political co-operation resurfaced on the agenda during the late 1960s 
in a radically different setting: ‘It now became possible, as it had not been at the 
time of the Fouchet Plans (...) to envisage an increased political role for Europe in 
the world without at the same time subordinating the Community principle to an
458. See Chapter 4 and 5, as well as: A.G. Harryvan ‘Supranationality or Britain? The 
Netherlands and the Fouchet negotiations, 1959-1962’, conference paper to be published in a 
volume on European integration in the 1960s, edited by Prof. G. Trausch of the Robert Schuman 
center in Luxembourg, at press; A.G. Harryvan and J. van der Harst, T or once a united front. 
The Netherlands and the empty chair crisis o f the mid-1960s’, in: W. Loth (ed.), Crises and 
compromises: the European project 1963-1969 (Essen 2000), 173-191.
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overarching union of states’. 462 Due to the French Republic’s Atlantic and 
European policies, this perspective had been effectively torpedoed during the 
1960s.
True, as early as June 1967 Prime Minister De Jong stated at the EC Rome 
summit conference that foreign policy consultations were ‘to be considered’ if 
(and when) Britain was to participate in them from the outset. At the same 
conference, however, De Jong and his Benelux colleagues rejected a Franco- 
German proposal to institutionalize consultations among the Six and provide them 
with a secretariat. Clearly, for De Jong such arrangements smacked too much of 
‘Fouchet’ and were considered premature.463 The second French veto later that 
year would prove him right.
By the end of 1967, indeed, French foreign policy - only moderately popular 
with the Dutch since the 16th century anyway - reached an all-time low in The 
Hague’s appreciation. Apart from the second veto, fundamental disagreements on 
NATO and WEU reduced the opportunities for fruitful foreign policy co­
operation to something close to nil. In Cabinet meetings Prime Minister De Jong 
drew a sombre picture of the situation: democracy in Europe was at stake. He 
refused to accept a future for the Netherlands as a satellite state of France or - 
after De Gaulle’s demise - of Germany. ‘History teaches us that democratic 
principles are not compatible with French or German hegemony. The accession of 
Britain and the Scandinavian countries is of the greatest importance for 
maintaining democracy in Europe’.464 Long-standing Foreign Minister Joseph 
Luns agreed that De Gaulle’s attempts at leadership were not in the best of taste. 
France, however, was in an isolated position and he warned against retaliation 
policies as proposed by De Jong: these ran the risk of overshooting their aim, 
unless London agreed on such a ‘show down policy’. There were numerous other 
possibilities to show Paris the error of her ways. Luns’ arguments won the day, 
with support from the Minister of Agriculture, who feared that the Prime 
Minister’s boldness would backfire on the common agricultural policy, with 
concomitant risks for the income situation of Dutch farmers.465
462. Christopher Hill and Karen E. Smith (eds.), European Foreign Policy. Key Documents 
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In January 1968 Benelux views on the desired course of European integration 
were expressed in a common Benelux memorandum. The three governments did 
not mince their words. They expressed their loyalty towards the supranational or 
‘communitarian' model as laid down in the Rome Treaty on the one hand and 
called for policy consultation with Great Britain and other non-members for those 
policy areas not covered by the Treaty - foreign policy included - on the other. As 
far as foreign policy co-operation was concerned the Benelux message to Bonn 
and Paris was clear: policy consultations without British participation were a non­
starter.466
From April 1969 onwards, the diplomatic climate in Europe improved 
substantially following De Gaulle’s departure and his succession by Georges 
Pompidou, who, almost immediately, abandoned the dogmatic rejection of EC 
enlargement. The end of the 1960s witnessed the accomplishment of two long­
standing aims of the Hague’s European policy: the completion of the EEC 
customs union in July 1968 - ever since the early 1950s, the primary aim of Dutch 
European policy had been the liberalisation of trade among the Original Six - and, 
the reopening of the negotiations on enlargement.
In The Hague, the prospect of forthcoming British EEC membership appears 
to have made all the difference. Within a few months foreign policy co-operation 
gained acceptance as a negotiable issue. Nevertheless, preparations for the 
political dimension o f the Hague December 1969 summit conference were far 
from elaborate. Policy papers on the subject remained confined to the view that 
the Netherlands was in favour of policy co-operation on an intergovernmental 
basis between the Six plus the UK and, that, revitalising the WEU framework and 
expanding its membership with the three other applicant states, was the way to do 
so. France, boycotting the WEU meetings since 1968, would have to change her 
ways. Luns, in the relative secrecy of Ministerraad meetings, indicated that 
eventually - following British accession - a more ambitious approach along the 
lines of the so-called second Fouchet draft might be called for. In arguing so, he 
was referring to the draft treaty that the Six had found agreement upon in January
466. NA, MR (880), Notulen Ministerraad 16.2.1968; J.J.C. Voorhoeve, Peace Profits and 
Principles. A Study o f Dutch Foreign Policy (Leiden 1985), 171. The memorandum gave rise 
to intricate but unsuccessful negotiations between the Five and the Four (the applicant states) 
on a technical co-operation agreement. By November 1968 this confrontational Benelux 
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sense of multilateral co-operation arrangements without French participation. NA. MR (883), 
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1962 - proposing an intergovernmental framework for foreign policy co-operation 
that would gradually develop into a communitarian-based and eventually 
supranationally-driven common foreign policy framework - and which was 
subsequently torpedoed by De Gaulle’s unwillingness to underwrite the (rather 
vague) communitarian perspective it embodied (see chapter four).467
7.2 The Hague Summit, the Davignon Report and Dutch Views on the EPC  
Machinery
Foreign policy co-operation was generally recognised as a moot point at the 
Hague summit of December 1969 and received relatively little attention. Without 
much ado, German Chancellor Brandt’s suggestion to request the Ministers o f 
Foreign Affairs to look into the matter and report on what was possible ‘within the 
context of enlargement’ found its way into the penultimate paragraph of the 
conference communiqué: ‘They agreed to instruct the Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
to study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification, 
within the context of enlargement. The Ministers would be expected to report 
before the end of July 1970’. Thus, in a few lines tucked away in the final 
communiqué, European Political Co-operation was bom. As we quoted Hill and 
Smith previously: ‘Even the interested observer might have been forgiven for 
failing to notice’.468 Fascinated by the short-term prospect of British accession, 
and eagerly participating in the debate on the long-term issues of economic and 
monetary union (see Chapter 6), Dutch policy-makers generally qualified for this 
category.469 In this they were not alone; the paragraph was generally considered a 
sop for Pompidou’s Gaullist supporters and few observers thought it would
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amount to anything.470 In the months following the Hague summit, political co­
operation and integration were discussed in the Cabinet as necessary conditions 
for economic and monetary unification and as a prerequisite for a future Political 
Union. Foreign policy co-operation rarely featured in these talks.
The intergovernmental set-up elaborated in the Davignon report on European 
Political Co-operation, presented in October 1970, met with disappointment and 
profound criticism in the Dutch Cabinet, where it was labelled ‘a capitulation to 
French opinions’. From a communitarian perspective the Davignon machinery 
was totally insufficient: the lightly structured decision-making process was 
projected parallel to and separate from that of the Community, with only a minor 
role for the Commission and the European Parliament and none for COREPER, 
the latter being substituted by the Political Committee of the political directors of 
the foreign ministries. As several ministers pointed out, the apparatus depended 
totally on the building up of consensus and did not constitute anything in terms of 
progress towards political unification of Europe. Nevertheless, withholding Dutch 
consensus to the report, state secretary for Foreign Affairs De Koster pointed out, 
would plunge the Community into a political crisis that could easily backfire on 
the entrance negotiations with Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the UK. Grudgingly, 
the Cabinet approved the Davignon proposals.471
This critical attitude with regard to the EPC set-up was to remain a dominant 
feature of Dutch European policy. Luns’ successor in the Biesheuvel government 
(1971-1973), Schmelzer, stressed the artificiality of the institutional separation 
between the Community and EPC. A quarter of a century later, looking back on 
the early seventies, he stated: ‘We emphasised perpetually that the European 
Commission ought to play an integral role in all European policy, on account of 
the cohesion and indivisibility between socio-economic and financial (and related) 
events on the one hand and external policies on the other. The two could not be 
disconnected’.472 To the extent that a tension existed between ‘those who hoped 
that EPC would transcend its own limitations and carry the whole integrationist 
project forward and those (...) who saw it as a pragmatic form of assistance to 
national foreign policy’, as Hill and Smith word it, the Netherlands clearly was on
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the former side.473 This stance reflected the reinforced communitarianism typical 
of Mr. Schmelzer. Successor to Joseph Luns, who had served the country as 
foreign minister for over 19 uninterrupted years, Schmelzer would turn out to be 
the most outspoken federalist foreign minister of the post-war period.474 He 
advocated a European federation along the lines of the Federal Republic of 
Germany in which the Netherlands’ position in the European Community would 
be comparable to a Land in the Bundesrepublilc. This was a highly idealistic but, 
in the context of the 1970s, also somewhat parochial approach, in that the trend in 
European co-operation at the time was distinctly of an intergovernmental rather 
than a federalist or supranational nature. Ironically, this intergovemmentalist trend 
was clearly reinforced by British entry, so vigorously advocated by the Dutch.
Apart from being fundamentally artificial, the institutional separation 
between the Community and EPC was deemed dangerous, in that the 
intergovernmental EPC could potentially ‘contaminate’ the Community’s 
supranational and communitarian character. The establishment, proposed by 
France, of a distinct and high-powered political EPC secretariat to be located in 
Paris was deemed particularly detrimental to the Community and the policy- 
initiating role of the Commission. In this respect, the Netherlands suspected the 
Pompidou government of trying to reproduce the old Fouchet plan in a new 
format. At the European summit conference in Paris in October 1972 Schmelzer 
successfully blocked proposals of this nature.475
Such strictures regarding EPCs institutional insufficiency did not prevent the 
Dutch foreign policy making elite from appreciating its potential added value for 
Dutch foreign policy as a whole. In January 1972, an evaluative Cabinet paper 
arrived at the conclusion that EPC foreign policy consultations could be judged 
favourably, as long as one kept in mind that their intergovernmental set-up 
seriously limited their scope and that the talks should not be to the detriment of 
NATO unity.476
473. Hill anti Smith, op. cit., 83.
474. Mr. Schmelzer was supported in this by state secretary Westerterp, who was of an equally 
federalist persuasion.
475. NA, MR (1160), Notulen Ministerraad 17.3.1972, NA, MR (1161), Notulen Ministerraad 
9.6.1972 and NA, MR (1162), Notulen Ministerraad 21.10.1972; Harryvan, Van der Harst en 
Van Voorst, op. cii.. 249. The 1986 Single European Act would eventually provide EPC with 
a (small) secretariat based in Brussels.
476. BZ, III, 913.100. no. 5469, ‘Discussienota over de Europese eenwording’, with 
accompanying letter 4.1.1972.
215
7.3 A Rude Awakening. The Netherlands, EPC and the 1973 Oil Boycott
Misgivings that EPC, by intensifying foreign-policy co-operation in Europe, 
would adversely affect the relationship with the US in NATO proved not 
unwarranted. In the early 1970s, in the US, the Nixon-Kissinger government 
became increasingly worried about European assertiveness in the international 
arena; to counter this tendency and to intensify the Atlantic ties, Kissinger 
proclaimed 1973 as T he  Year of Europe’. This failed to produce the desired 
result, however, and American-European tensions increased further following the 
start of the Yom Kippur war in the Middle East, on 6 October 1973. In the 
Netherlands, the centre-right Biesheuvel Cabinet was succeeded by a centre-left 
coalition (under prime minister Den Uyl), which was less inclined to consider 
Arab sensitivities than its predecessor, particularly foreign minister Schmelzer, 
had done. Three days after the start of the war, the new government issued a 
declaration, stating that Syria and Egypt had taken the initiative to the hostilities, 
and had thereby unilaterally violated the regional truce in force since 1967. The 
aggressors were summoned to withdraw behind the pre-6-October-1973 
demarcation lines. In the declaration, the government seemed to interpret UN 
resolution 242 along the following lines: Israel was entitled to have safe borders, 
and therefore border adjustments were not to be excluded beforehand. This 
interpretation left no room for endorsement by all the contending parties, as - 
previously - pleaded for by Schmelzer477.
The government’s pro-Israel policy by and large followed the American strategy 
in the conflict, and was thus in line with the country’s atlanticist traditions. The 
other eight EPC countries -  France in particular -  were more inclined to pacify 
the Arab countries, and urged the start of a so-called Euro-Arab dialogue which 
would also take into account the rights of the Palestinian people.
Not for the first time, the Middle East became a bone of contention among 
the EPC countries. From the start of EPC co-operation onwards, of all the issues
477. D. Hellema, Buitenlandse politiek van Nederland (Utrecht 1995), 259. With his so-called 
‘evenhanded’ Middle East policy, Schmelzer had encountered heavy criticism on the part of 
the Israeli government (see also: H.A. Schaper, ‘Nederland en hct Middcn-Oostenconflict', 
in: Internationale Spectator 29 (1975) 4, 235-238). It seems that by choosing this position, 
Schmelzer was an exception among postwar Dutch foreign policy-makers, while the Den Uyl 
government (1973-1977), taking an undiluted pro-Israel stance, returned to a more traditional 
policy on the Middle East conflict.
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discussed in the Political Committee, Middle Eastern affairs were the most 
difficult on which to reach common positions. This was above all due to the 
Dutch government's prioritising of Israeli security and its emphasis on the 
Netherlands’ special relationship with Israel, resulting in highly diluted and thus 
ineffectual compromise texts in EPC.478 Political director Van Lynden warned his 
Foreign Affairs Ministry against idiosyncrasy on the Middle East file.479 However, 
the government’s persistence clashed with the partners and effectively blocked a 
common EPC position. While meeting with his fellow Political Directors in the 
Political Committee in Copenhagen, Van Lynden was instmcted by the Foreign 
Office: ‘This is not the moment for a declaration of the Nine’. On at least two 
occasions during October and November the Netherlands torpedoed a mandate for 
France and the UK to act on behalf of the Nine in the UN Security Council. Dutch 
reticence incapacitated EPC, and caused political damage by undermining the 
country’s goodwill in the European capitals and thus the European solidarity the 
Netherlands would need urgently and soon.480 Both Foreign Minister Van der 
Stoel and Van Lynden found themselves wedged between Arab demands and EPC 
incentives on the one hand and the strong pro-Israel sentiments in Dutch public 
opinion and Parliament on the other. Prime minister Den Uyl himself (1973-1977) 
and some departments within the Foreign Office were inclined to keep the EPC 
profile on the matter as low as possible.481
The pro-Israel views of both government and public did not fail to attract the 
attention of the oil-producing countries’ policy-makers. Defence Minister Vrede- 
ling’s participation in a pro-Israel demonstration in Amsterdam had not remained 
unnoticed either. About the same time, Vredeling secretly started delivering 
ammunition, artillery shells and reserve parts to the Israeli army 482
478. Interview with mr. Rutten in: Harryvan. Van der Harst and Van Voorst, op. tit., 189-231 
(224-225).
479. Whereas Van Lynden advocated cautious policies on the Middle East his colleague Meijer, 
the director-general for development aid distinctly practiced a pro-Israel line. Early in 1973, 
Meijer instructed the Dutch delegation to vote against a proposed WIIO resolution together 
with - solely - Israel and the USA. Alarmed by this isolated stance Van Lynden argued that - 
as a rule of thumb - such deviant (voting) behaviour should be supported by at least one other 
EPC country and preferably more. Wim van Eekelen, Sporen trekken door strategische jaren 
(Meppel 2000), 75.
480. NA, MR (1237). Notulen Ministerraad 9.11.1973.
481. Van Eekelen, op. tit., 76-81.
482. Peter Bootsma en Willem Breedveld, De verbeelding aan de macht. Het kabiuet Den Uyl, 
1973-1977 (Den Haag 1999). 124. Whether prime minister Den Uyl and foreign minister 
Van der Stoel were left as unacquainted with Vredeling's secret arms deals as they later
. claimed, is a moot point. In his memoirs, state-secretary for Defence Bram Stcmerdink states
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When in October 1973 OPEC proclaimed an oil embargo, the Netherlands -  
together with the United States -  was the country most seriously affected by this 
measure. The reason why the Netherlands and - in Europe - the Netherlands alone, 
was singled out for a fully-fledged boycott can be only partly attributed to the 
country’s Israel-mindedness and its isolated stance in EPC. It seems that tactical 
considerations on the part of OPEC played an important part as well. The position 
of the port of Rotterdam as the home base of one of the world’s biggest oil 
companies (Shell) made the Netherlands an obvious target for Arab repercussions. 
Moreover, the hub position o f Rotterdam for German and Belgian oil supplies 
contributed to the latter countries’ circumspect stance in the conflict, and 
enhanced Dutch isolation.483 In retrospect, Van der Stoel assumed that these 
tactical considerations had motivated the Arab countries to start preparing the 
embargo against the Netherlands months before the actual outbreak of the October 
war.484
Apart from the United States, the government received little help from the 
partner countries and complained about the lack of solidarity in EPC. Irritations 
grew when the British Foreign Minister Douglas-Home confided to Van der Stoel 
that ‘the supply of crude oil to Britain has to be assured’ and when French
he and Vredeling acted on their own. When Stemerdink visited Den Uyl shortly before the 
latter’s death in 1987, Den Uyl recollected his surprise when, while visiting Israel in 1974, 
Golda Meir showered him with kisses, thanking him for the help offered by the Netherlands 
during the Yom Kippur war. A help Den Uyl himself had considered to be of an extremely 
limited nature: The Netherlands’ official Government stance was that only when Israeli 
territory itself would be in danger arms procurements for Israel were to be considered. Bram 
Stermerdink. Tussen dromen, daden en twijfels. Dagboekaantekeningen over de societal- 
democratic in Nederland en daarbuiten 1986-1993 (Amsterdam 1993). 249-250 and P. 
Rusman, ‘Dilemma’s bij de wapcnleveranties aan Israel, 1956-1977’, in: Philip Everts (ed.). 
Dilemma’s in de buitenlandse politiek van Nederland (Leiden 1996), 143-180. Bootsma and 
Breedveld in their book on the Den Uyl government (1972-1976) deem it likely that Van der 
Stoel was uninformed about the arms deals, but argue that Den Uyl - although possibly 
unaware of what was going on at the time - was filled in about the arms deliveries shortly 
afterwards. Bootsma and Breedveld, op. cit., 124-125. Hellema, Wiebes and Witte cany this 
argument further in their book on 'Nederland en de oliecrisis': Van der Stocl’s evasive 
answers to the Tweede Kamer, testimony by Israel’s ambassador to the Netherlands Bar-On 
and American sources appear to suggest that both prime-minister Den Uyl and foreign 
minister Van dcr Stoel were perfectly aware of the Netherlands' support for the Israeli war 
effort. Duco Hellema, Cees Wiebes and Toby Witte, Doelwit Rotterdam. Nederland en de 
oliecrisis 1973-1974 (Den Haag 1998), 32-37.
483. Joop van Ginkel, Het Westen en de oliecrisis 1973-1974 (’s-Gravenhage 1978), 69-70; NA, 
MR (1237), Notulen Ministerraad 9.11.1973 and Op. cit., 124-125. Joop van Ginkel, op. cit.. 
69-70; NA, MR (1237), Notulen Ministerraad (9.11.1973 and 16.11.1973).
484. Hellema, op. cit., 260.
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president Pompidou ‘consoled’ the Dutch that they ‘would not die of hunger and 
thirst’ because of the embargo.485
Early in November, Arab pressure increased with a boycott of the Royal 
Dutch airline, KLM, and the threat of a further cut in the production and supply of 
oil from the Middle East. Despite public professions implying the contrary, Van 
der Stoel eventually decided to give in and to support the ‘neutral’ EPC line 
towards the crisis, by signing the EPC resolution of 6 November -  a French 
initiative - in which for the first time the rights of the Palestinian people were 
formally recognised.486 Although the resolution was not the appropriate vehicle 
for removing away all Euro-Arab and intra-European divergences, it certainly 
helped to improve the Dutch diplomatic position, all the more so when in 1974 -  
in reaction to the oil embargo -  the United States instigated the creation o f an 
International Energy Agency (IEA) of the oil-consuming countries, an institution 
which all the EC countries joined except France. From that time on, France -  
instead of the Netherlands -  became the isolated party in the conflict. Diplomatic 
pressure by the US on the OPEC countries, the prospect of a Euro-Arab dialogue, 
as well as OPEC’s awareness that the boycott had largely missed its mark (see 
note 25), eventually resulted in the lifting of the oil embargo in July 1974. 
Furthermore, to Dutch relief, the US successfully stipulated mutual consultation 
between the Atlantic partners in cases where EPC dealt with issues directly 
affecting NATO. This substantially reduced the possibilities of EPC acting as a 
divisive force within NATO.487
The crisis in the Middle East was an obvious example of the difficulty in 
aligning the EPC countries in times of emergency. Despite the improvements it 
brought in communication between the ministries of foreign affairs of the Nine, 
EPC was still not seen as the proper policy instrument to make Europe a credible 
and forceful player in the international arena. Nevertheless, despite these 
limitations, the 1973/74 oil crisis also pointed out an EPC potential. In future, Mr. 
Rutten, the director-general for political affairs at the Foreign Ministry (1974-
485. Hans H.J. Labohm (ed.), De waterdragers van het Nederlandse Europabeleid. Terugblik op 
40 jaar DGES (Den Haag 1997), 108-109. Although The Hague was gravely hurt by 
Pompidou’s lack of sympathy, the French president hardly vitiated the truth. In fact, thanks 
to the distribution policy of the domestic company Shell, the Netherlands -  despite the oil 
embargo -  was one of the best-supplied European countries during the crisis; Duco Hellema, 
Cees Wiebes en Toby Witte, Doelwit Rotterdam. Nederland en de oliecrisis 1973-1974 (Den 
Haag 1998), 114-118.
486. Hellema, op. cit., 261.
487. Voorhoeve, op. cit., 235-246.
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1980) noted, EPC could and should be used to avoid the Netherlands being 
singled out as a target for wrath and retaliation by third countries. This is the so- 
called ‘umbrella-function’ of EPC.488 Moreover, EPC proved a useful tool in 
domestic politics. In the wake of the oil embargo, successive Dutch governments 
made use of EPC to gradually amend the country’s formerly unmitigated pro- 
Israel policy (again, with the exception of Schmelzer’s brief tenure). The Hague’s 
agreement with a series of EPC declarations, in which with increasing clarity the 
rights of the Palestinian people found recognition, steered the country’s Middle 
East policy in European mainstream direction. Such policy convergence proved 
beneficial for EPC. The second half of the 1970s witnessed a constructive Euro- 
Arab dialogue resulting in the Community’s 1980 Venice Declaration, 
recognising the right of the Palestinians to a Palestine homeland. But before this 
was to take place, the Netherlands had experienced a long and difficult way of 
learning interdependence.
7.4 The Netherlands and EPC in the 1970s. A Godsend fo r Dutch Cabaret?
Clearly, most of the EPC’s policies were highly declaratory and the stream of 
communiqués it issued during the 1970s gave the forum the image of a ‘paper 
tiger’. Foreign Office political director Rutten would sometimes compare EPC to 
the choir in a Greek tragedy: standing next to the scene EPC furthered comments 
and opinions on what was happening on the stage: it would sing praise, denounce, 
state goals and preferences, but all this without taking part in the action itself.489 
Such impotence was not confined to Middle East policies. A joint strategy was 
also lacking in the European response to the apartheid regime in South Africa, 
with on the one hand the ‘moralists’ (Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands), 
pleading for a tough stance towards Pretoria in the form of a weapon embargo and 
economic sanctions and, on the other side, the ‘realists’ (Germany, France and the 
UK), advocating less drastic steps. Likewise, the EPC was unable to play a role in 
mitigating the problems resulting from the economic recession of the 1970s, 
simply because it lacked due powers in economic areas.
488. Interview with mr. Rutten in: Harryvan, Van der Harst and Van Voorst, op. cit., 189-231
(224).
489. Interview with mr. Rutten in: Harryvan, Van der Harst and Van Voorst, op. cit., 189-231 
(224-225).
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Nevertheless, on a number of other foreign policy issues, EPC did function 
and it can well be argued that the overall picture of EPC in the 1970s was a 
successful one: European foreign policy co-operation constituted a noticeable 
exception to the rampant eurosclerosis of the time.490 The Euro-Arab dialogue 
after 1975, the common positions adopted at the Conference on Security and Co­
operation in Europe (CSCE), as well as their parallel voting patterns in the UN 
and its specialised agencies testified to the coherence-enhancing quality of EPC 
policy co-ordination.
EPC’s influence in stimulating and operating the CSCE was welcomed in the 
Netherlands, first and foremost because of the opportunities the conference 
offered to highlight the human rights situation in Eastern Europe. Whereas until 
then the Netherlands’ emphasis on human rights as a foreign policy objective had 
been treated with scepticism by friend and foe alike, the Helsinki negotiations 
provided the country with a forum. The Netherlands actively advocated the human 
rights issue and the free movement of people and information, to the extent that 
Soviet leader Brezhnev would scornfully refer to these issues as ‘Dutch 
cabaret’.491
Such a distinct European role in the CSCE process was possible at that time 
also, because the US administration showed little interest in this European 
initiative - initially, at least. The American attitude would change after the 
Helsinki declaration of 1975, with the consequence of a decreasing EPC profile in 
CSCE affairs from then on.
European policy co-operation had eventually enabled the Netherlands to play 
a role both in the Middle East crisis and in mooting the human rights situation in 
Middle and Eastern Europe, foreign minister Van der Stoel concluded in 1977 - a 
role, at least a larger role, than the realm’s own diplomatic means would have 
provided for.
National bureaucratic politics, argues George, may have contributed to this 
achievement. By 1970, the integration process had blurred the lines between 
foreign and domestic politics and in all Community member states the Foreign 
Office was engaged in a power struggle with various domestic ministries, 
including Agriculture and - above all - Economic Affairs, for control of 
Community affairs. For the challenged foreign ministries, George observes, ‘EPC
490. Voorhoeve, op. cit., 182.
491. Voorhoeve, op. cit., 223-224,134.
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was a godsend’, enabling them to re-conquer their traditional positions of primacy 
within national foreign policy making.492
To which extent is the George thesis applicable to the Netherlands? As the 
Middle East crisis showed, EPC profiling was opposed by political forces outside 
of as well as within, the Foreign Ministry (see also Van Lynden’s policy advise 
earlier in this chapter). One can expect that EPC was institutionally welcomed, 
apparently not so much by the Ministry in its entirety, but rather by the leading 
policymakers in the directorate-general for Political Affairs, who during the 1960s, 
had witnessed the relative political and financial clout of their department decline 
due to drastic expansion, both in terms of staff and budgets, of the rivalling 
directorates-general for European Co-operation and Development Aid, as well as 
of other domestic ministries. This helps to explain why, in the early 1970s, 
Political Affairs seized the moment of the oil crisis as an opportunity to provide 
EPC and the directorate itself with a higher profile. The George thesis, therefore, 
is applicable to the Netherlands, albeit only in part.
7.5 Discussion
The Hague’s ardent support for British EC-membership throughout the 1960s 
originated in a defensive line of thinking: the government feared that within a 
purely continental framework, France would seek political dominance, possibly in 
an alliance with the Federal Republic of Germany. The Hague’s reasoning, by 
contrast, was that UK membership would not only strengthen Atlantic partnership, 
but also neutralise the aforementioned tendencies towards Franco-German 
attempts at leadership of the Community. The government continued focussing on 
the Atlantic alliance as the decisive forum for discussing foreign policy and 
security issues. At the same time, in the areas of trade and welfare, The Hague 
opted for integration in a European context, by advocating supranationalism and 
furthering a strong European Commission.
As a result of this, the government’s approach of European Political Co­
operation was lukewarm. EPC was seen as potentially dangerous in that it could 
be used as a Trojan Horse for weakening the Atlantic link, sidelining the 
Commission and corrupting the community’s supranational calling. Nevertheless, 
EPC foreign policy consultations were to be judged favourably as long as one 
kept in mind that their intergovernmental set-up seriously limited their scope and
492. George, op. c i t 264.
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that the talks should not be to the detriment of NATO unity. From a 
communitarian perspective, EPC was considered of little importance: the creation 
of a foreign-political roof over the customs union and later the common market 
was deemed less urgent, especially if this roof lacked a connection with the EC’s 
supranational foundation. This policy line was to remain unaltered, at least until 
the end of the Cold War in 1990.
At times, European policy co-ordination and group diplomacy was not an 
option, but a necessity. Especially the country’s isolated position during the 
1973/74 Middle Eastern crisis and oil boycott was instructive in teaching 
interdependence the hard way. At this point, it seemed that, for the first time since 
the second world war- perhaps with the exception of the de-colonisation of the 
Dutch Indies and New Guinea - the Atlantic bond failed to give the Netherlands 
the desired protection and coverage against external threats. Despite the existence 
o f a strong sense of solidarity between the US and the Netherlands, OPEC’s oil 
policy hurt the Netherlands and manoeuvred the country into a vulnerable and 
diplomatically isolated position. It took some time before the government realised 
that going a Sonderweg and ignoring EPC harmed the country’s national interest. 
For a change, the Atlantic framework did not suffice.
The Atlantic factor -  though different in character -  also played a role in the 
CSCE process. In this case, initial American absence gave the Netherlands leeway 
to participate in the discussions and develop a high profile on the human rights 
dossier. It was discovered that EPC convergence and joint action sometimes 
provided a smaller power like the Netherlands with political leverage enabling it 
to play a role that its national diplomatic means could not have provided for. Later, 
however, when Washington changed its mind and became involved in the 
Helsinki negotiations, Dutch enthusiasm for CSCE seemed to wither 
simultaneously.
On the national bureaucratic level, EPC provided the directorate of Political 
Affairs with a useful instrument to improve its status and influence within the 
Foreign Ministry. The other directorates -  European Co-operation and 
Development Aid -  were downright sceptical regarding the new phenomenon, and 
would not hesitate to ventilate this in intra-ministerial discussions. George’s 
observation that the EPC constituted a ‘godsend’ for the Foreign Offices of the 
members-states is therefore only partially true for the situation in the Netherlands.
To what extent is EPC a cleavage in Dutch policy on European integration, as 
compared to the 1960s? In conclusion to this chapter, we may certainly speak of a
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change in the country’s appreciation of political co-operation in a European 
framework. When the UK entered the Community, the Dutch ‘Fouchet syndrome’ 
faded into the background, making the country ripe for acceptance of EPC 
membership. While initially the government hoped that EPC would transcend its 
own limitations and carry the whole integrationist project forward, it gradually 
came to value the co-operation as a pragmatic form of assistance to national 
foreign policy. It would be inaccurate, though, to call this a cleavage because, 
together with support for EPC’s development, Atlantic unity continued to be 
sacrosanct in Dutch foreign policy.
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Chapter 8: A Bumpy Road To Lomé. The Netherlands’ Policy on 
Association and the Yaoundé Treaties, 1956-1969
8.0 Introduction*
North-South development efforts were not among the common policies foreseen 
for the European Economic Community (EEC) in its formative years. Therefore, 
the association of 18 African countries and Madagascar (AASM) with the EEC 
during the 1960s was considered by many as an ‘historical accident’. An accident, 
however, which resulted in a unique framework of co-operation between 
industrialized and developing countries, as well as constituting the starting point 
of the fully-fledged Development Policy of the present-day European Union.493
‘Voluntary silence’ on behalf of the editors of the Spaak Report, the blueprint 
for the 1957 EEC Treaty, on the issue of the relationship between the future 
Community and the overseas territories of its member-states, forced France -  far 
and away the largest colonial power of the Original Six -  to come forward on this 
issue with a proposal of its own. In the ensuing multilateral negotiations France, 
finding itself in the position of ‘demandeur’, spared neither effort nor argument to 
convince and coerce its reluctant partners, the most reluctant of which may well 
have been the Netherlands.494
This chapter on the Netherlands’ policy regarding association with the 
Common Market by overseas territories; dependencies and former dependencies 
is divided into two parts, dealing with the issue in a chronological order. The first 
section covers the period 1956-1962, from the Venice conference till the signing 
of the first Yaoundé convention, with the second part focusing on the period 
stretching from Yaoundé I until the signing of the second Yaoundé Convention in 
1969. The central question is to what extent successive Dutch governments were 
willing to endorse overseas EC involvement, particularly in Africa and, to what
An earlier version of this chapter was published as: Anjo G. Harry van and Jan van der Harst, 
*A Bumpy Road to Lomé. The Netherlands, Association and the Yaoundé Treaties, 1956- 
1969*, in: Marie-Thérèse Bitsch en Gérard Bossuat, L ’Europe unie et l ’Afrique. De l ’idée 
d ’Eurafrique à la convention de Lome l  (Brussel 2005), 319-343.
493. J. Westhoff, ‘Het associatiebeleid van de Europese Gemeenschappen’, Internationale 
Spectator 27 (1973), 149-155 (129) and ‘Verslag van een gesprek met mr. J. Westhoff, 
Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer, (HTK) zitting 1970-1971, 10900 V 8,13 October 1970.
494. Etienne Deschamps, ‘La Belgique et l'association des pays et territoires d’outre-mer 
(PTOM) au marché commun (1955-1957)', in: M. Dumoulin, G. Duchenne and A. van Laer 
(eds.). La Belgique, les petits États et ta construction européenne (Brussels 2003), 119-145 
(123).
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degree, did they attempt to influence multilateral negotiations and policy 
outcomes on this matter.
8.1 From Venice to Yaounde I: Association as a Price Tag on the Common 
Market
When, in October 1956, the French and Belgian delegations in the EEC 
negotiations finally tabled their common Eurafrique proposals, the latter proved 
an unpleasant surprise for the Dutch policy-makers. The Eurafrique concept, 
raised at the Venice ministers conference in May of that year, after several 
postponements, was now emerging, highly contrary to a plethora of Dutch 
interests and desiderata. As such, it was considered a direct threat to the central 
aim of Dutch European policy since 1953, to wit realizing the Beyen Plan, or in 
other words, the establishment of a common market between the six EC SC 
countries.
The Hague’s inter-ministerial Co-ordination Committee (CoCo) advocated a 
partial, gradual, temporary and differentiated association of the overseas 
territories, allowing for specific treatment in each case. The Belgian/French 
proposal, however, demanded permanent, full and immediate association of these 
territories with the European common market, in that their exports to the EEC 
market would receive the same preferential treatment as the Six were to establish 
amongst themselves. Thus the Belgian and French overseas territories would 
benefit from the progressive liberalization of intra-European trade. In return, the 
overseas dependencies would have to gradually enlarge the preferential trade 
regimes applied for imports from their respective colonial powers to all six EEC 
member-states. In the Dutch view, this proposal was GATT-incompatible, as well 
as seriously lacking in balance. Chief-negotiator J. Linthorst Homan and his 
delegates pointed out the discrepancy between full market access for the French 
and Belgian dependencies in Europe on the one hand and no more than limited 
non-discrimination for European exporters overseas on the other. ‘A problematic 
export increase in exchange for total liberalization’, was their damning 
conclusion.495 Likewise, the Chambers of Commerce of Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam spoke out against the proposals: a slackening of trade with the non-
495. Min. BZ, II, 913.100, no. 66 ‘De Europese Gemeenschappelijke Markt en de overzeese 
gebieden der leden-landen’ FotoBtz: 145874.
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participating African countries, with the Middle East, with Latin-America as well 
as with Asia was to be feared, they argued.496
France and Belgium, moreover, proposed the establishment of an investment 
fund to facilitate economic development in the overseas territories, thus enabling 
the eventual creation of a fully fledged Common Market between Europe and the 
French and Belgian colonial possessions in Africa: Eurafrique. In The Hague, the 
suggestion of Dutch financial responsibility for economic development in Belgian 
and French colonial territories did not go down well at all. The establishment o f a 
regional common market in Europe was not to be confused with solving each 
other's colonial predicaments, was the general opinion among Dutch foreign 
policy makers, as well as their German colleagues. Apart from financial 
considerations, Dutch reticence was based on political misgivings. At the time, 
neither France nor Belgium showed any inclination towards granting 
independence to their colonial possessions, largely ignoring African aspirations to 
national independence. Therefore, a distinct risk that the projected preferential and 
financial arrangements would involve EEC in future tension, political strife and 
military conflict in Africa was undeniable. For the Netherlands, bearing the 
traumatic decolonization of the Dutch East Indies fresh in mind, such adventures 
were deemed utterly unattractive.497
The Belgian-French proposals hit The Hague, by their sweeping nature as 
well as their timing. At a very late moment in the negotiating process they added 
to the already substantial problems on the way to a successful closure of the 
negotiations. Hence, observations by Küsters and others to the effect ‘Wie 
unvorbereitet der französische Vorstosz die Niederländische Regierung tra f.498 In 
particular, the proposed investment fund constituted a nasty surprise: Clearly, 
France intended EEC membership to bring Paris extra-leverage and a re­
strengthening of its weakened political position in Africa. As The Economist
496. G. van Bcnthcm van den Bergh, De associatie van Afrikaanse staten met de Europese 
Economische Gemeenschap (Leiden 1962), 49.
497. Ibidem and J. Linthorst Homan, Wat zijt ghij voor een vent (Assen 1974), 221-223 and 
Charles Rut ten, Aan de wieg van Europa en andere buitenlandse zaken. Herinneringen van 
een diplomaat (Amsterdam 2005), 54-56. Full association of the Netherlands’ remaining 
overseas territories (Surinam, The Dutch Antilles and New Guinea) with the European 
Common Market was postponed for constitutional as well as economic reasons (see 8.2).
498. ‘How the French initiative hit the unprepared Netherlands’ government’ Min. BZ. II. 
913.100, Weekbericht 16, Periode 19-22 november 1956; H.J. Küsters, Die Gründung der 
Europäische Wirschaflsgemeinschaft (Baden-Baden), 384 (footnote 299) and Linthorst 
Homan. Wat zijt Ghij, 221-222.
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argued, explaining the ‘remarkable’ fact that African deputies to the French 
parliament so far had not spoken out in favour of full independence for their home 
countries: ‘African leaders are acutely aware that France provides nearly 200 
million dollars a year of immediately profitable investment and that the common 
market could double this figure .’ 499 (emphasis mine, AGH).
In the ensuing international negotiations, the Netherlands and Germany set 
out to detonate the explosive Eurafrique package, fiercely defended by France. 
Belgium, Italy and Luxemburg took a more passive stance. Linthorst Homan 
accentuated the GATT-incompatibility o f the proposals and the discrepancy 
between the trade regimes, a discrepancy in turn defended by France as a perfectly 
legitimate means of protection for the underdeveloped economies involved. Paris 
remained adamant that it deemed association and a public investment fund 
conditions sine qua non for France’s EEC membership. It was willing, however, 
to concede on the magnitude of the Fund and its management.500
Gradually, the terms of a compromise emerged. Eurafrique was sidelined, 
but France obtained the association agreement, albeit a temporary one; its 
successor after five years would have to be agreed upon with unanimity.501 A 
European Development Fund was to be established, although not as large as 
originally proposed and with a greater influence by the European Commission in 
its decision-making than France had considered desirable. The negotiations were 
extremely tough until the last moment. As late as 18 January 1957, prime-minister 
Drees voiced his worst-case scenario in which France would obtain preferential 
treatment but the common market would not materialize and in which 
improvement of intra-Six trade would be outweighed by losing business with the 
rest of the world. For achieving agreement on the financing of the Fund and its 
policies an unprecedented summit conference of government leaders was set up at 
Hotel Matignon, the seat of the French prime minister, on 19 February 1957. 
Drees’ willingness to compromise on the financial contribution by The 
Netherlands was stretched to the limit. Nevertheless, the government leaders 
reached a compromise well before the evening dinner, wrote Luns in his diary.
499. The Economist 1957, 479; as quoted in: Van Benthem van den Bergh, De associatie van 
Afrikaanse staten, 47.
500. NA, MR (405), Notulen ministerraad 18.1.1957.
501. A result largely undermined by articles 14 and 15 of the Implementing Convention, 
stipulating the terms of a fall-back arrangement in case the new association agreement was 
not agreed upon after the expiration of its predecessor. P. Olijslager. De associatie van de 
overzeese gebieden met de Europese Ekonomische Gemeenschap (Leuven 1958), 22-23.
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According to Spaak’s mémoires more time was needed: the talks lasted till four 
o’clock the following morning.
German Chancellor Adenauer, then at the vast age of 81, expressed his 
satisfaction by calling Drees, ten years his junior, ‘ein kluger junger Mann’.502
All in all, the Dutch government did not particularly welcome the association 
agreement laid down in articles 131-136 of the Rome Treaty. But The Hague also 
realized that in the given circumstances they had no other choice than to go along 
with it. Political realities -  notably the conditions sine qua non put forward by 
France - could not be denied.
The Treaty of Rome was by now a reality, but the political practice of 
association would give rise to a number of problems. Early in 1961, the Dutch 
Foreign Ministry noted the following:
Firstly, preferential facilities and the discrimination they entailed tended to 
reinforce unwelcome tendencies towards group formation amongst African 
countries, with the EEC committing itself one-sidedly to the French-speaking 
African countries.
Secondly, the economic and political links between the associated countries 
and EEC were subject to criticism of neo-colonialism by third countries.
Thirdly, preferential treatment proved detrimental to the economic and 
political links of the EEC countries, Germany and the Netherlands in particular, 
with a number of other African countries and countries in Latin America. 
Mentioned were Ghana, Nigeria, Brazil and others which were deemed 
economically -  and presumably politically too -  far more important than the 
associated countries o f the French Communauté. Hence this state of affairs 
provided the Dutch with yet another motive for EEC enlargement and association 
of the (former) British dependencies.503
From July 1961 onwards, when the United Kingdom, together with Denmark and 
Ireland, applied for EEC membership these considerations were reinforced by one 
of overriding importance: the UK wished to associate the lesser developed
502. John Jansen van Galen, Herman Vuijsje, Drees. Wethouder van Nederland (Alphcn aan dc 
Rijn 1980), 147; Charles Rutten, Buitenlandse Zaken, 42-44; Linthorst Homan, Wat zijt Ghij, 
223. Paul-Henri Spaak, Combats inachevés: II De l'espoir au déceptions (Parijs 1969). 96. 
Information on diary Luns provided by prof. Albert E. Kersten.
503. Rijksgeschiedkundige publicatiën (henceforth: RGP), kleine serie no. 97, Nederlandse 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking /, 1945-1963 (Den Haag 2002), Chef DIE, DGES (Kymmell), 2 
2.1961.
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Commonwealth countries and overseas British territories with the EEC according 
to the Rome Treaty arrangement laid down in articles 131 through 136. Such a 
pooling of preferences would deprive the currently associated French 
dependencies in Africa of their competitive preferential edge. Fierce resistance on 
their side was to be expected» possibly making France block British entry 
altogether.504
Precisely for these reasons, the Netherlands was originally against continued 
preferential treatment and financial support for the now rapidly growing number 
of former French colonies in Africa, which were gaining independence. Not 
surprisingly, The Hague arrived at the conclusion that ‘a privileged preferential 
regime for a small number of formerly French and Belgian countries’ was not in 
the interest of the realm. A broader oriented Aid and Development Program for 
Africa as a whole, open to all African states, was to be preferred. Now that the 
separation between the Six and the Seven in Europe was about to be overcome, 
the raison d ’être for a specific arrangement for former French dependencies did 
not make sense any more.505
The French plea for exactly such an agreement was deprecated by many in 
the Dutch policy-making elite. There was no automatic right, minister of Foreign 
Affairs Luns reasoned, to continued preferences for former colonies. Jelle Zijlstra, 
the influential finance minister did not mince his words either. He did not approve 
of EEC funding of French colonies at all. ‘It has been done once, to bring the 
French around to accepting EEC but [he] was not prepared to do it again.’506 
Other policy-makers in the foreign and economic ministries were less outspoken 
and viewed the issue as a complicated one: one did not want to insult the former 
colonies and maintain their ties with Europe on the one hand; one did not want to 
alienate the other African countries from Europe by denying them privileged 
treatment.507 Legal evidence for the French claim, supported by the Belgians, may 
have been slight; their political and practical ammunition was extremely 
convincing: the abolishment o f the association regime would be considered as a
504. RGP, Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking /, Directie Integratie Europa, DGES, to 
minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, 28.11.1961.
505. RGP, Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking /, Min. BZ to minister-president, 4.7.1960; 
Idem, Chef Directie Integratie Europa, DGES, Kymmell, 2.2.1961; Idem, Raad voor 
Economische Aangelegenheden (henceforth; REA), 23.6.1961.
506. RGP, Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking ƒ, Min. BZ to Minister-President, 4.7.1960; 
Idem, REA, 23.6.1961.
507. RGP, Nederlandse ontwikkelingssamenwerking /, Attachment to no. 228: DG BEB,Van 
Oorschot aan De Pous (economics minister), 14.12,1960.
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form of punishment for accepting independence. Abruptly ending their trading 
preferences would, Luns warned his colleagues in government, occasion rancour 
and encouragement to seek alternative contacts with the Communist bloc. For 
these reasons utmost caution was called for. It was the latter argument that won 
the day. Caught between a rock and a hard place, the government decided that the 
argument for continuation was to prevail, thereby accepting the basic logic behind 
the draft Yaoundé Treaty as drafted by the European Commission. By May 1962 
the Netherlands was aiming, as Luns worded it, for an association regime for 
former colonies more or less similar to the Rome Treaty arrangement.508
So The Hague accepted continuation of association, within the Yaoundé 
framework, first and foremost for political considerations. A second factor, 
however, appears to have played a part: since 1957 mainstream Dutch society as 
well as the Hague policy elite had gradually adopted a more positive stance 
towards development policy in general and financial and preferential support for 
third world countries in particular. In 1963 Cabinet was enhanced with a state­
secretary and, subsequently, (1965) a full minister for Development Co-operation. 
Due to this evolution in the Netherlands’ domestic political attitude towards the 
North-South issue, the option of torpedoing a preferential scheme beneficial for 
developing countries - even one of the Yaoundé variety - was politically 
contestable and hence unattractive. Thirdly, although the United Nations remained 
the preferred international institution for such multilateral aid and development 
efforts, the absence of progress on its SUNFED program had contributed to 
bringing ‘Yaoundé’ to the fore as an alternative multilateral framework for Dutch 
development financing.509
Acceptance in principle facilitated a relatively smooth course of the EEC- 
AASM negotiations. Compared with the latter phases of the Treaty of Rome talks, 
no agonizing reappraisals or last minute conferences of heads of state or 
government were called for. In the Dutch Cabinet such aloofness was further 
promoted by The Hague’s own colonial concerns. Throughout 1962, with the 
Papua New Guinea crisis at its height, resulting in this last colonial outpost in 
Asia being ceded to Indonesia, the Cabinet had time for little else and in June
508. Van Benthem van den Bergh, De associatie van Afrikaanse staten, 92: RGP, Nederlandse 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking I , Min. BZ to minister-president, 4.7.1960: NA, MR (675), 
Notulen Ministerraad 18.5.1962.
509. A point of view advocated by foreign minister Luns as early as January 1957, NA, MR 
(405), Notulen Ministerraad 18.1.1957. SUNFED stands for Special UN Fund for Economic 
Development.
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even instructed the Dutch delegates at the EEC-AASM negotiations to act as they 
deemed fit.510 Difficulties did arise, however, concerning a number of topics, 
resulting in tough negotiations.
Firstly, Germany and the Netherlands rejected the proposal to incorporate the 
projected tariff preferences in 18 separate free trade areas, one with each AASM 
country. T he  fundamental significance o f GATT’, economics minister De Pous 
argued, was at stake and ‘would be undermined’ by these free trade areas which 
would liberate trade only one way while discriminating against other tropical 
commodity producers. The issue, though valid enough, was sidelined, when in 
March 1962, the German delegation rather suddenly withdrew its objections and 
the Netherlands grudgingly followed suit.511 As Dutch delegates did not fail to 
notice, their African interlocutors were not particularly keen on the free trade 
concept as such and would prefer more direct benefits, export volume and 
minimum price guarantees for their specific export products in particular. Such 
direct product arrangements were opposed by all EEC member-states but France 
and thus barred from the Convention. Notwithstanding that, in later years, they 
would emerge in the Lomé agreements.512
Secondly, difficult negotiations were conducted on the yet to be established 
new Fund for capital aid to the AASM countries. The Netherlands delegation 
aimed at diminishing both the magnitude of the Fund and the Netherlands’ 
contribution to it. Finance minister Zijlstra harvested a limited but precious 
success on the second issue. Such, for that matter, in spite of fierce opposition 
from his Belgian colleague Fayat, amply demonstrating the complete absence of 
Benelux foreign-policy cooperation on this subject o f EEC decision-making.513
Thirdly and most importantly, the Netherlands did their utmost to guarantee 
easy future access for the British territories and former dependencies in Africa to 
the Yaoundé Convention. In the course of the negotiations the two issues, British 
entry and Yaoundé, grew increasingly intertw ined.514 In this respect the
510. NA, MR (675), Notulen Ministerraad 15.6.1962.
511. NA, MR (675), Notulen Ministerraad 30.3.1962; Van Benthem van den Bergh, De associatie 
van Afrikaanse staten, 132.
512. NA, MR (675), Notulen Ministerraad 6.4.1962.
513. NA, MR (675), Notulen Ministerraad 18.5.1962 and 22.6.1962; NA, MR (676). Notulen 
Ministerraad 6.7.1962.
514. As economics minister De Pous worded the issue in May 1962: i f  France is not prepared to 
accept the same trade policy regime for the Anglophone African countries as for the
. Francophone African countries it will be difficult for the Netherlands’ delegation to co-
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Netherlands delegation managed to block a right to veto on new accessions to the 
Convention for the A ASM countries. More importantly, a declaration of intent, 
indicating that the Yaoundé co-operation framework was open to countries with a 
comparable economic structure (to wit: Anglophone African countries and British 
and Dutch dependencies), was agreed upon.515
The second and third issues were to remain on the negotiation table for 
subsequent years. For the details of the arrangement agreed upon in the Yaoundé 
Convention, as agreed upon in the course of December 1962, we refer to the next 
section.
Given the multiple links between the two policy issues, it is hardly surprising 
that French president De Gaulle’s veto of British EEC membership on 14 January 
1963 did not remain without consequences for the Yaoundé treaty. As a means to 
express their disapproval of the unilateralist French move, the Netherlands, in 
collaboration with the other EEC member-states, postponed signing the Yaoundé 
treaty for six months until July 1963.516
8.2 From Yaounde I till Yaoundé II: The Netherlands as an Ambivalent 
Partner
Thus the first Yaoundé Convention was signed in the capital of Cameroon on 20 
July 1963. As president of the Council of Ministers, Foreign Minister Joseph Luns 
added his signature on behalf of the EEC and its member-states. Yaoundé created 
a free trade area between the Six and 18 newly independent African states (former 
French, Italian and Belgian colonies). The latter continued to have the benefit of 
the EEC’s internal tariff reductions, duty free entry for a certain number of 
tropical products and application of the common external tariff towards third 
countries. The AASM (Associated African States and Madagascar), in return, 
promised to reduce tariffs on industrial products coming from the EEC and 
granted all EEC members equal treatment. At the same time, they were allowed to 
impose duties or import quota’s to protect infant industries, as well as to make 
trade arrangements with third countries.
operate on the further completion of an arrangement for the Francophone African countries.' 
NA, MR (675), Notulen Ministerraad, 11.5.1962.
515. See 7.2 for details.
516. NA. MR (753), Notulen Ministerraad 21.1.1963, 25.1.1963,15/18.2.1963, and 22.2.1963.
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Compared to the previous association period, the EEC member states 
increased the amount of financial aid under EDF. They agreed to make available 
over the next five years (1964-1969) a total of $ 730 million (excluding EIB loans 
amounting to $ 70 million), divided into $ 500 million in development capital and 
$ 230 million for the diversification of the African economies and promotion of 
efficiency in tropical agriculture. Of this Community Fund, France and Germany 
each supplied $ 246.5 million, Italy 100 million, Belgium/Luxembourg 71 million 
and the Netherlands 66 million.
On the instigation of the Netherlands, a declaration of intent was added to the 
Convention, implying that EEC policies towards Africa should not be restricted to 
the French-speaking part of the continent only but extended to other countries 
with ‘comparable economic and production structures'.517 More in particular, 
Yaoundé gave African nations of the Commonwealth a perspective on future 
membership of the Convention or another form of association with the EEC. The 
latter was also considered for Surinam and the Dutch Antilles, two Dutch colonies 
in the Caribbean.
After its signing, the Convention did not come into operation until July 1964, 
mainly as a result of the protracted process of ratification in 24 national 
parliaments with different procedures. But it was not only the procedural problem 
that mattered, also content-related issues were at stake. The Netherlands was one 
of the last countries to file the ratification document, due to last-minute 
discussions on the - desired - involvement o f Commonwealth African countries in 
the Yaoundé framework. Nigeria had filed a request for association with the EEC, 
a move which was strongly supported by the Dutch government but rejected by 
France. Paris feared that at such early stage Nigerian association would have 
adverse effects on the position of the ‘established’ group of 18 AASM countries. 
At the time, it entertained strained diplomatic relations with Lagos, as a 
consequence of Nigerian protests against French nuclear tests in the Sahara. The 
Hague accused France of ‘certain sabotage’ and of disrespect towards the letter of 
intent concerning association of other (third) African states. Nevertheless, 
eventually, the government decided to push aside its indignation and support 
ratification, because further delays ‘would not in the first place hit France, but the
517. Ministerie van Economische Zaken te Den Haag, (Ministry of Economie Affairs, The 
Hague), (henceforth: Min. EZ), Archief BEB (henceforth: BEB), nr. 402, ’’Associatie- 
onderhandelingen Oost-Afrika”, 19.7.1965. NA, MR, 948 Raad voor Europese Zaken 
(Council for European Affairs, a sub-council of the Ministerraad), (henceforth: REZ), 
‘Conclusie Coördinatie Commissie van 10 juli 1968’, 11.7.1968.
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18 African countries’. The Hague also felt that the Yaoundé agreement left 
sufficient room for further interpretation and elaboration, as well as possibilities to 
exert diplomatic pressure on the French delegation.518 Despite this, the tone was 
set. The disagreement on Nigeria heralded a long period of conflict and 
diplomatic tensions between France and the Netherlands on the contents and 
scope of the Convention. It appeared that there were only very few Convention- 
and association-related issues on which the two countries could agree.
The Dutch government’s policy in the period until the signing of the second 
Yaoundé convention in 1975 was characterized by the following elements: 
extending the Yaoundé facilities to the non-French-speaking African countries; 
avoiding or reducing trade discrimination against (former) Dutch colonies; 
limiting national financial payments to EDF and supporting domestic firms in the 
francophone area.
8.2.1 Extending the Yaounde preferences to other, non-French-speaking, 
African countries
The EEC countries traded almost as much with the non-associated states in Africa 
as with the A ASM. Although France naturally had most commercial links with 
the latter group, the opposite was true for the other five, including the Netherlands. 
During the membership negotiations with the United Kingdom (1961-1963), the 
EEC had discussed several options for dealing with the British Commonwealth 
countries in Africa, ranging from full association to separate commodity 
agreements. But, as written above, until mid-1964, France successfully blocked 
negotiations on the inclusion of English-speaking countries in any association 
framework. French resistance stopped at the moment of ratification of the 
Yaoundé treaty: in June 1964 the EEC Commission was given a mandate to open 
negotiations with Nigeria. Somewhat later, in March 1965, Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda were added to the list of potential ‘associés’.
This satisfied the Dutch government, which welcomed involvement of the 
Anglophone countries for many reasons, not only because of the expected 
economic benefits -  as implicated above, the trade links with the Anglophone 
countries considerably exceeded those with the Francophone countries519 -  but,
518. NA, MR 751, REZ, "Associatieverzoek van Nigeria”, 15.5.1964.
519. An illustration is provided by the Unilever company, which in 1960 invested some £ 23 
million in the associated state of Congo and £ 48.5 million in non-associated Nigeria. C.
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also and especially, because o f the potential opening it offered to the desired 
British entry in the Community. The Hague had been abhorred by president De 
Gaulle’s veto of British EEC membership in January 1963 and strongly felt that 
the European division between the Six and the Seven was not to be copied on the 
African continent. On the contrary, pan-African integration was seen as a laudable 
and realistic perspective.520 The government also looked for possibilities to 
increase bilateral co-operation with Great Britain regarding African affairs.
However, concrete results were still remote. The candidate countries were not 
easy to deal with and, once again, France was unwilling to extend co-operation 
beyond the existing Group o f 18. In December 1967, more than three years after 
the start of the talks, a senior Dutch official complained that France ‘consistently 
sabotaged the negotiations’ with the non-AASM countries. He advised the 
government to give the French a taste of their own medicine, by coupling the 
coming negotiations on prolongation of the Yaoundé treaty (Yaoundé I was going 
to expire in 1969) with the association talks with Nigeria and the East-African 
states. The government should make it ‘absolutely clear that approval of Yaoundé 
II was impossible, so long as a satisfactory solution on new associations remained 
forthcoming’.521
In reality, the Dutch negotiating position was far from unassailable. There 
were two particularly weak points in this position, which Paris and the other 
capitals regularly managed to exploit. Firstly, the Commonwealth African states 
were unwilling to apply the principle of reciprocity to their trade relations with the 
EEC. Although Nigeria was prepared to make limited concessions for a certain 
number of products, Kenya and Uganda initially refused to grant any preferences 
to the EEC, claiming that only a small part of their foreign trade (one-fifth) was 
conducted with the Community, implying that - in case of full association - the 
remaining part would be adversely affected. The EEC countries felt that 
conceding these claims would produce only a limited free-trade zone with 
unilateral preferences. It would also set an undesirable precedent (new African 
candidates looking for association would not refrain from demanding similar or 
even more exclusive privileges) and erode the relevant provisions of the GATT 
treaty regarding free trade zones. All this was clearly unacceptable to France, the
Cosgrove Twitchett, Europe and Africa: from Association to Partnership (Westmead 1978), 
93.
520. Min. BZ, Code 996, (EEG), 1965-1974/4569 (96/431), ’'Financiële steun aan Afrika", 
13.5.1968.
521. Min. BZ, code 996 (EEG) 1965-1974, nr. 4423, Hoogwater to Hartogh, 5.12.1967.
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AASM countries, Nigeria and, eventually, to the Netherlands itself, which 
emphasized the importance of respecting existing GATT rules and creating a 
uniform association structure for all African countries.522
The final result was still unsatisfactory. The treaties of Lagos (1966) and 
Arusha (1968) brought Nigeria respectively the three East-African states under a 
special relationship with the EEC, but on unequal terms. The Arusha treaty 
included serious derogations from the free-trade area principle and amounted to a 
disguised, discriminatory trade agreement in favour of the East African 
countries.523 All this hampering certainly contributed to a weakening of the Dutch 
position during the negotiations.
The Hague further demanded that the negotiations on the prolongation of 
Yaoundé I should run parallel with the association talks with the Anglophone 
countries. This time, the Dutch wish was granted. Yaoundé II and the Arusha 
treaty came into force at exactly the same moment, on 1 January 1971. The treaty 
of Lagos was never ratified, due to insurmountable political conflicts between the 
EC and the military regime in Nigeria, predominantly concerning the secession of 
Biafra.524
A second problem concerned the Dutch position towards associating the 
Maghreb countries of Morocco and Tunisia. The Hague rejected such a 
construction for commercial reasons, but this was incompatible with the 
declaration of intent attached to the EEC treaty, entitling the two countries to 
negotiate an economic association with the Community. France sought to link the 
association negotiations with Nigeria to talks with the Maghreb countries, but this 
was unacceptable to The Hague, which pointed to the advanced stage of the 
negotiations with Nigeria, while Commission talks with Morocco and Tunisia had 
not even commenced. To solve this problem, the Commission suggested creating 
a free trade zone with the two North-African countries, based on article XXIV of 
the GATT treaty. The Dutch government agreed on the condition that the export 
of citrus fruits from Israel and Spain (both major suppliers of oranges to the 
Netherlands) would not suffer from a preferential treatment given to Morocco and 
Tunisia.525 Although a formal association with the two Maghreb countries was
522. Min. EZ, BEB, no. 402, "Associatieondeihandelingen Oost-Afrika", 19.7.1965.
523. Cosgrove Twitchctt, Europe and Africa, 146.
524. Ibidem.
525. Min. EZ, BEB, no. 402, "Associatieonderhandelingen Oost-Afrika", 19.7.1965.
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indeed avoided, the French ‘coupling’ tactics for a while delayed the negotiations 
with Nigeria.526
With regard to extending the association agreements, the government was 
rather reticent in giving the European Commission an important role in the 
negotiations. During the 1960s, the Netherlands had become well-known for its 
outright support o f a strong and autonomous position for the European 
Commission, but this was less the case with regard to the association issue. The 
Hague suspected the Commission of damaging Dutch interests by taking sides 
with France and the eldest group of associated countries, at the expense of the 
non-associated Anglophone countries.527 In the Dutch view, the DG Associated 
Countries in Brussels was basically a French-dominated bulwark, with few 
possibilities for influence by other countries and nationalities. This image was 
confirmed by Jaap van der Lee, General Director General Affairs from 1958 till 
1966, who - a native Dutchman - regularly felt himself ‘sandwiched’ between 
Paris, The Hague and the intimidating French dominance at the DG in Brussels.528
With the benefit of hindsight we know that during the 1960s DG VIII was 
entangled in a existential fight with, ironically enough, the main initiator of EEC 
development policy, the French government. As demonstrated with verve by 
Dimier and McGeever, this disagreement was of an institutional nature, to wit DG 
VIII's struggle for autonomy vis-à-vis Paris, particularly with regard to controlling 
the impementation of the projects of the European Development Fund. EDF 
director Jacques Fenrandi (1963-1975) set up a system based on personal 
relationships, dependence and loyalty. In this campaign he was extending on his 
previous carreer as a French colonial administrator, using personal friendships, 
negotiaton and compromises with African heads o f state:
Individual projects were presented and adopted on an ad hoc basis, according
to vague criteria, which at that time were linked less to the possible social
and economic efficiency of the project proposed than to Ferrandi’s personal
526. NA, MR (881), Notulen Ministerraad, 31.5.1968; NA, MR 948, REZ, ’’Conclusies 
Coördinatie Commissie van 10 juli 1968", 11.7.1968.
527. Min. EZ, BEB, nr. 400, M01912, ‘Heronderhandelingen Yaoundé-Conventie’, 23.4.1968.
528. A.G. Harryvan. J. van der Harst and S. van Voorst (ed.). Voor Nederland en Europa. Politici 
en ambtenaren over het Nederlandse Europabeleid en de Europese integratie, 1945-1915 
(Amsterdam 2001), 178.
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relationships with his “African friends” and political considerations 
(sometimes dictated by French priorities in Africa).52
When decolonization became imminent, however, France wanted to leave the 
control on development projects with local French companies or the consultancy 
firms linked to these companies. This was a direct threat to Ferrandi’s network. 
Hence he got involved in a struggle for control with French foreign minister 
Couve de Murville, who accused him of behaving ‘like a govemement’. 
Eventually, the battle between the Commission and the French Government was 
solved ‘pragmatically, and in a provisional way’. Thus, German and Dutch 
criticism on French policies that insofar as French companies were predominant 
on the spot, it was not difficult to see how the system could be prejudicial to other 
Member States’ interest remained as valid as ever.530 In this respect too, the 
perspective of British entry offered a window of opportunity.
Nevertheless, Dutch misgivings and the Ferrandi-Couve de Murville fight for 
control for once made France and the Netherlands adopt a common stance: both 
countries strove for a limited Commission role in African affairs.
Despite all this, the Dutch government was pleased to see that during the 
1960s trade with the AASM had increased with almost 5 percent per year.531 This 
was considerably less than the trade increase with the non-associated 
Commonwealth countries, but it was certainly better than the original doom 
scenarios had predicted. It confirmed the image of the Netherlands as an 
ambivalent partner in the Yaoundé process.
$.2.2 Avoiding or Reducing Discrimination vis-à-vis (Former) Dutch Colonies
In 1964, the Dutch Antilles and Surinam were brought into a special relationship 
with the EEC. This was at a rather late moment. In the 1957 Rome Treaty, the Six 
had made provision for association of the two colonies, without specifying the 
type of association regime.532 It would take seven more years before agreement on 
further specification was reached. The main cause for the delay concerned
529. Véronique Dimier and Mike McGeever, ’Diplomats Without a Flag: The Institutionalization 
of the Delegations of the Commission in African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries’, JCMS 
44 (2006), 483-505 (488).
530. Ibidem. 488.
531. Cosgrove Twitcheit, Europe and Africa, 63.
532. Declaration of intention with a view to associating Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles 
with the EEC, attached to the Rome Treaty.
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constitutional constraints, in that the 1954 Statuut van het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden (Statute of the Kingdom of the Netherlands) forbade the Dutch 
government to sign international treaties for Surinam and the Dutch Antilles.533 
Explicit consent of the two colonies was required. In 1960, however, the two 
countries expressed their desires to start negotiations with the EEC and, four years 
later, the Council o f Ministers gave its blessing to the association agreement.534
Although not falling under the formal regulations of the Yaoundé Convention, 
the two colonies hoped to benefit from the preferential partnership with the EEC. 
Like the AASM countries, they were allowed to impose duties or import quota’s 
to protect infant industries, as well as to make trade arrangements with third 
countries. The Dutch Antilles were particularly interested in expanding their 
exports of natural and refined oil products to the European market. At the time, 
the country’s refinery capacity amounted to no less than 40% of the EEC total. 
This dominant market position made France and the other member states protest 
against preferential treatment of non-EEC refineries. Eventually, the EEC 
countries gained some concessions in the form of safeguards against overabundant 
oil imports from the Caribbean, but all in all, the Dutch Antilles were happy with 
the outcome of the negotiations, the more so as the island economy had been in 
serious recession for several years and was in need of a boost.535 Surinam was a 
less controversial candidate for association, which made the negotiations run more 
smoothly. Paramaribo hoped to promote the exports of raw materials (mainly 
bauxite and wood) and agricultural products (rice and citrus fruits). Apart from 
the commercial advantages, the association provided the colonies with 
development funds (at $ 35 million for the period 1964-1969) which were 
primarily used for improving infrastructure and training skilled labour.536
The association was appreciated to such an extent that in 1969, the two 
countries emerged as ardent supporters of continuation of the special relationship 
with the EEC and feared that the then on-going negotiations on the introduction of 
global preferences for developing countries would have a negative impact on the 
existing regional arrangements. On this score, the colonies clashed with the 
government in The Hague, the latter being in full support of general global trade
533. R.A. Ferrier, Suriname en de Europese Economische Gemeenschap (Den Haag 1962), 1.
534. P.H.J.M. Houben, De Associatie van Suriname en de Nederlandse Antillen met de Europese 
Economische Gemeenschap (Leiden 1965), 104.
535. Ibidem, 18-20.
536. Ibidem, 103-105. The amount of $35 million, had originally been destined for Papua New- 
Guinea, but in 1963 the Netherlands relinquished control over this dependency.
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arrangements (see also next paragraph).537 Likewise, Surinam protested against 
the possibility of associating the Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean with 
the EEC market. Surinam argued that it would be unwise to associate countries 
which were already involved in a fairly closed trade system (in the Caribbean 
area),538 but the deeper reason lay in their fear of increasing competition for 
Surinam products on the European market. On this issue, the government 
reassured the governing board in Paramaribo that association with the Caribbean 
area was not going to be discussed before full British membership o f the EC.539 
Surinam further pushed the Dutch government to ensure that its associated 
position would not be affected in the event Surinam became independent (which 
would materialize in 1975540).541
Moreover, during the entire period, the Dutch government sought to limit 
possible adverse effects of the Yaoundé Convention on the export position of its 
former colony Indonesia. Dutch economic interests in Indonesia (independent 
since 1949) were still substantial and - to boost bilateral relations - the 
government supported Djakarta in gaining access to the EEC market.542 As a 
consequence of the high external tariff and the preferences given to AASM 
countries, Indonesia experienced difficulties in exporting palm oil and tapioca to 
the European market. The Dutch government consistently sought a reduction or 
even abolition of the EEC external tariff raised against tropical products coming 
from third countries. It thereby re-emphasized the impact of simultaneously 
running GATT negotiations on global trade liberalization. Global agreements 
should, in the Dutch view, gain precedence over regional schemes like Yaoundé. 
Similarly, the UNCTAD-instigated process of introducing general tariff 
preferences for developing countries was not to be hampered by so-called ‘reverse 
preferences’ agreed upon within the Yaoundé framework. The Netherlands 
fiercely protested against the latter’s damaging effects on the position of the 
developing countries. It was calculated that, as a consequence of ‘reverse
537. NA, MR (883), Notulen Ministerraad 11.10.1968.
538. NA, MR (866), ‘Nota inzake de verlenging en vernieuwing van de associatieovereenkomst 
met de Afrikaanse staten’, 24.10.1968.
539. Min. BZ, code 996 (EEG) 1965-1974, 4410, ‘Departementale bespreking Yaoundé IIP, 
27.7,1972.
540. By mid-1977 Suriname acceded to the Lomé Convention. The Netherlands Antilles decided 
not to participate in Lomé.
541. Min, BZ, code 996.430, EEG 1965-1974, Memorandum 569, ‘Toekomstige relaties van 
Suriname en de Nederlandse Antillen’, 3.7,1973.
•542. NA, MR 948, REZ, ‘Conclusies Coördinatie Commissie van 10 juli 1968’, 11.7.1968.
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preferences’, a country like Gabon lost more in terms of customs revenues than 
that it gained from EEC financial support.543
8.2.3 Reducing the national financial contribution to the European 
Development Fund (EDF) and  providing a level playing field for Dutch firms 
operating in Africa
When Yaoundé I started, the Dutch government was aware that domestic firms 
would have severe difficulties in penetrating the AASM-markets, given the 
traditionally advantageous position of French companies operating in the area. 
The government complained that even after granting independence to its African 
colonies, France protected the privileged position by concluding bilateral 
agreements with the associates.544 Despite this, The Hague hoped that in the 
longer run Dutch entrepreneurs would acquire better facilities to do business with 
and invest in the countries of French-speaking Africa. In practice, this was 
difficult to accomplish. In July 1968, the national employers’ organization 
informed the government that the distribution of projects financed from EDF 
monies still discriminated against Dutch firms. The European Commission had 
made several attempts to spread orders more evenly over the member states, but to 
no avail. The greatest proportion of EDF aid was given to infrastructural projects 
virtually excluding development of the industrial sector. As such, EDF mirrored 
the practices of former colonial donor states.545 To remedy this situation, the 
employers suggested modifying EDF policies along the following lines: a) to 
extend the group of beneficiaries of the Fund to countries with better market 
access for Dutch businesses like Nigeria and the East African countries, as well as 
(former) overseas territories, above all Indonesia.546
b) to stop prioritizing the financing of infrastructural works and, instead, 
concentrate on industrial and agrarian projects in the private sector; c) to counter
543. Ibidem.
544. Min. EZ, BEB, nr. 400, Note DGIH ‘inzake voortzetting van de associatie-overeenkomst met 
de G.A.S.M.’, 27.9.1968.
545. Martin Holland, The European Union and the Third World (Iloundmills 2002), 32.
546. The suggestion to include Indonesia fitted in with The Netherlands* plans to establish an 
international group of lenders to coordinate multilateral aid to Indonesia. Indeed, in 1967, the 
Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGG1) was founded. The other members included 
Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, the United States, as well as the Asian Development Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, United Nations Development Programme and World Bank.
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the privileged position of French business by rewarding joint tenders handed in by 
firms of different nationalities, preferably including a firm based in a smaller 
country (which would stimulate also the formation of joint ventures by Dutch 
firms and their French counterparts); d) to give the European Investment Bank a 
more substantial role in the management of the Fund; and e) to make sure that a 
minimum percentage of orders would be allocated to domestic firms, related to 
the size of the national contribution to the Fund. For example, the Dutch EDF 
contribution amounted to 9% of total contributions; the employers thought it 
reasonable that a minimum of 4.5% of EDF-financed orders should be awarded to 
Dutch firms.547 At that stage, it was calculated that the Netherlands acquired only 
2.16% of total orders deriving from EDF (see Table 3).548









Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
Total 730 100% 126 100%
Netherlands 66 9% 3 2.16%
Germany 246.5 34% 25 19.88%
France 246.5 34% 58 46.13%
Italy 100 14% 10 7.7%
AASM/third 23 18.4%
countries
Source: Min. EZ, BEB, Nr. 400, M01915, Note DGIH * inzake voortzetting van 
de associatie-overeenkomst met de G.A.S.M’, 27.9.1968.
From the above table it appears that France was not only the main contributor to 
EDF (together with Germany), but also by far the greatest beneficiary from EDF- 
financed orders, both in absolute and relative terms. As for order-acquisitions in 
francophone Africa, the Netherlands was the least privileged partner, both
547. Min. BZ, Code 996 (EEG) 1965-1974, nr. 4424, ‘Verlenging Conventie van Yaoundé', 
9.7.1968.
548. Min. EZ, BEB, nr. 400, MO 1915, Note DGIH ‘inzake voortzetting van de associatie­
overeenkomst met de G.A.S.M.’, 27.9.1968.
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absolutely and relatively. The fears government and business had expressed at the 
start of the association agreement in 1957 had proven justified. In the developing 
world, Dutch firms had acquired wide experience in doing business with their 
own (former) colonies and - to a lesser extent - with (former) British colonies, but 
they encountered continuous difficulties in entering the markets of French-Africa. 
For the government this was a major reason to plead against ever increasing 
national financial contributions to EDF.549 This plea found some support: under 
Yaoundé II (1969-1974) EDF was - only modestly - raised to a total of $ 918 
million, as compared with $ 581 million for the first five-year period (1958-1963) 
and $ 730 million under Yaoundé I. Such an absolute increase was not dramatic if 
seen over time, and the Dutch contribution in relative terms, remained fixed at 
9%550. Dutch worries were further qualified by the fact that also under Yaoundé II 
Surinam and the Dutch Antilles kept benefiting from subsidies and other 
privileges resulting from their association with the EEC. For the period 1969-1974, 
the two colonies received $ 32 million in the form of gifts and $ 9 million in 
loans.551
8.3 Discussion
During the entire negotiation period, running from the Venice conference until the 
signing of the Yaoundé II convention, France and the Netherlands found each 
other at the two extremes o f the political spectrum. Whereas France continuously 
pushed for preferential treatment and a privileged position of the francophone part 
of the African continent, the Dutch government proved reluctant, fearing that EC 
involvement in Africa would merely benefit French economic interests, at the 
expense of the other participants. Dutch firms found it hard to compete with their 
French counterparts on what they considered an extension of the French home 
market. From the beginning, the Dutch negotiating position was weak. The 
Benelux framework offered no solace, because Belgium, with its colonial interests 
in Africa (Congo), strongly leaned towards the French position. At times, the 
Netherlands received diplomatic support from Germany, but the German 
opposition to French plans and policies proved rather lukewarm. As a matter of
549. NA, MR 948, REZ, ‘Voortzetting van de financiële steun aan de GASM en de LGO', 
20.11.1968.
550. Dutch expenditure amounted to $ 80 million dollar, compared to 66 million in the previous 
period.
651. NA, MR 930, Memorandum Directie Integratie Europa, 2.7.1969.
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fact, the Dutch government, with its explicit stance, found itself rather isolated at 
the negotiating table. The only supposedly reliable ally on this issue, the United 
Kingdom, had not yet entered the EC. The government came to realize that 
approval of French Africa policies was the diplomatic price it had to pay for 
latter’s acceptance of the European common market. Advanced trade 
liberalization within the framework of the Six was given such a high priority in 
The Hague that the government eventually decided to push aside its opposition 
and go along with the association process, albeit always as a difficult partner. 
Association did not turn out to be a temporary phenomenon, as some in the 
government had hoped for. When French dependencies in Africa gained 
independence, preferential treatment and financial aid had to be continued, lest the 
abolishment of association would be regarded as a form of punishment for 
accepting independence. Hence, The Hague’s acceptance of the Yaoundé treaties. 
In this respect association resembled an eel-trap: having entered the first 
compartment of the trap one could still swim, but in a forward direction only, i.e. 
into the next compartment.
Contrary to its traditional policies, the Dutch government was not prepared to 
allow the European Commission to play a substantial role on the EC-Africa issue. 
While generally valuing the Commission’s position as an honest broker between 
the member states, in the Yaoundé process, the Dutch government saw no real 
advantage in allowing the Commission to play a prominent and independent role. 
This was primarily caused by negative perceptions of how the Commission’s 
General Directorate for Associated Countries was assembled and operated. The 
Hague saw DG VIII as basically a French dominated bulwark, directed by the 
responsible Commissioners Lemaignen and Rochereau, both Frenchmen. Also, 
the fact that the French fonctionnaire Jacques Fenrandi was put in charge of the 
European investment fund did not contribute to the Dutch trust in the policies and 
directives coming from Brussels. Ironically, as Dimier and McGeever 
demonstrate, also the French government took a sceptic view of DG VIII’s 
operations, particularly its attempts to acquire a more independent EC role on the 
African continent. It was one of the very few issues on which Paris and The 
Hague easily found agreement.
Throughout the 1960s, The Hague’s policy towards EEC and Africa was 
characterized by three dominant objectives. Firstly, extending the Yaoundé 
preferences to other, non-French-speaking African countries. Secondly, avoiding 
or reducing discriminative practices against (former) Dutch overseas territories.
245
And thirdly, reducing the national contribution to EDF and furthering a level 
playing field for Dutch firms operating in Africa.
As said above, ‘Yaoundé’ was never seen as a popular instrument in The 
Hague, but at the same time we witness a gradual change of perspective during 
the period under discussion. At the end of the 1960s and the early 1970s, 
‘Yaoundé’ developed from a predominantly French colonial problem into a 
possible framework for the North to support the countries of the South. In other 
words, the EC’s Africa policy was increasingly regarded as a positive vehicle to 
further development in the Third World. In the Netherlands, the change in 
Zeitgeist became visible in the appointment of a Minister for Development Aid at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had his own impact on the framing of 
government policy. This change of perspective culminated with the installation of 
a centre-left government coalition in 1973, a coalition which turned development 
co-operation into one of its key policy issues.
Having said that, ‘Yaoundé’ kept being seen as too limited a framework for 
development and, therefore, the Netherlands strongly welcomed the inclusion of 
the Anglophone countries in the association framework, under the Lomé 
agreement of 1975. This was in line with the government’s long-time preference 
for integration of the entire African continent. However, even the context of 
‘Lomé’ was seen as suboptimal. The government placed its hopes in wider - less 
regional - schemes, preferably such as those offered by organizations like GATT 
and UNCTAD, to provide more general solutions for global trade problems.
The EEC Treaty and the subsequent association treaties have been of the 
greatest importance for EEC policies with regard to the developing countries. As 
Martin Holland words it: ‘Whilst the Treaty was myopic in its largely 
francophone definition of the Third World this framework represents the origin of 
Europe’s fragmented and differentiated approach.’ The consequences were dire, 
for the developing countries, as well as for EEC itself. Since the dependency of 
francophone Africa on France for aid and trade, Cosgrove Twitchett argues, 
‘existed independently of the EEC and was in no way consequential to it’, the 
majority of the original member-states were ‘extremely loath to become involved 
with former African colonies’.552 The Netherlands was not amongst the latter. 
Throughout the EEC’s formative years Dutch diplomacy sought to overcome the 
limitations of selective association and to promote a stance in which human need 
and economic interests rather than historical ties would constitute the driving
552. Cosgrove Twitchett, Europe and Africa, 122.
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C o n c l u d in g  O b s e r v a t io n s
Looking back on the Netherlands* role in European integration during the 1950s 
and 1960s, Joseph Luns, the country’s long standing foreign minister depicted 
himself as an exponent of ‘the Dutch vision’. A vision that enabled the country to 
act as a ‘leading force’ in Europe, thus demonstrating that in specific 
constellations a middle-sized power can play a role of importance.553
What was this ‘Dutch vision’ and was Luns right in ascribing it such 
importance? In this book we set out to investigate whether, under which 
conditions and by which means the Netherlands have exerted engineering 
influence on the economic and institutional architecture of the European 
Economic Community - as a forerunner of the present-day European Union - 
during the Community’s formative years (1952-1973).
Our analysis demonstrates that the Netherlands have pursued a policy of 
engineering influence on European cooperation and integration throughout the 
period under scrutiny. From the late 1940s onwards, successive Dutch 
governments showed themselves convinced that the economic future of the 
country lay in Europe and that economic disarmament in the highly protectionist 
intra-European trade relations was elementary for the country’s economic survival 
and its future prosperity: Loss of empire, the economic collapse of the German 
hinterland, industrialization objectives and the limitations of the country’s 
domestic market - to mention the most important motives - were all conducive to 
an activist policy aimed at liberalizing intra-European trade. In this respect, Dutch 
diplomacy during the 1952-1973 period can well be described in Milward’s 
famous characterization as a ‘European rescue of the nation state’554.
Conceiving the Common Market
Jan Willem Beyen, on becoming Foreign Minister of the Netherlands in the Fall 
of 1952, brought about a structural change in the country’s European policy. He 
redirected and refocused the Netherlands’ European liberalization campaign away 
from the broad Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)
553. Michcl van der Plas, Luns: ‘Ik herinner mij... \  Vrijmoedige herinneringen van Mr. J.M.A.H. 
Luns zoals verteld aan Michel van der Plas (Leiden 1972), 171.
554. Allan S. Milward, The European Rescue o f the Nation-State (London 1992)
249
framework to the more limited grouping of the six members of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC), precisely for the reason that in this ‘little Europe’, 
by means of supranationalism, results could be obtained where OEEC had failed. 
His 1952 Beyen Plan proposed a supranationally supervised regional economic 
bloc amongst the six ECSC countries. Beyen, in the course of his ministry, 
increasingly advocated supranational institutions and supranational decision­
making in Europe. He actively pursued these aims, not for federalist reasons, but 
as a means to an end, to wit, to further and protect the Netherlands’ economic and 
political interests. From the second half of the 1950s onwards the Beyen approach 
- which we could call ‘functional supranationalism’ - became a leading principle 
of the Netherlands’ policy on Europe. The core o f this functional supranationalism 
was a transfer of national competences to a supranational community endowed 
with a strong executive.
Originally, Beyen presented his Customs Union project as a collateral to the 
projected European Political Community (EPC). The accompanying Dutch stance 
‘No political integration without economic integration’ did not go down well with 
Germany’s Federal Chancellor Adenauer, who preferred to hammer through the 
EPC Treaty without further economic complications. Once timely and efficient 
Benelux diplomatic cooperation had staved off this threat, French reluctance to 
engage in economic liberalization had to be overcome. Beyen’s tactic, after 
having successfully obtained the agreement of the other four ECSC countries on 
the basics of his Plan, was aimed at isolating France. Increasing American 
pressure on France, he reckoned, would eventually force Paris to accept the 
proposed liberalization of trade relations amongst the Six. This tactic did not work. 
The French Parliament’s down-voting of the European Defence Community 
Treaty in August 1954 also meant the downfall o f the EPC. Beyen’s campaign for 
economic disarmament among the Six came to a grinding halt.
Amidst general scepticism Beyen relaunched his Plan in the Spring of 1955. 
The advantages to be expected of a liberal trade regime in Western Europe for the 
Netherlands, Beyen reasoned, were as formidable as ever. A new government in 
France from February 1955 onwards meant decidedly improved and propitious 
circumstances for a relaunch of his Plan. Many begged to differ; in various 
European capitals, in the Dutch government, as well as in Beyen’s Foreign 
Ministry itself. In fact, in the latter, only the Western Cooperation Section showed 
support for and commitment to the New Beyen Plan. Beyen stuck to his guns. He 
deprecated the claim that the fate of EDC and EPC had demonstrated that Europe
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was unfit for new supranational institutions in general: ‘The ruining of the EDC 
project has not affected the approach of the Dutch government’. Prime minister 
Drees, too, was among those who were sceptical about the enterprise, fearing the 
establishment of yet another expensive international institution whose value for 
the Netherlands would be far from assured. The federalist minority in Cabinet, led 
by Agriculture minister Mansholt, on the other hand, criticized Beyen for once 
again focusing on the traditional Dutch interest, i.e. the furthering of intra- 
European trade. Instead, the Dutch initiative should first and foremost be aimed at 
the establishment of a political community. In answering his critics, Beyen 
stressed the need for a pro-active policy stance: now that plans for European 
economic cooperation, generally on an intergovernmental footing, were springing 
up like mushrooms, it would be most unfortunate if the Dutch found themselves in 
a position in which they could only react to proposals put forward by others.
In spite of all this criticism Beyen miraculously obtained Cabinet permission 
to prepare for a Benelux initiative on the issue. He contacted Belgian foreign 
minister Spaak, who advocated further sectoral integration in the areas of 
transport, classical energy and - above all - nuclear energy. In spite of Spaak’s 
initial doubts whether it made sense to initiate a proposal presumably 
unacceptable to France, he eventually agreed to a combined approach. In their 
historic hybrid memorandum for the July 1955 Messina conference of the ECSC 
countries, Benelux proposed the setting up of an intergovernmental conference to 
negotiate both Spaak’s Monnet inspired sectoral integration issues, as well as the 
question of horizontal integration, i.e. the establishment of a European common 
market along the lines of the Beyen Plan. By eschewing the notion of 
‘supranationalism’ and a further watering down of the Benelux proposals to the 
status of study objects, the Six at Messina managed to arrive at a compromise 
based on the Benelux memorandum. The Messina-declaration envisaged an 
intergovernmental conference on both branches of the Benelux proposal, prepared 
by an experts conference under chairmanship of a ‘political personality’.
In the literature the historical importance of ‘Messina’ is sometimes 
overrated. What basically happened is threefold. Firstly, Messina put European 
integration back on the negotiation table. Secondly, it was decided that the new 
talks would be on economic integration and thirdly, a certain method for these 
talks was agreed upon.
Thus, Messina created important conditions for successful negotiations. The 
decisive break through for the Beyen Plan, however, took place after this
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ministerial conference. Between June and September 1955, to the delight of the 
Dutch delegation at the Brussels experts’ conference, the Common Market issue 
underwent a remarkable upgrading from being an additional topic to the principal 
objective of the intergovernmental negotiations among the Six. Belgian foreign 
minister Spaak, appointed as the abovementioned political personality presiding 
the conference, played an important role in this agenda revolution. His personal 
conversion to the Beyen plan is to be attributed to ECSC representative Pierre 
Uri’s report on the Coal and Steel Community’s experiences in regional 
integration and the lessons to be drawn from the latter for future horizontal 
integration. Spaak went hook, line and sinker for this brilliant piece of political 
economy and, from then on, considered the Common Market issue the central 
issue of the negotiations. An additional benefit for the Dutch accrued from the Uri 
report in that it argued against overall levelling of wage levels and social 
securities as advocated by the French and dreaded by the Dutch.
On the institutional issue, however, in the 1957 Rome Treaty, the Dutch did 
not obtain the ‘High Authority’ like central role for the projected Executive, 
Beyen and the Netherlands’ government had advocated. The European 
Commission’s own decision-making powers turned out to be of a much more 
limited nature than the Netherlands deemed desirable for effective implementation 
of the Common Market and its adherent policies. Neither was the external profile 
of the new European Economic Community according to the Netherlands’ wishes. 
Overly protectionist in its relations with third countries as it was and, by 
introducing an unattractive association policy with Belgian and French colonies 
on top of this, it was looked upon by The Hague with dismay. On agriculture, the 
single most important export sector for the Dutch, the Treaty did not go beyond 
formulating a number of general principles.
Realising the Beyen Plan
All in all, on the one hand the Rome Treaty and its subsequent implementation 
constituted an important diplomatic victory for the Netherlands in that it 
committed the Six to the Customs Union and, eventually, the Common Market so 
highly valued and tenaciously strived for by The Hague. On the other hand the 
EEC’s institutional set-up, policy competences and external economic and 
political profile ended up a long shot from The Hague’s ideals and preferences.
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Taking into consideration the situational limitations on the Netherlands’ 
engineerial influence during the negotiations, however, this outcome is not 
surprising. Dutch policy initiatives and Benelux agenda-setting politics could 
thrive in a setting in which both France and Germany were internally deeply 
divided on the European integration issue. In Germany, during most of the 1950s, 
there was an ongoing debate between economics minister Erhard, who advocated 
liberalization on a global scale and Federal Chancellor Adenauer, who wanted 
regional arrangements with - above all - France. In France, the French induced 
downfall of the French proposed EDC, triggered off ever more acrimonious 
debates on France and Europe. The opposite was the case when in November 
1956, Adenauer declared the Brussels negotiations ‘Chef-Sache’ and travelled to 
Paris for direct talks with his French counterpart Guy Mollet. If and when - and 
this goes for the entire period under scrutiny - French-German bilateral 
deliberations get under way and turn out to be fruitful it is exceedingly difficult 
for the three Benelux countries to exert an active, let alone engineerial, influence 
on the eventual outcome of the negotiations. During the 1955-1957 EEC 
negotiations, this was a fortiori the case, now that the Benelux countries were 
divided amongst themselves.
Benelux foreign policy cooperation during the 1950s, enabled Luxemburg, 
Belgium and the Netherlands to streamline their policy positions in a way which 
greatly enhanced their collective engineering influence, as demonstrated in the 
above on a number of occasions (rendering innocuous Adenauer’s institutionalist 
EPC programme, manoeuvring the relance-agenda, upgrading the Common 
Market-issue. And we could relate many more). As such, Benelux foreign policy 
cooperation provided The Hague with a leverage it could never have had on its 
own. Such successes may have given rise to a myth: the myth that it was Benelux 
foreign policy cooperation which enabled the three countries to, if not to dominate 
the EEC negotiations, at least influence their outcome to an extent well beyond 
their power station. The primary source material in the Netherlands’ archives 
sends such interpretations to the shredder: The Spaak presidency, so instrumental 
in bringing about the June-August 1955 agenda revolution, subsequently 
torpedoed Benelux’ chances of setting pressure as a collective. Benelux 
cooperation remained inoperative because Spaak, eager to arrive at compromises 
acceptable to France and Germany, explicitly and implicitly discouraged the 
Belgian delegation at the conference to take sides with the Dutch. Since
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Luxembourg tended to follow the Belgian point of view, arriving at a common 
Benelux stance was rendered well nigh impossible.
Be that as it may, Benelux provided its three constituent countries with 
another source of influence, in that it acted as a test laboratory for regional 
economic integration. As the first post W W II regional experiment in cross border 
economic disarmament, Benelux provided lessons for regional integration in a 
wider European framework. Our analysis supports that Benelux demonstrated, 
firstly, that the benefits of regional economic integration, in terms of economic 
growth, went well beyond what was generally expected. On this issue, the 
spectacular development o f intra-Benelux trade and the recognition of a Benelux- 
trade enhancing effect appears to have played an important role in launching 
Beyen’s campaign for establishing a Benelux-like customs union on a broader 
European base. Beyen’s proposal was one amongst many. After all, it did not take 
a genius to wonder whether the tempestuous development of intra-Benelux trade 
was convertible to a European scale.
Secondly, Benelux left its empirical mark on the so-called policy 
harmonisation issue. This issue addresses the question as to which extent regional 
integration presupposes harmonization of national economic and social policies. 
The Hague’s governing elite distilled from Benelux experiences the lesson that 
policy harmonization could indeed be the result of, rather than a condition for, 
market liberalization. In Belgium, due to discontent with unexpected side effects 
from Benelux, the lesson was the opposite. During the negotiations leading to the 
Treaties of Rome, Benelux experiences in this respect served as a point of 
reference, sometimes as an example and sometimes as a spectre.
Thirdly and lastly, Benelux as a regional economic integration experiment 
demonstrated that the transformation from a national to a larger, encompassing 
Benelux market took place without dramatic structural changes for the economies 
involved. Eliminating trade restrictions resulted in increased competition and led 
in some industries to a loss of capital and jobs. In general, however, such 
adjustment problems were limited and of a temporary nature. The mild character 
of the Benelux adjustment process can partly be explained by the fact that 
sensitive sectors, agriculture above all, were excluded from the Benelux 
liberalization process. O f comparable importance was the finding that economic 
specialization resulting from Benelux liberalization manifested itself not so much 
between but rather within existing branches of industry, thus leading to more
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complementary rather than more competing production structures. Benelux also 
taught that the dynamic effects of regional integration could be relied upon to 
greatly diminish differences between competitive production structures.
During the EEC negotiations the Netherlands habitually referred to Benelux 
experiences and lessons as empirical proof and justification for The Hague’s 
policy preferences. More than occasionally, however, the outcomes of the 
Benelux laboratory for regional integration, effectively pleaded against Dutch 
preferences for solutions amongst the Six. On a number of essential issues - 
economic and social policy harmonisation, the institutional set-up, the inclusion of 
agriculture in the common market - Benelux was demonstrably not practising 
what it preached. Such cases of extreme divergence between Benelux practice and 
the Beyen/Luns programme clearly went to the detriment of Dutch capabilities at 
exerting engineering influence within the European framework.
Defending the Community
Riding the tide of economic growth and prosperity, the Six completed Beyen’s 
Customs Union by the l sl of July 1968, one and half years before schedule. In 
spite of the Rome Treaties and vagueness on agriculture, the Six managed to 
hammer out a Common Agricultural Policy, which increasingly dominated EEC 
decision-making: when in April 1965 the Cals government came to power ‘EEC’ 
more or less equalled ‘agriculture’, as 95% of the Community budget, 90% of its 
regulations and 70% of the time spent on Council meetings was CAP-related. For 
the Netherlands, as the largest agricultural exporter among the Six, the CAP 
represented a new life line: Even though CAP was of a dangerously protectionist 
nature in trade relations with third countries, it provided Dutch farming interests 
with a long sought for sizeable export market in continental Europe. By and large, 
and notwithstanding their differences on CAP’S protectionist nature, the 
Netherlands and France saw eye to eye with each other on the issues of agriculture 
and agricultural policy in Europe. Actually, in most EEC related affairs the two 
countries cooperated smoothly. Likewise, in (post)colonial affairs mutual 
understanding and help was the norm. French support for The Hague during the 
Dutch New Guinea conflict was returned by Dutch support for Paris in the 
Algerian war.
On European high politics, however, during most of the 1960s, Dutch-French 
relations were complicated - to put it mildly. In The Hague’s analysis the downfall
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of the French fourth republic turned France into the sick man of Western Europe. 
The democratic intentions and destiny of the new De Gaulle regime were 
questioned severely. In the eyes of many Dutch policy makers, De Gaulle and his 
new republic were an expression of France's problems, rather than part of a hoped 
for solution. For the latter, De Gaulle’s September 1958 letter to MacMillan and 
Eisenhower, proposing a ‘triple directorate’ for NATO consisting of the USA, the 
UK and France, seemed the definite proof that in his desire to restore French 
‘grandeur’, the new French president was living in a cloud cuckoo land.
In this psychological-political context the French 1959-1962 proposals for a 
European Political Union came as a most unwelcome visitor. The Hague 
deprecated a continental foreign-policy grouping under French or Franco-German 
guidance. It did so for Atlanticist reasons, but also because from the Netherlands' 
perspective, it would never make sense to create an additional political division of 
Western Europe over and above the economic one represented by the EEC. In 
short, De Gaulle’s geo-political ambitions should not be allowed to impede future 
British EEC membership. Due to German unpredictability - it was far from clear 
how far Chancellor Adenauer would go to gratify De Gaulle - as well as the 
‘maladie de compromis’ which The Hague ascribed to its Benelux-partners a 
positive outcome for the Netherlands was far from certain. In fact, at the February 
1961 Paris conference of the Six, the Hague government found itself in a 
dangerously isolated position. The Netherlands’ ‘préalable anglais', insisting on 
British participation as a basic condition for foreign-policy cooperation proved 
effective, in that a number of safeguards for NATO and the Communities could be 
agreed upon. On the main issue, however, whether the Six should proceed without 
British participation, no agreement could be reached and in December 1961, 
Belgian foreign minister Spaak broke with the common Benelux front, bowed to 
the majority and showed himself willing to negotiate on the basis of the French 
European Political Union propositions. It was De Gaulle who came to the rescue 
of the Netherlands' negotiators by - arguably intentionally - grossly overplaying 
his hand in drafting his January 1962 EPU proposal.
De Gaulle’s killing of the EPU negotiations, however, did not mean that the 
Netherlands could lean back and consider its vision on Europe as taken for 
granted. This vision concentrated on the establishment of a European common 
market, in which process a supranational executive equipped with far-reaching 
powers was deemed elementary. Dutch functional or instrumental 
supranationalism advocated an institutional structure in which decision-making
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powers in the Community lay with the Executive, that being the European 
Commission, on all questions related to the establishment and practical 
functioning of the common market. This view on European governance, as 
devised by Beyen, set the tone for future decades. From the establishment of the 
Community in 1958 onwards, the Netherlands attempted to defend the powers of 
the European Commission, advocated their extension, supported the principle of 
majority voting in EEC decision-making, as well as stressing the sovereign 
equality of the EC Member States. Once again, it should be pointed out that this 
stance reflected a functional or instrumental approach towards supranationalism, 
rather than a federalist creed (hence: functional supranationalism, or ‘the 
community method’). In government circles, supranationalism, like European 
integration as a whole, was considered a means to an end.
The stress on the Commission’s position, as the pivot around which the other 
actors in the decision-making process were to turn, seems attributable to a 
combination of explanatory factors.
Firstly, an important part was played by the conviction among Dutch policy 
makers that an intergovernmental organisation would be insufficiently capable of 
circumventing important national interests where this was necessary, to imple­
ment Treaty provisions. This applied in particular to the much sought for 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), crucially important to Dutch exports.
A second reason for placing the European Commission at the fore was 
constituted by the experience Dutch policy makers had accrued in the Benelux 
context. The slow, difficult progress in developing Benelux from a customs union 
towards a full and functioning economic union was, in their view, the fault of its 
weak institutional structure. It was precisely because Benelux, as an intergovern­
mental organization, had no supranational agencies with their own powers that it 
was so difficult to align the policies of the three participatory states and bring 
about a genuine free market in farm products. If primacy in the decision-making 
process was not placed with the Commission, Treaty agreements would be surely 
torpedoed in the Council of Ministers because of lack of unanimity. In short: 
Benelux was taken as a countermodel for the administrative organization of the 
EEC.
A third factor was the consideration that the rights and interests of medium 
and small Member States would best be respected in a supranational context. 
Precisely this consideration testified to the Dutch fear of being locked into a 
protectionist block dominated by a Franco-German directorate. Failing British
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participation in the Communities, The Hague sought guarantees against such 
domination by the incorporation of Member States on as equal a footing as 
possible in Community decision-making. In this latter respect particularly, 
supranationalism embodied the defensive trait, clearly recognisable during the 
Fouchet negotiations in Dutch policy makers’ attacks on intergovernmental 
decision making structures in which smaller nations, though formally entitled to a 
veto, de facto  found themselves forced to follow the lead of the larger ones and 
the fails accomplis with which the latter confronted them.
De Gaulle’s political harakiri of January 1962 did bring considerable relief 
which, however, could not last. In the Summer of 1965 the French Presidents’ 
‘empty chair crisis’ hit Europe in its central organs. Once again the Netherlands 
had to come to the rescue of the European Communities. This time De Gaulle 
went for an all-out attack, aiming to maim both the European Commission and 
Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of Ministers. The second half of 1965 
witnessed a new constellation in Europe, in that Germany, Italy and the three 
Benelux countries for the first time managed to uphold a lasting common front 
against French power politics
At the outset of the crisis, Dutch diplomacy was, to a large degree, dictated 
by domestic policy considerations. A well-organized cross-party federalist 
majority in Parliament saddled the Cals coalition government with an outspoken 
federalist agenda and coupled its political survival to its record on supporting 
European institutions. When French unilateralism struck, The Hague’s emphasis 
shifted rapidly from the offensive towards the defensive, prioritising the 
maintenance of the common front of the Five in order to protect the EEC and its 
communitarian character.
The 1965-1966 crisis may be characterized as yet another episode in a series 
of diplomatic disagreements on the future of European integration during the 
1960s. As in the past, the French Republic and the Netherlands represented pole 
positions: The Hague putting up an indefatigable defence of the European 
Community’s supranational character versus determined attempts by Paris to undo 
the communitarian elements of the Rome Treaty. Due to their common front, the 
Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg managed to maintain a 
united stance against French pressure; these five countries carried the day and The 
Hague ‘left the battlefield victorious’, as worded by the then State Secretary for 
European affairs in the Netherlands.
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Nevertheless, the outcome of the crisis, known as the ‘Luxembourg 
compromise’, was discouraging, at least in the short run. The Hague’s valiant 
attempts at creating a more supranational Community had been thwarted. 
Particularly its efforts to strengthen the controlling and legislative powers of the 
European Parliament had proven ill-fated. Subsequent developments proved, 
however, that in the longer run, the German-Dutch supported communitarian 
approach was to prevail overD e Gaulle’s short-term successes. Today’s European 
Union, in which qualifying majorities and blocking minorities are the order of the 
day and the co-decision procedure has upgraded the European Parliament to a co­
legislative role, a fortiori reflects the victory of communitarianism over De 
Gaulle’s confederal ideas.
De Gaulle’s resignation as French president in April 1969 opened new 
avenues, as demonstrated by the December 1969 Hague summit conference. ‘The 
Hague’ would turn out to be the summit which initiated both the first attempt at 
Economic and Monetary Union as well as European Political Cooperation. Along 
with these two fundamental initiatives actual enlargement was also on the agenda, 
all three to become of the greatest importance in the Communities’ development 
during the 1970s and later decades. In terms of engineering influence, the 
historical importance of the Hague summit is, by and large, to be attributed to the 
subsequent implementation and follow-up of the conclusions it reached. Had the 
subsequent Brussels conference, the Wemer and Davignon committees and the 
enlargement negotiations been unsuccessful, the by now famous triptych 
‘completion, widening and deepening’ would have remained null and void. In this 
respect the ‘spirit of the Hague’ appears to have been of more importance than the 
actual wording of the compromises arrived at in the Ridderzaal.
What was fundamentally new about the Hague summit was the decisive role 
played by the West-German government, led by Chancellor Brandt. The German 
contribution went well beyond its advocacy of EMU. For the first time - from The 
Hague’s perspective - widening and deepening the Community, rather than 
compromising with France, had become the Federal Republic’s priority. For 
Foreign Minister Luns the summit was a definite sign that the Adenauer days o f 
Germany blindly accommodating France were over. As such, for the Netherlands, 
the German performance heralded a new era in European integration. The 
Bundesrepublik at long last freed itself of its historically determined reticence in 
post-war European affairs and, thus emancipated, was ready and willing to lead 
the Community towards further integration and against future attempts at
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dominance. For the Netherlands, German emancipation was all the more 
important in that, in terms of engineering influence, German-Dutch relations 
represented an alternative for Benelux foreign policy cooperation. This was 
attractive, since foreign policy cooperation between Belgium and the Netherlands, 
in comparison with its impressive 1950s track record, had proved lifeless and 
ineffective, during most of the 1960s.
Externalising Europe, reluctantly
As far as the country's Atlantic ties and the Netherlands’ geo-political situation 
were concerned, European integration, in the eyes of The Hague’s foreign policy 
elite, constituted a complication rather than a means to exert engineering influence. 
On this issue, Europe came at a price.
As a result of this, the government’s approach of European Political Co­
operation was lukewarm. EPC was seen as potentially dangerous in that it could 
be used as a Trojan Horse for weakening the Atlantic link, sidelining the 
Commission and corrupting the community’s supranational calling. Nevertheless, 
EPC foreign policy consultations were to be judged favourably as long as one 
kept in mind that their intergovernmental set-up seriously limited their scope and 
that the talks should not be to the detriment of NATO unity. From a 
communitarian perspective, EPC was considered of little importance: the creation 
of a foreign-political roof over the customs union and later the common market 
was deemed less urgent, especially if this roof lacked a connection with the EC’s 
supranational foundation. This policy line was to remain unaltered, at least until 
the end of the Cold W ar in 1990.
At times, however, European policy co-ordination and group diplomacy was 
not an option, but a dire necessity. Especially the country’s isolated geo-political 
position during the 1973-1974 Middle Eastern crisis and oil boycott was 
instructive in teaching interdependence the hard way. At this point, it seemed that, 
for the first time since the second World War- perhaps with the exception of the 
de-colonisation of the Dutch Indies and New Guinea - the Atlantic bond failed to 
give the Netherlands the desired protection and coverage against external threats. 
Despite the existence of a strong sense of solidarity between the US and the 
Netherlands, OPEC’s oil policy hurt the Netherlands and manoeuvred the country 
into a vulnerable and diplomatically isolated position. It took the government 
some time before it realised that going a Sonderweg and ignoring EPC harmed the
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country’s national interest. Here Europe came at a price, to wit a humbling 
experience: for a change, the Atlantic framework alone did not suffice. Instead, 
Europe provided the country with an ‘umbrella’ against unilateral vindication by 
third countries.
Also, the external dimension of the Communities constituted a problem for 
the Netherlands in the country’s relations with the developing world. First of all 
there was the issue of required associative status with the Common Market for 
French and Belgian colonies in - above all - Africa. Association did not turn out to 
be a temporary phenomenon, as some in the Dutch government had hoped for. 
When French dependencies in Africa gained independence, preferential treatment 
and financial aid had to be continued, lest the abolishment of association would be 
regarded as a form of punishment for accepting independence. Hence, the 
Hague’s acceptance of the Yaoundé treaties. In this respect, association resembled 
an eel-trap: having entered the first compartment of the trap one could still swim, 
but in a forward direction only, i.e. into the next compartment.
Contrary to the main line of its European policies, the Dutch government was 
not prepared to allow the European Commission to play a substantial role on the 
EC-Africa issue. While generally valuing the Commission’s position as an honest 
broker between the member states, the Dutch government saw no real advantage 
in allowing the Commission to play a prominent and independent role in the 
Yaoundé process. This finding emphasizes the functional, or instrumental, rather 
than federalist nature of Dutch supranationalism at the time. Throughout the 
1960s, The Hague’s policy towards EEC and Africa was characterized by three 
dominant objectives. Firstly, extending the Yaoundé preferences to other, non- 
French-speaking African countries. Secondly, avoiding or reducing discriminative 
practices against (former) Dutch colonies. And thirdly, reducing the national 
contribution to EDF and furthering a level playing field for Dutch firms operating 
in Africa.
Benelux and Small States ’ Politics
Under specific constellations smaller countries can play a role of amazing 
relevance. Throughout the 1950s Benelux cooperation provided the Netherlands 
with a unique framework for furthering the Netherlands’ interests in Europe. 
Admittedly, the policy instruments applied by The Hague at the European 
negotiation tables were typically of the soft power variety: practical and academic
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experience with regional economic integration, smart ideas, agenda manipulation 
and teaming up with the Belgians and Luxembourgians. Again, room for 
manoeuvre for the Netherlands and its Benelux partners was by and large 
determined by the ongoing relationship between France and Germany. Konrad 
Adenauer was the key figure in determining the leeway for the Netherlands and its 
Benelux partners. If and when the German Chancellor decided to prioritize on a 
Franco-German understanding - and this was generally the case - 
Benelux’ chances at effectively promoting diverging negotiation outcomes were 
slender, at least on major issues. Throughout the Adenauer era this state of affairs 
underlined the importance of Benelux cooperation for The Hague: A united 
Benelux stance could make the difference. A common Benelux position was 
considered a potential asset and a proved source of influence. Conversely, a 
divided Benelux smacked of impotence and a possibly isolated position for the 
Netherlands amongst the Six.
The German Chancellor’s departure from active politics in 1963 constituted 
an important change: Adenauer’s successors in Bonn, by prioritizing a European 
understanding amongst the Six, considerably broadened The Hague’s room for 
manoeuvre. Likewise, France’s president De Gaulle’s unilateral policy choices 
contributed to a new power constellation within the EEC, in which it was France, 
rather than the Netherlands that painted itself into a comer. Benelux unity in 
European politics survived as an ideal, but lost out against the new reality in 
which a basic understanding between Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries 
(The Five) on the communitarian destiny of the Community and its open character 
prevailed. Hence we can conclude that in the course of the 1960s European 
pioneer Benelux was overtaken by the EEC, not just on the issue of regional 
economic integration but also in terms of foreign policy cooperation. The 
emancipation of Germany’s European policy, effective cooperation between the 
Five and a new dawn in France collectively triumphed in the Hague summit of 
December 1969.
For the Netherlands and its Benelux partners the end of the Adenauer era can 
well be likened to the situation for the smaller countries in Europe at the end of 
the XIX century. Back then, disagreement amongst the major powers and a 
concomitant decline of the Concert of Europe led to a considerable increase in 
Small Power influence: the Smaller Powers had grown in importance as potential
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allies for both the entente cord tale and the central continental powers.555 In this 
respect, the teaming up of the Five for a communitarian Europe is to be seen not 
only as the outcome of lofty shared ideals but also as a political alliance in the 
best of Europe’s political traditions. All through the 1960s, being part of an 
effective alliance cum sophisticated dynamic enabled the Netherlands to play an 
essential role in the process of European integration.
Making Europe and the world
The Netherlands pursued a course of engineering influence during the EEC’s 
formative years with a view to furthering the country’s national interests. Jan 
Willem Beyen laid the foundation for a Dutch European policy which was 
outstanding in that it acknowledged European interdependence and the need for 
European mutual economic disarmament at a time in which these concepts were 
far from self-evident.
What goes for Europe, goes for the world. Paraphrasing Mathisen556 we 
observe that there are strong indications that, in the longer run and greater scheme 
of things, the hope of the Smaller Powers rests with the further development of 
world institutions, for it is the nature of things that Smaller Powers’ rights can be 
better safeguarded by law and order than by the mailed fist.
555. C.A. Tamse, 'Kleine landen als een bijzondere categorie van internationale actoren. Het 
geval van Nederland en Belgis (1830-1914), in: C.A. Tamse, Het huis van Oranje en andere 
politieke mythes (Amsterdam 2002), 40-70 (64), previously published in W.F. de Gaay 
Forman a.o. (eds), Achter den tijd. Opstellen aangeboden aan dr. G. Puchinger ter gelegen­
heid van zijn 65e verjaardag (Haarlem 1986), 183-209.




A NOTE ON TIIE MAKING OF THE NETHERLANDS’ EUROPEAN POLICY DURING 
THE 1950s AND 1960s
The Netherlands’ policies on Europe have to be understood against the 
background of the country’s political system and the structure and traditions of 
The Hague’s governmental apparatus. In the Dutch system of government, apart 
from responsibility for their departments, ministers bear collective responsibility 
for government policy in general. At the same time, all ministers have the same 
constitutional status and enjoy a large measure of autonomy in determining their 
department’s policy.
During the 1952-1973 period covered by this study, European policy was 
generally considered foreign policy. The contemporary constellation, in which 
European policy making increasingly determines the domestic policy makers’ 
room for manoeuvre, was non-existent. Direct transgovemmental contacts 
between Dutch ministries and their foreign counterparts, currently a perfectly 
normal phenomenon, were unheard of at the time. Societal interests groups too 
were limited in their cross border ambitions and concentrated on domestic issues.
The same went for the Minister-President, the prime minister, who limited 
himself to a reticent role in matters of foreign and European policy. The prime- 
ministers of the period under scrutiny - Drees, De Quay, Marijnen, Cals, Zijlstra, 
De Jong and Biesheuvel - were firsts among equals, rather than leaders of 
government as in Britain, Germany or France. Presiding three to five party 
coalition governments their first responsibility was to maintain the domestic 
political balance underlying the ruling coalition. Although both Drees and De 
Quay attempted to increase their grip on foreign policy making, these attempts 
remained unsuccessful.
Thus, during the two decades covered by this study, the Dutch prime-minister 
acted as chairman of the Cabinet rather than political leader of the government, 
which helps to understand why foreign ministers Stikker, Beyen, Lu ns and 
Schmelzer played the main role in both initiating and implementing the 
Netherlands’ foreign policy. They are the hero’s of the tale told in this thesis, 
rather than the prime ministers of the period. Luns, serving the country as foreign 
minister for most of the period under scrutiny (1952-1973), experienced particular
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freedom of manoeuvre, successfully capitalizing on his experience, popularity and 
his ministry’s information edge in European affairs.
Under these circumstances, good coordination procedures in order to arrive at 
an unambiguous policy, are of the essence.
At ministerial level this coordination took place in the full session of the 
Council of Ministers or in one of its sub-committees. At official level, it was the 
responsibility of the ministry directly involved. In both cases, it was a matter of 
‘coordination through consultation’, not arbitrating powers in accordance with a 
‘top down* model. The stress on the equality of ministers and departments was 
still further enhanced by the fact that governments are coalitions. The ministers 
involved in a single matter were often not from the same political party. For 
Dutch foreign policy, this situation meant that while primacy for coordinating 
foreign policy lay with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, foreign policy was not its 
exclusive fief. Other departments had a technical and policy contribution of their 
own to make, and possessed considerable policy instruments in the sphere of 
foreign policy, going as far as having their own representation abroad.557 Hence 
the important role of the ministries of Economic Affairs and Agriculture, as well 
as the Finance Ministry, in formulating European policy during the decades 
covered by this book.
The interministerial division of tasks in the sphere of external economic 
relations went through radical changes in the period from 1945 to 1965. During 
the first years after the Second World War, this area primarily involved trade 
policy, specifically the conclusion of bilateral trade and payments agreements. 
This technical area did not interest the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs much558, nor 
did it have the requisite in-house economic know-how. On the basis of Cabinet 
agreements in 1946 and 1950, powers in this area, including those for 
interdepartmental coordination, were centred in the Directorate-General for 
External Economic Relations (BEB)559, falling under the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. This went together with a reorganisation of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, which after 1950, adopted a regional structure in the place of its previous
557. Jan M.M. van den Bos, Dutch EC Policy Making. A Model-Guided Approach to 
Coordination and Negotiation (Amsterdam 1991) 67; Joris J.C. Voorhoeve, Peace, Profits 
and Principles. A Study o f Dutch Foreign Policy, (Leiden 1985) 75-76.
558. The attitude at the Foreign Ministry at the time was summarized in the terse formulation of 
Minister Van Kleffens (1939-1947): ‘A diplomat does not discuss cheese'.
559. BAB stands for: Dircctoraat-Generaal voor de Buitenlands-Economische Betrckkingen.
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functional one. This created a distinction between foreign policy and external 
economic policy that was to lead to great problems later on.560
The BEB grew into a weighty agency. It did not confine itself to bilateral 
trade questions, but also played the major part in the negotiations on Benelux and 
the ECSC, and, to a considerable extent, determined Dutch policy towards these 
organisations. Alongside the BEB, however, a separate government commissioner 
for the European Recovery Programme was appointed in 1948, charged with 
Dutch policy in relation to the Marshall Plan. However, this government 
commissioner, Dr. Hirschfeld, did not fall under any ministry, but took his 
instructions directly from the Ministerraad. He and his office were responsible for 
determining Dutch policy in the OEEC. Partly in consequence of the great 
importance of Marshall dollars to the Dutch economy and politics, the Hirschfeld 
working group secured official control over the most important aspect of external 
economic policy. When Hirschfeld resigned in 1952, his working-group was taken 
over as a separate Directorate-General for the Economic and Military Aid 
Programme (DGEM) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This not only brought a 
new functional element into the now regional structure of the department; the 
arrival of DGEM also meant a considerable influx of financial and economic 
knowledge. Finally, the changeover meant that powers for coordination and the 
bulk of policy formation on OEEC affairs now lay with the Foreign Ministry and 
not with the BEB. This last aspect led to a competence dispute between the 
Economics Ministry (BEB) and Foreign Ministry (DGEM), which was to 
continue until the 1970s.561
DGEM’s position was strengthened still further within its own department by 
Minister Beyen’s explicit economic orientation in European integration policy. 
DGEM supplied the financial and economic expertise to carry through the Beyen 
Plan. DGEM Director Van der Beugel was, in 1954, also appointed Financial and 
Economic Advisor to the minister. In interdepartmental relations, DGEM was able 
to dominate because of the decisive stamp Beyen himself put on Dutch European 
policy through his initiatives. One consequence of this was that coordinating 
powers for the Dutch contribution to the EEC negotiations also fell to the Foreign 
Ministry (DGEM). In the process o f these negotiations Beyen successfully sought
560. C.B. Weis, ‘The Foreign Policy Institutions in the Dutch Republic and the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands 1579 to 1980*, in: Zara Steiner (ed.). The Tunes Survey o f Foreign Ministries o f  
the World, (London 1982) 363-388.
561. E,H. van der Beugel, Nederland in de Westelijke samenwerking. Enkele aspecten van de 
Nederlandse beleidsvorming (Leiden 1966) 17-24.
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to confine consultation for coordination purposes in the Cabinet, and thereby the 
contribution of Prime Minister Drees, to a minimum, interdepartmental 
consultation at the official level took on great importance. For this, an 
‘Interdepartmental Consultative Committee on European Integration’ was set up, 
chaired by Beyen himself. A score of officials from all the ministries directly or 
indirectly involved sat on it, and Beyen feared that such a large body could not 
achieve effective policy formation and would produce an obstructive effect. It was 
arguably for these reasons that Drees had urged that it be set up. Beyen coped 
with this problem by having actual policy coordination carried out in a small 
informal group of six or seven officials led by Van der Beugel, convoking the big 
Beyen Committee infrequently and thereby circumventing it with a fa it accompli 
policy.562 This approach succeeded, though it could not prevent interdepartmental 
discord emerging, sometimes painfully, from the Dutch delegations in Brussels.
The significant and growing influence which the Foreign Ministry and the 
DGEM thus managed to secure, in the area of European economic integration, 
was not well perceived by the BEB and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. They 
had willy-nilly agreed to the Foreign Ministry’s coordinating powers for the 
duration of the negotiations. But as soon as the EEC and Euratom Treaties had 
come into effect, primacy for both substantive policy implementation and 
coordination would have to be assigned to the Economics Ministry, as was the 
case for Benelux and the ECSC.
On the other hand there was not the slightest willingness in the Foreign 
Ministry to give up the position it had recently secured. In the meantime, in 
October 1956, the fourth Drees Cabinet had taken office, with Joseph Luns as 
successor to Beyen at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a position he was to retain 
until 1971. Alongside him, in January 1957, Van der Beugel was appointed 
Secretary of State responsible for European Integration in the same department. 
Under his supervision, a new reorganisation was carried out, with the object of 
improving their own apparatus so as to be able to head off the expected challenge 
from the Economics Ministry. For this, the DGEM was restructured as a sort of 
‘super-directorate-general’ concentrating all the department’s tasks in the area of 
European Cooperation and Integration: policy towards the OEEC, the EEC, 
Euratom, the Council of Europe, the policy aspects of Benelux and the ECSC that 
did not fall to the Economics Ministry, and the talks on the OEEC free-trade area
562. Marces Ermers/John Kragt, ‘Tussen tradities en tractatcn. Minister Beyen en de Europese 
. integratie 1952-1956' (unpublished thesis, KU Nijmegen 1988), 145-147.
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that had just begun. Zijlstra, Minister for Economic Affairs, had already firmly 
protested against the assigning of policy coordination on the last point to the 
Foreign Ministry by the Council of Ministers. For him the transformation of the 
DGEM and its renaming as Directorate-General for European Cooperation 
(DGES) was impossible to swallow. It prejudiced the future division of tasks 
between the two ministries most concerned, he argued. Tempers ran high, leading 
even to an (unusual) vote in the Council of Ministers, which was carried by the 
Foreign Ministry.
Zijlstra, however, stood firm and insisted that coordination powers for EEC 
policy should be assigned to the BEB. He was fully supported by his political 
backers, the protestant Anti-Revolutionary Party, so that a Cabinet crisis 
threatened. In July 1958, a difficult compromise was finally reached: policy 
coordination and the new interdepartmental ‘Coordinating Committee for 
European Integration and the Free-Trade Area’ (CoCo) were to fall under the 
Foreign Ministry, but the Chairmanship of the Coordinating Committee was to be 
held by the Minister for Economic Affairs.563 As the capstone of this edifice, the 
Permanent Representation in Brussels that had by now been set up was to act as a 
connecting link between the Committee and The Hague administration. Former 
delegation head Linthorst Homan was appointed Dutch Permanent Representative 
at the EEC and Euratom.
The set-up for decision-making on Dutch EEC policy, structured in this way, 
did not result in effective policy formation during the period from 1958 to 1965. 
A first reason for this was the shortage of personnel in the policy-forming bodies 
and agencies. It is not clear whether the workload on the national administration 
as a consequence of the Community’s beginning operations was underestimated 
from the outset, or whether, as The Hague documents suggest, it was more a 
matter of unforeseeable, unbridled expansion in Commission initiatives. In 1959 
DGES Director Van Ittersum was already sounding the alarm bell: the most 
pressing problem presented by the Community was the steadily increasing flow of 
European policy questions that poured from Brussels on to the desks of the 
national administrations. The overloading had reached such proportions that 
intervention was now necessary for physical reasons alone. Blame for this lay,
563. Anthony M. van der Togt, ‘Het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken in een veranderende 
wereld. Organisatorische aspecten van de vorming van het buitenlands beleid 1945-1974’ 
(unpublished thesis, KU Nijmegen 1984), 62-72. After the end o f the negotiations on the 
Free Trade Area, the CoCo was renamed ‘Coordinating Commission for European 
Integration and Association Questions’. The abbreviation remained the same.
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according to Van Ittersum, with the Commission, which ‘is dragged into this 
dervish dance by its far too big apparatus o f officials’. He showed special concern 
at the signs of physical and mental overstrain at the Permanent Representation in 
Brussels. The Commission ought to be slowed down by having it draw up, 
together with the permanent representatives, a scheme of priorities and a 
timetable.564 When the matter was discussed in Cabinet, too, the problems were 
attributed primarily to the Commission; according to Minister Zijlstra, it ought to 
confine itself to the task laid down in the Treaties of Rome instead of setting 
about undertaking all sorts of independent activity. The members of the Assembly, 
too, it was further suggested, should take a stance against the overload, and call 
for a timetable. Minister Luns did not wish to expand the Permanent 
Representation’s staff, though he did bring the timetabling suggestion up at the 
Council of Ministers of the Community.565 The staffing and overload problem was 
gradually brought under control. Thus, Permanent Representation staff in Brussels 
grew, despite Luns’s intentions, from 11 to 19 policy officers between 1960 and 
1964.5“
Of much greater importance was the failure of the coordination mechanism to 
work, or work adequately. The first pointer in this direction came in October 1959 
from Linthorst Homan. Seriously concerned, he reported to Luns about the lack of 
communication between the Permanent Representatives and the officials of The 
Hague ministries taking part in EEC working groups. In only a fraction of cases 
did it seem that the latter had made prior contact with the Dutch mission before 
Brussels meetings, and subsequent reporting on the outcome of meetings was 
insufficient, or reached the Permanent Representation too late. He was thus unable 
to form an overall picture o f what was being discussed, therefore hampering his 
work. Moreover, it was painful to have to hear from another Permanent 
Representative or from an official that, say, in Working Group X the Dutch 
position Y had been worded very differently, or even completely abandoned.567 
DGES Director Van Ittersum also pointed in this connection to the great number
564. Min. BZ, DGES, 1955-1964, 996.0, EEG, algemeen deel I: Van Ittersum to Luns, 
16.11.1959.
565. NA, MR (410) Notulen Ministerraad, 20.11.1959.
566. Min. BZ, DGES, 1955-1964, 130.1: Luns to Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken, 2.2.1961; 
Gids van het Departement van Buitenlandse Zaken en de Buitenlandse Dienst 1960 (’s 
Gravenhagc 1960)235;
Gids van het Departement van Buitenlandse Zaken en de Buitenlandse Dienst 196, ('s 
Gravenhage 1964) 316.
567. Min. BZ, DGES, 996.0, EEG, 1955-64, no. 31 Linthorst Homan to Luns. 31.10.1959.
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of EEC Working Groups made up of national experts and Community officials, 
which ‘is becoming so enormously large that there can no longer be any control at 
all over the instructions the national experts receive and how they carry out these 
instructions’. With such ‘uncoordination’, no solid policy formation could be 
expected.568
The coordination problem proved to be structural in nature. A 1963 study o f 
bottlenecks stressed the fragmented nature of Dutch policy, the inadequate contact 
between the CoCo and negotiators in Brussels, and the poor functioning of CoCo 
in general.569 That the quality of policies being processed suffered from this lack 
of coordination is obvious. The study mentioned points out that policy 
fragmentation made it harder to arrive at an overall strategy -  when one set o f 
decisions did not completely contradict the other. Thus, again in 1963, after the 
negotiations in the EEC Council of Ministers on agricultural regulations, it was 
found by the Cabinet that such small account had been taken from The Hague’s 
standpoint because of the manifest internal division of the Dutch delegation.570 
And Linthorst Homan, looking back in his memoirs at his time in Brussels, points 
to the tactical consequences of the lack of mutual synchronisation and sifting of 
the departmental contributions: since a superfluity of subordinate points were 
brought up, the really important aspects of the Dutch argument were no longer 
meeting with a hearing from the partner countries.571
One important cause of the coordination problem was the continuing 
competency conflict between the two ministries most concerned, Foreign Affairs 
and Economic Affairs. The Luns-Zijlstra compromise of July 1958 had not really 
solved the competency question, because both parties continued to stick to their 
initial positions. While the Economics Ministry sought to use its CoCo 
chairmanship to secure a tighter grip for the BEB on coordination, the Foreign 
Ministry defended its primacy with conviction, seeking in turn to draw to itself 
Benelux and ECSC matters that fell under Economic Affairs. That practical 
cooperation in CoCo, and therefore policy coordination, was not best served by 
this dispute is not hard to guess.
Various solutions to the problem were proposed and tried out. Thus, when the 
Marijnen government took office in 1963, a special sub-committee of the Council
568. Min, BZ, DOES, 996.0, EEG, 1955-1964, algemeen deel I: Van Ittersum to Luns, 
16.11.1959.
569. Van der Togt, op. cit., 76.
570. NA. MR (758) Notulen Ministerraad 22.12.1963.
571. Linthorst Iloman, op. cit., 241.
271
of Ministers, the Council for European Affairs (REZ) was set up in order to 
consolidate the Council of Ministers’ hold over the decision-making process. The 
Foreign Ministry pressed for the appointment of a new Secretary of State for 
European Affairs (Van der Beugel’s portfolio had been abolished after the fall of 
the Fourth Drees Cabinet in December 1958) to deal chiefly with policy 
coordination. In 1963 this appointment was made, but the competency conflict 
between the two ministries was only made the fiercer. The harmful effects of this 
internecine strife were not confined to the ‘unavoidable consequence that the size 
of Dutch delegations to international talks is only occasionally exceeded by a 
phalanx of briefcase-toting Italian ambassadors’572. W hat Van der Beugel found 
still more important was that the policy-makers had to spend a disproportionate 
amount of time solving, or in most cases not solving, competency disputes, 
thereby making both the unity of policy and the strategic space for the policy 
suffer. A real solution to the competency question was not found until 1972. The 
dispute was decided in favour of the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs.573
572. Van der Beugel, Nederland in de Westelijke samenwerking, 23-24.
573. Ibidem.
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